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INTRODUCTION
A Millennium of Islam in West Africa
Daniel F. McCall
The dozen studies which follow cover a thousand years, though
the bulk of the discussion bears upon the nineteenth-century Central
Sudan, with major concentration on the jihad, commerce, military
sociology, and slavery. The studies are treated through a combination
of perspectives provided by the concepts and approaches developed by
history and anthropology, and various related social sciences. This
makes the studies neither more nor less historical or sociological;
both these disciplines strive to explain changes and developments in
society, though social scientists are usually less interested than
historians in describing the events through which changes have come
about. The contributors here have sought to fuse the materials from
different disciplines, and to a large extent they have succeeded.
Africanists by and large now recognize the necessity for this
interdisciplinary approach. The fusion of perspectives does not
come, however, by a mere mechanical juxtaposition of data obtained on
the one hand from written documents and on the other from observations
and interviews of fieldwork. It is fine to recognize, as does I. M.
Lewis, that, "Of course, history, where it is known or discernible,
cannot be ignored — to do so would be to limit the scope and depth
of social analysis";^ but it is not enough. The history must be
sought where it is not known and not yet even discerned, and much
recent fieldwork as well as archival research has begun to reveal
history of areas and events that had, often, receded from the public
view. History is not sought in order to give "purely historical ex-
planations for events in terms of their antecedents . "2 This is an
outdated, erroneous, and pejorative opinion formerly held by many
social scientists unacquainted with the nature of the discipline of
history, and it is surprising to find it still being expressed in some
quarters. Modern historians, like social scientists, explain events
in terms of a "systematic analysis of the manner in which institutions
are interrelated and mutually sustaining in a given social setting";
3
in fact history as well as anthropology can legitimately claim, on the
basis of its scope, to be within both the humanities and the social
sciences.
In recent years a number of volumes on Islam in Africa have
been published. To note only some of the outstanding titles in Eng-
lish, there are J. S. TrimingharrUs Islam in West Africa (London, 1959)
1. I. M. Lewis, ed.
,
Islam in Tropical Africa (Oxford, 1966), 3.
2. Ibid .
3. Ibid . Here, I have turned the author T s phrase back upon him.
v
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and A History of Islam in West Africa (London, 1962) and two surveys
of the continent south of the Sahara, Islam in Tropical Africa
, edited
by I. M. Lewis (Oxford, 1966) and Islam in Africa edited by J. Krit-
zeck and W. Lewis (New York, 1969) . In addition, a number of local or
regional histories within Islamic areas have appeared, as, for ex-
ample, Murray Last T s The Sokoto Caliphate (London, 1967) and J. A.
Braimah and J. R. Goody T s Salaga: The Struggle for Power (London,
1967) . The ready availability of these works now renders redundant
any lengthy introduction ranging over substantive topics and problems.
But only a few years ago the situation was quite different, so that
I. M. Lewis felt constrained to devote ninety-one pages to a review of
the regional distribution of Islam and the discussion of agents of
Islamization and of tribal politics, law and customary practice,
traditional belief and ritual in African Islamic societies, and the
conditions of the modern world. His explanation of the initial ac-
ceptance of Islam in West Africa as the consequence of the Almoravid
movement^ -- even in areas where it never penetrated — would seem to
fall back on antecedent events rather than the analysis of the inter-
related institutions of the societies of the Sudan, a problem which
the first two essays in this volume at least begin to attack. None-
theless, Lewis T scholarly but readable essay is extensive in scope and
succinct in statement, as well as balanced, detached, and emphatic,
and any reader who misses a longer introduction here is recommended to
turn to Lewis T .
Still, one observation on the nineteenth century seems to be
called for here. This period was influenced by the series of move-
ments called jihad, which were not typical of the earlier or later
periods
,
although a misapprehension of the nature of events surround-
ing the Almoravids and the actions of Askia Mohammad seem, to some, to
make "holy wars" endemic. Jihad, in Arabic, does not mean "holy war,"
but rather "striving" or "effort." The object of the j ihad was to
establish the Islamic moral order in society, but not necessarily by
force of arms. Indeed, among their injunctions placed on believers,
none of the four major legal schools imposed j ihad as one of the
"pillars of faith.
The emergence of military-moral movements in Africa, from the
eighteenth-century Futa Jalon to the late nineteenth-century Nilotic
Sudan, cannot be seen in isolation from the "neo-Sufism" of the wider
Islamic world, for these African j ihad and/or Mahdist movements are
local versions of a type of reform which occurred in Turkestan, India,
and Indonesia as well as in Arabia. 6 "Wahhabism" in Arabia did not
inspire the African movements, as M. Hiskett showed,'7 but it was an
analogous phenomenon, sparked by the same forces. These movements
sought social reform as well as a purification of the faith. The
common elements in the world conditions of the time were the decline
of Muslim states and the increasingly unfavorable trade relations
between Dar-el-Islam and the rest of the world, which was coming more
4. Ibid., 16.
5. See Fazlur Rahman, Islam (New York, 1968)
,
34.
6. Ibid.
,
240-260.
7. Mervyn Hiskett, "Northern Nigeria," in J. Kritzeck and W. Lewis,
eds., Islam in Africa (New York, 1969), 287-300.
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and more under the dominance of Western commerce. 8 These political
and economic stresses caused intelligent men in Islamic societies to
examine the institutions of their society and judge them in the light
of their traditional values.
9
Disturbances in the interior of Africa
were more linked to the wider world than has generally been recog-
nized. But we ought not to be surprised, for Mungo park reported
nearly two centuries ago that the "trading Moors" conspired against
his progress as they were all convinced that he was spying. 10 Pro-
bably they feared that European traders would try to displace them,
as they knew had transpired in some other Muslim areas.
8. Compare with the characterization of the nineteenth century in
the introduction to N. R. Bennett, ed.
,
Leadership in Eastern
Africa. Six Political Biographies (Boston, 1968)
.
9. The fiscal system and the system of social stratification quickly,
came under attack. See D. F. McCall, "Muslims and Non-Muslims in
West African States in the Nineteenth Century," in a volume
edited by B. Obichere being prepared for publication.
10.
Mungo Park, Travels in the Interior of Africa (Edinburgh, 1860)
,
299—295; see also 203, 112.
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The four maps provided in this volume are intended only to
give the location of places mentioned throughout the text and are
given without regard to chronology.
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sPART I
THE EARLY CENTURIES

CHAPTER 1
ISLAMIZATION OF THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL SUDAN
IN THE ELEVENTH CENTURY
Daniel F. McCall
The history of Islam in Northern and Western Africa is a single
continuum. In this paper we are concerned only with these parts of
the continent. Islam in East Africa articulates more with the move-
ments in the Indian Ocean region than with other parts of Africa.
Islam moved into northern and western Africa in a series of
spasmodic thrusts. There have been four such pulsations to date.
Each was completed in less than a century. The first was in the
seventh century A.D. ; the second in the eleventh; the third in the
late eighteenth to early nineteenth; and the fourth in the first six
decades of the twentieth century.
Two of these periods have been essentially military: the con-
quests of the seventh and the j ihads of the eighteenth-nineteenth
centuries. The other two were principally periods of peaceful prose-
lytization -- the twentieth century, under European colonial rule,
completely so, and the eleventh century, despite the spectacular case
of the Almoravids (which dominates the literature) was for the major-
ity of the cases a time of peaceful conversion.
The seventh century spread was restricted to the Maghrib and
was part of the original expansion of Islam beyond the Arabian penin-
sula. In the eleventh century the rulers and merchants of the more
important states in the Western and Central Sudan adopted, at least
nominally, the religion introduced from the north via the trans-
Saharan trade routes. The mass of the people in these states seem
to have persisted in their old beliefs and behavior. This is indi-
cated, for example, in the persistence, contrary to the principles
of Islam, of the ritual-related plastic arts.
The jihad movements of the eighteenth-nineteenth centuries re-
sulted in some extension of Islam to previously non-Muslim peoples
,
but it was more effective in bringing about the increasing involvement
of the ordinary classes of people in the religion of the ruling and
commercial classes.
Vertical as well as horizontal reinforcement of Islam was
facilitated by the increase of literacy and the ease and safety of
travel under colonial rule (even when the European administrators were
hostile to the religion as was frequently the case in the former
A.O.F .)
A
1. Some observers predict a post-independence expansion of Islam
which will sweep the continent. The premise is that Islam
1
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The first steps in the advancement of Islam into Africa were
very rapid. 2 From 641 to 717 A.D. conquest of the Maghrib and Iberia
was accomplished, but the area to the south of the desert which bor-
dered the Jezerat al-Maghrib was to wait three more centuries, from
the eighth to the eleventh, before there would be noticeable penetra-
tion of Islam. In this paper we will be concerned with the conditions
which determined the delay and the change of conditions which later
furthered the diffusion of Islamic religion and culture.
is handicapped because it is viewed as having been allied with
colonialism; with the latter out of the way, the former will soon
be crowded out. Tribal religions are ignored and considered to
lack the resources to survive in modern society. Thus far, how-
ever, neither Christianity nor tribal religions have faced any new
obstacles and Islam has not increased its rate of expansion. Pol-
itics in the modern world are not necessarily associated with
religion and if they become so in some situations there is no cer-
tainty that the effect would be continent-wide; rather the chances
are against it -- despite whatever pan-Africanist sentiments may
be involved.
2. The fall of Alexandria in 641 A.D. was the prelude to the Arab
occupation of Egypt, which was soon accomplished. A raid into the
Byzantine province of Africa in 647 against the Patrician Gregory,
who had revolted against Constantinople, destroyed the army of
this would-be emperor; the Arabs did not stay in the west this
time, but returned to Egypt. They went back again to raid in 654,
but it was not until 670 that a large force from Egypt built Kair-
wan as a fortified and permanent settlement. In 681 Oqba appeared
with his army at Tangier, but he had over-extended his forces and
found himself faced by a Berber-Byzantine combination. His forces
were attacked even in Kairwan, which was taken in 683, but despite
the defeat and death of Oqba, the Arab city was retaken by Zohair
ibn Quais. It was not secure until the Byzantine African capital,
Carthage, was captured in 695.
The Arabs pushed west again, reaching the Atlantic under the
leadership of Musa ibn Nosair in 704. The consolidation of this
territory was the ambition and despair of many rulers ; there were
rebellions and heresies, yet the Islamic thrust had enough energy
in 711 for the invasion of Spain, which had already been raided in
675. By 717, the whole Iberian peninsula was under Muslim rule,
and in 720 Narbonne was taken and held till 759. The conquests be-
yond the Pyrenees could not be held, and after the defeat of Abd-
er-Rahman near Poitiers in 732, the Muslims found the Frankish
forces too much for them.
In emphasizing the rapidity of the Arab conquest of North Af-
rica, a comparison is made to the rate of progress of other invad-
ers
,
of whom only the Romans matched the Arabs in mastering all of
North Africa, but the Roman expansion was much slower. The empha-
sis on rapidity, which was characteristic of the Arab advance
everywhere, does not contradict G. Marqais’ point in La Berberie
Musulman et 1 T Orient au Moyen Age (page 27) that the conquest of
North Africa was for Islam the most laborious of any. Marqais is
comparing the progress of the Arabs in the Middle East and in
North Africa; we are comparing the conquest of North Africa by
its various conquerers
.
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Why was there such a long delay? Was the Sahara an effective
barrier? Were the energies of the original thrust exhausted? Were
the Muslims not interested in the south? Perhaps the answer is yes to
each of these -- at least to some extent. Certainly the Arabs knew
how to survive in the desert. They were better equipped in this re-
spect than any of the previous rulers of the southern Mediterranean
littoral, but, having swarmed out of one desert, they were perhaps not
anxious to swarm back into another -- the green lands proved more at-
tractive. Some tentatives
,
it is true, were attempted across the des-
ert, but the forces were inadequate and the attempts were not contin-
ued. ^ The Sahara was occupied by tribes which were equally adapted to
those hardy conditions and who had good fighting men; furthermore,
the local tribes knew the location of the water points which the in-
vaders would have to discover if, rather than merely raiding, they
were to remain.
Also, it is clear that serious rifts in the body politic of the
new Islamic state appeared before the Maghrib could be considered rea-
sonably subdued. Yet this did not prevent them from continuing to em-
bark on campaigns against Iberians and Franks.
The incoming Arabs immediately learned what many local North
Africans had long known: that there was gold in the Sudan; the at-
tempts to penetrate militarily to that land were in part at least a
response to this attraction. However, the gold was coming north in
any case, to Sijilmassa and to Wargla, and so they could be content,
for the moment while their forces were so widely extended, to control
the northern termini of the trade routes.
But more important than these, factors were the pre-existing
political systems. The Byzantine Roman Empire and the Sassanian Per-
sian Empire had their war-torn boundary just to the north of Arabia.
The Arabs were neighbors of both, traded with both, and sometimes
raided and were raided by both. The Arabs were particularly well
placed to assess the strength or weakness of each of the contending
empires. When it became obvious that these empires had fought each
other until both were weakened and rent by internal dissensions, the
Arabs burst in from the south and took the fruits of victory in most
of the extent of the two empires
,
and nowhere did they go beyond the
former Roman or Persian authority or sphere of influence. This was an
enormous area and population to digest, and the Muslims were not pre-
pared for civil administration, which they left in the hands of the
cadre of administrators of the preceding governments. Thus the old
frontiers tended to be perpetuated.
It was easy to become involved in a political contest, such as
that of Count Julian of Ceuta and the Visigoth King Roderic
,
for ex-
ample, because they were part of the old state system, but the states
3. In 736 A. D. See J. S. Trimingham, A History of Islam in West
Africa (London, 1962)
, 44, n. 5.
4. The earliest extant reference to Ghana, that of al-Fazari in the
eighth century, dubs it "the land of gold." This is evidence that
it was not Arabs who pioneered the trans -Saharan trade; it was in
existence when they arrived. Some economic historians of the
ancient Mediterranean lands, such as Rostotzeff, conclude that
trade existed though the evidence is meager; others, e.g. Warming-
ton, tend to discount it. I have argued in favor of the first po-
sition in "The Traditions of the Founding of Sijilmassa and Ghana,"
Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana , V, 1 (1961) , 3-32.
4 DANIEL F. MCCALL
to the south of the Sahara had been merely distant trading connections
and not political allies or enemies
.
When Islam does finally establish itself to the south of the
desert, there is again a rapid advancement along a broad front. From
west to east, Tekrur before the third decade, the Lemtuna and Godala
of Mauritania in the next decade, Malel (the precursor of Sundiata T s
Mali?) about mid-century, Ghana in 1076, the Songhai on the Middle
Niger River in 1009-1010, and Bornu around Lake Chad between 1085 and
1097 were all brought within the fold of Islam. 5 These peoples con-
stitute the major part of the Muslim peoples of the Sudan in the fol-
lowing centuries. Only the Hausa in the fourteenth century make an
important addition to this list of conversions. The conversion of
Jenn£ a century before the Hausa did not affect such a sizeable popu-
lation.
It seems to me a peculiar and notable thing that every impor-
tant state of the time in the Sudan from the Atlantic to Lake Chad was
Islamized in the eleventh century and then, aside from some minor
"seepage” or diffusion from these states, there is virtually no fur-
ther success for this prosyletizing religion until the latter part of
the eighteenth century. ^ (Hausa states were weak and poor in the
eleventh century, probably under the shadow of Bornu, and not yet par-
ticipating directly in the caravan trade to the north.)
5. All of these dates are open to question. Al-Muhallabi (A.D. 985)
,
quoted by Yaqut, says of the Songhai kingdom, "Their king makes a
profession of Islam before his subjects, and most of them follow
his example." On the other extreme, Mahmud al-Kati states that
"The Islamization of the people of Gao took place between 471 and
475 (1078 and 1082)" (Tarikh al-Fattash, p. 333). The date A.H.
400/1009-10 comes from As-Sa T di (Tarikh as-Sudan, p. 3) . The
total difference is three years less than a century, but the dif-
ference between al-Muhallabi and As-Sa T di is only fourteen years.
The former does not mention the name of the king and there is no
way of knowing whether this was Kossoi and that, therefore, the
discrepancy is one of calculation of dates, or whether the refer-
ence to the earlier date might be to a predecessor of Kossoi.
Dates are so troublesome in this literature
,
one might choose this
as the more likely explanation, but as conversion is not likely to
come without some preparation, the idea of a predecessor making a
"profession" in a partial fashion is believable. There appears to
have been a gradual progression in Kanem, cf. the mahram of Umme
Jilma, Sir Richard Palmer, The Bornu Sahara and Sudan , 14-15.
The latest date, that of Kati, must be doubted because it is later
than al-Bakri (1067)
,
who mentions the gifts of the seal, sword,
and Koran from the Amir al-Musulmi. As-Sa T di, therefore, seems to
be more consistent with our other information. However, the pre-
cision of dates is not important here, and the validity of each
will not be examined. No matter which date is accepted for a par-
ticular state, the situation remains the same: every important
state in the Western and Central Sudan adopted Islam in a period
which extended over approximately a century.
6. None of the histories of the region or the general histories of
Africa explicitly emphasize the importance of the eleventh century
in this respect. It is deductable from the information given, but
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This episodic pattern of expansion seems to call for some dis-
cussion. It is possible but not likely that there was no connection
between the various conversions in the eleventh century series. Two,
or even three, conversions at the same period might be accepted as a
coincidence, but five conversions (not counting Ghana 1 s, which was by
force) in such short order in more or less contiguous areas does not
seem like coincidence, especially when this was followed by a lapse
of time with little prosyletization — or at least with little re-
sults .
One might be tempted to suspect that behind the apparent regu-
larity of the four movements of advance interspersed by periods of
quiescence there was some general social process, or even "law” such
as social scientists continually hope to find. This does not appear
to be the case as each of the advances seems to be powered by dif-
ferent forces. Yet we can learn a good deal about "society" as well
as "history" by studying the eleventh-century social change and re-
ligious conversion in Sudan; but since Islam came in this instance
from the north, we will briefly look at the circumstances of the prior
Islamization of the Maghrib.
The first thing to examine is the nature of the force that car-
ried the Arabs to victory. It may seem an unnecessary statement of
the obvious to say that it was the force of religion, but if we ex-
amine the following statements by Henri Pirenne, we will see exactly
what that meant in this military context.
When Mohammad died in 632, there was as yet no sign of the
peril which was to manifest itself, in so overwhelming a
fashion a few years later. No measures had been taken [by
Constantinople] to defend the frontier. It is evident that
whereas the Germanic menace had always attracted the attention
of the Emperors, the Arab onslaught took them by surprise.
^
disguised by the organization of the narrative which is usually
to deal seriatim with the various states of the Sudan for periods
encompassing several centuries. The following histories were
checked to compare their treatment of this topic: R. Cornevin,
Histoire des Peuples de l T Africrue (Paris, 1960); R. and M. Corne-
vin, Histoire de l TAfrique (Paris, 1964); J. D. Fage, Introduction
to the History of West Africa (Cambridge, 1962); L. C. D. Joos
,
Br&ve Histoire de l T Afrique noire (Paris, 1964); D. T. Niane and
J. Surat-Canale
,
Histoire de l T Afrique Occidentale (Conakry,
1960); R. Oliver and J. D. Fage, A Short History of Africa
(Baltimore, 1962) ; R. Rotberg, A Political History of Tropi-
cal Africa (New York, 1965) ; Trimingham, History of Islam ;
D. L. Wiedner, A History of Africa South of the Sahara (New
York, 1964). Joos (page 25) comes close to making the point
when he wrote: "Dfes le milieu du XIe sifecle, l TAfrique
semble avoir ddpassd le crise politique et religieuse qui marque
le fin du Xe et la premiere moitid du XI e sidcle." But he does
not discuss the "political and religious crises." Rather, having
used this as a point of departure goes on to consider later
periods. There are a few other statements of other authors which
indicate that they may have an implicit knowledge of this point,
but no one makes a clear statement that there is anything more
than coincidence in the clustering of dates of conversion of the
various states.
7. H. Pirenne, Mohammad and Charlemagne (New York, 1957), 148.
6 DANIEL F. MCCALL
He then describes the "overwhelming onslaught" in Asia and North Af-
rica, concluding with these words.
All this may doubtless be explained by the fact that the in-
vasion was unexpected, by the disorder of the Byzantine armies,
disorganized and surprised by a new method of fighting, by the
religious and national discontent of the Monophysites and
Nestorians of Syria, to whom the Empire had refused any con-
cessions, and of the Coptic Church in Egypt, and by the weak-
ness of the Persians. But all of these reasons are insuffi-
cient to explain so complete a triumph. The intensity of the
results were out of all proportion to the numerical strength
of the conquerors^ [underlining mine].
Pirenne then contrasts the Germanic invasions with those of the
Arabs
,
in which the former peoples were absorbed into Roman civiliza-
tion and the latter preserved their distinctiveness. There is only
one explanation, he asserts, and "it is of a moral order. "9
Put succinctly then, until Mohammad provided a single and ulti-
mate authority that could override the "confused conflicts of the
tribes, "10 the peoples of the Arabian peninsula, whether of the desert
or of the towns, remained divided and weak; but, united in submission
to Allah, they not only had the strength of their combined numbers but
a psychological unity and the strength of conviction which could carry
them to extraordinary feats of exertion and endurance.
This fine fighting organization had to have a goal. Of course,
this was to impose Islam on the peoples of the world, but it is ob-
vious that the peoples of the "two Empires which marched with Arabia,
the Roman and the Persian," received the first attention. If religion
was responsible for the unification of the Arabs
,
economics was much
more important in the selection of their military objectives. The
Arabs were long familiar with commerce. Mecca itself was a caravan
stop
,
and Mohammad had been a camel driver in the trade caravans as
had many of his followers, or they had guarded or raided them. The
Arabs had lived for centuries as poor neighbors of the rich empires
to the north. Booty, more than proselytization, drew the Arabs out of
the desert. As George Marqais has suggested:
Reading the chronicles leaves us with the impression that the
hope for temporal goods prevailed, for most of them [the con-
quering Arabs], over the desire to die in combat for the Faith
and to be revived before God "with their sabers on their
shoulders . "12
So it is not surprising that the Muslims in North Africa were
at first more oriented toward the Mediterranean to the north than
8. Ibid
. ,
150.
9. Ibid .
10. Ibid., 148.
11. Ibid . But the impact was felt beyond the Arab conquests: Charle-
magne^ empire was the principal result, as Pirenne saw it, but
J. Br/^nsted in The Vikings (Hammondsworth
,
1960)
, Ch. 1, sees
the Viking raids as a further consequence.
12. Georges Marqais
,
La Berberie Musulman et 1 T Orient au Moyen Age
(Paris, 1956), 22. In this and all the subsequent French works
the translations are my own.
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toward the desert to the south. Iberia, Sicily, Sardinia, Italy,
southern France, and the Aegean, all of which they attacked, were
within the limes of the Empire; the desert to the south was not.
Once there, they had to try to hold North Africa; the Arab land army
had to develop a supporting maritime force to prevent Byzantine rein-
forcements. The people of North Africa were already in close inter-
relationship with those of Europe, and the political contests invited
Muslim intervention. Furthermore, the small Arab forces, soon rein-
forced by converted Berbers who had lived within the Empire
,
naturally
took over their regional orientation. Thus the Arab attraction to the
Empire was reinforced by the North African experience. The conquest
of the Maghrib may be characterized, then, in a not too oversimplified
fashion, as a systematic quest for booty by a force of piratical no-
mads who were unified by the disciplinary force of religion.
The winning of the Sudan to Islam has two faces — one is that
of the earlier type -- the Almoravids; and the other is the prosyleti-
zation by traders. The first face is reasonably well known; it is re-
counted in one fashion or another in all histories of West Africa
which cover that period. And this conquest of Ghana by the Almora-
vids is one of the best known facts of African history. One historian
has even suggested that 1076 for the Western Sudan has the order of
significance that 1066 has for England. The great attention given to
this story and the relative neglect usually accorded the less spec-
tacular and less detailed stories of the Islamization of other Sudan-
ese states, I feel, distorts our picture of the period. The Almora-
vid history is a parallel of the Arab conquests; the others are a new
element. Let us then first consider the Almoravids.
The Almoravids, Tekrur, Ghana, Susu, and Mali
The Berbers of the Western Sahara repeat the pattern of the
Arabs in the Arabian Desert. The Lemtuna and other Sanhaja tribes had
lived in the Sahara for some centuries, although they may not have
arrived on Ghana T s borders until after the disturbance caused by the
arrival of the Arabs in northern Africa; like the Arab tribes before
Mohammad, the Berbers were divided and weak. Generally, they were in-
effective against the states to the north -- Sijilmassa, Fez, and Ta-
hert -- and to the south -- Ghana. They were less prosperous; their
eyes looked with envy on their richer neighbors. Eventually Islam
gave them, as it had to the Arabs, the cohesion to effect the conquest
of these neighbors.
The Lemtuna Berbers had, before conversion to Islam, achieved
a momentary unity in the eighth century:
Already, at the period when the dynasty founded by the
Umayyad prince, Abd-er Rahman-ibn-Moawia-ed-Dakhell^ reigned
in Spain, they [the Lemtuna] formed a powerful nation which
obeyed hereditary kings, of whom the memory is preserved to
our own time.
I
1
*
13. Abd-er Rahman-Ibn-Moawia-ed-Dakhel established himself at Cordova
in 756 A.D.
14. Ibn Khaldun, Histoire des Berbbres
, translated by M. DeSlane
(Paris, 1835), II, 65. This is an interesting reference to oral
traditions. It is too bad that Ibn Khaldun does not inform us
how he came to knowledge of it.
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The Lemtuna unity was apparently accomplished under Urtentac.
One of his successors, Tilutan, who died in 222 (837), made some in-
cursion into the Sudan. According to Ibn-Abi-Zera, as cited by Ibn
Khaldun:
He subjected the countries of that region and forced the Blacks
to pay tribute. He marched surrounded by one hundred thousand
fighting men mounted on mehari camels. 15
Ibn-Abi-Zera^ account is supported by Al-Yaqubi T s Kitab al Buldan ,
written in the late ninth century, which says that the western cara-
van route from Sijilmassa was dominated by the Sanhadja.
It was probably at this time that the Berbers became estab-
lished at Awdoghost. If, as W. D. Cooley asserts (it is not clear on
what evidence) Audoghost had once been a capital of Ghana, 16 then the
incursions of the Lemtuna at that time must have been considerable.
However, the Berbers were unable to maintain their unity. Ibn-Abi-
Zera continues
:
His death ti.e. Tilutan T s] occurred in 222 (837). His suc-
cessor, Ilettan, died in 287 (900) ; Temim, son and successor
of the latter, reigned until the year 306 (918-9)
,
when he was
killed by the Sanhadja. Then division took place among the
Lemtuna . 1?
Who the murderer was is not precisely indicated, since the Lemtuna are
a part of the Sanhadja, but presumably he was a non-Lemtuna.
After Temim, division rent the nation and this state of affairs
lasted for one hundred twenty years. Abu-Abd-Allah, son of
Tifaout and generally known by the name Narecht, mounted the
throne then and rallied all parties. He was a man full of
virtue and religion; he made the pilgrimage to Mecca and, after
a reign of three years, he lost his life in a military expedi-
tion. His son-in-law, Yahya, son of Ibrahim-al-Guedali, then
took command. 18
15. Ibid .
16. W. D. Cooley, Negroland of the Arabs
.
2nd ed. (London, 1966)
,
6.
Cooley mistakenly has the city in Ghana T s possession until the
time of the Almoravids.
17. Cited by Ibn Khaldun, Histoire , II, 66.
18. Ibid . Alfred G. Gerteiny, in Mauritania (New York, 1967), 23-25,
places conversion about 1020 and renders the Islamic name as
TAbdallah abu Muhammad and the Berber name as Tarcina, and his
reign as 1020-1023 A.D. His successor is given as Yahya ibn
Brahim el Djodaly. The latter is, of course, identical with
"Yahya, son of Ibrahim-al-Guedali" as we have rendered it from
DeSlane T s translation of Ibn Khaldun, and the other Islamic name
is not too variant to assume a probable identity (Abu-Abd-Allah
and TAbdallah abu Muhammad)
,
but what is the source of Tarcina?
Gerteiny says this is the name given to him by informants in
Mauritania (personal communication) . Whether this comes from
essentially oral traditions or from a literary tradition inde-
pendent of Ibn Khaldun, however, is not clear. Presumably, how-
ever, Tarcina is to be assumed to be equatable with Narecht.
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Thus, from 919 to 1038 there was a period of internal divisions
for the Lemtuna, and in 1038-1039 Narecht was apparently converted,
taking the name of Abu-Abd-Allah; note that his father has a Berber
name and that he himself, even after his conversion, is still "gen-
erally known" by his Berber name. The fact that he was killed in bat-
tle three years after taking office may be coincidental, but it may
mean that he had opposition from some segments of his people to the
new religion. At any rate, by the name of his successor, it is evi-
dent that he was succeeded by a Moslem.
According to another historian, cited unnamed by Ibn Khaldun,
there was a ruler of the Lemtuna between Temim and Narecht, who suc-
ceeded in reuniting the tribes. This was Tinezwa, who
reigned over all the desert, and that in the fourth century of
the hegira, at the period when the Umayyad sovereigns, Abd-er-
Rahman-en-Nacer and, later, his son Al-Hakem-al-Mostancer
,
governed Spain, and when the Fatimid caliphs, Obeid-Allah and
his son Abu-1 T Cacem, governed in Ifrikiya. He marched at the
head of a hundred thousand warriors mounted on mehari camels.
His domain extended over a region of two months travel and as
wide. Twenty Negro kings recognized his authority and payed
him taxes. His sons ruled after him, and then the unity of
the nation was shattered so that each fraction and each tribe
had a king.
The citation of these rulers as contemporaries of Tinezwa place him in
the earlier part of the fourth century of the hejira . It is note-
worthy that Tinezwa does not have a Moslem name and is to be presumed
to be a pagan.
Thus Lemtuna power was dominant for at least two reigns — that
of Tiloutan in the ninth century and that of Tinezwa in the tenth cen-
tury — over some of the peoples of the Western Sudan and even made
inroads into the territory of Ghana, but in each case the successors
soon lost control of these conquests. These confederations were, how-
ever, preliminary to the great confederation that was to come, the
Almoravids
.
The leaders of the Almoravids are said to have come from the
same line of kings, 20 but the exact descent is obscured by the manner
in which it is reported. 21 Yahya, apparently after his marriage (at
19. Ibid . The numbers 100,000 when used for warriors, two months
travel for extent of realm, and twenty conquered kings, are pro-
bably all merely conventional figures to indicate a considerable
number.
20. Ibid.
,
65.
21. Thus Yahya-Ibn-Ibrahim, who sets in motion the events that led to
this religious movement, is said to be a Goddela. He was son-in-
law of Narecht, who succeeded after the latter T s death. Yahya is
said to have been the grandson of Telagauin, the grandson of
Urtentac, the presumable founder of the royal line. How then was
Yahya a Banu Goddalu and not a Lemtuna? He may have been the son
of Telagauin* s daughter by a Goddala and probably succeeded due
to the lack of any surviving sons of brothers of Narecht, for
otherwise these would have had precedence over him. (Even if one
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least it is related subsequently in the text)
,
made the ha j.i . This
was in 440 (104-8-1049)
,
ten years after the 120 years of disorder
specified by Ibn-Abi-Zera; so that at this time Yahya may be under-
stood to have maintained effective control of the nuclear Lemtuna
region which Narecht had established. The old conquests had, on the
other hand, been largely lost. Fage summarizes the struggle between
the Lemtuna and Ghana in the ninth and tenth centuries in this way:
"Ghana was eventually victorious, and by the end of the tenth century
it seems that Awdoghost was paying tribute to Ghana. ”22 And Triming-
ham writes that after the death of Temim, ”Gana became the dominant
power, gradually extending her rule. ”23
Yahya did not himself make any recorded incursion into the
Sudan, but he was the agency by which the nominal Islam of the desert
Berbers became intensified. He brought back from Sijilmassa a reli-
gious preceptor, Ibn-Yazin, also a Berber but not a Lemtuna.
At the death of Yahya, there were ”new dissensions,”^ tribes-
men refused to heed the instructions of Ibn Yazin, and he retired to
a ribat, or fortified retreat, with his followers. 25 These included
were to assume that these desert Berbers were then matrilineal,
as are their neighbors the Tuareg, the claim to office through a
female would only be valid if this office specifically, as well
as descent, was traditionally transmitted in this manner -- that
would be to say that Urtentac had obtained his position that way,
but he appears to have been an innovator and the office would not
therefore have existed before him. The whole discussion is in
reference to previous male rulers with no mention of the distaff
side, and allowing for the patrilineal bias of the Islamic writ-
ers it is most probable that the office, whatever may have been
true of other aspects of the society, was transmitted patri-
lineally
.
)
This polity consisted basically of two desert tribes. Its in-
stability is partly the traditional Berber social organization,
but partly, no doubt, the rivalry of the tribes. The situation
would make intertribal dynastic marriages a strong likelihood.
With or without the right to succession of the offspring of such
marriages to succeed to royal office, it is possible that this
succession was viewed by some as usurpation. He may have been
the leader of a Moslem faction to whom was opposed a pagan claim-
ant with a legitimate claim. Whether there was any legitimist
opposition to him cannot be determined from our sources. At any
rate, Yahya married into the family of Urtentac. This could not
give him or his sons any greater legitimacy in patrilineal Is-
lamic society, but it might win for him the support of those who
were uncertain in their allegiance and would strengthen the ties
with those to whom he was already related in the uterine line.
22. J. D. Fage, "Ancient Ghana: A Review of the Evidence,” Trans
-
actions of the Historical Society of Ghana , III, 2 (1957) , 85.
23. Trimingham, History of Islam , 21-22.
24. Ibn Khaldun, Histoire, II, 68.
25. These dissensions have always been assumed to be due to the
strictness of Ibn Yahya 1 s teaching, but the shortness of the time
with which he overcame the objections to him does not allow much
chance for prosyletization of the opposition. I suggest it is
more likely that we have here a contest over the question of suc-
cession and that Islam was involved in this argument, but not as
the primary issue.
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two brothers, Abu-Bekr and Yahya-Ibn-Omar-Ibn-Telagauin, whom Ibn
Khaldun describes only as Lemtuna chiefs. Who ruled the Lemtuna while
these chiefs were in the ribat, we are not told. Possibly the dis-
sension was so great that there was no ruler, or there may have been
a Goddala ruler. Since the brothers eventually succeeded to power, we
are interested in what relationship they had, if any, to their pre-
decessor, Yahya. We are not informed on this point. Since their
father T s name was Omar, they were obviously not sons of Yahya. They
may have been somehow related, since they claim descent from a Tela-
gauin, as did Yahya. This seemingly deliberate obscurity here permits
us to entertain the possibility that these brothers may have been the
legitimist contenders against the Goddala branch. 26 The defensive lo-
cation of the ribat was strengthened not only by the surrounding water
but by neighboring Tekrur, which was already Muslim --it has been
suggested that its conversion was related to its restlessness under
Ghana T s hegemony. Ibn Yazin doubtless expected military aid from his
Tekruri co-religionists if it was needed.
When Ibn Yazin had a thousand followers in his religio -military
brotherhood, he set out to bring the Lemtuna, Goddala, and Messufa to
embrace his more stringent form of Islam. That he was able to do so
is testimony both to the inspiration he had given his men of the ribat
and to the degree of dissension of the tribes. Yahya-ibn-Omar was
given the title of amir . 27 All of this must have transpired in a very
short time, for Ibn-Yazin arrived in 1048-1049 and Yahya-ibn-Omar took
Awdoghost in 1054,28 dying the following year. Yahya-ibn- Ibrahim
could not therefore have lived long after his return from Mecca, and
the training period in the ribat could not have lasted longer than
three or four years.
Abu-Bekr succeeded his brother, and the next year turned his
attention northward. He invaded the Sous and captured Massa and
Taroudant. Ibn Yazin was killed in battle in 450 (1058)
,
but the con-
quest continued. Sijilmassa was the first capital of the Almora-
vids.29 They now controlled the northern terminus of the western gold
route and the desert through which it ran, but a dispute between the
Lemtuna and Messufa threatened this new empire. Abu-Bekr turned south
to meet this threat in 453 (1061)
,
leaving his cousin Yusuf Ibn-
Tashfin in command in the north. The latter went on to take Fez and
defeat the Hammadites from the Central Maghrib, while Abu-Bekr suc-
ceeded in healing the dissension by uniting the tribes against Ghana.
Wishing thus to give free rein to their ardor, he led them
against the infidel nations of the Sudan, and carried his
victorious arms to the distance of ninety days journey beyond
the country of the Almoravids .30
26. These brothers were Lemtuna and later had to contend with Goddala
revolts; but they also had trouble with the Messufa who were also
members of the confederacy (if we can use this term)
,
so the re-
volts do not of themselves indicate more than normal divisive
-
ness. Yet the probability remains that the Ibn Omar were legiti-
mate claimants and that there was a rival Goddala branch.
27. Ibn Khaldun, Histoire, II, 69.
28. Fage, "Ancient Ghana," 86.
29. D T Herblelot, Bibliothbque Orientale (Paris, 1697).
30. Ibn Khaldun, Histoire , II, 72.
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The date of the defeat of Ghana is given as 1076, so that Abu-
Bekr may have been campaigning in the south for fifteen years before
this event. 31 By that time, Yusuf Ibn-Tashfin had gained control of
all the Maghrib-al-Aksa and was considering the invasion of Spain and
of the Central Maghrib. When Abu-Bekr returned north, his cousin re-
fused to return to him the authority which he exercised. There were
thenceforth two Almoravid kingdoms
,
the northern consisting of the
Maghrib -al-Aksa, and, subsequently, Muslim Spain, and the southern
consisting of the western Sahara and part of the western Sudan. But
the southern kingdom did not last long. In 1087, Abu-Bekr was killed
while trying to suppress a revolt of his Berber tribes. Thereafter,
no one in the desert succeeded in healing this breach, nor was the
northern group of Almoravids able to bring the desert tribes under
its domination.
Eventually, the southern Sanhadja came under the control of the
kings of the Sudan states. Ibn Khaldun says:
As for those who remained in the desert, nothing changed
in their manner of living and until today they remain divided
and disunited because of the diversity of their sentiments
and their interests. Subjected to the authority of kings of
the Blacks [Melek-es Soudan ] , they pay the impost (khradj)
and furnish contingents to his armies. 32
This reverse was typical of the fortunes of war in this region.
The peoples of the desert and those of the savannah strove constantly
to dominate each other. The people of the Sudan controlled the desert
to the approaches to Wargla in the time of Mansa Musa, but in the
time of his great-grandson after the profligate Djata had squandered
wealth and lost territory, the king of Mali had to send an army
against Takedda (which he took). 3^ At other times, the Berbers inter-
vened in the affairs of the cities along the Niger and even moved
south of the river. In the contest between the desert and the savan-
nah, the weakness of one invited the attack of the other; at some
times the desert was controlled by the Sudanese states, and at other
times the Sudanese states were pillaged by the desert confederations.
The period of Almoravid domination of Ghana did not exceed
eleven years. Yet Ghana never fully recovered hegemony over its old
subjects other than some of the Soninke, and eventually Ghana itself
fell under the control of the Susu and then of the Malinke. In part,
this may have been because Ghana was already in decline. Ibn Khaldun
informs us that:
The kingdom of Ghana had fallen into its final enfeeblement
toward the period when the empire of the wearers of the litham
(the Almoravids) began to become powerful; also, this latter
people, who lived to the north of Ghana . . . extended their
31. Others have interpreted the southern campaign as one of short
duration, after which Abu-Bekr returned to Morocco, again went
south after being repulsed by his cousin, and only subsequently
turned his attention to Ghana.
32. Ibn Khaldun, Histoire, II, 104.
33. Ibid.
,
112.
34. Ibid.
,
115.
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domination over the Blacks, devastated their territory and
pillaged their property. Having subjected them to head-
tax, they imposed tribute and brought a large number of them
to embrace Islam. The authority of the kings of Ghana was
extinguished, their neighbors, the Susu, subjugated this
country and reduced the inhabitants to slavery. 35
This paragraph telescopes at least three centuries; Ibn Khaldun
combines the later consequences of the defeat with the statement of
Ghana T s previous weakness. Al-Bakri specifies some of the details of
Ghana’s "final weakness": "The king’s interpreters, the official in
charge of his territory, and the majority of his ministers, are Mus-
lims . "36
Having Muslim officials would not in itself be a sign of weak-
ness, but in a situation where contending Lemtuna and Ghana forces
watched for a sign of weakness from the other as a signal to attack,
and especially in a situation wherein Islam provided an excuse for an
offensive, the pagan state of Ghana was being undermined by the use of
these officials, who did not give allegiance to the "religion of the
king" (Al-Bakri T s phrase). The description by Al-Bakri was written
about ten years before the Almoravid conquest of Ghana and the divided
loyalties of the king’s ministers were apparently not visible to him,
for he writes that:
This Tankamanin [probably the last king of Ghana before the
Almoravid conquest] is powerful, rules an enormous kingdom,
and possesses great authority.
When the king of Ghana calls up his army, he can put . . .
200,000 men into the field, 40,000 of whom are bowmen. The
horses of Ghana are very small. 37
The mention of horses in this context indicates that Ghana’s army was
organized around its cavalry.
According to the Tarikh al Fettach, written long afterward by a
Sudanese in the seventeenth century, Tankamanin’ s capital town was
known as Kumbi. This Kumbi, if it is properly identified as the pres-
ent Kumbi Saleh, is in the desert, as is Awdoghost, which, as we noted,
may have been an earlier capital. After the defeat by Abu-Bekr, the
capital may have been moved to the banks of the Niger (or perhaps the
Senegal — either of which might be referred to as the Nile by Arab
writers)
,
for al-Idrissi (1154) places it there, stating that the
king’s "castle" was built in 510 (1116-1117) . The king is now a Mus-
lim, which is not surprising, but unless he has acquired a fictitious
genealogy, he may be partly descended from a Berber conquerer, for his
ancestry is given as deriving from Salih ibn Abdullah ibn al -Hasan ibn
35. Ibid.
,
110.
36. W. W. Rajkowski’s translation, cited by Fage, "Ancient Ghana."
37. Al-Bakri, Description de l’Afrique Septentrionale par El-Bekri ,
translated by M. DeSlane (Alger, 1913)
.
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Ali ibn Abi Talib.^8 This was written during the century preceding
the domination of Ghana by Susu and Mali.
Just before Sundiata rose to power, Ghana was still an impor-
tant kingdom, though subordinate to Sumanguro of Susu. The epic which
has come down from Balia Fasseke, recorded and translated by D. T.
Niane, gives a description of thirteenth-century Ghana under the Sisse
king, Sumaba.39 Shortly after this, around 1235 A.D.
,
Ghana suffered
a new defeat by Mali, and, if it did not disappear, became insignifi-
cant in the politics and commerce of the Sudan.
From the time of its recovery from the Lemtuna conquest to the
emergence of Sumanguro and, then, Sundiata, Ghana had continued under
Muslim kings, an independent state but shorn of its old hegemony. The
conversion of the Ghana kings was apparently forced by Abu-Bekr,
because Al-Bakri specified, a decade previously, that the king was a
pagan, and a subsequent conversion, in the midst of a war which the
enemy defined in religious terms, is not very likely. When the south-
ern Almoravid power fell apart, the rulers of Ghana would have been
free, presumably, to return to their ancestral faith, which is what
one would expect if the conversion was forced, and that fairly re-
cently. Why did the dynasty remain in the ranks of Islam? There are
a number of possible answers.
If the royal house had been deposed by the Almoravids
,
the new
house, even though it probably was from the royal clan, would have
found the new religion a support in the argument for its legitimacy
in the face of dissatisfaction on the part of members, or supporters,
of the old royal house. If the conquerors had married into the old
royal house, a male offspring would be legitimate in Ghanaian eyes.
As Al-Bakri noted, the succession was matrilineal, and it would be
legitimate in Almoravid eyes since Islam favors patrilineal succes-
sion as was already the Lemtuna custom. A king of such descent might
survive in office even after his father’s people were driven out, for
his legitimacy derived from his mother. A Berber paternity still would
not explain the descent from the son-in-law of the prophet, but it
would make the fiction more plausible. It might also go back to an
Arab-Berber marriage which could add further substantiation, if not
proof, to the claim.
Second, Ghana lived on commerce; her customers to the north
were Muslim, and there were now many adherents to that faith in the
Wagadu country, so that it might have harmed relations with these
groups if the kings had rescinded their conversions. On the other
38. To fictionalize a genealogy was pretty standard practice. This
one, which claims the son-in-law of the prophet is dubious but
not necessarily spurious. It would be possible for a Maghribene
conquerer with some Arab ancestry to have married into the royal
family. Such a marriage of a patrilineal conquerer with a royal
woman of a conquered matrilineal society would give their off-
spring legal claim by both systems of reckoning, but succession,
having been so legitimized in the eyes of the local people, would
probably soon have been changed to Islamic norms. The alleged
genealogy would have seemed less unlikely to the people of the
time (if that mattered) if a conquerer who asserted such an an-
cestry had in fact married into the royal family.
39. D. T. Niane, Soundjata (Paris, 1960).
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hand the continued adherence to Islam must have hindered Ghana T s ef-
forts to recoup its position of hegemony among the peoples of its old
empire. The opposition, which eventually became strong enough to col-
lect tribute from Ghana itself, was the pagan power of Susu. I sug-
gest that we consider the proposition that Susu was the focus of the
conservative elements who were still attached to the old religion.
These elements were never eliminated and came to power again in the
same region in the Bambara kingdoms after the Moroccan defeat of Gao.
Is there a connection between the names Sisse and Susu? Nei-
ther term has a semantic referrent except as an appellation, so it is
impossible to say that they are cognates. Nonetheless, the proba-
bility is strong that the Susu were the intransigeant pagan remnant
of the old Ghana dynasty, and that the Sisse are that part of the
royal family which went over to Islam.
When the Sisse were brought under submission by Susu, but al-
lowed to retain local authority and, it would seem, treated gener-
ously, the pagan element had come to the supreme position in the
western Sudan again after almost two centuries. Since the Sisse were
no longer in a position to give leadership to the Muslim forces
,
the
way was open to Mali to assume this leadership, and it is pertinent to
the question of Sundiata T s claim to the vacant leadership that the
Sisse king calls him "cousin."^ Sundiata T s family had been Muslim
for at least two generations, which would make him an adherent of good
standing in the Muslim camp. There can be little doubt, although nei-
ther our written sources nor the epic of Balia Fasseke mention it,
that the Muslims of the north, either of the desert or the Maghrib
or both, gave aid in arms, men, or money to the forces of Sundiata
which, after all, were fighting for their cause.
The success of Sundiata over Sumanguro is not necessarily that
of the better military strategist, nor the emergence of Mali over Susu
necessarily that of superior numbers . It is rather the better inter-
national connections of the Muslim over the pagan and the consequently
better supply of military necessities.
The struggle to establish Islam in the western Sudan, which
reached an intensive stage in 1076 with the conquest of Ghana, did not
end until about 1235, when Sundiata defeated the last strong pagan
king, Sumanguro. The pagan Susu then seem to have moved off to the
southwest and are perhaps to be found in the Guinea-Sierra Leone area
today. 4-1 Although the campaign began, as we noted, with the Lemtuna
40. Niane, Soundjata, 68.
41. The names are variously rendered, and some would like to make a
linguistic distinction which would render the present people un-
related to the old kingdom. If one raises the linguistic focus
from the words to the languages, it is clear that the Susu are
closely related to the Soninkd (who are accepted as the people of
old Ghana) . The differentiation of Susu and Soninkd as languages
may be older than 1076, but the Susu could still have been a part
of the kingdom. There can be little doubt that Sumanguru T s tribe
had been part of Ghana before its defeat. Whether these were the
same or not, Sumanguru’s people were sufficiently closely related
to make them a natural refuge for the defeated dynasty — or for
that part which refused to accept Islam and domination.
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carrying on a j ihad in the Arab fashion, the job of Islamizing the
peoples of Ghana^ empire was not completed by the Berbers. It had to
be brought to fruition by the Sudanese, even as the Arabs could not
accomplish the Islamization of the Maghrib without the aid of the Ber-
bers. In the later phases of the struggle in the Sudan, the trade re-
lationships became as important as the military factor, and in this
respect the conversion of the area west of the Niger bend has simi-
larities to that of the Songhai area of the bend. The military phase
of the Almoravids is more dramatic, but it is not typical of the pat-
tern of the expansion of Islam in the Sudan.
Peaceful Conversion: A Closer Look at Gao and Bornu
Five hypotheses are suggested: (1) that Islam offered several
advantages for Sudanese states in the conditions of trade then pre-
vailing; (2) that trade was the main vehicle for the dissemination of
Islam in this region from the time of its introduction to the present
time; (3) that the competition of the various states in the Maghrib
for the Sudan trade (the source of gold which was essential to their
financial stability and therefore, perhaps, to their very existence)
increased the pace at which the Islamization of the Sudan proceeded;
(4) that the loss of maritime supremacy in the western Mediterranean
by the Muslim states of the Maghrib diminished their trade in other
directions and caused the merchants of North Africa to increase their
involvement in trade to the Sudan; and (5) that the eleventh century
was a "turning point" in the history of the Sudan. In the discussion
of these hypotheses, a supplementary hypothesis will be put forward,
namely that Gao probably obtained from Jenn6 the gold which it traded
northward, and that this was possible because of the control of Niger
navigation by a single ethnic group.
The Advantages of Islam in Commerce
Misunderstandings arise easily in commercial exchanges where
each party is naturally wary lest one gain an exorbitant profit at the
expense of the other. This is especially true when the traders have
different cultural backgrounds, for this implies different definitions
of situations, different concepts of "honesty," different standards
of measurement, different patterns of courtesy and manner of pro-
ceeding, and different languages -- in short, complete disjunction be-
tween the two parties to the exchange in systems of value and percep-
tion. Naturally merchants soon learn the systems of their customers,
but it is not always easy to accommodate them. Especially since there
were several Sudanese systems for the Maghribene merchants to learn
and, with the turnover of personnel in the course of time, there would
always be some neophyte traders from the Maghrib in the south who
would not be well informed, even though they would have learned as
much as possible from their countrymen -- which would be possible ex-
cept where competition between groups or families of northern traders
made such knowledge a valued advantage. Confusion must frequently
have occurred.
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Islam provided a common moral basis for commerce. The Shari T a
provided a common standard of acceptable practice. In addition,
Islamic culture provided a standardization of weights and measures. ^2
A few Maghribene coins have been found in the Sudan, indicating that
they were used perhaps more than we have realized, although barter was
undoubtedly generally practiced.
The religious regulation of trade had been in effect in Ifri-
qiya at least since the time of the Aghlabids
,
and a hisba manual of
the time is still extant.^ In discussing the effectiveness of the
Islamic regulation of markets, Margais writes:
The regulation of disputed transactions in the suks [markets],
the repression of fraud, curtailing of prices and their con-
formity to the legal tariff, the equivalence of weights and
measures to the standards set by the chief of the state, in a
word the moral supervision of commerce, are subject to the con-
trol of a civil service, the hisba . The functionary who is in
charge of this, the mohtasib , whose duties, besides being very
extensive, are those of a censor of morals, is an important
personage, generally of juridical training and who holds an
authority of a quasi -religious character .
^
We cannot say, of course, that this system was utilized in the
Sudan at that time in this highly developed form, but some tendency
toward it is implicit in the acceptance of Islam.
Islam may have been advantageous to Sudanese merchants in yet
another way. In areas of endemic conflict there is a need for a
neutral to act as go-between. He must be easily recognized so that he
would not be attacked by either side by mistake. He is often a man of
a religious character. Clothing, tailored in a certain style, has
always been in the Sudan a means of recognizing a Moslem; it could
also have been accepted as the symbol of a privileged traveler who
should, by common consent and in the general interest, be free from
attack and pillage. Herman Melville found that in the Marquesas a
young man with elaborate tattooing was permitted to go unmolested be-
tween the valleys even in time of war. ^5 Cabesa de Vaca found that
traders and healers could travel from the Gulf of Mexico far into the
interior, provided they displayed a calabash.^ It can be suggested
that Muslim clothing in the eleventh-century Sudan might be as effec-
tive as tattooing in nineteenth-century Typee or calabashes in the
sixteenth-century Mississippi valley. But we must admit that this was
not a guarantee against all cupidity since we know that guards were
hired to protect caravans; yet it is likely that it was sometimes ef-
fective.
42. The Sudan used salt as currency. Weights for gold of the type
later made famous by the Ashanti were in use. Cowrie shells cir-
culated and a torque, later known on the Guinea coast as a "ma-
nilla," as well as other media of exchange were then current. I
intend to devote a later essay to the problem of weights, mea-
sures, and currencies of the pre -Islamic Sudan.
43. J. A . Williams, Islam (New York, 1963), 113-114.
44. Margais, Berberie Musulman
.
81.
45. H. Melville, Typee (London, 1845).
46. Cabeza de Vaca, Relacion de los Naufragios y Commentarios (Madrid,
1906)
.
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Trade as a Vehicle for Islam
Islam does not have, aside from the recent Ahmadiyya, any
regularly constituted missionaries. Every Muslim, like every Jeho-
vah's Witness, is supposed to be a prosyletizer for his faith. A com-
mon sight in the non-Muslim forest areas of the Guinea coast lands is
the Muslim who is a trader by day but who in the evening gathers around
him any who will listen to his explanations and exhortations in behalf
of his faith. There is little doubt that as long as Muslim merchants
have been doing business south of the Sahara, they have also been ex-
plaining and exhorting. Sometimes, however, there are social condi-
tions which favor the efforts of the prosyletizer and sometimes there
are social conditions which inhibit the listeners from yielding to
arguments and pleas
.
We have it reported, for example, that an early nineteenth-
century Ashanti in Kumasi, who had been converted to Christianity by
a Fanti trader, was ordered by the Asantehene to renounce his new
religion, under pain of death if he did not comply. Such a conver-
sion impugned the divinity of a sacral king and amounted to l£se
majestd. Where the state religion supported a sacral king, conver-
sion would always be politically dangerous
,
except in cases where the
king might permit, or even delegate, an official to assume such a
guise in order better to deal with outsiders. Merchants who were sub-
jects of the king might also receive such permission, but in either
case the king, mindful of his pagan subjects, would not expect, or
permit, zeal for the intrusive religion. Once a prosyletizing reli-
gion establishes a power base in the region, the possibilities in-
crease and the king may have difficulty in controlling some of his
subjects who have connections with outsiders.
Religious conversion is both an individual and a social pheno-
menon. We could not, if we wished, examine the aspects of individual
conversion in the eleventh century — the data for such a study have
long been lost, and even for the social aspects they are uncomfortably
scanty. Yet we can say that when there is a pattern of behavior in a
society or a period of history, the existence of the pattern indicates
that there are social factors as well as the idiosyncracies of the in-
dividuals to be considered. Paul Radin, an anthropologist who studied
religious behavior among New World autocthonous peoples
,
pointed out
that there are in all societies individuals with a mystical and/or
religious bent and there are others who are essentially secular and
worldly. Some converts to Islam in the eleventh-century Sudan were
probably as devout as St. Francis and others were probably as prag-
matic and insouciant as Henry of Navarre
,
who considered Paris worth
a mass.
The appeal of Islam to the secular, pragmatic type of individ-
ual, of whom there were surely a good number in states with a long-
distance trade, should be clear from the preceding discussion of
hisba. It is suggested by the nature of the pattern — rulers and
merchants only — that many of the conversions were pragmatic.
The Competition of Maghrib States for Sudan Trade
For a time too short to be historically important the Fatimids
controlled all of the Maghrib. While the contest for control of this
area may have been more tribal (Sanhaja vs. Zanata) than religious
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(Shi T ism vs. Kharijitism)
,
the accomplishment of unification had the
effect of giving to one state all the northern termini of the trans-
Saharan trade routes.
The revolt of Abu-Yazid (94-4— 947) and the diversion of forces
to the conquest of Egypt weakened the Fatimids. Charles-Andr£ Julien
says, "On the eve of the insurrection of Abu-Yazid, one could say that
the Fatimids had a toe -hold in Morocco but not that their situation
there was assured. "^-7 After the revolt the Fatimids were not able to
reassert their control in the west. Julien continues, "The Spanish
tUmayyads] had profited from the revolt of Abu-Yazid and eliminated
from the whole of the western Maghrib the political influence of the
Fatimids." 1*®
And from that time on the situation can be described in the
words of Georges Marqais : "The North African wars were the narrow
fields where the Caliphate of Cordova and the Caliphate of Cairo
confronted each other, through deputized personnel. "4-9
The control of the Maghrib al-Aksa (or the western part of
North Africa) was important in terms of the revenues of the gold
trade. The western route, from the bend of the Niger to southern
Morocco, was the most developed at that time, with the loss of Sijil-
massa, and the failure of the Fatimids to maintain control over the
northern terminus of this route had, I maintain, great consequences
for the subsequent history of the Maghrib and the Sudan. If Fatimid
unity of the Maghrib had not been disrupted, there would have been
less warfare north of the Sahara but, probably, slower economic and
social development south of the desert. Since the major portion of
the gold trade was going to Sijilmassa, which now articulated with
Cordova and its allies, the Caliphate of Cairo had to be concerned
with the development of an alternate route for access to the Sudanese
source of the gold supply. We will see below that this is precisely
what seems to have happened. Therefore, we may say that if the
Maghrib had remained united, the Fatimid state might have been con-
tent with a single developed trade route, but with the Maghrib divided
into two spheres of influence, there was need for two routes and the
development of the more easterly central route aided the growth of the
central Sudan and strengthened the kingdom which controlled the trade.
Later, when the Cairen sphere of influence in the eastern and central
Maghrib collapsed and there was a fragmentation of political power,
there was a push to develop an even larger number of trading partners
to the south.
We are not concerned here with the total trade but only with
gold, for the other African products might have been replaced by
products of the Asian tropics ; but that region could not substitute
for Africa in the supply of gold. 50
47. C.-A. Julien, Histoire de l TAfrique du Nord (Paris, 1956), II, 60.
48. Ibid.
,
65.
49. Marqais, Berberie Musulman , 132.
50. See below.
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The Importance of the Sudan Trade to the Maghrib States
It must be emphasized that until the New World mines were
opened to intercontinental commerce, the Sudan was the principal
source of gold, not only for North Africa but via North Africa for
most of the rest of the Old World as well.
This fact is scarcely noticeable in Islamic historiography,
which focused on dynastic and tribal fortunes and religious movements.
It is not surprising that there was not then an equivalent of economic
history, for this is a very recent scholarly development. A recent
economic historian wrote, "Before the sixteenth century, it [the
Sudan] had been the only source [of gold] ."51
Another modern economic historian puts the case more strongly.
This gold enlivened the Mediterranean economy: a veritable
flow of gold was established which washed not only the Medi-
terranean but the whole of Europe and the Orient. Gold played
here a creative role: "It was a particle of economic force
. . . initiator of large commerce, which was thus acquired
by these countries: awakening Northern Europe, renewing the
Occident, developing Byzance, vitalizing commerce in the
Indian Ocean and central Asia. ”52
Behind all the strife of religious, dynastic, and tribal groups
with all their particularistic theological and genaeological argu-
ments, so well set down in the contemporary literature, there was
constantly the motivation to gain or to keep the control of the gold
supply
.
When the Fatimids lost control of the western route at the end
of the tenth century, Ifrikiya, which since the time of Oqba had been
the center of legitimist power in the Maghrib, was cut off from the
main supply line. Therefore, the rulers of Ifrikiya, whether Fatimid
or Zirid, would encourage the redevelopment of the central route,
which in the long past days of Carthage had been the principal route
but had been long superceded by the western route. When the Zirids
broke from Fatimid control, they probably succeeded in maintaining
the connection with Gao. Therefore, Cairo was probably responsible,
via Kufra — i.e., south of Zirid-controlled territory — for the
stimulation of interest in Islam and its attendant international re-
lationships in Kanem-Bornu. Cairo, Kufra, Fezzan, Bornu would have
been the Fatimid route and the Zirid route was Manzuriya in Ifrikiya
to Wargla, Twat, Gao, while the Spanish Umayyads depended on the route
from Sijilmassa to Taghaza, Taodeni, and then to Ghana. But all of
this was temporary for power in the eleventh century was everywhere
unstable. The western route was soon in the hands of the Almoravids.
The Zirids collapsed and the Fatimids declined but remained an impor-
tant factor in the Saharan trade. One can gauge the success of the
Maghrib states in competition for the Sudan trade by the dates at
which gold coinage appears and disappears.
51. M. Lombard, "L T or du Soudan dans l T histoire ," Annales (1935), 117.
52. G. Lassere, "L T 0r du Soudan," Les Cahiers d T Outre-Mer , no. 4
(Oct. -Dec. 199-8)
,
373.
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Revenues were necessary, not only for the routine activities of
states, but in time of constant strife to pay armies. The duties
on the gold trade were one of the most important sources of income for
the North African states. 53
The Redirection of Maghrib Trade from the Sea to the Desert
The Muslim powers lost control of the western Mediterranean to
the Christian maritime states in the late tenth and early eleventh
centuries . In previous centuries the possession of this control had
determined the political character not only of the Maghrib and Muslim
Iberia, but also of Carolinian Europe. This is the famous thesis of
Henri Pirenne: without Mohammad there would have been no Charle-
magne. 55 If the Muslim control of the western Mediterranean had such
widespread consequences, their loss of control must also have had some
effects. 56
In face of the lack of any documentation, one cannot demon-
strate that Maghribine merchants, shut out of the sea-trade, turned to
the south, but we have this suggestive juxtaposition: the whole of
Dar-al-Islam was foundering in dire turmoil and the Sudan, unaffected
by three centuries of commercial contacts with Islam, suddenly --
without invasion from north of the Sahara -- undergoes conversion in
at least half a dozen states. It suggests to me a reorganization of
the energies of the Maghribine peoples -- and the only portion of this
population known in the south was the merchant class.
The Eleventh Century as "Turning Point” in History
Without having the Sudan in mind, it has been claimed that the
eleventh century was a TTturning point 1 ’ of history.
If there are, as it is said, ’’turning points of history,’’
epochs when, by entry on the scene of new protagonists, by
entry into play of new factors, the conditions of life of the
States and of the peoples seem profoundly modified, the
eleventh century was one of these turning points for the world
53. Ibn Hawkal gives the revenues of the Fatimid treasury from Sijil-
massa for a certain year in the late tenth century. He elsewhere
gives the total revenues of the State, but it is for a different
year. One of the editors of the new French translation of Leo
Africanus probably had this in mind when, in a footnote, it is
asserted that the gold trade accounted for half of the Fatimid
income. It is not that simple and I have in preparation a paper
which discusses the problem.
54-. A. Lewis, Naval Power and Trade in the Mediterranean, A.D. 500 to
1100 (Princeton, 1951), 183 ff.
55. Pirenne, Mohammad , passim . Br^nsted, The Vikings . Ch. 1.
56. This must not be pushed too far, but that the closing of one area
of activity to the energies of the Maghrib would make another
area more inviting is not illogical -- and we have the coinci-
dence in time of the loss of Mediterranean maritime power and
Sudanic conversions to suggest that this was indeed so.
22 DANIEL F. MCCALL
of Islam. The events which it witnessed affected the East
as well as the West, from Persia to Spain; and the Christian
world, which had had a determining part in these upsettings,
would, after some delay, feel it in its turn. 57
There is no doubt that the western and central Sudan should
have been included in this general statement. That it was not is per-
haps symptomatic of the neglect by area specialists of neighboring
areas unless there are handy summaries of relevant materials available
to them. 58
The Empire of Gao
The earliest of the dates that has come down to us for the con-
version of a ruler in the Sudan is that of 1009, when Za Kossoi
adopted Islam. 59 Kossoi was the fifteenth ruler of his dynasty. The
state, before the reign of Za Kossoi, was apparently known as Kaokao
(the old capital) and thereafter as Gao (the new capital) . It was an
old establishment, supposed to go back to the seventh century. This
state, for the rest of its history, was involved in the trans-
Saharan trade
,
and it is probable that it had already been so involved
for some time. It seems a reasonable suggestion that the conversion
of Za Kossoi, in which he did not carry all of his people, was moti-
vated largely by the desire to improve relations with his trading
partners to the north. The Touareg of Tadmekka, on the trade route,
were already Islamized at that time, and, of course, so were the peo-
ple of the Central Maghrib.
Za Kossoi received an honorific title and ,Ta seal, a Koran and
a sword, sent in effect, it is claimed by the Amir of the Believers. "60
Two rulers used this title at the time : the Fatimid Caliph in Cairo
and the Umayyid Caliph in Cordova. Since Al-Bakri is the author of
the work in question, we can assume that he used this title only in
regard to the Cordova ruler; certainly he would not have used it for
his master’s rival.
The phrasing of Al-Bakri’ s words suggests that he is skeptical
that the gifts came from Cordova. We should be too, for he had means
of checking in his own city, where he was master of the royal archives,
but we need not follow him in inferring, as he seems to, that the
story is unfounded. The gifts may have been sent by the Fatimid
ruler, or by his Zirid deputy in Ifrikiya in his name, and in any
case the mission would have come through this intermediary.
If the title refers to the Fatimid ruler, the reported time of
the incident is consistent with plausibility, for it was not until
1016, or six years later, that the Zirids first broke with the Fati-
mids and 109-8 when the secession was finalized by offering the Friday
57. Margais, Berberie Musulman , 7.
58. But the general summaries of the history of the Sudan have not,
in any case, made this point. See note 6.
59. See note 5.
60. Al-Bakri, Description de l’Afrique , 183. Trimingham, History of
Islam
. 88, translates "ring" rather than"seal," and in note 1
considers Spain the source of these gifts.
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prayers in the name of the ruler of Bagdad. (If the Zirids had sent
the mission in their own name they would not have claimed such an
exalted title; therefore it can be accepted as most likely that the
gifts came from Cairo, therefore before 1016.)
After the break between Ifrikiya and Cairo, direct contact be-
tween Cairo and Gao would be more difficult, if not impossible, and
the Zirids probably inherited the advantage of the southern connec-
tion. Badis, one of the Zirid rulers, is said to have had two gi-
raffes which presumably came to him from the Sudan and it is thought
that they were gifts of T,les chefs africains."^
The Fatimids and the Zirids had good reason to encourage Za
Kossoi to increase his competition with Ghana in the gold trade, but
the ability of Za Kossoi to deliver the gold still needs to be de-
monstrated. The main gold supply region of the period, so far as we
know, was the Bambuk region, access to which from the north was con-
trolled by Ghana in 1009 and somewhat later by Susu and then by Mali.
Where did the Gao merchants get their gold?
This question cannot be answered with certainty, but we can
posit a tentative answer which seems plausible. The gold came to Gao
along the Niger in pirogues from Jennd, whence access to Bambuk could
be gained by going west, but to the south of Ghana T s and Mali’s terri-
tory. Or, perhaps, Bourd came into production at that time, which
would have been more accessible to Jenn£. Jennd was founded by
Soninke, i.e., by people of the same ethnic group to which the people
of Ghana belonged. According to As -Sa’di, Jennd was founded in the
second century of the hegira by pagans. Thus, at the time that Za
Kossoi moved his capital from Kaokao to Gao, Jennd was in its second
century of existence. We do not know the circumstances under which
Jennd was founded. If it was founded between 822 and 921 A.D.
,
during
which time Tiloutan and Temim reigned, the Berber inroads on Ghana may
have induced the latter to displace the locus of their activities or
to start a new venture; the trade of Jennd would then articulate with
Ghana, along the river to the bend of the Niger (then controlled by
their relatives, the Bozo), and thence overland. After 1076 the in-
fluence of Ghana on Jennd must have been ineffectual, no matter what
it was before.
On the other hand, Jennd may have been founded by a dissident,
or even unrelated, group of Soninkg and never come under Ghana’s con-
trol. At any rate, after the Sorko (Songhai rivermen) replaced the
Bozo, the orientation could easily have been changed.
There is also the claim that Jennd was founded in 1250, which,
if true, eliminates the above possibilities. The historian, As-Sa’di,
was cadi in Jenn£ and his date for the founding of the city should be
given some weight, so we here discount the later date.
Jenn6 may, or may not, have paid tribute of some sort to Mali,
but it apparently was never militarily or politically subject to any
other state until the time of Sonni Ali. This claim of independence
for Jenn£ is interesting. The preservation of independence, attri-
buted to natural protection in the marshes, cannot be wholly explained
by geographical factors.
61. Marqais, Berberie Musulman , 184.
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How did the merchants of the city move their goods during the
time the country was controlled by a hostile Mali? The answer to this
is undoubtedly in the domination of the Niger by the Sorko, the boat-
men of the Songhai. It is significant in this context that the ex-
pansion of the Sorko in the upper regions of the Niger, replacing the
Bozo, is attributed to the period of Za Kossoi’s reign, and, likewise,
the moving of the capital to Gao would put it closer to the up-river
source of gold (if it came from Jenn£) . It may also be significant
that, while most of the rulers of Jenn£ have Mande names, as would be
expected, one of them has a Songhai name. 62
It is suggested here that Jenn£ may have played in relation to
Gao the same role that it later played to its neighboring city, Tim-
buctu. Let us recall As-Sa T di T s statement: "Without Jenn£ this
blessed city [Timbuctu] would be nothing." An alliance of some sort
between the Soninke of Jenn£ and the Songhai of Gao seems certain, at
least after the fall of Ghana in 1076, but we can expect that it pre-
ceded Ghana T s defeat by about two generations. This alliance is no
doubt one reason for Jenn£ T s inability to hold out against Sonni Ali,
when Gao began its military expansion much later, in the fifteenth
century, because it was then shorn of Sorko support.
Kanem-Bornu
The kingdom of Kanem in the eleventh century was of comparable
antiquity to that of the Songhai and possibly as great or maybe even
greater than that of Ghana .
^
It was the dominant power in a large
basin centering on Lake Chad. 64
Conversion took place in the reign of Hume or Umme Jilmi. This
king flourished, according to all authorities, around 1086-1097 A.D.65
According to a mahrarn^ published by Sir Richard Palmer, we read
(after the formal opening)
:
The first country in the Sudan which Islam entered was the land
of Bornu. It came through Muhammad ibn MSni who lived in Bornu
for five years in the time of King Bulu, six years in the time
of King Arki
,
four years in the time of King Kadai Hawami
,
fourteen years in the time of King Umme.
62. Jean Boulnois and Boubou Hama, L T Empire de Gao (Paris, 1954), 47.
63. The early history is scarcely attested in extant documents and
can be approached for the most part only indirectly. These
problems are seldom given any serious attention and most scholars
have preferred to begin with the arrival of Islam.
64. See Y. Urvay, Histoire de 1 T Empire du Bornu (Paris, 1949),
Introduction.
65. R. Cohen, "The Bornu King Lists," Boston University Papers on
African History
.
II (Boston, 1966)
.
66. A mahram was a letter of privilege granted by a king to a sub-
ject for outstanding service. See Palmer, Bornu Sahara and
Sudan, 12; Trimingham, History of Islam , 110; Cohen, "King
Lists," 47. This is mahram A, pp. 14-15 in Palmer. See D. F.
McCall, "Exegesis of a Mahram," Boston University Papers in Afri-
can History
. IV (Boston, 1969), 1-19.
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Then he summoned Bornu to Islam by the grace of King
Umme
.
Islam was spreading for two years before, through Mohammad
ibn M&ni, it became general.
This document has a number of difficulties. One is that it
must have been copied many times since the original version was com-
posed, supposedly in the late eleventh century, and obviously later
materials have at some points been incorporated. How much modifica-
tion of the oldest parts has occurred is hard to say. The mahram has
Muhammad ibn M&ni living in Bornu^'7 during the reign of Hume for two
years longer than most authorities concede that he ruled. 68 Whatever
the explanation of this discrepancy, it suggests that Ibn Mdni lived
in the kingdom during the entire reign of Hume and that he had been in
the country for some time previously. By this account, he came first
in the reign of Bulu who is generally taken as the eighth ruler (or at
least the eighth name on the king list — some earlier names may have
been lost) and stayed on in the reign of Arki who was the succeeding
king. Then, if King Kadai Hawami in this mahram is the same as Huwa
or Houa in other sources
,
he was also resident in Bornu in the follow-
ing reign. The next name in all versions of the king list is Soolooma
and he is not mentioned in the mahram . However, he only ruled for
four years and in later times he might be overlooked, but during the
reign of Hume, his successor, when the mahram was presumably written,
he would surely not have been forgotten. So, one might wonder if Ibn
M9.ni was absent from the area during this reign — but Nachtigale and
Landeroin give this ruler the name Abdallah and others give him the
supplementary name Abd el Jilil which suggests that he had been per-
sonally very favorably disposed to Islam but had not made it the
official religion. This might be the meaning of the phrase, TT Islam
was spreading for two years before . . .
"
In a subsequent paragraph, where it is stated that each of the
kings since the arrival of Ibn Mini prior to Hume had studied with the
religious teacher, we find the proof that he was not absent in the
time of Soolooma, for we find the name Abd el Jalil with the rest in
the proper order from Bulu to Hume.
We also find the statement that Hume "read secretly," but this
would not seem to have been necessary in the time of Soolooma, who had
been so far affected as to take an Arabic name. So we may surmise
that Hume began his studies in an earlier reign. The whole account
suggests a considerable number of years of preparation before the of-
ficial conversion was brought about.
At any rate Ibn M&ni could not have lived continuously in the
country since the time of King Bulu, because the number of years of
his residence, as given, do not accord with the number of years of the
reigns of the mentioned kings. Bulu reigned for sixteen years and
probably it was in the later part of his reign that the prosyletizer
arrived. Arki ruled for from forty-two to forty-four years — of
which Ibn MSni was there only six. It may be, if this was the first
67. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan , 12.
68. The mahram gives fourteen years and the later scholars usually
calculate twelve
.
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six years of the reign and continuous with his residence in the pre-
vious reign, that the reason for his leaving was that the king was
resistant to, or had even become hostile to, the idea of conversion,
although Arki — like Bulu before him — read some of the scripture
with Ibn Mclni and was even more generous in his gifts of camels to the
teacher. 69
Muhammad ibn M&ni may have begun his ministry in the Sudan
about 1030 A.D.
,
if we accept the dates which Urvoy gives for Bulu
(1019-1035)
,
which seems more plausible in this context than Lande-
roin T s dates (1002-1018) or those Palmer and Nachtigale give, which
put him back in the mid-tenth century. Assuming that he was at least
twenty when he arrived, he would have been about eighty when Hume
died, yet even greater longevity is claimed for him. He is alleged
to have "lived one hundred and twenty years." Yet, just prior to this
it is implied that he lived through the reigns of six kings subsequent
to Hume and the lengths of these reigns totals one hundred and seventy-
eight years. 70 But actually the wording is that Islam was estab-
lished and so we can view this part as a later interpolation before
the paragraph, "These were years of Islam, and Mohammad ibn M9ni lived
one hundred and twenty years." The teacher of Hume probably died not
long after the reign of the convert who gave him the mahram .
According to the above calculation of the life of Ibn M&ni we
have a man of admirable longevity, but not a mythological character of
incredible age. He may have returned to his home country several
times for business, personal, or other reasons — or he may even have
been forced to leave as a troublesome innovator -- but in any case he
was absent for the greater part of Arki T s reign (1035-1077 apud Urvoy).
From the distance of Al-Bakri T s perspective the efforts of his earlier
prosyletizing was not visible and Kanem was described as a "race of
idolatrous Negroes." Ibn M&ni would return in the next reign to resume
his work and make Al-Bakri T s description inapplicable, even if it was
much too late to merit the claim: "The first country in the Sudan
which Islam entered was the land of Bornu."
Where did Ibn M&ni come from? If the name in the mahram can be
equated to the Hadi al Uthmani given by Makrizi as the man who brought
this state into the Muslim world, it suggests Umayyad (Eastern, not
Spanish) origin, for the latter is said to have claimed descent from
the caliph Uthman. Al-Bakri also had heard of Umayyad refugees from
Abbasid persecution in Kanem, but Trimingham^l suggested that this is
a "legend" which "may derive from the name of the first Muslim ruler,
Ume, or Hums." Yet this explanation could only be acceptable if Hume
had ruled in, or before, Al-Bakri T s time; but all authorities (except
presumably Trimingham) have placed him later.
Uthman was murdered in 655, but his kinsman, Mu T awiya, after
some struggle established the caliphate as hereditary in the House of
Umayya, and this dynasty ruled in Damascus until 74-7, when "the Abba-
sids openly raised the standard of revolt. "72
69. However, the gifts are listed in an ascending order of generosity
and this leads one to suspect that it is a conventionalized ac-
count.
70. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan , 14-.
71. Trimingham, History of Islam , 114- , n.l.
72. G. E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East (New York, 1961)
,
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At the time we have calculated for the arrival of Ibn M&ni in
Bulu T s kingdom, the Umayyads had been refugees from Damascus for
nearly three centuries (and if he was a descendant of Uthman, but not
of Mu T awiya, his family may have departed even earlier). Had the
family been settled in Kanem all this time — a minimum of six genera-
tions and probably closer to nine -- and still maintained its iden-
tity? Unless an extended family — or several collateral lines — and
some retainers were there together, marriages would have to be with
pagan women, and that introduces the likelihood of dilution of the
Islamic commitment and the temptation to become involved in the poli-
tics of one T s maternal relatives -- which would have been the politics
of a pagan state with a divine king. While it is possible that de-
vout observance could have been maintained by strong paternal instruc-
tion of the children, especially if there were commercial contacts
with Muslim merchants to reinforce such teaching, the conditions in
general would be more likely to bring about the acculturation of the
refugees to the religious norm of the community.
Ibn Mclni, however, was not born in Kanem. He lived there five
years in the time of King Bulu and he taught the king. There is
nothing to indicate that this is hagiographically supposed to convey
the idea of a prodigy child, so we must assume that Ibn MSni came as
an adult from somewhere outside the kingdom. So, perhaps he was not
of the Umayyad refugee group — or perhaps they were not actually in
Kanem but to the north in the Fezzan where, as middlemen, they con-
trolled the trade of the Kanem kingdom.
Since 969 A.D. an Umayyad (not of the Spanish branch) would
have been free of persecution in Fatimid Egypt. Especially if the
descent was direct from Uthman, and not through the Damascene caliphs,
the Shi T a rulers of Egypt would have no cause to view such a person
as contaminated with guilt of the persecution of the Alids.
No matter whether born in the Fezzan or elsewhere, whether of
illustrious (but sometimes dangerous) descent or not, Ibn M&ni would
have found Egypt open to him and there he had access to the greatest
commercial emporium in northeastern Africa. (We are not certain that
he was a merchant, but we do know that he had a great number of cam-
els. What was the use of so many, if not for caravans?)
If we take 1030-1031 as the probable time of the beginning of
Ibn Mclni T s mission, the Zirids of Ifrikiya had become defiant but not
yet finally broken relations with the Fatimid court in Cairo. As a
countermove to Zirid interception of the revenue and goods of the
trade with Gao
,
we might postulate that the mission of Ibn Mclni was
encouraged by Cairo. By the time that Hume obtained power (and I am
inclined to view the reign as Islamic from the outset) in 1085, the
Zirids had disappeared from power and the Banu Hilal had already
swept over their land "like an army of locust, they destroyed all in
the passage," in the words of Ibn Khaldun. "Ifrikiya was reduced to
anarchie. "73
Of the fifty years dedicated to the conversion of the princes
of Kanem, nearly three decades were after the fall from power of the
Zirids, so that, if control by Ifrikiya of the Gao trade was the rea-
son for beginning the mission, personal devotion must have been the
73. Julien, Histoire, II, 72.
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reason for continuing it. Certainly Gao would again become accessible
to Egyptian merchants, despite Maghribene "anarchie
,
TT once the Ifri-
kiyan interference was removed. Egypt in the lifetime of Ibn M&ni saw
a contest for power between the Turkish and Negro elements in the
army. Abu Tamim Ma T add (1035-1094)
,
who reigned with the title al-
Mustansir, was only seven years of age at the time of his succession.
His mother, a Negro, had the power in her hands during his minority,
and she promoted the interests of her kinsmen. Negroes had become
numerous in the time of his grandfather, Abu Ali al-Mansur (996-1021)
,
who reigned under the title of al-Hakim bi T amr Allah, when there was
friction between the Turkish element in the army and the Maghribene
troops on whom the strength of the Fatimids had till then rested. He
brought Negroes into the army as a counterpoise to the contending
ethnic segments. The result was that the Turks and Negroes in Mustan-
sir T s reign struggled for supremacy and Egypt was so rent that the
country almost fell to the Abbasids. At times Egypt was but little
better than the Maghrib for security, but the dynasty survived the
troubles. The ’’golden age” was past, ”yet Egypt in the time of al-
Mustansir was still the leading country of Islam. ”79-
It would be interesting to know what, if any, contacts, af-
filiations, or loyalties with states in the Sudan the influential
Negroes in Egypt had at that time. Islamic states in the Sudan might
bolster the position of Negroes in the power structure of Egypt, but
whether they sought to further Islamization, or even if they had means
to do so, is uncertain.
We must look now, finally, at Kanem T s ability to deliver gold.
There is not enough locally to support extensive trade. ’’Gold is very
widespread in West Africa. ”75 But "Dahomey (Perma) and Togo, while
having auriferous indications, are rather poor in this metal, the same
as Nigeria. The gold of these countries is of recent exploitation.
6
There was a route to Gao?? and the Kanemi may have obtained
gold there, but this would have been expensive to buy from middlemen.
Is it possible that Kanem could at this time have been the exploiter
of the Lobi mines? The ruins in this area are a mystery, but usually
associated with Mande activities — nonetheless, the line from Kanem
to Lobi is more or less the same as that taken later by Hausa mer-
chants to northern Gold Coast.
It may be that earlier Kanem had relied entirely on alluvial
gold dust that could be washed out of the silt of local streams, but
it seems logical that the growth of the kingdom and the increase of
trade after the conversion depended in part on access to one of the
important areas of gold-bearing geological formations. Knowledge of
their existence, if not previously possessed by the Kanemi, would now
be available to them from the Fatimid merchants. Wherever they ob-
tained the metal, they got it in sufficient quantity to gild their
court and officials. 78
74. P. K. Hitti, History of the Arabs (8th ed.
,
New York, 1964), 625.
75. R. Mauny, Tableau Ggographique de 1 T Quest Africain au Moyen Age
(Dakar, 1961), 293.
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Conclusion
The hypotheses put forward at the outset are not demonstrated
as fact, but they appear to be tenable and to merit further considera-
tion. It is rewarding to consider a particular process (conversion)
in a particular time (the eleventh century) and place (western and
central Sudan)
,
because this raises more questions than a kaleido-
scopic passage over the entire history. The questions must come
first; the answer naturally take somewhat longer. At this point the
work is obviously not completed, but at least there is some progress
on the first part.
In the course of dealing with this problem I began to realize
that the literature which I consulted was either by Arabists who ig-
nored Africa or by Africanists who generally were not Arabists, and,
when they were, still treated the Sudan in isolation from the Maghrib,
Egypt, and the rest of Islam. The understanding of Islam in the Sudan
cannot be complete, it should be obvious, without exploring the re-
lationships with the thought and movements of Dar-al-Islam.
The studies of Islam tend to be theological or social, but
seldom economic, while studies of trade are often concerned only with
economic factors. There are conceptual difficulties in bringing the
two together, but can anyone doubt that they are related?
With the problems of bringing material from so many categories
together, some limitation of results must be expected. All that is
claimed here is that it is worthwhile to try to relate things from
different academic pigeonholes when they are found together in so-
ciety. Hopefully, by this process, we will ultimately replace some
hypotheses with proof, and then we can more narrowly assess the re-
maining hypotheses.
Addendum
Since this paper was written, Michael Brett has argued that the
Saharan trade along the three major routes in the tenth century was in
the hands of Ibadi merchants centered in the Djerid (southern Tunisia),
but in the eleventh century Egypt and Morocco exerted a stronger pull
and Ibadi primacy disappeared; by the twelfth century a network which
was a "complicated pattern" had developed. 79
This idea does not offer any serious problems for the interpre-
tation given above, for, while the merchants may have been principally
from one region of Ifrikiya and members of a particular sect which
should have provided some further sense of unity, yet there is nothing
in this situation to eliminate commercial rivalries. Brett admits
that at that time "the Djerid was a turbulent region, with much fight-
ing between shaykhs, clans and tribes. "80 This type of commercial
79. M. Brett, "Ifriqiya as a Market for Saharan Trade from the Tenth
to Twelfth Century A.D. ," Journal of African History . X, 3
(1969)
.
80. Ibid., 357.
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domination by merchants from a particular locality but with intense
competition between groups would be similar to the nineteenth-century
prominence of Awjila-Jalu merchants of the eastern and central Saharan
trade in which different families competed. 81
Nor would such Ibadi prominence in the early trade be an ob-
stacle to political influences, and Brett refers to the Ibadi mer-
chants expanding trade "under auspices of the Fatimids of Ifriqiya
... in response to a sharp demand for gold to further imperial
designs in the east. "8 2 But the trend of his argument is to play down
the gold and emphasize other items and aspects of the trade. In fact,
Brett T s concern seems to be more with the Ifrikiyan economy than with
the Saharan trade, but his data, at least, and probably most of his
interpretations are compatible, I believe, with the theses which I
have presented.
81. T. Walz, "Notes on the Cairo-Fezzan Trade Routes during the
First Half of the Nineteenth Century,” unpublished ms.
82. Brett, ’Ifriqiya as a Market," 358.
CHAPTER 2
PATTERNS OF ISLAMIZATION IN WEST AFRICA*
Nehemia Levtzion
The nineteenth-century jihad movements in the northern Sudanic
belt of West Africa put an end to a peaceful process of Islamization
which had been going on for almost a thousand years. Not only did the
jihad cover earlier patterns of Islamization, but it also changed the
ideas present informants may have on the role of Islam and the extent
of its influence before this religious revolution. In other words,
Muslims in the jihad states may often find it difficult to relate —
with any sympathy and understanding — the older Islamic traditions.
These traditions, however, have been retained farther to the
south in areas where Muslims have been influential minorities for some
centuries, but remained outside the orbit of the jihad . There --in
states like Gonja, Dagomba, or Mamprusi — Islamic influence has by no
means been static during the last three centuries; it has, however,
developed on a pattern which may be detected from oral traditions
,
and
is reflected in the present situation, which the researcher may ob-
serve. In other words, we are accorded the opportunity to look at a
process as seen by the actors themselves.
^
As I worked among Muslims and chiefs in the Volta Basin, where
Islam gained ground since the seventeenth century, I had a strong
feeling that I was dealing with a process similar to that which had
taken place farther to the north some centuries earlier. Indeed, when
I turned back to the Arabic sources and oral traditions of the early
Sudanic states, the evidence became more revealing, as if the texts
have been tuned to a new key.
What I am about to try here is to offer a model for the process
of Islamization, based on an interpretation of the evidence on Islam
in the Sudanic belt from the tenth to the sixteenth century, indi-
cating parallels with the Volta Basin, the southern savannah belt from
the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. A comparative study of
these two areas readily suggests itself because both were exposed to
intensive peaceful trading activities.
Following the Arab conquest of North Africa, the Berbers
gradually accepted Islam. The Berbers carried Islam across the Sahara
to hand it over to the Soninke in the sahil , the "shore” of the desert.
* This paper has been read before meetings of the African Studies
Programs at Northwestern University, Indiana University, Boston
University, and the University of Wisconsin. I am grateful to
all participants for stimulating comments and queries.
1. N. Levtzion, Muslims and Chiefs in West Africa: A Study of Islam
in the Middle Volta Basin in the Pre-Colonial Period (Oxford,
1968), 192-193.
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The Soninke brought Islam to the Malinke, their neighbors to the
south, and Malinke-speaking traders — the Dyula — spread Islam as
far as the fringes of the forest. This way of transmitting Islam, in
relay, within wider cultural contacts between neighboring peoples,
helps to explain the peaceful process of Islamization. Indeed, the
Islamization of Africa became more successful because of the Africani-
zation of Islam. Islam proved its vitality because of its rational
basis, simplicity, and adaptability on the one hand, and its tradition
of scholarship on the other. These two aspects account for two trends
in West African Islam -- compromise and militancy.
These two trends were represented already in the eleventh
century. In Gao, according to al-Bakri, the people were pagans and
the king Muslim, but pre-Islamic customs persisted in the court. 2
In Takrur, the Muslim king forced his subjects to accept Islam; he
introduced the Islamic law, propagated Islam among neighbors, and
waged a holy war against the infidels. 3 It is the compromising atti-
tude — the symbiosis of Islam and the African traditional religion
-- which was typical of Islam in West Africa before the eighteenth
century, whereas the militancy of Takrur was the exception, and may be
explained by its position on the lower Senegal in continuous and in-
tensive contacts with the nomads of the southwestern Sahara. (Indeed,
because of that, Islam in Senegal is an exception in other aspects
as well, such as the role of the brotherhoods and its contemporary
political implications.)
In Ghana of the mid-eleventh century Muslims lived in a sepa-
rate town or quarter — like the zongos of modern Ghana — under the
auspices of a pagan king. This king "was praised for his love of
justice and generosity towards the Muslims ... He had a mosque near
his court where Muslims prayed when they called upon him. His inter-
preters, the official in charge of his treasury and the majority of
his ministers were Muslims.”^ In Gao such close contact with Muslims
brought about the Islamization of the king. This had not happened in
Ghana by the time of al-Bakri. The king adhered to his ancestral
religion, perhaps in defiance of his northern enemies, the Sanhaja
Almoravids, who represented Islamic aggressiveness. Acceptance of
their religion might have implied political submission. Elsewhere I
have tried to explain in a similar way the resistance of the Mossi to
the Islamized empire of Songhay in the fifteenth and sixteenth cen-
turies. ^ In both cases peaceful traders were welcomed, but Islam
would be rejected if it represented an obvious danger to the political
system. Ghana, however, was conquered by the Almoravids, and its re-
sistance to Islam broke with the destruction of its military and poli-
tical power. Ghana of al-Zuhri and al-Idrisi in the twelfth century
was a Muslim kingdom.®
2. Al-Bakri, Al-Masalik wa T l-Mamalik: kitab al-mughrib fi dhikr bilad
Ifrlqiwa wa T l -Maghrib (Paris, 1911), 183, translated as Descrip-
tion de l T Afrique septentrionale (Paris, 1913), 39-2-343.
3. Ibid
. ,
172/ tr. 324.
4. Ibid., 174-176/ tr. 327-330.
5. Levtzion, Muslims and Chiefs , 163-164.
6. Al-Zuhri, Kitab al-Jughrafiyya in Youssouf Kamal, Monumenta Carto-
graphica Africae et Aegyti (Le Caire et Leyde, 1926-51), III, 802;
Al-Idrisi, Nuzhat al-mushtaq fl ikhtiraq al-afaq: sifat al-Maghrib
wa-ard al-Sudan wa-Misr wa T l-Andalus (Leyde, 1866), 6, translated
as Description de l TAfrique et de l T Espagne (Leyde, 1866), 7.
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Not all the Muslims in Ghana before the Almoravid conquest were
foreigners; many probably were Soninke.7 These were the traders who
commuted between the sahil and the goldfields. Through their trade
they became urbanized and detached from the peasants 1 way of life, and
in dealing with the traders from the Maghrib, they were exposed to Is-
lamic influence. In their wanderings they could find hospitality and
a sense of community among fellow-Muslims in the trading centers, such
as those described by al-Bakri, along the routes leading from Ghana to
the goldfields.
8
As most traders in the sahil and the savannah were Muslims
,
trader and Muslim became almost synonymous. Not only did traders tend
to become Muslim, but there are documented cases in which traders who
settled down as peasants went through a process of de-Islamization,
gradually losing their Islamic characteristics .
9
As long as Islam was confined to the trading communities
,
it
operated in the fringes of the West African societies . There was a
dispersion of Muslims rather than a spread of Islam. The latter hap-
pened when Muslims succeeded in winning over the chiefs. An early ac-
count of such a process is offered by al-Bakri.
The small chiefdom of Malal, beyond the upper Senegal, was af-
flicted by drought from one year to the other. All the prayers and
sacrifices of the local priests were in vain. Then a Muslim promised
that, if the king accepted Islam, he would pray for his relief. When
the king agreed, the Muslim taught him ”to recite some easy passages
from the Koran, and instructed him in those religious obligations
which no one can be excused of not knowing.” On the following Friday,
after the king had purified himself, the two set out to a nearby hill.
All that night the Muslim prayed, emulated by the king. ”The dawn
only started to break, when Allah brought down abundant rain. The
king ordered the idols broken, he expelled his sorcerers, and became
Muslim together with his family and the nobility. But the common peo-
ple remained pagans. ”10
This Muslim succeeded in winning over the king by demonstrating
the omnipotence of Allah; praying to Allah having saved the kingdom
where all sacrifices by local priests had failed. Islam made its
earliest appeal in competition with the African traditional religions
,
proving its superiority as a source of blessings. The eighteenth-
century Gonja Chronicle has a similar theme as a charter for the bond
between Muslims and chiefs. Muhammad al-Abyad — ancestor of the
Gonja imams — made a miracle, in the name of Allah, to bring a vic-
tory in a fierce battle. "When the king of Gonja saw this it made him
wonder. This faith, he said, is better than our religion. He became
devoted to Islam together with his brothers." In a later version of
the Gonja oral traditions, we find the following significant statement
7. Al-Bakri (175, 176/ tr. 329, 330) suggests a distinction between
Muslims and "followers of the king T s religion" (ahl din al-malik)
and not between white Muslims and black pagans.
8. Ibid., 177/ tr. 332.
9. Y. Person, "Les anc^tres de Samori," Cahiers d T Etudes Africaines
,
13 (1963), 133-134, 139-140, 147-152; Levtzion, Muslims and
Chiefs, 144.
10.
Al-Bakri, 178/ tr. 333-334.
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’’Actually, if you want to wage war, and you do not find a Mallam, then
it is impossible for you to do so.”H
Chiefs were particularly inclined to seek the prayers of Mus-
lims, and their highly appreciated amulets. Chiefs were under greater
strains — competition over the chieftaincy, fear of plots, wars with
other chiefs, or responsibility for the welfare of the whole community
-- than the common people whose way of life harmonized with the rhythm
of the traditional religion. Also, chiefs, rather than commoners,
came into physical contact with the Muslims; in controlling the Mus-
lims 1 trading activities, in inquiring of Muslimj about conditions in
other countries
,
and in employing literate Muslims in the administra-
tion. I therefore emphasize the role of chiefs as early recipients of
Islamic influence, and consequently the importance of centralized
chiefdoms in the process of Islamization. Indeed, a survey of the
spread of Islam in West Africa clearly shows that Islam did not spread
among stateless peoples
,
even where geographical conditions were the
same.
The king of Malal together with members of his family and the
nobility accepted Islam, whereas the commoners remained pagans. As
mentioned above, this was also the case for Gao at the same period.
Islam thus became a divisive factor within African kingdoms and a po-
tential source for internal crises. This may have been of consider-
able concern for the king of Aluken, a province of Ghana, who, accord-
ing to al-Bakri, ”is said to have been a Muslim, but Concealed this .”12
Chiefs found themselves in a difficult position between an in-
fluential Muslim minority, living close to the center, monopolizing
the trade, and having extensive outside relations, and the majority of
the pagan subjects. The way out of this dilemma was for them to main-
tain a middle position between Islam and paganism; to be neither real
Muslims nor complete pagans . That a negative definition is necessary
indicates that it is difficult to locate the exact position of the
chiefs between the two poles of Islam and paganism. From the middle
position some dynasties or individual rulers sometimes advanced toward
a more complete acceptance of Islam and sometimes fell back to regain
closer relations with tradition. The position of a dynasty or a ruler
lent the color to their kingdoms which made some appear Islamic and
others pagan. The historical circumstances in which such changes may
have taken place will now be illustrated by tracing the development of
Islam in Mali over the centuries.
Arabic sources and oral traditions agree that chiefs among the
Malinke were under Islamic influence before the time of Sundjata,
founder of the empire of Mali
,
in the first half of the thirteenth
century. Sundjata, therefore, came from a dynasty which had already
accepted Islam, at least nominally. Yet, the traditional epos of Mali,
11. Levtzion, Muslims and Chiefs , 51-54.
12. Al-Bakri, 179/ tr. 335.
13. Ibn-Khaldun, Kitab al- T Ibar: kitab ta'rlkh al-duwwal al-islamiyya
bi T l-Maghrib (Algiers, 1847-1851), I, 264, translated as Histoire
des Berbbres et des dynasties musulmanes de l TAfrique du Nord
(Paris, 1925-1956), II, 110-111. For oral traditions, see, among
others, C. Monteil, ”Les Empires du Mali,” Bulletin du Comity
d T Etudes Historiques et Scientifiques de 1 TA.0.F. (1929)
,
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in telling the story of Sundjata, contains hardly any Islamic ele-
ments. Sundjata is presented as a great hunter and magician, which,
indeed, reveals as much about the nature of the oral traditions as
about the image of Sundjata. But one may suggest that in a critical
hour of history, when he had to mobilize the national resources of the
Malinke in their war of liberation against the Soso, Sundjata, though
nominally a Muslim, turned to the traditional religion for support --
to the particularistic spirit of the nation rather than to the uni-
versalistic appeal of Islam. He, therefore, came very close to the
pagan pole.
From its center on the upper Niger, Mali expanded into the
sahil to include the old Islamic centers of Walata, Dia, and later
Timbuktu and Jenne. Muslim traders operated over an extensive network
of trade routes across the length and width of the empire. Sudanese
and North African Muslims came to live in Niani, the capital. Through
its involvement in the trans-Saharan trade, Mali came closer to the
outside Muslim world, especially under those kings who made the pil-
grimage to Mecca and visited Cairo on their way. There were diplo-
matic relations between Mali and Morocco. As the small Malinke chief-
dom turned into a vast multi-ethnic empire with an influential Muslim
minority within and extensive Islamic relations without, its rulers
changed their orientation from closer attachment to the ancestral re-
ligion toward an Islamic outlook.
During its golden age, at the time of Mansa Musa in the four-
teenth century, Mali was regarded as a Muslim empire and was accepted
as such in the Muslim world. A critical review of the evidence, how-
ever, will reveal the vitality of the pre-Islamic heritage, which sus-
tained elements of the traditional religion.
In the fifteenth century, Mali lost the sahil together with
Timbuktu, Jenne, and other centers where Islam was more firmly estab-
lished. Mali was deprived of direct contact with the Muslim world
north of the Sahara. The capital declined and was deserted by its
floating population, the commercial Muslim community. Hence, those
factors which had lent strength to the Islamic magnetic pole ceased to
function. As more ethnic groups escaped the domination of Mali, the
kingdom contracted to its original Malinke nucleus, contributing to
the reassertion of traditional values. Muslim divines remained at-
tached to the chiefs 1 courts and continued to render religious serv-
ices to chiefs, but the chiefs had lost the Islamic zeal and appear-
ance of their fourteenth-century predecessors and were sliding back
toward the pagan pole.
Ibn Battuta’s account of his visit to Mali in 1352-1353 is of
great significance for any analysis of Islam in fourtheenth-century
Mali. He was present at the two Islamic festivals, which he described
in great detail. The king was present at the public prayer, making
it an official ceremony to which non-Muslims may also have been at-
tracted. In return, all the prestige of Islam was mobilized in ex-
horting loyalty to the king, as revealed by the contents of the
preaching. But, as the Islamic festival became a national feast, it
also had to accommodate pre-Islamic ceremonies, which are among the
sources of the kingship’s legitimacy. Ibn Battuta described a dance
19-. D. T. Niane, Sundjata ou l’£popde mandingue (Paris, 1961)
passim .
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of masks on the afternoon of the festival day as well as a recital of
oral tradition by the griots.^-5 In Gonja, Dagomba, and Mamprusi,
Islamic festivals also became the principal national feasts
,
but few
Islamic elements remain there in the way these festivals are cele-
brated by chiefs and commoners.
As a pious Muslim from another culture, Ibn Battuta regarded
"the ridiculous recital of the poets" among the "vile practices" of
the people of Mali, along with other pre-Islamic customs, such as the
rule that "all women must come before the king naked without any cov-
er," or the practice of sprinkling dust over the head as a sign of
respect before the king.^' This practice was later among those con-
demned by TUthman dan Fodio.-*-^
Individual kings, like Mansa Musa of Mali or Askiya Muhammad
of Songhay
,
sincerely attempted to be devout Muslims ; they supported
the T ulama T and sought their advice. But even these kings were unable
to relieve the monarchy of the pre-Islamic traditional basis. Askiya
Dawud (154-9-1583) followed the example of his father Askiya Muhammad
in his attachment to Islam; he could recite the whole Koran, and is
said to have studied the Risala, a basic work of the Maliki school.19
He was visited in his palace by one of the leading T ulama T of Tim-
buktu, who was shocked by the persistence of pre-Islamic practices and
said to the Askiya: "I thought you were mad when I saw you [doing
all these]." "No," the Askiya replied, "I am not mad myself, but I am
the king of the mad. ”20
Within the political system, Islam and traditionalism were by
no means abstract concepts, but represented different social groups
competing to extend their influence over the rulers. Part of the
history of Songhay — which is quite well documented in the Ta 1 rikhs
and reflected in the oral traditions — may be explained in terms of
this tension as it was related to the competition among candidates for
the kingship. Some of the Askiyas relied on the custodians of tradi-
tionalism and departed from the policy of alliance with the T ulama T
which had been initiated by Askiya Muhammad.
The core of my argument is that, though kings were instrumental
in introducing Islam, supported the Muslims, and came themselves under
Islamic influence, they did not become unqualified Muslims as long as
they did not free themselves from the traditional basis of their au-
thority. That a chief cannot be a good Muslim is implied by the Kano
Chronicle. Umaru, Sarki-n-Kano in the first half of the fourteenth
15. Ibn Battuta, Tuhfat al-nuz5r fi ghara'ib al-amsar wa- T a.ia T ib al-
asfar; Voyages (Paris, 1922), IV, 4-09-4-14-.
16. Levtzion, Muslims and Chiefs
. 55, 89-90, 98, 133.
17. Ibn Baftuta, 423-424.
18. M. Hiskett, "Kitab al-Farq : A Work on the Habe Kingdoms Attri-
buted to 1 Uthman dan Fodio," Bulletin of the School of Oriental
and African Studies [BSOAS ] , XXIII, 3 (1960), 563, 569.
19. Ta T rIkh al-Fatt5sh
,
pub. et trad, par 0. Houdas et M. Delafosse
(Paris, 1913), 94/ tr. 177-178.
20. Ibid
. , 114/ tr. 208-210. See also J. 0. Hunwick, "Religion and
State in the Songhay Empire, 1464-1591," in I. M. Lewis, ed.
,
Islam in Tropical Africa (London, 1964)
,
310-311.
21. On the tension between Islam and paganism in Songhay, see J.
Rouch, Contribution £ l T histoire des Songhay (Dakar, 1954)
,
200-204.
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century, was a Mallam and associated with Mallams before he became
Sarki. Some time after his accession one of his Muslim friends ad-
monished him: tT0 Umaru, you still like the fickle dame who has played
you false. 1 ’ Umaru then called the people of Kano and said: "This
high estate is a trap for the erring, I wash my hands of it." "Then
he resigned . . . and spent the rest of his life in regret for his
actions while he had been sarki. "22
During my field work in the Volta Basin, my informants — both
chiefs and Muslims -- were consistent in emphasizing the distinction
between being a chief and being a Muslim. When I asked about a cer-
tain chief whether he was a Muslim, Muslim informants would laugh in
embarrassment. They could not say a chief was a pagan, but neither
could they accept him as a Muslim. One way of answering this per-
plexing question was to say that "he was praying." Indeed, chiefs —
though not Muslims — do pray occasionally
.
23
Islamic influence reached the various social groups within a
kingdom in different degrees. Because of its adaptability in com-
promising with traditional African ways of life, Islam. could appeal
differentially to a wide section of the population. Commoners in the
capital and near the courts of other chiefs may have been drawn into
the orbit of Islam by attending official ceremonies in which Muslim
prayers were said. These were indeed professed pagans, but they are
to be distinguished from other pagans not incorporated in an Islamized
kingdom. In Dagbane, the term chefera (from the Arabic kafir*) is
reserved for the stateless Konkomba and Bassari, who are completely
untouched by Islam. It implies that the non-Muslim Dagomba are re-
garded as less pagan than the Konkomba. 24-
Professed Muslims with little or no Islamic education regard
praying as the principal manifestation of their faith. For those
Muslims, who were very probably the great majority, the ritual rather
than the legal aspects of Islam were of greater importance. Even the
Koran was regarded as a source of blessing rather than a revelation of
the divine law. 25 in the Volta Basin the Imam, with his ritual func-
tions, is the leader of the Muslim community, and most Muslim communi-
ties have no Cadi to administer the Islamic law. Even in a city like
Jenne, as late as the seventeenth century, according to Ta T rIkh al-
Sudan , Sudanese Muslims did not refer to the Cadi but preferred to
litigate before the preacher, who settled their affair by conciliation
(and very likely with reference to customary law as much as to the
shari T a) . 26
Imams and Koranic teachers. Cadis and scholars were members of
the T ulama T class. But even here we must distinguish two groups:
22. H. R. Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs (Lagos, 1928), III, 108.
23. Levtzion, Muslims and Chiefs , 108-109.
24. Ibid .
25. See, for example, the story about the Koran of Larabanga (in
Gonja, Ghana): M. El-Wakkad and I Wilks, eds. and trans.,
Qissat Salagha Ta T rIkh Ghun.ia - "The Story of Salaga and the
History of Gonja," Ghana Notes and Queries
. 3 (1961)
,
12-15;
Levtzion, Muslims and Chiefs
.
73.
Al-Sa T di, Ta T rikh al-Sudan
,
pub. et trad, par 0. Houdas (Paris,
1900)
,
18/ tr. 33.
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those who lived with the chiefs, and rendered them religious services,
and those who lived in the commercial towns, in autonomous Muslim com-
munities. 27 Those who served the chiefs became integrated into the
socio-political system of the state. Though in their personal conduct
they endeavored to observe the obligations of Islam, they must have
accepted the realities of compromise in presenting Islam to their
chiefs in mild and diluted forms. For al-Maghili and T Uthman dan
Fodio these were the vile 7 ulama 7 ,28 yet for centuries they carried
the burden of extending the frontiers of Islam.
In the autonomous Muslim communities in the commercial towns
— for which Timbuktu is the most illustrious example — the 7 ulama 7
maintained a high standard of Islamic scholarship, had connections
with other centers of learning in the Muslim world, and were concerned
with the application of the Islamic law. These T ulama T represented
normative Islam — as taught in the books — whereas the majority of
the Muslims practiced what may be called popular Islam. Continuous
communications between the remotest Muslim communities and the centers
of learning prevented the widening of the gap between normative and
popular Islam, but the very existence of such a gap inspired the
T ulama T in their attempts toward reform.
Unlike the T ulama T in the chiefs 7 courts, who were dependent
on the chiefs, the T ulama 7 of Timbuktu dealt with the rulers from an
independent standing. They were therefore in a position to preach to
the kings and admonish them without compromising. 29 it was this tra-
dition of the 7 ulama 7 which brought about the militant j ihad movements
in the nineteenth century.
At the time of Askiya Muhammad, a militant 7 alim , al-Maghlll,
tried to introduce reforms through the Songhay monarch. Yet, in spite
of the best intentions of Askiya Muhammad he failed to transform Son-
ghay into an Islamic empire, as became evident under some of his suc-
cessors. Indeed, the experience of many centuries proved that the
ruling dynasties could not go all the way to become Muslims to fit the
standards set by the 7 ulama 7 , because of their residual pre -Islamic
heritage. This radical break with the past could not be accom-
plished through evolution; an armed revolution was necessary. In
other words
,
if chiefs cannot turn true Muslims
,
then the only way to
make the state Islamic is for the 7 ulama 7 to become chiefs.
Most of the states which emerged as a result of the jihad move-
ments were not, strictly speaking, theocracies (indeed few, if any, of
the states in the wider Muslim world were theocracies) . But a signif-
icant change occurred as a result of these Islamic revolutions. Islam
moved from the periphery to the center of the socio-political system
and became the only source of legitimacy for the state and its rulers.
27. On the 7ulama 7 in the court of Mali, Ibn-Battuta, IV, 404- ; on
Muslim autonomous communities, Ta 7 rikh al-Fattash , 179-180/ tr.
3L4-315.
28. M. Hiskett, TTAn Islamic Tradition of Reform in the Western Sudan
from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century,” BSOAS, XXV, 3
(1962), 581.
29. On the confrontation between the Cadi Mahmud Aqit of Timbuktu and
Askiya Muhammad, Ta 7 ri!kh al-Fattash , 60/ tr. 116.
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In terms of our model, the pagan pole was deprived of its magnetism.
For the first time the commoners themselves were gradually moving
toward Islam, not only because of greater coercion but also because
this was the way to identify oneself with the socio-political system
and its values. Those who remained pagan, irrespective of their num-
bers, were relegated to the lowest status and to the fringes of the
society. Only by becoming Muslims could they again become recognized
members of the system. The Hausa-Fulani state emirates of Northern
Nigeria are the best example of such a process.
I have not as yet said anything about one of the most important
institutions in West African Islam, the tarI eras or Muslim brother-
hoods. The reason is that, in my opinion, the brotherhoods became
significant in the eighteenth century only. Indeed, I could not trace
any clear reference to brotherhoods in the seventeenth-century Ta * rikh
al-Sudan and Ta T rIkh al-Fattash . In other parts of the Muslim world
the brotherhoods are sometimes associated with popular Islam, but, in
West Africa -- apart from Senegal which is a case in itself — the
brotherhoods were associated with the better educated elite rather
than with the rank and file. In the Volta Basin I had the impression
that to become a Tijani is regarded something like a second conversion
into Islam of a higher level.
As the influence of the brotherhoods — first Qadiriya and then
Tijaniya -- spread in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the
more deeply Islamized Sudanic belt, a new spirit of devotion to Islam
was inspired. The brotherhoods enhanced solidarity and cohesiveness
in the elite corps of Islam to bring about more militant and uncom-
promising attitudes. The brotherhoods therefore played an important
role in stimulating the .jihad movements. On the other hand, I believe
that in West Africa, excluding Senegal, the brotherhoods were of lit-
tle, if any, importance in the early stages of the spread of Islam; in
the process of extending the frontiers of Islamic influence.
Throughout this paper it may appear as if I were posing as a
censor of Islamic ethics and conduct by using such terms as "true
Muslim," "unqualified Muslin," or "not complete Muslim." In fact, for
the purpose of my studies I accept as Muslim every individual who re-
gards himself as a Muslim. I could not, however, avoid making the
distinction between different levels of practicing Islam, and for that
purpose have tried to follow the standards set by the T ulama T for what
I call normative Islam. My perception of the process of Islamization
is of a movement of individuals and groups
,
departing from any form of
traditional religion before its contact with Islam and following a
line which ends with normative Islam. Everyone along this line may
regard himself as a Muslim, and it is for Allah to judge his faith and
deeds. It is impossible for us to weigh in quantative terms what per-
centage of non-Islamic elements he carries with him in order to be
able to place him exactly in the appropriate section on that line.
But where we have enough evidence we may say that he has not yet gone
through the complete process. The conviction that the process should
be completed is again not mine; it was manifested by the very occur-
rence of the jihads .

CHAPTER 3
THE SONGHAY EMPIRE UNDER SONNI ALI AND ASKIA MUHAMMAD:
A STUDY IN COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS
Anne W. Pardo
Introduction
As the Mali Empire began to decline in the last half of the
fourteenth century, various subject peoples reasserted their inde-
pendence. One of those peoples was the Songhay, who had been subject
to Mali domination at various times in the late thirteenth and early
fourteenth centuries. Songhay as a kingdom had existed since the
seventh century, and even when subject to Mali, the Songhay king was
allowed to remain on his throne as long as he swore loyalty to the
Mali Mansa. However, in 1375, the Songhay took advantage of the weak-
ness of Mali and reestablished their freedom. During the next two
centuries
,
the Songhay created an empire which was comparable in many
ways to that of Mali at its height. Although the core of the Mali
empire remained independent, and was never under Songhay rule, most of
the outlying areas were conquered by Songhay, and in addition new
territories to the east were conquered. Thus the Songhay Empire was
a successor to Mali in that it again brought the area of the middle
Niger or central Sudan under one government. Songhay took from Mali
the profitable trans -Saharan trade in gold and slaves, which provided
an economic base for the empire.
The kings of Songhay, like the Mansas of Mali, were Muslim, as
were many members of their court. According to Es-Sadi, the fifteenth
Dia was converted to Islam, around 1010, and moved his capital from
Goungia to Gao. From this time, there was contact with Muslims, both
traders and marabouts; however the bulk of the populations remained
attached to their traditional beliefs. Songhay freed itself from Mali
central around 1375, but it was not until a century later that the
great expansion of Songhay occurred. There were two chief architects
of Songhay T s expansion — Sonni Ali (1464-1492) and Mohammad Ture
(1493-1528) . These two rulers were entirely different both in per-
sonality and methods of rule, and they received quite different treat-
ment by the historians of the time. Sonni Ali is still a popular
figure in the area today, due to oral traditions, and yet he was
vilified by the local historians of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, Es-Sadi and M. Kati. Mohammad Ture was glorified by these
same historians and his reputation has been further enhanced by schol-
ars such as Delafosse, Urvey (who skipped over Sonni Ali)
,
and Trim-
ingham. Es-Sadi referred to Sonni Ali as ’’evil, libertine, unjust,
tyrannical, sanguinary; only God knows how many men he has caused to
41
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die."1 On the other hand, he spoke favorably of Mohammad Ture: "God
has favored Askia-Mohammad T s reign, he has assured him great conquests
and has covered him with his magnificent protection. "2 The prejudi-
cial view of Sonni Ali is being reevaluated by historians today, such
as Boubou Hama, who has the following opinion of Sonni Ali: "The
giant of West African history, Sonni-Ali-Ber
,
through his incomparable
military genius, forged the Songhay Empire and with the same stroke
the period of Songhay direction of the western and central Sudan after
the collapse of the great Mali empire. "3 Hama does not discredit
Mohammad Ture, but tries to redress the balance between these two
great men. 1*
An aware interpreter of his time, his era, it was Mohammad
Ture who was the zealous administrator of all that Sonni
Ali could save, on the basis of Islam; he was equally re-
markable as the man of the Sudanese revival, of the great-
ness of the Songhay people now integrated into a much vaster
ensemble, open to the Muslim world of the period and to the
possibilities of fruitful exchanges and trade.
In this paper I will examine the character and achievements of these
two rulers of Songhay and compare their accomplishments and impor-
tance .
* * * * *
Sonni Ali was descended from Ali Kolon, who, with his brother
Suleiman Nar, was either a hostage of the Songhay ruler at the court
of Mali during the time of Mansa Musa, ® or else in the service of the
Mansa of Mali.® The brothers left, or escaped, from Mali around 1335
and threw off the control of Mali; Ali Kolon became the ruler and took
the name of Si or Sunni for his dynasty. It was possible that this
dynasty was a continuation of the Dia dynasty (of Lemta Berber ori-
gin) 7 because Ali Kolon was a son of Dia Yasi-boy. However, with Ali
Kolon, the ruling house took a new name. Sonni Ali, or Ali-Ber, was
the eighteenth king to rule after Ali Kolon, and he came to the throne
in 1464.8 Es-Sadi said that Sonni Ali had come from Tekrur, but he
gave no further details. 9 Other traditions claim that his father was
a Sonni,1® and that he was named Ma Dogo, 11 or Suleiman Dandi. 1 ^ His
mother was from Farou or Fara (attributed to various localities) and
was not a Muslim. According to Rouch, Sonni Ali learned idolatry
1. Abderrahman ben Abdallah ben Imran ben Omir Es-Sadi, Tarikh es-
Soudan, 0. Houdas, trans. (Paris, 1964), 103.
2. Ibid . , 121.
3. Boubou Hama, Histoire des Songhay (Paris, 1968), 128.
4. Ibid., 174.
5. Ibid
. ,
143.
6. Es-Sadi, Tarikh , 10.
7. E. W. Bovill, Caravans of the Old Sahara (London, 1933), 86.
8. Es-Sadi, Tarikh , 6.
9. Ibid., 104.
10. J. Beraud-Villars
,
L T Empire de Gao (Paris, 1942), 43.
11. J. S. Trimingham, A History of Islam in West Africa (London,
1962)
,
93.
12. J. 0. Hunwick, "Religion and State in the Songhay Empire, 1464-
1591," in I. M. Lewis, ed.
,
Islam in Tropical Africa (London,
1966)
,
301.
13 . Beraud-Villars
,
Gao , 43
.
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and pagan customs from his mother and the magic of kings from his
father. 19- Hama has put forward the thesis that Sonni Ali came from
Kebbi
,
actually from Farou near Sokoto
,
with an army to deliver Gao
from the Tuareg, Arabs, and Berbers. it was possible that his
mother was a slave from Farou or the daughter of a ruler of that area,
and that Ali either went to her house in his youth or that she taught
him her traditional beliefs. His father taught him the traditions of
the kings because he would one day rule. These latter seemed to em-
phasize magical rather than Islamic elements. Thus Ali was exposed to
three systems of belief: royal magic and superstition, local beliefs
of Farou, and Islam as practiced in the court and the trading center
of Gao.
When Sonni All came to the throne, Timbuktu had been under
Tuareg rule since 1433. The Tuareg chief, Akil-ag-Meloual
,
did not
rule Timbuktu himself but left it in the hands of Mohammad-Naddi
,
who
had governed Timbuktu also under the Mali empire. 15 in m_65 Mohammad-
Naddi died and was succeeded by his son Ammar. Mohammad-Naddi had
sent his congratulations to Sonni Ali upon his accession; Ammar, how-
ever, had sent him an unfriendly letter. In 1467 or 1468 Akil arrived
in Timbuktu during the annual tax collection and confiscated Ammar T s
share of the tax in addition to taking his own. Ammar turned to Sonni
Ali for assistance in ridding Timbuktu of Tuareg domination. During
his first three years
,
Sonni Ali had been consolidating his power and
was eager to add Timbuktu to his domain. Ammar had promised to de-
liver the city to him.l? At sight of Ali T s army, Akil and many of the
Muslims fled to Walata; at the last moment Ammar fled too, fearing
perhaps that, because of his earlier opposition, Ali would not treat
him kindly. 1° Sonni Ali seemed to have been feared by the Muslims,
either because his insensitivity to the scholars was already known,
or perhaps because of his pagan upbringing. He justified these fears
by his harsh treatment of those who remained behind in Timbuktu. His
excuse for the harsh treatment was that Muslim scholars were too
friendly with the Tuareg ;19 but it may also have been frustration
with Ammar. El-Mokhtar, brother of Ammar, had been left behind to
make submission to Ali, who accepted him as Mayor of Timbuktu, despite
his persecution of this line. The possession of Timbuktu alone did
not assure Ali of control over the profitable trade; in order to se-
cure that trade, Ali turned next to Jenne. Rouch claimed that the
siege of Jenne took place from 1471 to 1476; 20 Hama placed it from
1466 to 147321 (thus before and after Timbuktu was captured) ; Dela-
fosse said that the siege was four, not seven years, beginning after
the capture of Timbuktu and ending by 1473.22 Ali did not persecute
the people of Jenne; in fact, he married the mother of the young king
(the king having died during the siege). 23 Sonni Ali thus had gained
14. Jean Rouch, Contribution £ l T Histoire des Songhay (Dakar, 1953)
,
181.
15. Hama, Songhay , 128.
16. Ibid
. , 144.
17. Ibid .
18. Es-Sadi, Tarikh
.
105.
19. Ibid
. , 107.
20. Rouch, Contribution
.
182.
21. Hama, Songhay
, 145.
22. Maurice Delafosse, Haut-S£nggal-Niger (Paris, 1912), II, 79.
23. Ibid.
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control of the centers of trade within the Sudan and of the terminus
of trade with North Africa. He proceeded to extend his control over
the country between these two towns.
In these exploits the Mossi were one of his enemies and he at-
tacked them in 1469, 1470, 1477, and 1483. 2l+ He made expeditions
against Hombori and Bandiagara in 1465, 1466, 1476, and 1484, and
against the Fulani of the Gourma region (South of the Niger and Tim-
buktu) in 1465, 1470, 1488, and 1492. 25 Ali planned an attack on
Walata by digging a canal and transporting his army by water; while
he was involved with that project, however, the Mossi attacked and
pillaged Walata in 1480, and Ali turned to meet and defeat the Mossi
in 1483.26 in 1486 he undertook new persecutions against the Muslims
of Timbuktu and put El Mokhtar, the Mayor, in prison. Sonni Ali's
major enemies were thus the Fulani, the Tuareg, and the Mossi, and
he conducted numerous expeditions against them as there was not one
center of power which he could defeat and thus end the threat once and
for all. In 1492 he met his death on the return from an expedition in
Gourma (see below) . An account of his reign reads like a series of
battles, but he was establishing his control over new areas and it was
necessary to eliminate the opposition. Even those who vilified Sonni
Ali testified that he was a strong man with great energy, 27 ’’always
the victor, never vanquished. ’’28 Thus he must have been a talented
general, able to organize men, keep their allegiance, and supply his
army (especially as he was constantly on the move and away from his
capital for long stretches of time) . He had residences at Koukiya
(Goungia, ancient capital)
,
Gao (actual capital)
,
Kabara (part of
Timbuktu)
,
and Owara (Aoure) in Dirma; but he spent little time in any
of these places, being constantly on expeditions . 29
Sonni Ali drew his army from the people of his empire as
needed; there was no standing army. He had several generals, among
them Mohammad Ture and his brother Omar-Komdiago. His government
seemed to have been administered by chiefs or governors (farma or
faren or koi)
,
who were sometimes head of an army as well, i.e., the
Dendi-fari Afoumba.30 The governors probably drew their army from
their provinces. There was a hi koi or chief of the flotilla; 31
Ali seemed to use the rivers for transportation, as was evident in his
scheme to build a canal to Walata. Songhay was composed of twenty-
four tribes of slaves or castes ;32 some of the occupations of these
groups illuminate practices current in Songhay. There were cutters of
grass for horses; 31 thus horses were present and probably used by the
army. Another group was the fishermen and boatmen; 34 thus, the impor-
tance of the river was indicated. Others were servants, smiths.
24. Rouch
,
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26. Es-Sadi, Tarikh, 114.
27. Ibid. 103.
28. Mahmoud Kati, Tarikh el-Fettach,
trans. (Paris, 1964), 82.
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shoemakers. ^ 3 There were numerous other titles listed by Kati, many
of which were retained by the Askia. Thus Ali had created a vast em-
pire by conquest, with the beginnings of a bureaucratic network; un-
fortunately he was still securing himself militarily and did not live
long enough to complete the organization of his administration. For
that reason, the credit has often been given to his successor. But he
had accomplished an admirable feat in twenty-eight years. Trimingham
has said that he tried to build his empire by force; 36 but perhaps he
did not live long enough to complete the next step. When he died,
his empire was divided geographically into two areas : the west cen-
tered around Timbuktu and Jenne; and the east, around Gao and the Son-
ghay homeland. Had he lived longer, he might have been able to affect
greater integration between the two. And perhaps there would have
been other innovations. It was claimed that he had contact with the
Portuguese and gave them permission to establish a factory at Wadan.37
The Arab historians pointed to the Muslims killed by Sonni Ali,
thus implying that he was an infidel, like his mother. And yet there
were instances in the accounts of both Es-Sadi and Kati where he took
part in Islamic rituals. What then was his religious position? As we
have seen from his background, he had had contact with the traditional
beliefs of a rural area, with the royal cult, and with Islam. From
Rouch we gain an idea of the complex nature of Songhay religion and
how Islam had infiltrated and strengthened the traditional beliefs. 3
8
Songhay had borrowed religious practices from both Islam and Mali,
and probably from other sources too. Rouch believed that Sonni Ali
had attempted to synthesize Islam and traditional religion. 39 Hun-
wick added that perhaps the traditional beliefs were weakening, and
thus Sonni Ali took from Islam certain aspects to strengthen tradi-
tional ways. 4-0 But Ali T s power was based on tradition; although he
used Islam, he did not want it to become dominant and thus his perse-
cution of the Muslim traders of Timbuktu was aimed at limiting their
power. 9-1 Hunwick T s thesis was that Ali wanted to maintain Islam as a
royal right and provide a strengthened tradition with some Islamic
elements for the people. 4-2 it was possible that these were Ali T s in-
tentions; let us consider some of the details.
Although there is no proof for the conclusion that traditional
ways were beginning to weaken, we do know that Islam had been present
since 1010 and that with the development of Timbuktu and Jenne, these
towns were Muslim centers. 4-3 in fact, we might assume from Ammar T s
letter criticizing Sonni Ali that the Mayor of Timbuktu considered
himself an important and even semi-independent person. But we also
know that Islam was limited to the trading centers and trade routes
and that rural areas were little affected. However, the increase of
35. Ibid., 111-112.
36. Trimingham, History, 93.
37. Bovill, Caravans, 90.
38. Jean Rouch, La Religion et la Magie Songhay (Paris, 1960),
passim.
39. Ibid., 14.
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trading contacts, the disruption of the countryside caused by the fall
of Mali and the expeditions of Sonni Ali, could have had a detrimental
effect on the traditional religious beliefs. Islam was more easily
introduced and accepted when society was disrupted and there was a
break with the past.^ Yet Sonni Ali certainly did not choose to use
Islam alone as a new integrative force
,
perhaps because he did not
want to be subjected to an outside force. Rouch claimed that Sonni
Ali wanted to rid his territory of all foreign influence (Islam, Mali,
Arab, or Tuareg)
,
and build a purely Sudanic state. ^5 Since there had
been Islamic influence from 1010, it would not be possible, probably,
to eliminate Islamic practices. And there were certain aspects of
Islam which were useful, i.e., in the areas of trade, standardization
of weights and measures, Arabic as the language of trade, or the su-
pervision of markets.
Despite Ali T s persecutions of the Muslims, therefore, the two
Tarikhs mentioned his performance of Muslim rituals. Kati said that
although his actions were those of an infidel, he spoke as though well
versed in religious (Muslim) things. He was recorded as praying at
the time of Islamic holidays, or Ramadan, while on expeditions.^ He
made the qadi, Habib, his chief qadi, because he respected the pater-
nal cousin of this man, one El-Mamoun. ^8 On another occasion he sent
the Muslim scholars of Timbuktu a present of some women captives. ^9
He postponed his daily prayers and then said all five at one time, 50
but he did perform them. Es-Sadi referred to him as a Kharedjite. 51
Whether or not this was an excuse to disqualify his Muslim practices,
an explanation of his treatment of Muslims, or simply another name
used against him (because the Malikite code was predominant in the
Sudan)
,
was not clear. Beraud-Villars claimed that the Kharedjite
doctrine had been propagated by Abu Yezid, whose mother was a native
of Gao. 52 jt may have appealed to Sonni Ali because it rejected the
Khalif in Mecca, and thus he claimed to be Kharedjite without adhering
to any of the austere practices of that sect. 53 Levy defined the
Kharedjites as a dissident group which renounced the need for higher
authorities; one could follow the laws without guidance and where
such guidance was necessary, a local believer could be chosen. 54 This
lack of subordination to outside authority would have appealed to
Sonni Ali. It was Rouch T s contention that Ali was a Muslim when he
began his reign and then reverted to the traditional beliefs. 55 But
Hunwick has pointed out that this interpretation was based on an in-
accurate translation of an Arabic manuscript of Al-Maghili; the ac-
curate translation stated that he fasted at Ramadan, gave alms, and
also worshipped idols and trusted soothsayers and magicians. 56
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Let us examine some of the traditional religious practices
which Rouch observed several centuries later, which showed Islamic
influences. The Songhay believed in a high god, a creator, but re-
mote, with no associated cult; a concept which could be equated with
Allah. 57 The cult of Maleka, an angel of good, was influenced by both
Islam and magic. 58 The cult of Zin, based on the divinity of the
soil, a belief of agricultural people, was much influenced by Islamic
ideas. 59 The ancestor cult was an important part of traditional be-
lief; Islamic influence, however, made the ancestors an intermediary
in the worship of Allah°0 or substituted a venerated marabout for the
ancestors. 61 Sometimes a historical figure, such as Sonni Ali, was
incorporated into a myth or cult, displacing the previous character. 62
Traditional cults, such as the Holey, gods in the form of men who
could act in the earth, water, or sky, were used to explain natural
events, and were still accepted in Rouch T s time. 63 The belief in
magic and divination could be easily accepted within an Islamic frame-
work. 64 Not all of these beliefs were accepted by everyone at the
same time, but it does indicate the ways in which Islam can be accom-
modated with traditional beliefs. In fact, the Muslims were city
dwellers and traders, who needed the fishermen, smiths, and cultiva-
tors, and therefore did not destroy their traditional beliefs which
were related to their occupation but added Islamic elements. 6 5 Rouch,
therefore, concluded that:
The observer in general sees only Islamic manifestations --
Ramadan fasts, feasts of the sheep, daily salams. He has
often concluded that the Songhay are entirely Islamised.6
But on closer examination,
Islam in Songhay appears less like the dominant religion than
like an essential element of a religious complex (itself
formed through the contact of various influences) in which
it is, more or less thoroughly, melded. 67
Was Sonni Ali then attempting a synthesis of Islam and tradi-
tional belief? He was equipped by his personal background to do so,
and he also needed a strong base for his expanding empire. Some syn-
thesis would of course take place naturally, but it did appear that
Sonni Ali kept up Islamic practices and yet persecuted the leaders
and also participated in traditional practices. And for this contra-
dictory situation there must have been a reason. Trimingham concluded
that he was making fun of Islam with his prayers. 68 Delafaosse felt
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that he was undecided as to which religion to accept. ^9 But as Hun-
wick has mentioned, these explanations are not consistent with the
other facts we know of Sonni Ali, his personality and his military
exploits. On the other hand, Ali did not use Islam in the way that
Mohammad Ture would do. Therefore, the possibility remains that he
was pursuing a purposeful course as concluded by Hunwick. "Sunni Ali,
therefore, in his apparently ambivalent attitude, was but endeavoring
to maintain the equilibrium and safeguard his own position. "70
I found it instructive to consider the religious beliefs of
Sonni Ali both as a means of comparison with Mohammad Ture and also as
an explanation of some of Ali T s political and military actions. The
relationship of each to Islam was quite different, and the way
each treated Islam was to have almost opposite results in the empire.
What can be said of Sonni Ali T s personality? Kati described
him as "tyrannical, debauched, cursed, oppressing, "71 and Es-Sadi T s
string of adjectives consisted of "evil, libertine, unjust, tyranni-
cal, sanguinary ."72 Their attitude was colored by his treatment of
Muslim scholars, especially in their native city of Timbuktu. But
Sonni Ali was also a good soldier and a vigorous ruler. He probably
believed that force or strong action was the best way to produce re-
sults. Being a strong and determined man, he did not accept criti-
cisms well, especially from those who did not seem to him to have had
the necessary experience. He was likely an impatient man who could
not take time from battles to perform prayers or other rituals . He
was a man of action, a soldier; he was also a man of occasional vio-
lent temper. When he was angry with someone he might order his exe-
cution, but he would later repent, sincerely. 73 His servants, knowing
this
,
would hide the condemned man until Ali repented and then produce
him; one of these servants was Mohammad Ture. 74 Ali was ambitious and
forthright; he was not crafty or cunning. He must have been an excel-
lent soldier to have achieved the exploits he did. His use of the
river for transportation was clever, and the idea of a canal to Walata
showed a sharp intellect. That he was a great man in the eyes of the
people is illustrated by Hama T s writings.
There were several versions of Sonni Ali T s death, and none can
be completely accepted. One version was that he drowned in a River
Koni on his way back from a military expedition in Gourma in 1492-
1493.75 Another was that he died suddenly in the village of Konna,
struck down by God. 76 The Songhay traditions from Tera, however, as-
serted that Ali was assassinated by one of his generals, Mohammad
Ture, who later took the throne from his son. 77 His death appeared to
have been sudden, so perhaps the traditions were trying to account for
that as well as for what was to follow. His son did succeed him for a
short time, as Sonni Bakary Daa or Sonni Barou, so whether or not
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Mohammad Ture assassinated Sonni Ali, he did not gain power immedi-
ately. Both Kati and Es-Sadi claimed that Mohammad Ture was motivated
by religious considerations ; Kati even said that he had asked Sonni
Barou three times to convert to Islam, but each time he had refused. 78
Mohammad Ture T s first attempt to take power in February 1493 by at-
tacking Sonni Barou at Diaga was unsuccessful. Beraud-Villars felt
that there was discontent with the choice of Barou as the successor,
partly for religious reasons, and that Mohammad Ture, who had personal
ambitions, organized the discontent. 79 The fact that Sonni Barou
would not accept Islam was certainly the excuse if not the main reason
for opposition, and in April 1493 Mohammad Ture made a second attack,
at Angou, and defeated Sonni Barou, who fled to Anorou. 86
What sort of man was Mohammad Ture to have served under Sonni
Ali and then have brought the Sonni dynasty to an end? The Tarikh el
Fettach attributed a common origin to the Dia, Sonni, and Askia dynas-
ties
,
but gave no further details
.
88
- This would contradict the belief
that Sonni Ali had a Berber origin, 8 2 because it was generally agreed
that Mohammad Ture was Sudanese, i.e.
,
Soninke. 88 The tradition, how-
ever, indicated that Mohammad Ture was the nephew of Sonni Ali, having
been the son of his sister Kassai, naming a genie as his father. 8L|- In
order to explain his inferior rank relative to his birth, the tradi-
tions said that Sonni Ali was told by divines that he would be assas-
sinated by a son of his sister Kassai; thus he put all her sons to
death. 88 But Mohammad Ture was born on the same night as the girl
baby of a slave of the compound, and Kassai and the slave exchanged
babies. 86 According to Hama, the legend was a means of justifying
Mohammad Ture T s later position, 87 which would be a possibility.
There are several questions which should be asked here. Mo-
hammad Ture was fifty when he took the throne, but if he was so reli-
gious and opposed to Sonni Ali’s practices, why did he serve him for
so long? Kati claimed that only one king, the Bara-koi (chief of Bara)
allied with Mohammad Ture against the Sonni. 88 Mohammad Ture, however,
as a general under Ali, would have had troops under his command. He
was probably a skilled warrior, having studied under Sonni Ali. As
such, he would also have had access to Ali and probably could have as-
sassinated him, although one might expect him to have had someone else
perform the actual act for him. He would then have to justify his ac-
tion and position, and may have used religion as an excuse and a
means. There was, however, no indication that he was particularly re-
ligious up to this time; in fact he probably aided Sonni Ali in per-
secuting Muslims. Beraud-Villars described him as intelligent, ener-
getic, thoughtful, a man who knew what he wanted, but not an adven-
turer; 89 and yet he had served Sonni Ali until the age of fifty, an
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advanced age for that era. Did an opportunity suddenly present itself
and Mohammad Ture was chosen by the Muslims, or chose himself, to take
action? Or had Sonni Ali*s evil practices increased beyond endurance?
I cannot answer that conclusively.
Under Sonni Ali, Mohammad Ture had held the title of askiya,
but he was not the only askiya ; his actual position was Tondi-farma
or chief of the cliffs and the Tondi Mountains. 90 His brother, Omar
Komdiaga, also held a position under Ali, that of Kotalo-farma, or
chief of Kotalo (an unidentified region). 91 If the title askiya ex-
isted under Sonni Ali, then the origin recounted by Es-Sadi that it
was the equivalent of "he is not that" in Soninke, and was uttered by
Ali T s daughters when they learned of Mohammad Ture T s accession, would
not be possible. 92 Also, the blood relationships of Ali and Mohammad
Ture would have given the latter access to the magical powers as well
as partially justifying his succession, which did not seem to have
been the case. Regardless of his origin, Mohammad did succeed and
take the name of Askia for the new dynasty which he founded.
The advent of Mohammad Ture as Askia brought a change for the
position of Islam in the empire. Muslims were no longer persecuted,
El-Mokhtar was released from prison, and his brother Ammar, who fled
in 14-69 to Walata, was recalled to be governor of Timbuktu (he had
died and the position was given instead to his son Omar). 93 The
Tarikhs could not say enough favorable things about the Askia and his
treatment of the Muslims. It was possible that Mohammad Ture owed his
accession to Muslim support and whs thus obligated to them. Two years
after he took power, in 14-95, he went on pilgrimage to Mecca. Several
interesting facts emerged from this event. He must have felt his po-
sition to have been secure in order to have allowed him a two year
absence. He left his brother Omar Komdiago, now governor of Gourma,
in charge. He was accompanied by his son Musa and his confident Ali
Folan, whom Kati said was the chief of the palace eunuchs, 9^ and whom
Delafosse called a general. 93 His pilgrimage was lavish, after the
fashion of Mansa Musa (perhaps even consciously copying him) . He took
much of the wealth from the treasury which had been accumulated by
Sonni Ali and distributed it as alms in the Holy Cities
,
thus making
an impression. Oral tradition claimed that he made the pilgrimage to
seek pardon for killing Sonni Ali. 96 Another reason given was his
need for advice from religious authorities on the affairs in his em-
pire. 97 The traditions of Wanzerbe held that the ulama in Mecca were
divided as to whether Mohammad Ture was a Muslim or a pagan. 98 Still
another reason put forward to explain his pilgrimage concerned his
desire to create a new basis of authority because Sonni Barou and his
brothers had escaped with the traditional insignia of office which had
been the outward symbols of the traditional basis of authority.^ The
Sherif of Mecca, according to Kati, gave him the turban of sovereignty
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and the title of imam; 100 Es-Sadi said it was the Abbasid Khalif who
named him his lieutenant in the Sudan. 101 He therefore acquired, from
his pilgrimage, new insignia of office, regardless of what it actually
was. Hunwick has suggested that the story of Mohammad Ture T s pilgrim-
age in Kati was altered by Seku Ahmadu in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, with additions pointing to the advent of another savior, such as
the story of the twelve Khalifs. 102 Furthermore, it was likely that the
Abbasid Khalif mentioned by Es-Sadi was in Cairo, not Mecca, and was
the puppet of the Mameluk Sultans ; he thus granted Mohammad a meaning-
less privilege as his lieutenant in the Sudan. 103 There was little
doubt, however, that Mohammad Ture was impressed by what he had seen
on his pilgrimage. The lands he had traveled through wdre all Muslim,
and this may well have influenced him in favor of Islam. He had been
treated well, perhaps partly because of the wealth he displayed (like
Mansa Musa). He had met Muslim scholars, such as El-Djelal-Es-
Soyouti, who advised him on matters of state. 10^ Thus, regardless of
what he had been when he §et out, he came back with a belief in Islam
and a desire to put it in force in his empire, and this could be seen
in his subsequent actions.
Beraud-Villars characterized Askia as an organizer and consoli-
dator, not a conqueror. 105 But the conquering had been done by Sonni
Ali and Askia had certainly participated as his general; furthermore,
he undertook additional military expeditions as we shall see. Sonni
Ali had begun to organize his acquired territories, but had not been
able to complete the mammoth task. Thus Mohammad Ture was not the in-
novator, at least in some areas, that he has sometimes been consid-
ered. Before discussing his political policies, however, it must be
made clear that military actions continued, in suppressing revolts in
conquered areas and in repelling Mossi raids. Although Mohammad Ture
did not always head his army in person, his skill and experience as a
general must have been an important factor. Furthermore, his brother,
who also had experience under Sonni Ali, served as the Askia* s second-
in-command. Mohammad Ture came to power in May 14-93, and in 1499-14-95
he captured the town of Diaga, possibly with the help of his brother,
whom he named Kan-fari
,
chief of the summit, at this time. 106 Askia
told Omar to select a city for his headquarters and to establish him-
self therein; Omar selected Tendirma and proceeded to establish him-
self there (peacefully?) with the aid of the Sorko inhabitants .107
After this, Askia left on his pilgrimage, trusting his brother to
maintain the empire in his absence. Part of the army and court ac-
companied him on pilgrimage, perhaps eliminating some possible dis-
sensions. On his return from Mecca, Askia was imbued with religious
zeal and conducted his only jihad against the Mossi, in 1498-
1499. He went through the formula of asking King Nasserere I of
Yatunga to convert, and, when he refused, he tried to force him
through war. 108 The battle was considered a victory because he de-
feated the Mossi army, but the Mossi were not converted as a whole
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(many captives were taken and became soldiers) . 109 In 1499-1500 Askia
annexed Bagana, a former territory of the Mali empire. Having added
that large area in the west, he then turned his army to the east. De-
lafosse claimed that he moved against Sonni Barou in Ayorou (where he
had fled) ;110 but Rouch and Hama contend that it was AyarrAir, not
Ayorou, and that Delafosse had confused the two places.HI The expe-
dition in the Sahara accordingly lasted from 1500 to 1504 and resulted
in the Berber-Tuareg-Kabyles coalition being crushed.
I
12 During this
same period Omar conducted an expedition in Dialana (former Diara of
Mali)
,
which was probably a continuation of the Bagana campaign. One
of the captives in the Dialana campaign was to become the mother of
Askia T s son Ismail. Kati, however, said that from 1502 to 1504
Askia remained in Gao
,
undertaking no expeditions ;114 therefore he did
not lead the second half of the Sahara campaign mentioned above. It
was in 1502 that Al-Maghili visited Gao; I will discuss his influence
on Askia later in the paper. In 1505-1506 there was an expedition in
the southeast against Borgou or Bariba, in which the Niger was uti-
lized to transport troops. (El Kassoum said the Borgou campaign
lasted until 1509. )H5 The casualties among the leaders of Eastern
Songhay were high,H£3 a fact which greatly disturbed Omar. Askia,
however, justified their death as they were still attached to Sonni
Ali and would have become troublesome later on.H? This would indi-
cate that Askia was not completely accepted.
There followed one year of rest, and then in 1507-1508 there
was an expedition against another of Mali T s former territories, Ga-
lamboutH° or Kilanbunt.119 Askia sent two of his trusted advisors,
Ali Folan and the Balama, Mohammed-Korei
,
to meet with the Bagama-fari
in 1511-1512. But there was no indication of the reasons behind this
meeting. 12° The following year Askia faced opposition in the form of
the Fulani chief Tenguella who posed as a Muslim prophet and reformer,
rousing followers in Bakounou (to the west of the Empire which had
been captured from Mali) . Delafosse said that Askia defeated Ten-
guella, 121 Kati claimed that it was Omar, 12 2 but at any rate he was
killed and his followers fled to Futa where they established a Fulani
dynasty which lasted until the eighteenth century. 123 The importance
was that Askia fought against other Muslims. Having defeated this
threat in the West, Askia again turned to the east, this time to
Katsina to reassert an old domination. 124 The Kanta of Kebbi admired
this victory and allied with Askia against Agades in 1514-1516, which
was duly conquered and forced to pay tribute. However, Askia and the
Kanta quarreled over the division of the booty!25 and separated; in
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1516-1517 Askia tried unsuccessfully to conquer Kebbi. This was
Askia* s most serious defeat and was to check his expansion in the
southeast as well as diminish his reputation. 126 Bagana received a
definitive defeat in 1517 at the hand of Omar; 127 this was the second
or third expedition against Bagana. However, Omar died in 1519 and
Askia lost his brother, second in command, and trusted adviser. Askia
himself must have been seventy-seven. An older brother, Yahia, suc-
ceeded to Omar T s position as Governor of Gourma. There were however
no more military battles
,
testimony to either the importance of Omar
or the advanced age of Askia, or both. About 1519 Askia became blind,
although it was only known by Ali Folan, who thus became inseparable
from him. It was at this time, taking advantage of his age, that his
sons organized against him; however, I will not include a discussion
of those events. I have dwelt at length on the military events of
Askia T s reign, in order to show that it was not very different from
that of Sonni Ali. Both pacification and new conquests continued
under Askia. He was continuing the pattern established by his prede-
cessor.
I turn now to a consideration of the political side of Askia T s
reign, which as we shall see, was inseparable from the religious.
From the beginning, Askia had made a conscious effort to ally with the
religious leaders. He brought the scholars back from Walata; he con-
sulted them; he used religion to justify his position; he built
mosques and sponsored schools. In essence he established Islam as the
state religion, not an easy chore, despite the association with Islam
over the centuries, as traditionalism had been strong under Ali. In
seeking advice during his pilgrimage he may have been looking for
more objective guidance than that given by Timbuktu scholars which
might have had some elements of revenge. He made contact with Es-
Soyouti and A1 Maghili in Cairo, and carried on a correspondence with
the latter after his return to Gao which dealt with Islamic solutions
to the problems of his realm. From the correspondence we can see that
certain pre-Islamic practices continued in Songhay and were mixed with
Islamic practices. For instance, Askia asked what he should do about
the practices of sand-divining, astrology, and the use of talismans to
bring good luck or prevent evil. 128 one area in which Islam offered
benefit and regulation was that of trade, and yet Askia complained of
cheating in weights and measures
,
of running off with goods and non-
payment, of selling pregnant slaves and then quarreling with the buyer
over ownership of the child. 129 A1 Maghili suggested that a market
overseer would solve many of these problems .130 Islamic practices re-
garding women, i.e.
,
the veil and harem, were not practiced in Songhay
because Askia complained of the free mixing of men and women in the
markets and the fact that Jenne girls went nude as long as they were
virgins. l^l A1 Maghili counseled that a very firm hand be taken, but
obviously Askia was dealing with a population which was still largely
non-Muslim, and it may have been that too firm a hand would have
caused revolt. This correspondence did however indicate Askia T s sin-
cerity in attempting to implant Islam.
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From the preceding military discussion, it becomes obvious that
Askia was continuing the expansion and consolidation policies of Sonni
Ali. One of his most original and outstanding contributions was in
the military area. Sonni Ali had relied on an army which he called up
from the people as needed, which was quite often due to the constant
wars. Thus farmers and artisans had often to neglect their regular
occupations. Perhaps Askia had recognized the dangers of such a pol-
icy when he was a general under Sonni Ali. He thus created what we
know today as a standing army, a group of permanent soldiers who were
thus more dedicated and more mobile. Furthermore, the rest of the
population was then free to develop agriculture, crafts, and commerce,
increasing the prosperity and stability on the village level. The
prisoners of war, especially the Mossi, were a source of young cap-
tives who were trained as soldiers. 132 Rouch claimed that the motiva-
tion of the campaigns in Dendi, against the Tuareg in Air and Agadez,
was the capture of young men to staff the army, because these peoples
were particularly admired as brave soldiers. 133 The composition of
the army therefore underwent a change, and Askia became the commander
of a trained group, dependent upon him.
In the administration of the empire, Askia was confronted with
many problems. The empire was largely of recent acquisition and was
thus in need of unification and cohesion. He promoted Islamic prac-
tices as a method of cohesion, but it was not a simple matter to
supersede the traditional ways. It was a Sudanese practice to allow
conquered peoples to retain at least some of their own organization,
customs, and religion. 134 The governmental organization was decen-
tralized, the governors were chosen from the Askia 1 s family, the hus-
bands of women in his family, or from his loyal followers .13 3 The
empire was divided into a number of provinces, some of greater impor-
tance than others, each ruled by a governor. These were (1) Dendi, in
the southeast, from Agades to Bornu including the Hausa states, gov-
erned by the Dendi-fari; (2) Banku, composed of the area between
Timbuktu and Gao; (3) Bal, northwest of Timbuktu (not including that
city)
,
governed by the Bal-ma; (4) Kurmina, including Gao and Kukia,
with its capital at Tendirma, governed by the Gourman-fari (Omar,
second in command to Askia) ; (5) Dirma, to the southwest of Kurmina;
(6) Bara, to the southeast of Kurmina; (7) Macina, including Fulani
population, governed by the Masina-mangha; (8) Baghena, including the
core of the ancient kingdom of Ghana, also Biru and Walata; (9) Hom-
bori, or Tondi, administered by Hombori-koi (not a full-fledged gov-
ernor)
; (10) Burgu or Barba. 136
In addition to the governors of these provinces, the other high
offices in the empire consisted of the Balama
,
probably master of the
palace; Hi-koi or chief of the navy; Fario-mondio or head tax collec-
tor; the Kori -farina who was the grand priest of traditional religion
according to Delafossel37 but according to Hama, this interpretation
was based on a mistranslation and he was actually the minister of the
strangers ; 13 8 Adiga-farina
,
function unknown; Sao-farina or chief of
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the forests, the hunt, and building construction; Ho-Koi-Koi or chief
of the fishermen. 13 9 in addition to these' officials and the gover-
nors, each provincial division or city had its administrator, called
koi, thus there was the Dirma-koi, the Bara-koi, the Jenne-koi, and
each had its own tax collector, the mondio, also. 14-0 Each of these
officials was assigned a certain rank, with specific duties and privi-
leges which were explicit. 1^1
These divisions and officials did not originate with Askia, as
has sometimes been implied. Rather, he refined what Sonni Ali had
left, but some of the structure had certainly been established by Ali.
Under Ali, the army had been governed by young nobles with the title
of fari or farma; the best general under Ali was said to be Afoumba,
the Dendi-fari, governor of Dendi province. 14-2 This same position ex-
isted under Askia. Askia himself had held the title of tondi-farma ,
governor of the cliffs and mountains of Hombori, probably equivalent
to Hombori-koi. His brother Omar was the Kotala-fari, but unfortu-
nately we cannot locate that district. The Hi-koi existed under
Ali; 19-3 fact Ali used water as a means of transportation whenever
possible. Kati also mentioned the mondio Ouanki during Ali T s reign,
so that office also was in existence before Askia. There was also
mention of another askia , Baghna, who was perhaps an equal of Mohammad
Ture.14-4 The terms of Timbuktu-koi and Jenne-koi were certainly in
use prior to Askia. 14-5 Thus Askia was not completely an innovator,
although he made some new contributions as in the creation of a stand-
ing army.
The empire T s unity was based around the Niger River, but there
were still essentially two divisions: the old Songhay with Gao as its
capital and that of the Timbuktu-Macina area. 19-6 Sonni Ali had been
attached by his traditions to the eastern half; but Askia broke with
the traditional orientation and made Timbuktu his second capital. 19-7
This might have been as a result of his ties with the Muslim scholars
in his early reign, or because of his orientation toward Islam, or he
may have felt more accepted in the western sector. It could also have
been an attempt to balance the old traditional influence against Mus-
lim influence. 3- 9-8
Commerce flourished under Askia. He instituted the Muslim
practice of market inspectors to* enforce honesty and justice
,
as well
as standardization. 19-9 The trading cities of Timbuktu and Jenne pros-
pered, especially since the traders were free from conscription into
the army and could devote themselves to trade. Large amounts of Euro-
pean merchandise found its way south to these markets, 150 in exchange
for gold, slaves, kola nuts, and ivory.
139. Delafosse, Haut-Sdndgal-Niger , II, 87-88.
140. Ibid
.
,88.
141. Ibid .
142. Rouch, Contribution
, 183.
143. Kati, Tarikh, 89.
144. Ibid
. ,
88.
145. Ibid
. , 84, 86.
146. Beraud-Villars, Gao , 52.
147. Ibid
. , 62.
148. Beraud-Villars, Gao , 71.
149. Hama, Songhay
, 71.
150. Ibid.
56 ANNE W. PARDO
In the area of cultural life, Askia certainly provided a cli-
mate in which Islamic learning could flourish in Timbuktu and other
cities. The major fields of interest were law, religion, education,
Arab language and literature, plus rhetoric, logic, eloquence, dic-
tion, Malekite law, grammar, astronomy, history, and geography (mathe-
matics was neglected and medicine centered on faith healing) .151 At-
tention was also given to better banking and credit facilities, con-
structing new and more spacious buildings, and to more elegant
dress. 152 Askia modeled his court and his own dress on what he had
observed during his pilgrimage, especially in the court of the Khalif
of Cairo, thus introducing new influences from the Mediterranean. 153
The University of Sankore in Timbuktu became the center of Muslim
learning, not only for West Africa, but for much of the Muslim
world. 13*+
Conclusions
These then were two men who ruled the Songhay empire during a
period of sixty-four years, whose reigns were separated by only a few
months, who ruled for twenty-eight and thirty-six years respectively,
and yet whose reigns were vastly different. The most important dif-
ference seems to have been the basis of their power. Sonni Ali had
based his authority on tradition whereas Mohammad Ture had turned to
Islam. For whatever reasons, this factor would necessarily inject a
different flavor to each reign. Furthermore, each had faced threats
to his authority. Sonrti Ali had felt that the Muslims were becoming
too strong and might destroy his authority, and thus he had to deal
harshly with them. He also faced outside threats such as the Mossi,
Tuareg, and Fulani. Mohammad Ture had committed himself to making Islam
a state religion, for reasons discussed earlier, but the majority of
the people living outside the cities were traditionalists. Thus he
had to allow some traditional practices to continue and accepted com-
promise. It was possible that Sonni Ali, through his youthful ac-
quaintance with traditional ways, had realized that Islam did not of-
fer a substitute for all of them, i.e., the immediacy of traditional
beliefs and the interrelation of agricultural rites and the practice
of farming. Mohammad Ture, however, brought up at court, had more
familiarity with Islam and less exposure to traditional beliefs as
practiced in the rural areas. It is an interesting irony that Sonni
Ali was assumed to have had a Berber origin (although mixed with
Negro by his time) whereas Mohammad Ture (if his relationship to Sonni
Ali is accepted as legend only) was believed to have been purely
Sudanese; yet it was Sonni Ali who espoused traditional ways more
closely, and Mohammad Ture who turned more clearly to Islam. It
proves at least that the distant Berber origin had little effect by
the time of Sonni Ali.
I think it likely, moreover, that Sonni Ali kept up his Muslim
practices, even if superficially performed, for a purpose. He had
151. Ibid.
,
173.
152. Ibid . , 172.
153. Ibid .
154. Ibid.
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banished the Muslim scholars who spoke out against him; therefore
there was no one to criticize him if he did not pray or fast, unless
there remained a large enough segment of the population who had ac-
cepted Islam and whose loyalty he wished to retain, or who were too
powerful or numerous to be suppressed. Thus he was trying to appease
them; he knew he could not eliminate Islam, so he tried to limit its
power. He saw no harm in participating in both religions, and may
even have worked toward a synthesis. In the case of Mohammad Ture,
little was known of his devotion to Islam until after his accession to
the throne. He probably had assisted Sonni Ali in suppressing the
Muslims, Fulani, and Tuaregs. There was no record that he objected to
those policies; in fact, he also fought against the Muslims led by
Tenguella. I feel that his strong attachment to Islam was a result of
his pilgrimage, which he had undertaken for political purposes. He
was greatly impressed by the Muslim countries through which he trav-
eled, and decided to use Islam as a means of cohesion at home, es-
pecially as he needed a unifying force other than tradition. Perhaps
he had also appealed to the Muslim scholars, whom Sonni Ali had re-
jected, in the early days of his rise to power, being both in debt to
them as well as attempting to use them as his tool. Thus these two
leaders viewed Islam from widely differing angles.
When Sonni Ali had come to power, Songhay controlled the Niger
from the bend southeast to Dendi. He was requested to rid Timbuktu of
the Tuareg, and having accomplished that in 14-68, it was logical that
he would extend his control to Jenne, in order to gain control of the
trade based upon these two cities. In order for this trade to pros-
per, however, he had also to insure its free transit, and so he took
Dirma also, the country between these two cities. The Mossi were op-
posed to his expansion and he fought four battles against them, de-
feating them each time but never eliminating them. Sonni Ali, with
additional expeditions, secured the central portion of the empire; his
most important additions had been Timbuktu and Jenne. Mohammad Ture
continued the establishment of Songhay control in areas gained by
Sonni Ali, and also fought against the Mossi, conducting his only
jihad there in 14-98-1499. The Mossi were defeated but he neither
eliminated nor converted them. He continued Ali T s policy of attack-
ing the outlying territories of the declining Mali empire, wresting
Bagan and Dialana from Mali. His expeditions to the north, in Agades,
broke the Tuareg power, who had also been an enemy of Ali. He ex-
tended Songhay dominion over Katsina and Borgou, but was stopped in
the southeast by Kebbi in 1516-1517. The new territories added by the
Askia had only a tenuous connection with the empire, mainly that of
paying tribute; I do not think he was able to establish himself firmly
in them. Rouch felt that the defeat against Kebbi marked the end of
Songhay expansion; Mohammad Ture had enlarged the empire, improved the
administration, but had not succeeded completely in substituting Islam
for traditions as the basis of his authority. 155 Sonni Ali T s reign
has been characterized as one of constant military expeditions, in
contrast to that of Askia which brought calm and prosperity .156 But
I think we have seen that this opinion was the result of a prejudiced
view of Sonni Ali. Military activity certainly continued as a major
factor under Askia. Thus it is necessary to redress the balance
155. Rouch, Contribution
.
199.
156. Es-Sadi, Tarikh , 112.
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between these two rulers, and realize that Askia was the continuation
in many important respects of Sonni Ali. The important difference came
in the area of religious position vis-h-vis Islam, but this factor,
although major, should not be allowed to cloud the other issues. The
differences between these two rulers were not as great as has been as-
sumed, but centered rather around personality and use of religion.
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CHAPTER 4
A MUSLIM POLITICAL TRACT FROM NORTHERN NIGERIA: MUHAMMAD
BELLO T S USOL AL-SIYASA
B. G. Martin
Muhammad Bello (1781-1837) was the son of T Uthman dan Fodio of
Sokoto, the leader of the Fulani jihad in Northern Nigeria, and the
nephew of TAbdallah dan Fodio. In the history of the nineteenth-cen-
tury Islamic reform movement in the Western Sudan, he is hardly less
important than his father and uncle. Like them, Bello was a prolific
writer. A recent list of his compositions includes ninety-five ti-
tles. In this list appear books on history, on sufism and the Qadiri
brotherhood, on grammar, commentaries (on both poetical works and the
Our T an)
,
medical matters and ophthalmology, genealogy, on the origins
of the Fulani people, biographical materials about his father, trea-
tises on the uses of astronomy and the drawbacks of astrology, writings
on the expected Mahdl, and other contemporary religious and political
problems of every kind .
^
Bello T s purely political writings come to about half a dozen,
but in many other places and passages he gives his views about the
caliphate and the imamate or about political theory in general, as in
his most famous book, the often-quoted Infaq al-maysur fi ta T rikh
bilad al-Takrur.
The Usui al-siyasa wa kayfiyat al-makhlas fi umur al-ri T asa
("The Fundamentals of Statecraft and the Way of Deliverance in matters
of leadership”) was written as a piece of advice to T Umar Dallaji,
first Fulani Amir of Katsina, a town to the northeast of Sokoto.
T Umar Dallaji himself came from the town of Yandoto, south of Katsina,
in the South Katsina or Katsina Laka region. He had played an impor-
tant part in the jihad , and had served as a flag-bearer and emissary
to Yandoto on T Uthman dan Fodio* s behalf. He then led the military
operations against the Habe ruler of Katsina. He was famous for his
learning, and had been on the pilgrimage. Bello complied with T Umar T s
request for a "few words” about administration and politics: evi-
dently he was in the habit of doing this for his subordinates, for he
had written two similar treatises for Ya T qub, Amir of Bauchi.^
1. See D. M. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate (London, 1967)
,
244-248.
2. Books which seem to be largely on politics in this list are: Al-
Ghayth al-wabl fi sirat al-imam al- T adl ; Al-I T lam bi-ma vajib
T ala T 1-imam min hifz baydat al-Islam ; Al-Insaf fi dhikr ma fi
masa T il al-Khilafa ; Kitab al-tahrir fi qawa T id al-tabgir li T l-
siyasat ; Shifa* al-asqam fi ma T rifat madarik al-ahkam ; and the
Usui al-siyasa .
3. See Last, Caliphate , 244, 246, for Al-Ghayth al-shu T bub fi tawsiy5t
al-Amir Ya T qub , Al-Qawl al-mawhub . . . , etc.
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Although the Usui al-sivasa is not dated, Bello speaks in the intro-
duction of T Umar Dallaji as a warrior who was still fighting, but had
already achieved "high position" and "power." This may indicate that
the treatise was written soon after T Umar had become Amir of Katsina.
As the successful Fulani assault on the town took place about 1806,
and since the Infaq al-mavsur (1812) lists T Umar as being Amir of Kat-
sina on that date, this span of six years seems likely as the time of
composition of the book. 1* T Umar Dallaji was still ruling Katsina when
he died in 1835.
To resolve the problem of the origins of Bello T s political
thought and to unravel his vision of a vanished ideal is not easy.
All the same, the "Fundamentals of Statecraft" contains a number of
Bello* s principal ideas, and it deserves translation for that reason.
In the Usui al-sivasa , Bello is writing a generalised statement, a
distilled version of his views, as authoritative, yet practical guid-
ance to a particular amir . Thus he begins with some proverbs and
anecdotes and sayings of the Prophet, with a warning against laziness
in office. The final observation in the introduction, about politics
being derived from justice, has an Aristotelian ring about it.
With his first principle, Bello moves into the domain of Is-
lamic political theory. Although this principle and many of those to
follow might have been derived from his reading of early general dis-
cussions of the caliphate like that of Abu Mansur al-Baghdadl T s Usui
al-DIn (c. 1035)
,
it is more likely that they are inspired by later
writers of the post-Abbasid period like Ibn Taymlya (d. 1327)
,
his
famous pupil Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziya (d. 1350)
,
and from Badr al-DIn ibn
Jama* a (d. 1366) . In his discussion of the first principle, Bello
also acknowledges his indebtedness to his father T s Kitab al-Farq or
"Book of the Difference between the governments of the Muslims and the
governments of the Unbelievers,"^ In the Kitab al-Farq , *Uthman dan
Fodio had included a quotation from Ibn Jama* a.
Bello T s third principle, the need for close association between
good men of religion and the amir, seems to echo the third section of
his father T s book, and his father T s observation about those who strive
for the amirate not deserving to have it is found in the same passage.
Both Bello and his father emphasize justice for the subjects and the
4. See the comments on the dating of this book by J. 0. Hunwick in
Research Bulletin (Ibadan), III, 2 (1967), 141-142. There is more
information about T Umar Dallaji in Last, Caliphate , passim , and
S. J. Hogben and A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Emirates of Northern Ni-
geria (London, 1966), Ch. XVI, 156-183, on Katsina, including a
genealogical chart of the Dallazawa amirs of Katsina (descendants
of *Umar Dallaji) on p. 183.
5. Mervyn Hiskett, "Kitab al-farq
. a Work on the Habe Kingdoms At-
tributed to *Uthman dan Fodio," Bulletin of the School of Oriental
and African Studies , XXIII, 3 (1960), 558-579.
6. This quotation (p. 564) is apparently not from the prose work of
Ibn Jama’ a, Tahrlr al-ahkam fl tadblr ahl al-Islam (the Arabic
text of which may be found in Hans Kofler, "Handbuch des islami-
schen Staats- und Verwaltungsrechtes von Badr al Din ibn Gama T a,"
Islamica
.
VI & VII (1935)
,
349-414 & 1-34) but rather from a ver-
sified abridgement by an unknown author, perhaps one of the titles
listed by Carl Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur
Supplementbdnde
. II, 78.
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amir T s good works, just as they stress sympathy for one T s own sub-
jects, and praise for personal tolerance and flexibility. Bello has
little to say about the office of wazlr , but the post had less sig-
nificance in the case of a local ruler. Nor is much said in the "Fun-
damentals of Statecraft” about tax collectors or tax collection, which
is not to be oppressive. Bello T s fourth principle implies that tax
collectors, like others of the amir T s subordinates, must be closely
supervised by him at all times.
Further evidence about the origins of Bello T s political views
can be found in two of his other books
,
the Shifa* al-asqam fl
ma T rifat madarik al-ahkam and the Kitab al-tahrlr fl crawa T id al-
tab slr li T l-siy5sa . In the first section of the ShifaT, Bello says that
he read with his father more than 20,000 books, and a good proportion
of these must have dealt with the caliphate and other political ques-
tions. In the Kitab al-tabrlr ,7 Bello cites such political writers as
the Egyptian scholar al-Qaraf! T s Kitab al-ihkam fi T l-farcr bayn al-
fatSwI wa T l-ahkam , and a book (whose title is not mentioned) by the
famous Ibn Rushd or Averroes
,
and an unidentified book by Ibn Qayyim
al-Jawziya.
Bello T s dependence on his father and his uncle make it obvious
that all three of them were familiar with the same texts (no doubt
from T Uthman T s personal library) and so possessed a common intellec-
tual ambiance, based on very similar educations. Drawing on these
common sources, they developed political views which ran parallel.
Yet each one of them developed his own interests and interpretations
merely because the circumstances of each were different. As the chief
theorist of the jihad, T Uthman had necessarily to develop his ideas as
to why withdrawal from the company of the syncretists was inevitable
,
and why friendship with unbelievers and association with them was un-
desirable. He had then to investigate the state structure which would
best conform to Islamic practice, as he understood it by reading the
influential political manuals current in his time.
But his son and his brother T Abdallah had other aims. Bello
squeezed TAbdallah out of the caliphate. All the same, TAbdallah had
great practical experience, although not to the same degree as Bello.
Hence, TAbdallah 7 s circumstances and his irritation at Bello led him
to be the most theoretically oriented of the three. This tendency may
be seen in his Div5 al-Hukkam8 and his Diva al-sultanlya — in contrast
7. Published by the Gaskiya Corporation, Zaria, 1963. Al-QarafI (one
of three Egyptian authors by this name known to Brockelmann, who
does not list this title) is mentioned on p. 35, Ibn Rushd on p.
94, and Ibn Qayyim on p. 50. Other writers cited here are Ahmad
Zarruq, Al-Tamhid
, p. 6, TAbd al-Wahhab al-Sha T ranI, Yawaqltj p.
23, and Ibn Farhun 7 s Tabsira , p. 50.
8. In the discussion on the * imamate in the Diva T al-hukkam , Ch. II,
9-21 of the Zaria edition of 1956, T Abdallah mentions the fol-
lowing writers on politics
,
not usually citing the titles of their
books: al-Suyutl, al-Laqani, al-NafrawI, Fawakih al-Dawanl , Ibn
7 ArabI, al-Qurtaibi
,
Ibn T Arafa, al- 7 Allama Khalil [b. Ishaq], Al-
Tawdih, Ibn Qasim, and Muhammad ibn 7Abd al-Karlm al-Maghlll. The
whoie of the third fasl in TAbdallah 7 s chapter is a summary of a
book by al-Maghlll, most probably the Ta T rif fi ma yajib T ala T l-
mulUk.
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to Bello, who underlines the utilitarian side of politics and the
practical value of a down-to-earth style in administration in his
Usui al-siyasa , and other books.
Indeed, Bello almost always emphasizes practical politics and
day-to-day administration, whereas his father and uncle pay much more
attention to politics as they ought to be, rather than what they ac-
tually are. Then too, in his introduction to the "Fundamentals of
Statecraft," Bello complains that having to exercise sovereign power
is a great misfortune, as if he spoke from experience and personal
conviction. Again, like his father and uncle, Bello is looking back-
ward at an idealised Islamic past, into a historical mirror, from
which he tries to reproduce a fugitive vision, the only correct gov-
ernment for the new state. Here the caliph and his amirs must work
out the purposes of the jihad in detail. Above all, they must create
a religious and political framework in which the members of the Mus-
lim community can live out their lives righteously, and where their
proper conduct on earth will assure them of salvation after death,
since this is the entire purpose of the Islamic polity.
Manuscripts of the Usui al-siyasa accessible include one from
the Shahuci Judicial Schools collection at Kano (ms. 62, "Native Au-
thority Collection")
,
and another from the National Archives of Ni-
geria at Kaduna. The first manuscript, from Kano (ms. B) has a very
legible script in the jihadi style influenced somewhat by tabi T I , but
is a very inaccurate and careless copy. Manuscript A, from Kaduna, is
in a jihadi hand, and is far less legible, but is coherent and has
been copied with some care. 9 Another manuscript, listed by D. M.
Last, may be found in the library of the Nizamiya School in Sokoto,
but has not been seen by the translator.
Other copies are Ibadan mss. 82/508/M 13 and CAD 1M-2 and 158.
Another manuscript, used by Bjorkmann and Brass, formerly at the Ham-
burg University Library, was destroyed in an air raid on Hamburg
during World War Two. 10
I have based my translation on Manuscript A because of its ac-
curacy, making an occasional minor correction from Manuscript B. Man-
uscript A has neither a date nor the name of the copyist, while Manu-
script B was copied by one Muhammad "for the learned Muhammad Tukur."
Manuscript B has no date; and the photographs I have used for the
translation are made from microfilms and do not permit me to give any
accurate information as to the dimensions of the paper used nor its
watermarks. Manuscript A has 25 lines to the page and is 10 pages
long; Manuscript B has 19 lines to the page and is 15 pages in length.
The foliation of Manuscript A is as follows
:
9. See A.D.H. Bivar, "The Arabic Calligraphy of West Africa," West
African Language Review
.
VII (1968)
,
3-15, with plates illus-
trating these styles.
10. See W. Bjorkmann, "Zwei Hamburger arabische Handschriften uber
den Islam im Sudan," Folia Ethno-Glossica
.
Ill (1927), 2-9-.
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fol. la. lines 1- basmala <
fol. la. lines 4--10
.
,
account
fol. la. line 10 to fol. 2b,
etc
fol. 2b, line 10 to fol. 3a,
ciple
;
fol. 3a, line 18 to fol. 3b,
fol. 3b, line 4 to fol. 4a,
fol. 4a, line 5 to fol. 4b,
fol. 4b, line 1 to fol. 5a,
fol. 5a, line 11 to fol. 5b,
conclusion.
line 18, first political prin-
line 4, second principle;
line 5, third principle;
line 1 , fourth principle
;
line 11, fifth principle;
last line, seventh principle and
I would like to express my thanks to Dr. Mervyn Hiskett for the
use of his microfilms, and to Dr. Nazir al-Azma for elucidating cer-
tain passages in the text. Also, my thanks are due to the Shahuci
Judicial School, and to the National Archives in Kano indirectly for
the use of their material.
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UsOl al-Siygsa
(Air, Blr) In the name of God, the merciful,
the compassionate!
May God bless our master Muhammad and his family and his com-
panions and grant him salvation!
The impoverished slave of his Wealthy Master, Muhammad bin
T Uthman, known as Bello, says, "Praise to God who has granted us the
benefits of faith and of Islam, and has given us guidance by our lord
and master Muhammad — may God Almighty bestow peace upon him and the
best of blessings and well-being!
NOW THEN, I have been asked by the sincere brother and upstand-
ing friend, the kind T Umar Dallaji, the warrior on the Path of God —
may his jihad be justified, may God make him victorious, prolong his
power and high position, and aid him with His Spirit, and multiply the
number of his supporters! -- to write for him a few words concerning
THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICS, AND THE WAY OF DELIVERANCE IN MATTERS OF
LEADERSHIP fUsul al-sivasa wa kavflvat al-makhlas fi umur al-ri^sa) .
1
After practising istikhara . I have given an answer to him.
God is the One to whom we have recourse for help.^
for
KNOW, MY BROTHER, that the mightiest of catastrophes that may
fall on one of God T s servants is to be a chief Qarif) or an amir who
is charged with heavy responsibilities. Truly, that servant is ac-
countable for his speech, his actions, and his circumstances. If he
is an amir , he will be responsible for both his subjects (ra T :Lva) and
for himself, just as he is for the administrators over his subjects
f
T ummal ra T rvatih) . Hence it is said, "Whosoever God makes lazy, let
him praise God the Almighty, for He has lightened his responsibilities
greatly, and He has shielded him from the discomfort of this world
here below, for there is nothing but troubles in it." But He has
planned for him nothing but torture in the Next World, and for that
reason the Prophet declared , "Have you not been told (Blv) what the
amirate is?" [His listeners] said, "Yes, 0 Prophet of God.” And he
said, "The beginning of it is blame (mallama)
,
the second part of it
is repentance (nadama)
,
and the third part of it is the torture of the
Day of Judgment ( T adhab yawm al-qiyama) . " As the poet says
,
(meter : w5fir)
"If Indolence drops her tail over you.
You* 11 sleep a long night in its shadow."
1. Generally, the second phrase in this title has been read wa
kayflyat al-mukhlis fl umur al-ri T asa , but in both the mss. I have
used, the word is unmistakably vocalised makhias , which yields
better sense.
2. Istikhara is a technique for obtaining guidance to a problem in a
dream. Formulas for achieving it may be found in many sources,
such as the popular book on magic and charms by the Egyptian Shaykh
Ahmad al-Dayrabl (d. 1151/1738)
,
Al-Mujarrabat al-kabir (also known
as Al-Fath al-Malik al-Majid, al-mu T allaf li-naf T al- T abld) ,
Sulaymdn Mar T I (Singapore, 1366/194-8)
,
74—78.
3 . I have not been able to trace this line
,
but it may be a popular
jingle, or perhaps a laml* In the style of the Ayyubid poet Baha T
al-DIn Zuhayr.
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[As for] the person whom God has afflicted with sovereign power
(wilaya)
,
let him try to discharge its duties. Although it may be a
misfortune, it is at the same time one of the greatest blessings to
the person (Alv) who is called to carry it out. So give thanks to the
Bestower of it, for it confers happiness without end. But the person
who does not tackle it resolutely and gives no thanks to its Bestower
will suffer unceasing calamity, for there is no misfortune to compare
with it, unless it is unbelief (kufr) in God Almighty.
Now the evidence of the might of sovereign power and the glorious
part of its importance is what has been told of the Prophet of God,
when he said that ,TThe justice Qadl) of a sultan for a single day is
better than the devotion [of an ordinary man] £or seventy years." He
also declared, "On the Day of Judgment, when no shade exists but the
Shadow of God, and there is no refuge but His Shadow, seven men will
be granted shelter: the sultan who is just towards his subjects, the
young man who grows up in devotion to His Lord; the man who stands in
the marketplace but has his heart in the mosque; the two men who love
each other in God; the man who mentions God when he is alone, when it
brings a tear to his eye; the man who is invited by a beautiful and
noble woman and who is inclined to her but says [to himself], T I fear
God the Almighty* ; and the man who in secret gives alms (sadacra) with
his right hand but does not let his left hand know of it."
The Prophet likewise (B2r) said, "The best-loved and the closest
to God is the just sultan, but the most abhorred and the most remote
from Him is the tyrannical and despotic ruler." 1*-
Muhammad said, "[I swear] by Him in whose Hand is the soul of Mu-
hammad, that the just sultan will be raised into Heaven for actions on
behalf of all his subjects. The prayer which he makes is worth sev-
enty thousand prayers [by others.]" Since this is so, there is no
more glorious gift which may be granted to one of God T s servants than
the rank of sultan , for He causes one hour of his life to be the equi-
valent of the entire existence of another person. The man who does
not comprehend the significance of this favor and busies himself with
oppression must be anxious lest God place him among the number of His
enemies
.
Another piece of evidence which shows the enormous importance of
sovereign power is what is related by Ibn *Abbas. "The Prophet of God
came to us on a certain day, and stayed with the people at the door of
the Ka*ba . There was in the house a man of the Quraysh, and the Pro-
phet said, T 0 you great men of the Quraysh, (A2r) do three things for
;
your subjects: if they ask you for mercy, grant it to them, and if
!
you govern, do it with justice, and act on what they say. The curse
of God and His angels [is on the man who does not act in this way].^
|
From him, God will accept neither a religious duty nor a work of
! supererogation. *"
The Prophet likewise said, "The man who arbitrates between two
ji enemies and commits oppression (B2v) while so doing is cursed by God,
for the curse of God is on all tyrants." He also said, "There are
4. B: "The tyrannical ruler who devours tax money.”
5. Reading "fa la*nat Allah wa mala*ikatih *alayh," as in B.
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three people upon whom God will not look at the Day of Judgment: a
lying sultan , a fornicating shaykh , and a poor man who gives himself
airs." To his companions, the Prophet said one day, "The time will
come when you will conquer East and West and they will both be in your
hands. All the administrators of places ( T umm5l al-amakin') will be in
Hellfire except those who have feared God the Almighty and have fol-
lowed the path of piety and discharged their duties honestly."
The Prophet also asked, "What of a person whom God has placed
over the affairs of his subjects, if he deceives them or advises them
wrongly or is unsympathetic to them? Does God not exclude him from
Paradise?" He likewise said, "The man who is in charge of the politi-
cal affairs of the Muslims and does not guard them as he would guard
the people of his own family has built a sitting place for himself
within the Fire." And Muhammad declared, "Two men from my community
will not obtain my intercession: the oppressive ruler and the fanati-
cal religious innovator fmubtadi T ghal)
,
for they have both over-
stepped the limits." Further, he said, "The person who will feel the
greatest tortures on the Day of Judgment is the tyrannical sultan .
"
Muhammad also said, "Five people have incurred the wrath of God
and His keenest anger, and their place is in the Fire: the amir who
draws his sustenance from the people but does not bother to treat them
justly or relieve their oppression, the chief of a people who give him
things, but who fails to strike a balance between the strong and the
weak and judges vengefully or by caprice; the man who does not in-
struct his children to be obedient to God Almighty, fails to instruct
them in the essentials of religion, and does not care where they ob-
tain their food; the man who hires an employee, and when the man has
done his work, fails to pay him (B3r) his wages; and the person who
treats his wife shabbily over her dowry."
It is said of T Umar ibn al-Khatrtab
,
that when he was paying his
farewells one day at a funeral, he met a man who was praying there.
When the dead man had been buried, that man put his hand on the tomb
and said, "0 God, if you tortured him, it is your right because he dis-
obeyed you. If you have pardoned him, it was because he was in need
of your mercy. So blessings on you, 0 dead man, unless you were an
amir, or a chief or a tax collector or bureaucrat." When he had
spoken these words, he vanished before the eyes of the people. 'Umar
sent after him, but he could not be found, and T Umar said, "That was
Khidr — peace be upon him!"^
KNOW that the principles of politics are seven, and that their
essence is derived from the meaning [of the word] justice ( T adl) . Two
principles have to do with the amir, the w51i, or the imam two with
administrators and people who sit in council CiulasaM . The remaining
three have to do with the subjects (raTiya)
.
THE FIRST PRINCIPLE is that the amir, the imam , or the wali
should fear God, and should be a follower of the Sunna of God T s Pro-
phet. He should be concerned with his hereafter and should observe
the limits laid down by God, a man who has renounced worldly pleasures
and is far from liking leadership [for its own sake], yet who still
6. Khidr is sometimes identified with Elias or St. George.
7. See introduction for a discussion of these offices.
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wishes to rule. Know that the most appropriate course is that the man
who obtains leadership will be accountable for it. The person whom we
see striving hard for it causes us to think that he does not deserve
to have it. And the person who takes it for himself has already com-
mitted oppression, for he has put something where it did not deserve
to be. If it is a question of leadership, then that is part of the
harmony of the world fnizgm T alim)
,
the implementation of the rules of
the Divine Law (Shar T ia) I For this reason, there is no hadith re-
corded for us which concerns the establishment of the Great Imgm or
his deputies
,
precisely because leadership and greatness lie in that
point. No person is saved from it except by God T s grace. If the
Lawgiver commanded us explicitly to seek the imamate, it was because
it was becoming open to public disturbance. The Lawgiver did not
command the public disturbance which took place; instead. He hindered
the amirate from existing until there was a responsible man to assume
it. When it became known that had it not been for the walis who pos-
sess power, no person would have been safe in his own house, to say
nothing of (A3r) [being safe] in the wilderness, [it became clear
that] it would not have been permissible for any person to take kharaj
from the peasants, nor would a .jihad have been legal. Money would not
have been found for spending on the Path of God, and the welfare of
the people would have been lost. Therefore, the selection of a Great
Imam and his deputies, wazirs and amirs, becomes a necessity. And he
is established so that the interest of religion may be guaranteed, and
the entire harmony of the world likewise. If it were not for the
amirate, if people sought to obtain their rights from each other with-
out a power or force to protect them, it might happen that men would
be killed before they could kill a single individual whose killing was
necessary. It is for this reason that people say that if [a ruler] is
impious or is not a follower of the Sunna of His Messenger, and does
not concern himself with the matter of his hereafter, he may carry
himself and his subjects into repugnant practices opposed to the
Sunna of Muhammad, as is often the case with kings and sultans . Among
them, the erosion of the foundations of their own states through the
revival of the practices of their forefathers and ancestors is well
known. (B3v) From father to son, they continue to take turns with
those practices which are in opposition to the Divine Law. Hence they
are ignorant of how to carry out the responsibility of the charge
which God Most High has laid on chiefs ( T urafa T ) . My father ( T Uthman
dan Fodio) has discussed this matter in his Kitab al-Farcr , and it may
be read there. And if he [ruler] is not somewhat removed from the
love of leadership and the desire of sovereignty for itself, one may
fear that he is infatuated with himself and will not deal justly with
his subjects. It is not appropriate that the limits should be estab-
lished except by a person who is removed from the matter and is not
hampered by it, like the wali .9
(B4r) THE SECOND PRINCIPLE is that the amir or the imam or the
wal t should be flexible, capable of granting pardon, able to forget
rancor, inclined to generosity and tolerance. The most highly prized
8. See Mervyn Hiskett, "Kitab al-farq , a Work on the Habe Kingdoms
Attributed to fUthman dan Fodio," Bulletin of the School of Ori-
ental and African Studies
.
XXIII, 3 (1960), 566 ff.
9. This entire passage, beginning with the phrase, "If a ruler is im-
pious ..." and ending with "like the waii," appears out of order
in B, where it is inserted on folio B3r (line 16) and goes on to
folio B3v (line 7)
.
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qualities of his nature will be openhandedness
,
and patience in the
sense of courage. If it happens that he is inflexible, without any
inclination to generosity or tolerance, then he will have to fear that
the people will become tired of him and will scatter, as God the Al-
mighty has said, "Because of God T s mercy, be easy on them: if you
have been thick-skinned and hard-hearted, they will run from fear of
you, so pardon them." If it happens that he has no courage, he may
risk being overtaken by events if he experiences difficulties, or be-
come confused when he is confronted with catastrophes or annihilation.
His standing will decrease and the affairs of his subjects will be
ruined. It is more worthy for him to be unshakeable and firm in
temper, a steady support to his administrators and subjects, [other-
wise] they will turn over to him every important or difficult matter.
If he is not a free giver, he may risk being thought stingy in paying
money for good reasons on behalf of his subjects. The people may
blame him and do without him, which is not appropriate.
THE THIRD PRINCIPLE is that the imam or the amir or the wali
should always be craving for the company of the learned men of
religion and be intent on listening to their advice to him. The ruler
must be wary of the evil men of religion (’ulama’ al-su T ]
,
(BM-v) who T
are greedy for worldly things. They will praise you (sic] and glorify
you and seek to propitiate you by being greedy for what you possess
of the dross of this world and ill-gotten gains, so that they may ob-
tain some of it by double-dealing and trickery.
Now the pious learned man is the one who does not envy what
money you possess
,
and treats you as you deserve in his preaching and
his talk, just as they say that Shaqlq al-Balkhl went to Harun al-
Rashid, who said to him, "Are you Shaqlq the Ascetic?" He answered,
"I am Shaqlq but I am not an ascetic." Harun said, "Command me," so
Shaqlq said, "God Most High has put you here in the place of [Abu
Bakr] al-Siddiq, and He seeks from you his style of alms -giving, and
He has entrusted you with the place of T Umar ibn al-Khattab al-
Faruq (lit. : T he who distinguishes truth from falsehood’) and He
seeks from you the same differentiation between right and wrong, and
He has put you in the place of [’Uthman] Dhu’ 1-Nurayn, and He requires
from you his way of life and his generosity, and He has placed you in
the place of T A1I ibn Abi Talib, and He seeks from you knowledge and
justice, just as He sought* it from him."
Rashid said, "Go on," and Shaqlq declared, "Yes; know that God
Almighty has a place known as Hell. He will make you the doorkeeper
of that place, and will give you three things, a treasury, a whip, and
a sword, and He will order you to prevent people from entering the
Fire with these three things. The man who comes to you with a request
should be let into the treasury; the person who disobeys His Lord’s
command should be punished with the whip, and he who kills some one
for no (B5r) reason, kill him with the sword, with the permission of
the dead man’s wali . J-Q If you do not do as He orders you, then you will
become the leader of the People of the Fire and the headman of the
House of Perdition."
Rashid said, "Continue with what you are saying," so Shaqlq
went on, "People like you are like a spring of water, and the rest of
the administrators of this world are like streams flowing out of it.
10. The word wali in this context must mean wali al-dam , an avenger
in a blood feud.
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If the spring is pure, the streams will have no impurity, but if the
spring is foul, then the purity of the streams will be of no advan-
tage.” (A3v)
So if the ruler does not keep the company of good learned men,
nor listen to their advice, but instead takes evil men of religion as
his companions, they may force him along their own line of conduct, or
the people may think they are doing so. Truly, a man follows the
ethics of his best friend. Some wise verses are:
(meter : tawll)
"Don T t ask about the man
But ask about his companion.
Truly, the companion serves
As an example for comparison. "H
THE FOURTH PRINCIPLE is that the imam or the amir or the wali
should lay conditions on his administrators, above all, to be just.
He should select them from among the best of his men, and should look
into their doings at all times. T Asim bin Badhila said, "When T Umar
ibn al-Khattab appointed an administrator, he stipulated that he
should not ride a horse nor dress fashionably nor eat the finest
foods, nor lock the doors on the needs of the people, nor what was in
their interest. [He used to say], "Distinction should be enough for
you. Do not wish for anything more." T Umar also wrote to his chief
administrator, Abu Musa al- TAsh T arI, saying "The happiest of governors
is he whose subjects are pleased with him, and the most unfortunate of
governors is he whose subjects are unfortunate because of him, so be-
ware of oppression. If your administrators follow in your footsteps
and become like you, then they are like an animal in a green pasture
which eats so much that it becomes fat. Its fatness is the reason for
its destruction, for it is slaughtered for its fat and assigned [as
food]." The prudent thing is to be on your guard against administra-
tors and servants. For reasons of their own advantage, they will urge
the wali on and make his tyranny acceptable. They will throw him into
the fire to gain their objectives. Indeed, your worst enemies are not
those who are trying to destroy you, but are instead your administra-
tors and helpers (ghliman)
,
the majority of whom are slaves to their
bellies and their pleasures (furuj) and their greed. To obtain their
desires, they will make their amir into a net [to catch benefits].
They serve themselves, but not him. The sign of this is that they
spread a sweet smell. If sovereign power were taken away from him and
given to someone else, they would all turn their backs on him and come
close to that other person. Wherever there is a dirham, (AM-r) they
will crowd around the place and prostrate themselves
.
THE FIFTH PRINCIPLE is that the imam or the amir or the wdli
should order the people of his state to do justice and goodness and
avoid tyranny among themselves, to love good and hate evil. The re-
sult will be that the character of the people and the administrators
will be on the same plane as that of the amir. If they act rightly
in the sight of their Beneficent Master, He will inject mercy into the
hearts of their amirs to do good to them. If they disobey their Lord
and outrage the earth with corruption, God will inflict a penalty on
11. A quotation from the Mu T allaqa of Tarafa; see A. J. Arberry,
The Seven Odes (Cambridge, 1957).
12. An Islamic silver coin.
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them, and they and their amirs will be blamed, for the Almighty has
said, "We shall set some oppressors over others," and in the badlth
(B5v) it is recorded, "As you are, so you will be governed."
THE SIXTH PRINCIPLE is that the imam or the amir or the w51i is
the one who lays down for the people of his state their worldly and
religious duties. And he is the one who fosters the artisans fal-
sunna T ) and is concerned that people have a trade, which is indis-
pensable to the population, such as cultivators and smiths, dyers and
physicians, grocers and butchers and carpenters and all the trades
[which contribute] to the harmony of this world. He must allocate
them to every village and every [town] and quarter, according to the
urging of the people, likewise foodstuffs and supplies as they are
needed, and as the towns and country places become filled with popula-
tion. He must see to the construction of walled towns (husun) and
bridges and the maintenance of markets and roads and the realisation
of the general public welfare, so that the harmony of this world may
be maintained.
In the Jawhara, TA1I ibn Abl Talib said, "I saw T Umar ibn al-
Khattab one morning on a saddled animal. I said T 0 Commander of the
Believers, where are you going? 1 and he replied, T With a donkey we
will fertilise [a field whose crops are intended as alms] (sadaqa) . 1
I followed him and I said, TWill the caliphs after you not be humble,
0 Prince of the Believers? 1 He answered, T 0 Abu T l-Hasan, do not blame
me, for I swear by Him who sent Muhammad with prophethood, that a lamb
might go to the bank of the Euphrates [and fall in] and T Umar would be
asked about it on the Day of Judgment, for there is no mercy for the
wali who lets [the rights] of the Muslims perish. 1 "
In [Sayyid Ibrahim al-] Shibrakhltl T s [commentary on the
Mukhtasar13 of Khalil, it is related] that one of the prophets of
Banu Israel asked his Lord about the longevity of the Kings of Per-
sia, for they lived long lives. To him, God revealed that "They in-
habited my country, where my worshippers lived." And in the story, it
is said that "They treated my servants justly and made my land flour-
ish, and provided the necessary religious facilities for them by
building mosques and making them lively with worship and prayer, es-
tablishing judges and teachers there (B6r) and observing their rights
in God T s patrimony, providing (A4v) instructors for the children,
furnishing preachers
,
muhtasibs
,
and tax collectors
,
and inspectors
for the oppressed and the destitute."
1 Umar was constantly looking into the problem of the destitute
among his subjects and being of service to them personally. In the
Jawhara, al-tfasan al-Basri declares that T Umar was once walking at
night to Madina when he ‘came upon a woman of the Ansar carrying a
waterskin. He asked her about it, and she said she had a family but
no servant. She had gone out at night to fill it with water. He was
annoyed that she should [even] go out in the daytime [for this pur-
pose], so he carried it for her until she reached her house. He said,
"Go to T Umar early in the morning so that he can help you," and she
said, "I will go." She went to him, and while she was there, she
13. According to C. Brosselard, "Les Inscriptions arabes de Tlemen,"
Revue Africaine . V (1861), 322-325, it is stated that this four-
volume work is listed in an inscription of waqf books at the Darb
al-Massufa Mosque, Tilimsan. No date for this inscription is
given
.
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recognised him as the man who had carried her waterskin. When she
had gone away, ’Umar arranged the matter and sent after her, ordering
some one to be her servant and giving her support.
THE SEVENTH PRINCIPLE Is that the amir or the imam or the wali
should deal gently with his subjects, and should put the leading per-
sons among them in eminent positions, each according to his rank. As
for the common people, he must not burden them with what is unneces-
sary either In the religious or in the worldly sense, but see that
they recognise their master, and order them to perform the stipulated
duties as is requred, and forbid them from doing reprehensible actions,
and increase their knowledge of what is permissible. (B6v) If there
is any difference of opinion over what these are, do not be harsh over
what are forbidden things and what are duties, or things about which
there is controversy. People who do reprehensible things come first
[in condemnation], but do not hurry to disavow them or hurt their be-
liefs or thwart their activities or their worship in matters which
certain mujtahids may have created from their own actions or views
,
but which are not explicit in the Book or the Surma, unless they con-
flict with concensus (ijm5 T ] . What is best is to force them according
to what has been explicitly legislated by God. As to what has been
contrived but is not in accord with the infallible law of God Almighty,
that is mere legislation by man. Hence differences will appear in it,
but in the Hereafter, God will not question His servant about it. For
this reason, it is not necessary to give a narrow interpretation to
individual judgments. [And they say], ,T0 God, do you not act with
grace and a guiding hand?” That is charity and good counsel.
In the hadlth, it is recorded that the Prophet of God declared
to Mu’adh [ibn*Jabal al-Ansari] when he prolonged the prayers, (A5r)
’’Truly, you have discouraged people and done abominable things. Look,
my brother, at the reward of the prolongation of prayer before God.
How did Muhammad look on Mu’adh when he forced his followers to stand
for a long time when it was a hardship? How can you force them to
endure difficulties which the Prophet tolerated?” He said, ’’What I
had left to you is the pardoning of matters which muj tahids have
created though by analogies and similarities.”
And it is said in the hadlth, ”He who takes responsibility for
a certain matter concerning my community, and is concerned with them,
0 God, be concerned with him: (B7r) and he who takes responsibility
for a certain matter concerning my community and treats them kindly,
0 God, treat him with kindness.” [Another hadlth is], ”1 fear for
you, that the Prophet may summon [God] against you, for you have
straitened [the situation] of my community, where God had made it
easy for them.”
Now Muhammad was the most learned of the people about God and
the most pious of them, and he used to deal with the subjects ac-
cording to their circumstances, and he tolerated the roughness of the
nomads ( T ar5b] and the insults of the hypocrites to the point that he
was told to be more harsh with them. He won over their champions by
the payment of large sums to them, so that their trust would be firm
in their hearts, and so that they might return to faith in God, and
allowed them into his council and preferred them for the mattress
and pillow (i.e., as associates having the place of honor in his
majlis] . He was pleased that they came to him, and authorised their
presence as much as he could. He used to say, ”Be generous to noble
peopl^ who come to you, let people who believe continue in their
faith” and he entrusted them with responsibility according to their
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degree of faith. Whoever has read any books about the life of the
Prophet will know that what we say is concerned with only a few of
his good qualities, for [the Qur 1 an 1 says, "A prophet has come to you
from among yourselves, and what you have gained is dear to Him, and
vrtio cares for the Believers
,
a person who is compassionate and for-
giving.”
And if they turn away, say, ”God is sufficient to me: there
is no God but Him. I depend on Him, for He is the Lord of the
Mighty Throne." (B7v, A5v)
CHAPTER 5
THE IMPACT OF THE FULANI JIHAD ON INTERSTATE RELATIONS
IN THE CENTRAL SUDAN KATSINA EMIRATE:
A CASE STUDY
Richard W. Hull
At the opening of the nineteenth century, the Sultanate of
Katsina was an independent, thriving state controlled by a Hausa
aristocracy. Although the state was founded in ca. 1250, its inde-
pendence came later and gradually. In 1554- it threw off the yoke of
the crumbling Songhay Empire; and after 1784 it was strong enough to
resist payment of a coronation tax and other levies demanded by the
kingdom of Bornu.-*- Moreover, the centuries-long military struggle
with its commercial rival, Kano, had if only temporarily perhaps,
come to a halt. In 1801, the Hausa of Katsina defeated their second
most important commercial competitor, the Hausa Sultanate of Gobir,
which lay to the northwest. 2 Katsina was at peace, and had become a
magnet attracting merchants and pastoralists from throughout Hausa-
land and Bornu. Indeed, as early as 1740 the kingdom had become
well known for its peaceful
,
}
prosperous conditions and in that year a
large element of the wealthy Arab trading community in Kano abandoned
its stalls and moved to the secure and bustling markets of Katsina
city. 3 Furthermore, many nomadic Fulani who had passed through
Katsina in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century in their
eastward search for pastures for their cattle were returning to these
now peaceful environs and settling among their already established
Fulani cousins.
Clearly, in 1801 it would not have been unreasonable to pre-
dict that the nineteenth century would witness the continued rapid
growth of an independent Katsina and its rise to economic pre-
eminence in the Central Sudan. Yet this prophecy was to be denied.
Indeed, within six years an event was to occur which would result in
a total power transferral to another (minority) ethnic group, place
the kingdom under the sovereignty of a foreign power, and plunge it
into nearly a century of warfare and economic stagnation. This paper
shall attempt to explain how Katsina fell into such a condition—and
remained in that state—by examining the internal politics of the
kingdom and its interaction with its newly-created neighbors, Sokoto
and Maradi. History has taught us not to judge the strength of a
society or polity solely by its economic stability and growth.
1. Thomas Hodgkin, Nigerian Perspectives (London, 1960), 29; S. J.
Hogben and A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria
(London, 1966), 162-163.
2. H. A. S. Johnston, The Fulani Empire of Sokoto (London, 1967), 60;
Documents Scientificrues de la Mission Tilho (1906-1909) (Paris,
1911)
,
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3. W. F. Gowers, Gazetteer of Kano Province (London, 1921), 18.
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Katsina T s populace may have been relatively wealthy at the turn of
the century, but it was suffering from a grave political and spirit-
ual malaise. Since the mid-seventeenth century the kingdom had been
advancing northward and engulfed the pagans around Maradi and Tessawa
in present-day Niger Republic. These peoples, however, were never
completely assimilated into the mainstream of Katsina society. Nor
were the Fulani, who had been given a large measure of political
autonomy within their own areas of settlement but were denied politi-
cal representation in the central government. Such a situation was
frustrating to this ethnic minority for it was forced to pay certain
taxes uncalled for in the Muslim Qur T an yet had no voice in appor-
tionment or expenditure. The recent pastoral Fulani migrants were
especially oppressed for they were heavily taxed on their cattle and
did not enjoy the tax exemptions or concessions granted to some of
their cousins who had arrived earlier and had ingratiated themselves
(and intermarried) with the Hausa elites.
In addition, many Fulani had abandoned their pastoral ways and
had established their own towns or had migrated into the towns inhab-
ited and governed by Hausa chiefs. In the latter communities, these
settled or "town" Fulani enjoyed few political rights. This situa-
tion did not present serious problems under stable political condi-
tions. But between 1800 and 1806 Hausa Katsina was weakened by a
succession of five kings. 4- None of them were in office long enough
to establish a strong administration. Hausa central authority was
therefore highly vulnerable.
As in any polity, prosperity often leads to less emphasis on
the faith (in this case Islam) and more attention to temporal and
economic affairs. Increasingly, there was the argument, especially
among young Fulani students reared in the theologically-oriented
Qur T anic schools, that Katsina, like its Hausa neighbors, was becom-
ing too materialistic, too syncretic. The Sultanate was ripe for
reform or revolution.
*****
It was in 180M- that the prominent Fulani scholar from Gobir,
T Uthman B. Muhammad Fodiye, declared a Jihad or Holy War against the
Hausa rulers of that kingdom. Within a few years, this Jihad would
sweep most of the Hausa monarchs off their thrones and lead to the
ultimate establishment of the vast Central Sudanic Fulani Empire of
Sokoto. The conquest of Katsina was crucial to the establishment of
the Caliphate (or Empire) of Sokoto, for at the opening of the nine-
teenth century Katsina was, commercially, one of the most important
polities in Hausaland and was a vital entrepot in the north-south
trade between North Africa and the forest states of southern Nigeria.
Furthermore, it was an immediate neighbor to the center of Fulani
power, located at Sokoto.
Not surprisingly. Shaikh T Uthman chose as his lieutenants in
Katsina men from three strategic areas of that Sultanate. Flags (the
symbol of leadership in the Jihad) were bestowed upon these three
youthful revolutionaries, and they were instructed (along with other
flagbearers) to fight for Islam in their respective states. The
4. See Documents Scientifiques
.,
460.
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three Katsina jihadi were not pure Fulani but were members of quasi-
Fulani families of mixed ethnic complexion. Umaru Dunyawa was a
leading figure among the Sullubawa, a large group of pastoralists in
the northwestern marches. Umaru Dallaji, a former student of the
Shaikh, counted himself with a poor, though influential, clan of
scholar/p astoralists in the south-central region. The third major
flagbearer was Na Alhaji, the son of a pious Muslim scholar from the
central core of the kingdom. Na Alhaji T s family, though Fulani, had
recently migrated from Bornu. Many members of these families or
clans were not urbanized but rather lived on the rural fringes of
Hausa towns. Generally speaking, however, they tended to act as a
demographic wedge between the two concentrations of Hausa power and
population: the north and the deep south.
^
Among the three major flagbearers, Umaru Dallaji emerged as
the most favored by the authorities in Sokoto. This was because of
his earlier participation in the Jihad in Gobir and his close friend-
ship with the Shaikh T s son, Belo.
The first months of the Jihad in Katsina were disappointing.
Umaru Dunyawa expected to easily subdue the local Hausa chiefs in the
northwestern marches of the kingdom. However, he encountered strong
opposition not only from the Hausa but from his own people, who had
grown rich under the Hausa authorities and were at first unwilling to
lend support for fear a political upheaval would upset the economic
status quo. Indeed, it was only after Shaikh ’Uthman offered
them the lands of pagan peasants in the far north that they agreed to
give at least their tacit support. Dunyawa was then able to garner
enough strength to wrest control of Hausa territory from the suburbs
of the capital, Katsina city, northward to the town of Maradi.^
Shaikh T Uthman T s success in winning the support of Dunyawa and his
Sullubawa was highly fortuitous. The conflict in the north forced
the Hausa to fight a two-front battle because Dallaji and Na Alhaji
were busy making trouble in the south. Furthermore, the northern
Fulani campaign effectively isolated the Hausa from their potential
allies in Gobir. Similarly, another Fulani reformist had tied up the
Hausa kings of Katsina and Daura in the northeast and therefore pre-
vented a coalition between them and the Hausa monarch of Kano.
Meanwhile, in the central heartland of Katsina Na Alhaji had
established a string of military ribats or strongholds. But the
Hausa king cleverly neutralized this jihadi as a rival by enticing
him with the hand of his daughter in marriage. Through her, the king
succeeded in presenting the becalmed jihadi with a poisoned gown
which ultimately brought about his death.
?
5. For backgrounds see "Yandaka History,” SNP 7/10, 1778-1909, Ni-
gerian Archives, Kaduna Branch (NAK) ; ”Jibiya District Notes,”
Katprof/1, acc. no. 3, n.d. , NAK; D. C. Fletcher, ”Re-Assessment
of Yandaka District," Katprof/1, HIS/13, 1928, NAK, 6-7; H. R.
Palmer, "History of Katsina," Journal of the African Society ,
XXVI, 103 (April 1927), 225.
6. See H. R. Palmer, "Native Chiefs Confidential Reports," 22 Novem-
ber 1921, Katsina Provincial Office, Katsina City (KPO) ; W. B.
Nicholas, "Kaita Assessment Report," Katprof/1, HIS/26, 1948, NAK,
49.
"Assessment Report - Yandaka District," HASS 1898, 1909, NAK,
17-19.
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Na Alhaji T s untimely death was then used by Dallaji, who had
already won stunning victories in the south, as a pretext to launch
a major offensive against the treacherous Hausa king who resided at
Katsina city. In early 1807, the Fulani and Hausa clashed on a broad,
flat plain not far from the city gates. Through the shrewd diplomacy
of Shaikh T Uthman, the Fulani were able to enlist the support of the
Sultan of Air from the northern desert town of Agadez and the comman-
der of the armies of the nearby kingdom of Kaura Namoda. After
fierce fighting, the beleaguered Hausa monarch was slain, and his
lieutenants fled to the walled confines of the capital where they
hastily appointed a successor. Eventually, the city itself was be-
sieged and Hausa rulers were driven northward, beyond the frontiers
of their vanquished kingdom.
Now that Hausa central control had been smashed, the jihadis
sought to bring the Hausa urban strongholds in the deep south under
their hegemony. Already, the Fulani had conquered much of the sur-
rounding countryside. The task now was to besiege each community and
to starve it into submission. The four major jihadis (Dallaji had
urged the appointment of a fourth, Na Banye) and their armies encoun-
tered stiff resistance. It was therefore necessary for Shaikh
T Uthman to grant some additional flags to local Fulani chiefs in
order to win their active support. These chiefs, like the original
jihadis, were allowed to retain the lands they conquered and to
assume the ancient official titles of their Hausa predecessors.
This added support, while extremely helpful, did not bring
about the total conquest of the south. Indeed, in the hilly and
rocky country of the southwest, where there were located a number of
Hausa intellectual communities of great antiquity, the Fulani were
unable to evict the ruling elites. The Fulani also had difficulty
controlling the territory along the kingdom’s northern frontier.
Umaru Dunyawa had appointed a governor to the town of Maradi, but his
administration was oppressive and he was assassinated by the local
populace in 1819. The Fulani authorities at Sokoto could do little
to prevent this calamity for the Shaikh, ill for several years, had
died in 1817. His son and successor, Belo, was fully engaged in the
consolidation of his own power within the Caliphate itself. Katsina,
now a self-governing Emirate within the Caliphate, also had severe
internal problems. Maradi was therefore able to declare its indepen-
dence from Dunyawa and to call upon the former Hausa rulers of
Katsina to establish a Katsina government in exile. They consented,
and henceforth successive rulers of Maradi called themselves T,the
King of Katsina in Maradi. Upon taking office they vowed to con-
tinue the struggle for the liberation of Katsina from the Fulani
usurpers. The major goal of Maradi diplomacy would be the reasser-
tion of Hausa authority in Katsina. Thus, for the next eighty years
the Hausa of Maradi waged intermittent war upon the Fulani to the
south; wars which brought misery to both states and resulted in
mutual economic, social and demographic dislocation.
8. See Anon., "The History of Umaru Dallaji and Consequent History of
the Kings of Katsina," Muhammad Bello Kagara, trans. (unpublished
paper, personal library of Muhammad Bello Kagara, 1952).
9. Yves Urvoy, Histoire des Populations du Soudan Central (Paris,
1936)
,
281; Dixon Denham, Hugh Clapperton, and Dr. Oudney, Narra-
tive of Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa in
the Years 1822, 1823 , and 1824 (London, 1826) , 253-254; Durbin
Katsina Ibrahim and Magajin Rogo, Maradi, 14 August 1966.
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It was not long before this miniscule Sultanate of Maradi
expanded and engulfed the territories of Tessawa and Gazawa, which
were situated to the east of them. Eventually, Maradi T s conquests
deprived Katsina of a considerable portion of its northwestern fron-
tier, a vital military buffer zone.
*****
By 1817, the Jihad of Shaikh T Uthman had resulted in the es-
tablishment of a vast Fulani empire in Northern Nigeria. With the
exception of Bornu, parts of Kebbi and Gobir, the hill areas of the
Middle Belt, and the pockets mentioned above, the Fulani had over-
thrown the traditional Hausa* monarchies. Before examining the impact
of the Jihad on relations between Katsina, Sokoto and Maradi, let us
probe more deeply into the Jihad itself. First of all, it must be
emphasized that the early jihadi, for the most part, were not mem-
bers of the old Katsina Fulani establishment. Rather, they were
relative newcomers and were only part Fulani, with strains of Arab,
Bare-Bari, Mande or even Hausa ancestry. It is equally significant
that not all Fulani favored the Jihad : in fact the Ruma Fulani
violently resisted it and some Sullubawa only gave the jihadi their
half-hearted support. 10 Unlike the established, older Fulani fam-
ilies of clans, the newer immigrants had not acquired a sense of
loyalty to the Hausa monarchs nor did they have a strong desire to
follow the authority of the existing local Fulani aristocrats.
Furthermore, arriving later, they had to compete with Hausa agri-
culturalists for the dwindling reserve of fertile lands. These proud
Fulani pastoralists despised peasant society, believing it to be in-
ferior to their own.H The Jihad in Katsina may therefore be seen,
in part, as a struggle between quasi-Fulani rural pastoralists and
sedentary Hausa agriculturalists. After that struggle had been won
by the former, it became a conflict between the rural Fulani (with
some allies in the towns) and the urbanized Hausa elites.
We do not know the motives of the Katsina jihadi, because to
date we have found no manuscripts written by them. Therefore only
tentative conclusions may be drawn. From oral testimonies, it would
seem that the Jihad was fought largely by Fulani (undoubtedly with
the neutrality or support of some Hausa) and that their primary mo-
tive was political—the overthrow of Hausa rule at every level of
government. However, the clash between the rich landed Fulani es-
tablishment, and their poorer, though perhaps more politically am-
bitious cousins, indicates that there was a degree of class rivalry
in addition to the competition between Hausa and Fulani tribes.
Fulani newcomers, some of them nouveau riche , undoubtedly wanted
political status commensurate with their roles as advisers and
teachers; and it is likely that the rural Fulani poor sought more
grazing land and a more equitable tax system.
What were the economic results of the Jihad? Were the
grievances of the cattle Fulani ameliorated? The answers appear
to be negative. The cattle tax that Shaikh T Uthman preached
10. Anon., T,Umaru Dallaji”; S. J. Hogben, ,TRuma District: Census and
Report,” HASS/1166, 11 November 1927, NAK.
11. Murray Last, The Sokoto Caliphate (New York, 1967)
,
lxxix.
12. See H. R. Palmer, "Katsina Division - Report on Taxation,”
HASS/1289, December 1908, KPO, 31.
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against was restored; and in the course of the nineteenth century the
incidence of indirect taxation increased. Moreover, it has been
noted that the Jihad was followed by nearly nine decades of warfare
between Maradi and Katsina. The western locus of commerce shifted
away from the capital in an easterly direction and the major caravan
routes soon intersected nearly twenty miles east of the city gates.
The western portions of the kingdom became depopulated as a result of
incessant Hausa raids from Maradi, and the center of agricultural
activity drifted toward the Galadima’s fief in the southeast. 13
Socially, the Jihad did not result in any lasting animosity
between the Hausa intellectuals and the Fulani. The majority of
Hausa scholars chose not to follow their kin into exile, and for
them life continued much as before. However, many Hausa scholars in
the southwestern town of Kogo did not adhere to the Shaikh 1 s re-
formist ideas and were forced into exile. As a result, that area’s
ancient reputation as a great Central Sudanic center for Islamic
learning was lost.-1- 1*'
For the Fulani jihadi, the Holy War was a great success for
they were now in control of the former Hausa fiefs and were therefore
in possession of great wealth and influence. In reality, a new class
had emerged, even though it was looked down upon socially by some of
the older pre-jihadic Fulani elites. In the case of the Hausa aris-
tocracy, the Jihad had been a total disaster. In nearly every in-
stance, they lost political control and were driven into exile. The
Hausa therefore lost political representation in Katsina. This was
unfortunate, for under the ancient regime the Fulani, even though
the Hausa-dominated towns
,
were at least governed locally by their
Hausa-dominated towns, they were at least governed locally by their
own people in the major areas of Fulani settlement. After the Jihad ,
the Hausa were well treated but they were denied, in most cases,
direct participation in government.
In the judicial realm, the Jihad led to some positive and
beneficial reforms. Katsina was blessed during the nineteenth cen-
tury by a succession of outstanding Fulani justices who adhered to
the Maliki code of Muslim law. These men, all from the same Fulani
family, held the Muslim juridical title of Alkali. After the Jihad ,
Sokoto endowed Katsina’ s Alkali with a private estate which provided
a source of revenue for both him and his court. The concession was
significant for it enabled the Alkali to be independent, financially,
of Katsina T s monarch and other potential pressure groups. In addi-
tion, the chief Alkali was a life appointment and the king could not
depose him without permission from Sokoto. Thus there was less com-
pulsion for the Alkali to toe the line of the executive authorities.
These reforms were to make the judiciary fairly independent of the
executive branch of government. By the same token, the chief justice
(i.e.. Alkali) was expected to operate entirely within the judicial
realm and was not to make political decisions. In extreme cases,
appeals could be made from the chief Alkali’s court to the king and
ultimately to the Shaikh (and his successors) in Sokoto.
13. Denham, Clapperton, Oudney, Narrative , 120-122.
14. Malam Urwatu, Katsina, 23 July 1966.
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Unquestionably, the most important changes that occurred due
to the Jihad were political in nature. In the Hausa period, Kat-
sina T s monarch ruled supreme and was responsible to no one. During
the Jihad , however, the Fulani Katsina flagbearers received their
commissions from Shaikh T Uthman and therefore were responsible to
him. The Shaikh established his base at Sokoto and through his
flagbearing lieutenants was able to amalgamate the formerly indepen-
dent Hausa kingdoms into a mighty and expansive Fulani empire. He
assumed the title of Sarkin Musulmi which literally means ’’king of
the Muslims,” and is the Hausa equivalent of the ancient Arabic
Muslim designation ’’ amir al-muminin” (Commander of the Faithful)
.
The title was of dual significance, for the Sarkin Musulmi
was both political and spiritual overlord of the kingdoms which made
up his immense empire. After the Shaikh T s death, successive rulers
of the empire assumed this title. Katsina T s monarchs, like those in
other kingdoms comprising the Sokoto Empire, recognized the superior-
ity of the Sarkin Musulmi and were expected to send gifts to him from
time to time as a token of their respect and allegiance. Within a
few decades, this tribute evolved into an annual payment of a portion
of Katsina T s revenue. The Sarkin Musulmi also possessed the privi-
lege of deposing and confirming the appointments of not only the
ruler of Katsina but the major hereditary nobles and kingmakers as
well. 15
Since it would have been impossible for the Sarkin Musulmi to
oversee the administration of every dependent kingdom, he appointed a
representative to each. The Galadima of Sokoto, a member of the
royal court, was his representative to the court of the king of Kat-
sina. The choice was wise, for the Galadima T s family were originally
Katsinawa Fulani from Gobir. This official rarely visited Katsina,
and delegated responsibilities to his eldest son, who carried the
title of Dan Maliki. The latter spent several months each year in
Katsina and saw to it that Sokoto ! s share of the revenue was collec-
ted and safely transferred to the treasury of the Sarkin Musulmi. 16
It is significant that the Vizier of Sokoto, an official only second
in rank to the Sarkin Musulmi, did not deal directly with emirates or
kingdoms outside his portfolio. Katsina was one of those states. 1^
*****
By 1807 the Hausa power structure in the city of Katsina had
been destroyed, and within the next two years the Fulani assumed con-
trol over most of the major fiefdoms in the kingdom. To soften the
blow of this transfer of power, and for political convenience, the
Fulani usurpers adopted the old Hausa system of government with its
plethora of titles, fiefs, and court regalia. The revolutionaries
had in fact now become the establishment. Yet a subtle power strug-
gle within the Fulani hierarchy at Katsina began to develop. When
the capital was taken from the Hausa, Dunyawa and the late Na
Alhaji T s son occupied the quarters of the city they had conquered,
while Umaru Dallaji took control of the palace and the central market
15. Ibid . , 24 July 1966; Muhammad Bello Kagara, Katsina, 4 July 1966.
16. Malam Guda, Katsina, 6 July 1966.
17. Last, Sokoto . 204.
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area. The capital was then partitioned into three parts, correspond-
ing to the areas controlled by the three jihadi. These men also
held major former Hausa fiefs in the surrounding countryside. 18
The tripartite division of Katsina had a debilitating effect.
Administrative problems could not be expeditiously handled, and there
was no unified command in the army. Consequently, the kingdom was
highly vulnerable to the Hausa menace and was largely responsible for
the reassertion of Hausa rule in Maradi. Sarkin Musulmi Belo, son
and successor to Shaikh T Uthman, feared that if the triumvirate con-
tinued it would eventually lead to civil war and a further deterio-
ration of central authority. Consequently, in 1812 he abolished the
arrangement and officially declared Umaru Dallaji the ruling monarch.
Rather than assigning him the ancient Hausa non-Islamic title of
TTsarki" (snake killer) he installed him in office as "Emir," which
was a Muslim designation of Middle Eastern origin. The kingdom in
turn was henceforth referred to as an "Emirate."!9
Belo, astute diplomat that he was, did not forget the achieve-
ments of the other jihadi. Indeed, each received an aristocratic
title and was assured that he and his successors would forever be
among the kingmakers of Katsina and that he would be installed and
deposed not by the Emir but by the Sarkin Musulmi through his per-
sonal representative, the Galadiman Sokoto. Moreover, they were ex-
tended the privilege of control over revenue collection in their
fiefs, and their tax bill was henceforth stated separately from that
of the Emir.
This arrangement was undoubtedly an improvement over the anar-
chic triumvirate system of government. However, it possessed some
weaknesses. First of all, the Emir was not to be an absolute ruler
as were his Hausa predecessors, but rather primus inter pares .
Secondly, he was required to rule within the context of a highly de-
centralized confederation of fiefdoms, some of which by virtue of
their special connection with the Sarkin Musulmi in Sokoto were al-
most completely independent of Katsina central authority.
From Sokoto T s standpoint, the new arrangement was undoubtedly
welcomed. It left the Emir in a weak enough position to prevent him
from challenging the hegemony of the Sarkin Musulmi; and the special
relationship worked out with the major fiefholders gave the Sarkin
Musulmi a degree of control over administration in the Emirate. At
the same time, the appointment of a Kaura (one of the flagbearers) as
supreme war chief tended to unify the military command and thus
strengthen Katsina* s hand vis-^-vis their opponents in Maradi.
Emir Dallaji did not oppose the scheme
—
perhaps because of his
loyalty and deep friendship for the Sarkin Musulmi and his son and
undoubtedly because of his pleasure over being entrusted with the
responsibility of establishing a Fulani ruling dynasty. This, how-
ever, was not the case with his descendants and successors. Through-
out the nineteenth century Katsina T s monarchs sought ways to reassert
the autonomy of the king.
18. Anon., "Umaru Dallaji"; "Assessment Report."
19. Last, Sokoto, 53; Malam Urwatu, Katsina, 9 July 1966.
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When Umaru Dallaji died in 1835, he was succeeded by his sec-
ond son, Sidiku.20 This was not an auspicious moment for a change in
leadership. In the following year, at the battle of Gawakuke in
Gobir, a combination of Tuareg, Gobir and Maradi forces was routed
and the Hausa sultan of the last state was killed. 21 Thus, with
Hausa expansion into Gobir blocked, Maradi turned its attention to
Katsina in the south. According to oral tradition, Sidiku was ap-
pointed over his elder brother, Bello, because of his reputation for
learning and piety. The appointment naturally triggered rivalries
within the ruling family, and the Hausa exiles in Maradi took advan-
tage of this by launching an invasion. 22 The fief of the Sarkin
Sullubawa had been dangerously unstable since its northern half was
reconquered by the Maradi forces in the years after 1819. Umaru
Dallaji had been able to give Dunyawa enough support to prevent the
entire Sullubawa fief from falling under Hausa control, but Dunyawa T s
successor foolishly raised taxes and appointed irresponsible collec-
tors. The Maradi king profited from the seething discontent within
the fief by liberating it from Fulani rule. It was this initial
success, coupled with the struggles among Dallaji T s sons and rela-
tives, that spurred the Maradi Hausa to launch an invasion into the
heart of Katsina. Indeed, the time was ripe for the powerful and
adroit diplomat, Sarkin Musulmi Belo, had died in 1837. His son and
successor, Ali, was young and initially encountered difficulty in
working with the older statesmen who had served under the Shaikh and
Belo since before the Jihad. 23
When Maradi began to infiltrate the Emirate, the Fulani of
Ruma, who had earlier opposed the' jihadi, declared their neutrality
and allowed the Hausa guerrillas to use their territory as a corridor
to the rest of the kingdom. 29- By 189-3, the Maradi Hausa under Dan
Mari had forged an alliance with a number of Katsina towns which were
situated in the center of the Emirate and had also taken control of
three large southern communities with sizeable Hausa populations.
One of those communities, Karofi, was deep within Katsina territory
and became the Hausa base of operations against the Fulani regime. 25
A feeling of insecurity developed among the peasants, whose crops
were being stolen or destroyed by the invaders; local chiefs re-
sponded by constructing high protective walls around their villages.
It is noteworthy that military campaigns in the Emirate were not led
by the Sokoto authorities but were usually left to local initiative.
Again, as in the Jihad, Katsina appealed to its neighbors for
assistance. The emirates of Daura, Borgu, Katagum, Misau, Gombe,
Bauchi and Kano responded. The old Fulani tactic of controlling the
surrounding countryside and starving the urban Hausa strongholds was
re-employed. In time, the major Hausa base was forced to capitulate
and its leader was executed. These events led to the rapid collapse
of the invasion and a reassertion of Fulani control. °
20. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, 170.
21. Last, Sokoto, 71.
22. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, 170.
23. Last, Sokoto , 81, 89-.
29-. F. de F. Daniel, "History of Katsina" (unpublished paper, KPO,
1927)
,
19.
25. Gowers, Gazetteer, 19; Fletcher, "Re-Assessment of Yandaka Dis-
trict," HIS/13, 1928, NAK.
26. Anon., "Umaru Dallaji"; "Yandaka History," 11.
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The conflict itself enabled Katsina T s warlord, the Kaura, to
expand his own fief holdings. But more importantly, Emir Sidiku, at
the conclusion of the war, sought to strengthen his own hand by turn-
ing his vengeance upon all those who had supported, tacitly or other-
wise, the Maradi attack. Hausa communities in the west were de-
stroyed; and Ruma, which had alternated its support depending on the
changing fortunes of the Katsina regime, was similarly devastated.
Formerly, Ruma had acted as a buffer state between Katsina and
Maradi. Now its ruling family and the majority of its inhabitants
were forced to flee before Sidiku T s ravaging armies. The Emir’s
terrorist activities were a mistake, for Ruma became a wasteland and
served as a permanent corridor for future Hausa irruptions into the
Katsina, Zaria and Kano emirates. 27
Sidiku’ s terrorism and his obvious attempt to enhance his own
power alarmed both Katsina and the Sarkin Musulmi. The latter, at
the urging of Katsina ’s electoral college, deposed him in 1844 and
chose his elder brother, Muhamman Bello, as successor. 28 Sarkin
Musulmi Ali had wisely used his authority to remove an excessively
ruthless and autocratic Emir. However, Sidiku now became a thorn in
his side by assisting the Hausa of Tsibiri in campaigns against
Sokoto and Gobir and by attempting, though futiley, to forge an alli-
ance with the Hausa exiles in Maradi.
Bello (not to be confused with the late Sarkin Musulmi) real-
ized that Katsina central authority would have to be strengthened in
order to prevent a repetition of the disastrous events of the 184-0 ’s.
However, his efforts to bolster the power of the office of Emir were
peaceful and diplomatic. The titled fiefholders were henceforth re-
quired to spend a portion of each year at the capital under the
watchful eye of the Emir and his court. Over the years, this resi-
dency requirement was extended to the point where the fiefholders
rarely visited their constituencies and became in effect absentee
landlords without direct political control over their fiefdoms. The
responsibility for tax collection and general administrative super-
vision was now entrusted by them to their slaves who were given the
title of jakada. This transfer of responsibility was highly signi-
ficant for it resulted in a new class of government officials—
a
wealthy and powerful slave hierarchy without social status but with
varying degrees of control over local administration. Furthermore,
it led to the increasing urbanization and stabilization of the Fulani
aristocracy.
Bello may have brought the Fulani hereditary aristocracy more
tightly under his control, but it is doubtful if this led to any
sweeping extension of his authority over the major fiefs. In fact,
those fiefholders who received their titles directly from Sokoto,
and who remitted their taxes to the Sarkin Musulmi, resisted Bello’s
attempt to force them to reside at the capital. Such kingmakers (and
descendants of flagbearers) as the ’Yan Daka and Kaura continued to
reside on their fiefs and to enjoy almost complete control over the
internal administration of their lands. Thus, this special relation-
ship with Sokoto enabled them to maintain a certain degree of inde-
pendence and made it difficult for the Emir to encroach on their
prerogatives.
27. TtRuma District Notes,” HASS/6, 1927, NAK; Hogben and Kirk-
Greene, Emirates , 171.
28. Ibid . , 171.
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Emir Bello sought to overcome the authority of the weaker
landed aristocrats in several ways. First of all, he enlarged his
palace staff, gave them titles, created new forms of taxation, and
entrusted them with the responsibility of collecting those taxes.
Consequently, there were two sets of tax collectors: those respon-
sible directly to the Emir and those who were employed by the fief-
holders. Secondly, a number of palace staff were given fiefs to
govern and were made directly responsible to the Emir. Finally,
Bello enhanced his own financial position (and hence his power) by
making a few alterations in the tax scheme. Umaru Dallaji, when in
office, had differentiated between Muslim and pagan Fulani. While
the former were required to pay tax on corn, the latter were (as
before the Jihad) subject to irregular levies. About 1850, Bello
abolished all distinctions between the two classes because, it is
said, the number of pagan Fulani had decreased. ^9 Both were there-
after subject to the same forms of taxation. In 1804, Shaikh
T Uthman had preached against the cattle tax. Bello not only re-
tained it but raised the rate significantly.
These changes profoundly affected the power structure in the
Emirate and were achieved without an internal civil war or the de-
struction of any existing institutions. The difference was that now
a new authority was superimposed on the old, and in some cases tended
to submerge it. Bello had given the slaves a large measure' of' polit-
ical control over local administration and tax collection and in so
doing hoped to short-circuit the power of the hereditary aristocrats
who had quite naturally tried to block any aggrandizement of the
power of the office of Emir.
During Bello T s reign, Katsina enjoyed relative peace and sta-
bility. However, the Jihad and subsequent wars with Maradi had taken
their economic toll. We know this because in the 1850 T s Katsina was
host to an astute European traveler. Dr. Heinrich Barth. Barth first
came to Katsina in 1851 and returned two years later. He noted that
the capital city had experienced a period of decline and that al-
though it was surrounded by a wall approximately 13 miles in circum-
ference, its inhabitants numbered no more than about seven or eight
thousand. Barth estimated that the city at one time had a population
of at least 100,000 but that it had declined after the Fulani Ji-
had . He was told that the principal foreign merchants had migrated
to Kano and concluded his study with the prediction that:
... unless either the Fulbe [Fulani] succeed in crushing
entirely the independent provinces to the north and north-
west, or until the Goverawa and Mariadawa [sic ] ? whose king
still bears the title of serki-n-Katsena [sic ] , reconquer this
town, it will continue to decline and become more desolate
every year. 31
Barth T s statement strongly supports the contention that the Jihad and
29. "Kano Province Half Yearly Report Ending June 30, 1909,” SNP
10/6, 3835, NAK, 32; also, Malam Guda, Katsina, 8 July 1966.
30. Henry Barth, Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa
(London, 1965), I, 476.
31. Ibid.
,
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the subsequent conflicts with Hausa Maradi seriously crippled the
Emirate T s economy and retarded further development. At the opening
of the nineteenth century, on the eve of the Jihad
.
Katsina was
emerging as one of the most prosperous trading centers in Hausaland.
The best caravan track to the south was between Katsina and the
bustling city of Bida, which lay on the edge of the massive forest
zone. Furthermore, many of the important caravan routes to North
Africa came down through northern Katsina, which was in Hausa-Maradi
hands after the Jihad . Thus, economically, the Jihad and the subse-
quent failure to achieve a condition of peace between Katsina and
Maradi was disastrous for that region of the Central Sudan. In human
terms, the peasantry had the most to lose because it was they whose
farms were left desolate ' and who had to take refuge in the walled
cities where they became a landless proletariat.
*****
After the defeat of the exiled Hausa in 1844, Sokoto increas-
ingly carried the burden of war with Gobir and Maradi. Sokoto took
the offensive, won impressive victories, but failed to take the Hausa
strongholds in Tsibiri and Maradi. 32 Nevertheless, with the pressure
(or onus of war) off Katsina, Emir Bello could devote greater atten-
tion to long-overdue reforms. Diplomatic relations between Sokoto
and Katsina under Sarkin Musulmi Aliyu (184-2-1859) and Muhammad Bello
(1844—1869) respectively, were far more cordial than during the short
but stormy days of Sidiku.
Muhammad Bello ruled until his death in 1869; yet towards the
end of his reign the wars with Maradi regained momentum. 33 Dan
Baskore had succeeded to the Maradi throne in 1854 and undertook to
unite his subjects behind him in a new bid for Katsina. This dynamic
warrior and able administrator reasserted the traditional foundation
of Maradi diplomacy—the reconquest of Katsina. To this end, he de-
voted nearly all his energies. Within a year he reorganized, ex-
panded and equipped a large and highly disciplined army and used the.
desolate Fuma bush country as the main avenue for attacks upon the
Fulani. On one occasion, he advanced as far as the gates of Katsina;
and at an encounter at Kabakawa his troops came within yards of
capturing the elderly Bello. In a later invasion, Dan Baskore pene-
trated deeply into southern Katsina and, like his predecessors, used
a local community as a base for operations against towns in the
neighboring emirate of Zaria. The Fulani of Katsina, under Bello,
were at first unable to control these devastating invasions. But in
1868 a decisive victory was finally achieved. The story was told
many years afterward by an eyewitness and was written down by a
British District officer:
Dan Baskore set out with two thousand horses late in the dry
season to attack Katsina. . . They reached Muduru in Durbi
district, before their approach was known to Katsina. Durbi
quickly gathered a force from his own men. . . Presumably they
were trained to concentrate at short notice. However, the
32. M. G. Smith, "A Hausa Kingdom: Maradi under Dan Baskore, 1854-
75,” in Daryll Forde and P. M. Kaberry, eds.
,
West African King-
doms in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1965)
,
98.
33. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates , 183; Malam Urwatu, Katsina,
24 July 1966.
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season was late and Danbaskore \ sic 1 found no water for his
cavalcade at Muduru. A boy was brought in, who had a cala-
bash of water, when Durbi and his force came upon them,
affecting a complete surprise. There was a great slaughter
of men and horses, caught as they were with their backs to the
lake. The water of Sabe lake is said to have run red with
blood. Some five hundred men were slain. Those who escaped,
passed by Allemi and Gafiya, and tried to reach Riga Lake.
But Durbi had preceded them by a shorter route. His archers
tied the geza shrub together across the paths to entangle the
horses, and making full use of the cover afforded by the riv-
erine forest, exacted a further heavy toll with their arrows.
Danbaskore’ s horsemen were forced to withdraw unsuccessful.
The same story was repeated at the Sauri lake. Eventually a
dispirited Danbaskore reached Birnin Kuka with a handful of
men. This was probably the last raid in force.^ 1*
These accounts of the wars with Maradi are important because
they reveal the continuing weakness of the Katsina regime. Most of
the battles were defensive in nature. Katsina—despite its numerical
superiority—was not united enough to prevent the Hausa exiles from
probing deep within its frontiers. Perhaps the reason for Maradi ’s
failure totally to conquer the Emirate lay with the problem of logis-
tics. The supply lines from Maradi were too tenuous and their ina-
bility to win the countryside prevented them from living off the
rural peasants.
For twenty-one years, until his death, Dan Baskore led eighty-
three raids against Fulani Katsina, Zamfara, and Sokoto, including
two unsuccessful sieges of Katsina city.^ Under this energetic
Sultan Maradi reached its peak of power and administrative develop-
ment. While Katsina’ s Emir Bello had administratively and fiscally
strengthened the Emirate to the degree that it prevented a future
Hausa reconquest, Dan Baskore T s work had made Maradi strong enough to
withstand any attempt by the Fulani to conquer it. The tragedy, how-
ever, was that although both were adept at forging alliances with
their own ethnic group in other states, neither made an effort to
come to terms with one another. Indeed, peace between Katsina and
Maradi was inconceivable. Successive emirs were bound by the fami-
lies--and rival branches—to continue the "honorable war." An emir’s
or sultan’s reputation, and ability as a leader, were assessed
largely by his ability to prosecute the war successfully. Further-
more, their wealth—and hence ability to wage war—rested in large
part on the amount of war booty they could extract from the van-
quished. Too many citizens, especially the aristocrats, were pro-
fiting by these military raids which they conducted. It is there-
fore questionable whether either side would have preferred peace
under the existing political conditions. No written evidence or oral
testimonies suggest that either camp wished to convene a conference
to discuss peace. Yet, through a complicated spy network both were
kept well-informed of each other’s activities. For the Hausa exiles
in Maradi this was a war of honor. For the Fulani usurpers in Kat-
sina it was a struggle for survival.
34.
35.
Nicholas, "Kaita,"' 51.
Smith, "Hausa Kingdom," 98; PocumentsL Scientifiques , II, 463-464.
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Dan Baskore T s irruptions represented one of the last concerted
massive attempts to reassert Hausa control over the Emirate. His
death was followed by a series of monarchs lacking in prestige and
the ability to consolidate their predecessor’s political and terri-
torial gains. Within a decade Maradi was torn by civil war, and its
raids against Katsina were less frequent and effective. 3 6 in a sense
this was fortunate for Katsina because for the next three and a half
decades it too experienced intense rivalry within the ruling circles.
*****
For Katsina, the connection with its overlord, Sokoto, was a
mixed blessing. Shaikh ’Uthman and his son and successor, Muhammad
Belo, had imposed on the Emirate an effective system of checks and
balances. The powers of the successive Katsina emirs were circum-
scribed not only by the ultimate authority, the Sarkin Musulmi, but
through those aristocrats who received their commissions directly
from Sokoto. This situation produced a condition of dependence and
helped to ensure continuing loyalty and cordial relations between the
two states. Successive emirs of Katsina also received their commis-
sions of office from the Sarkin Musulmi, who lent legitimacy and
strength to their position vis-^-vis certain titled local aristoc-
rats. By the same token, however, those latter officials cherished
their own connection, or special relationship, with Sokoto and used
it as a shield against attempts by emirs to whittle away their au-
thority and prerogatives. In other words, as long as the office of
Sarkin Musulmi carried great weight, it was in the interest of the
emir to curry the favor of Sokoto. As a result, the emirs of Katsina
never attained the extensive position of authority enjoyed by the
chiefs of some of the other emirates. Until the final decade of the
nineteenth century they were little more than primus inter pares and
they remained remarkably loyal to their Sokoto overlords. With con-
stant threats to legitimacy emanating both from the Hausa exiles in
Maradi and from rival branches within the Dallaji family itself,
successive emirs used the Sokoto connection as a protective device.
The tragedy for Katsina, however, was that the original jihadi
had failed to give the Hausa a role in the governance of the new re-
gime. It would seem that once the Jihad had gained momentum, the
Fulani wanted the total destruction of Hausa authority, regardless of
whether a given Hausa chief happened to have professed Islam. Fur-
thermore, by failing to win the unequivocal support of the Hausa
peasantry (more especially the Hausa townfolk) and some of their
overlords, the Fulani would have to cope with neutral or hostile
elements within Katsina during the devastating post-jihadic Maradi
irruptions. In addition. Shaikh Uthman had initially failed to ex-
ploit the historic Hausa commercial rivalry between Gobir and Katsina.
Sultan Yunfa of Gobir and the Sultan of Katsina had been at odds with
one another for several years prior to the Jihad . In fact, the Sultan
of Katsina had tried at one point to forge an alliance with the Shaikh
against the Gobir authorities, but for some unexplained reason was
rebuffed. Thus, the great jihadic victory in Katsina was, in some
respects, a hollow one. A sharing of power between Fulani and Hausa
Muslims might, in the long term, have ensured peace, greater popular
representation in government, and perhaps even unity between Katsina
and Maradi.
36. M. Perie, "Cercle de Maradi Historique Complet Politique et
Administratif des Origines h 1940" (unpublished manuscript,
1948)
,
passim .
CHAPTER 6
THE COMMERCE OF HAUSALAND
,
1780-1833
Lucie G. Colvin
Introduction
The Hausa people of Northern Nigeria and southern Niger Repub-
lic-*- have been famous as traders since the Europeans first heard of
them in the sixteenth century. Yet we know little, if any, more of
their indigenous commerce and commercial history today than was known
in the middle of the nineteenth century after Heinrich Barth published
the findings of his prodigious explorations . 2 Only isolated aspects
of their commerce have attracted historians so far. The trans -Saharan
trade in which the Hausa were involved has received recent attention, 3
1. In this paper, following the current custom, "Hausa” will be used
to refer to both Hausa proper and the assimilated Fulani who now
rule the Hausa states. "Habe" will be used when only the Hausa
proper are meant.
The central Hausa city-states were Kano, Katsina, Zaria, Gobir,
Zamfara, and Daura. Hausa is also spoken in Yauri, Bussa, Zaberma
or Zerma, Gurma, Borgu, Nupe, and Gwari. These sometimes are con-
sidered "bastard" Hausa states. After the Fulani jihad, Sokoto
was the capital of the empire which included most of the old cen-
tral states, and Gwandu, the capital of the western empire embrac-
ing several of the "bastard" states.
Spelling of personal and place names will be according to
modern usage, except in quotations or direct references. There
the author 1 s spelling is retained. Hausa words are spelled ac-
cording to the rules adopted by the Hausa Committee
,
that is
,
double consonants appear, but long vowels and tonal patterns do
not. Hausa terms are not underlined after their first occurrence.
Arabic words are transliterated using the rules of Farhat J.
Ziadeh and R. Bayly Winder in An Introduction to Modern Arabic
(Princeton, 1957) . Arabic words which have been borrowed into
Hausa may be spelled in the Hausa fashion where this is appropri-
ate, e.g.
,
Hausa "shehu" for Arabic "sheikh."
2. Heinrich Barth, Travels and Discoveries in North and Central
Africa (London, 1857-1858)
.
3. A. Adu Boahen, Britain, the Sahara and the Western Sudan, 1788-
1861 (Oxford, 1964) ; A. Adu Boahen, "The Caravan Trade in the
Nineteenth Century," Journal of African History [M], III, 2
(1962), 349-359; C. W. Newbury, "North African and Western Sudan
Trade in the Nineteenth Century: A Re-evaluation," JAH
,
VII, 2
(1966), 233-246.
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as have the various currencies which they used. 1* M. G. Smith has pub-
lished excellent anthropological studies of the Hausa economics, ^ but
he has not been concerned with historical depth. The purpose of this
paper is to begin a comprehensive history of Hausa commerce, that is,
to trace the movement of goods through Hausaland in all directions and
to provide a chronological perspective. ^ This approach is intended to
bridge the present scholarly gap between generalizations about com-
merce spanning several centuries on the one hand, and, on the other,
detailed information submerged in accounts essentially concerned with
something else, for example, explorers 1 journals and local chronicles.
Chronologically, this paper begins not at the beginning of the
Hausa T s rise to commercial preeminence in the sixteenth century, but
near the end of the eighteenth century, about the middle of their
period of prosperity. This ambiguity is forced on the topic by the
lack of sources for the later sixteenth, the seventeenth, and the
eighteenth centuries. Only in the last quarter of the eighteenth cen-
tury did the Europeans begin soliciting detailed reports of the trade
of the interior of West Africa. Given these contemporary accounts,
the chronicles and the work of modern anthropologists can be very
useful, but without them it is very difficult to reconstruct commer-
cial history reliably. Hence it was found best to begin when the
sources do, at the end of the eighteenth century. The paper ends with
the journey of Richard and John Lander down the Niger in 1832-1834,
also a point dictated at least partically by the sources. After this
time we have no more eyewitness accounts of Hausaland until the jour-
ney of Heinrich Barth in 1854, and his account properly belongs to the
history of the Sokoto empire, not to the period of transition with
which I am concerned.
The paper thus spans a period of fifty years, the time of the
last Habe emirs, or sarakuna (sing, sarki) as the Hausa call them, and
the period of the Fulani jihad under cUthman dan Fodio. In Europe it
was a period of great scientific, geographical, and commercial inter-
est in Africa — the era of the first explorers. The flow of informa-
tion, the fruit of this interest, was interrupted only by the turmoil
of the Napoleonic Wars. For England, the latter half of the period
saw the beginnings of her efforts to end the slave trade, a time when
she hoped greatly that diplomacy in the interior of Africa would dry
up the sources of the trade.
The first European report on the Hausa kingdoms from North
Africa was solicited by a German named Niebuhr in 1772. In 1785 an-
other German, A. von Einseidel, made a second brief reference to the
4. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, T,The Major Currencies in Nigerian History,”
Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria
.
II
, 1 (December
1960) ; M. Hiskett, ”Materials Relating to the Cowry Currency of
the Western Sudan," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African
Studies [BSOAS], XXIX, 1-2 (1966), 122-142, 339-366.
5. M. G. Smith, The Economy of the Hausa Communities of Zaria (Lon-
don, 1955); M. G. Smith, "Historical and Cultural Conditions of
Political Corruption among the Hausa," Comparative Studies in So-
ciety and History , VI (1963-1964), 164-194; M. G. Smith, "Social
and Economic Change among Selected Native Communities in Northern
Nigeria" (unpublished Fh.D. dissertation. University of London,
1951)
.
In this paper, commerce is considered to mean interstate trade
only. Purely domestic trade is excluded for lack of sources.
6
.
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Tripoli-Hausa trade. The Association for Promoting the Discovery of
the Interior Parts of Africa began collecting information about the
commerce of the sudan belt in 1788.7 They obtained relatively exten-
sive information on Hausa trade from four sources between then and
1800: their agents, Lucas in Tripoli Regency (1788-1790), Frederic
Horneman in Cairo and Fezzan (1797-1800)
,
and two Moroccan merchants
resident in London. Also encompassed in this period were Mungo Park T s
first and second journeys on the upper Niger, 1795 and 1805; Bowdich T s
and Dupuis 1 missions to Ashanti, 1817 and 1820 respectively; Clapper-
ton^ two missions to Hausaland, 1823-1824 and 1826-1827; Caillie T s
journey to Timbuktu in 1825 and Laing T s abortive expedition to Hausa-
land in the same year; and finally the Lander brothers 1 voyage from
Hausaland to the Niger delta in 1832-1834.
The Nature of Trade
A general picture of the character of trade and the details of
commercial organization in Hausaland is a necessary beginning for a
study of this kind. Western economic concepts and assumptions are not
appropriate, and neither are most generalizations about "primitive”
commerce. The best conceptual tools for analyzing Hausa commerce dur-
ing the period under consideration are probably those put forth by
Karl Polanyi.8 Those which are applicable are noted below.
The customs, regulations, and functions of commerce have been
reconstructed by correlating sources dating from the early nineteenth
century with subsequent, more detailed and analytical descriptions.
Using this method, one can with some certainty remove anachronisms
from the later pictures. It is very difficult, however, to resurrect
the details of customs which have been abandoned, as they sink from
memory and do not appear in subsequent studies. This particularly
corrupts our image of pre-jihad Hausaland, since the jihadists either
feigned or actually were remarkably ignorant of the Habe milieu in
which they operated. 9 Many, including cUthman T s ancestors, were
7 . In this paper
,
"sudan" refers to the belt of savannah and park
lands stretching across Africa between the Sahara and the rain
forests. To Arabs involved in the medieval trans -Saharan trade
it merely meant "the land of the blacks." Horneman reports that
at the end of the eighteenth century it was usually used to de-
note only Hausaland. See E. W. Bovill, ed.
,
Missions to the
Niger , I (Cambridge, 1962), 115. Denham and Clapperton used it
in this meaning, and also loosely to denote everything west of
Bornu.
8. Karl Polanyi, Conrad Arensberg, and Harry Pearson, eds.. Trade
and Markets in Early Empires : Economies in History and Theory
(Glencoe, 111., 1957), especially Ch. 13, "The Economy as an In-
stituted Process."
9. For example, the map of Hausaland given Clapperton by Bellow
represented far fewer places than were known to most long-
distance traders. The latter were mainly Habe.
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recent immigrants to the area, 10 and their contempt for the inhabi-
tants prevented them from learning much about local customs.
This colors virtually all travelers 1 reports and subsequent
studies in some form or another. Several Habe states were recreated
in exile, presumably in much the same form in which they existed be-
fore the jihad, and they constitute a type of control group against
which to measure Fulani changes. However, any change in these re-
located states which has passed from memory cannot be accounted for.
Thus this study cannot fully reconstruct whatever was unique in the
Habe period, and not adopted by the Fulani conquerors. Fortunately,
this affects only a few questions, as there seems to have been a large
degree of continuity between the original Habe society and Fulani rule
as it later evolved.
Several general aspects of trade are characteristic of both the
Fulani and the Habe periods of Hausa history. The first is that com-
merce involving the Hausa states was essentially discontinuous. That
is to say, it was made up of a series of individual ventures planned
for the circumstances of the moment.-*--*- The participants were profes-
sional long-distance traders who were able to go wherever they knew
market conditions to be favorable. There were trails connecting
nearly all of the Saharan oases and Sudanese states with one another,
laterally as well as north and south. Thus what is usually called a
trade "route” is simply the most commonly used itinerary for certain
traders and caravans. When political or economic conditions demanded
it, these itineraries could be changed even while a caravan was en
route. This meant on the one hand that the fortunes of a market could
change very rapidly in either direction.
On the other hand, there were a number of factors conducive to
stability and regularity. Established commercial contacts, credit
facilities, and living arrangements made traders prefer a regular
route. Moreover, the governments of the various Hausa states, the
Fezzan, Bornu, and Ashanti were themselves deeply involved in trade. 12
This made long-term diplomatic relations and commercial intercourse
mutually reinforcing. Even when states were at enmity with one an-
other, they did not necessarily stop all foreign merchants from pass-
ing between them. To cut the routes entirely might hurt them as much
as it did their enemy. The geographical placement of sources of sup-
ply and demand, the conditions of travel and transport, and health
10. Dixon Denham, Hugh Clapperton, and Dr. Oudney, Narrative of Trav-
els and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa in the Years
1822, 1823, and 1824 (2nd ed.
,
London, 1826), Denham 159. This
edition 1 s pagination is consecutive within each author 1 s section;
thus the references here and following will indicate the specific
author as well as pages. See also Thomas Hodgkin, ed.
,
Nigerian
Perspectives (London, 1960), 188-189.
11. Polanyi, Trade and Markets , 260, has cited this as a character-
istic of nonwestern trade in general.
12. M. G. Smith, personal communication, April 1967; Proceedings of
the Association for Promoting the Discovery of the Interior Parts
of Africa , I (London, 1791)
,
105; Denham, Clapperton, Oudney,
Narrative , Denham 329, Clapperton 43; Casely Hayford, Gold Coast
Native Institu cions (London, 1903)
,
for the Ashanti state trading
organization.
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considerations also favored some market sites above others. This at
least limited the range of possible areas to which a trader might
choose to go.
The second major characteristic of Hausa trade is that it was
under the firm control of the government. Each state regulated where
j
markets could be established, how they could operate, who could trade
and where they could go, what merchandise could be sold and the
i prices which could be asked for it. In addition to this the state
itself, as the largest commercial interest, naturally exercised pow-
erful influence on trade. Because of this interest, the state was
concerned not only with regulating commerce in the negative sense,
but also with promoting trade. This required both sound domestic
policy and active foreign policy. The merchant was treated more or
less as an honored guest when the reigning sarki was interested in
trade: he was protected from theft and deception, his goods were re-
stored to his heirs if he died, and all of his traveling needs were
catered to. Foreign policy involved establishing good relations with
j
states which could provide the goods in which the Hausa nobility was
|
interested.
Commerce and the State
To understand this relationship between commerce and govern-
ment as it actually functioned requires some acquaintance with the
structure of Hausa states. Hausa society was and is hierarchical,
built on the basic personal client-lord relationship. A great man
typically has as clients a number of men who are totally dependent on
|
him and work as his agents or servants, as well as some who are of
independent means but consult with him on political questions. 13
When clientship obtains between two economically independent
persons, the relationship can best be regarded as a formalized
friendship between socially unequal persons. The inferior greets his
lord regularly in person and bearing gifts (Hausa: gaisuwa — greet-
j
ing, or gifts of greeting)
,
reports on any events of concern to his
I lord, seeks advice and personal favors in political dealings, and,
upon request, performs favors in his competence.-*- 1*
The relationship extends both upward and downward on the so-
cial scale, as many men were both lords and clients. However, as
j
client one might have only one lord, whereas as lord one might have
f
many clients. 15 Clientship was an essentially personal relationship,
but customarily it was hereditary and sometimes it was attached di-
rectly to a political office, rather than to its holder. 16
There were several conditions of men which affected«status in-
I dependently of this structure. There were slaves, economically
13. M. G. Smith, "The Hausa of Northern Nigeria," in James L. Gibbs,
Jr., ed.
,
Peoples of Africa (New York, 1965), 134.
I 1*- Ibid . . 134-135.
15. Smith, "Hausa," 135.
16. Ibid.. 135.
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dependent clients, eunuchs, resident aliens, free commoners, mallams
(Arabic: mucallim — teacher; in Hausa, anyone with a Koranic educa-
tion)
,
and hereditary nobility. Members of each group could fit into
hierarchies within the group, but the groups themselves could not be
ranked into a strict hierarchy, because different values and oppor-
tunities existed in each. Politically, the groups were intermeshed
at all levels of authority. The top political offices of each king-
dom were held by slaves, eunuchs, njallams, aliens, and nobility all
balanced against each other. 17
The wealth of the state and that of the individuals running it
were differentiated, 18 but in practice the use of wealth was mingled
in the persons of officeholders. The wealth of the state derived
from basic sources: (1) taxes, fines and other levies on the produce
of the subjects; (2 ) the agricultural and industrial produce of slave
villages ;19 (3 ) tolls, commissions, gifts and other speculative income
through trade; and (4) plunder and tribute, the products of war. Of-
ficeholders had personal access to a cut in each of these, depending
upon their positions. Non-officeholders could gain wealth through
trade, by investing in slaves, or through war and plunder. In the
late nineteenth century in both Fulani and Habe Zaria, the easiest
road to wealth was successful politics . 20
This was probably equally true in the Habe city-states of the
eighteenth century. Even if one chose trade or a military career,
one had to be a successful politician to rise in either profession.
All means of gaining wealth theoretically were under the control of
the state, and actually were thus guarded when the clientship system
with the sarki at the top was functioning correctly. In practice
everywhere in the Sudan, wealth had to be under the control of the
state in order to ensure the stability of a state. For with wealth
one could obtain horses, guns, spears, slaves and either the respect
or the fear of the people — hence political power. The political
power of any one individual or interest group was integrated into the
state only by Macchiavellian considerations and the clientship sys-
tem. Therefore, it was essential that the sarki personally strive to
keep a firm hand on both powerful individuals, and also all means by
which persons might gain power. It is not necessary to consider
other forms of control here; the relevant point is that this was the
logical ground for close state regulation of merchants and trade.
Many critical military supplies were brought by merchants, especially
guns, horses, swords and shields. But commerce, because it involved
the presence of aliens with no stake in the other aspects of a polity
and/or the movement of subjects outside their ruler T s sphere of au-
thority, was inherently difficult to control.
17. For a full description, see M. G. Smith, Government in Zazzau
(Oxford, 1960)
,
chs. Ill and IV.
18. There was an official royal treasury in Kano at least as early
as the fifteenth century, for the Kano Chronicle reports that
Treasurer then became a eunuch office. See H. Richmond Palmer,
ed. and trans., Sudanese Memoirs (London, 1928), III, 112.
19. Slave villages (Hausa: rinjoji [sing, rinji 1 . gwandu , or
rumada) were founded by nobles and wealthy men with a large
number of captives and a few free men or trusted clients as
overseers. They were one of the main sources of stable income
for nobility.
20. Smith, Economy of Zaria , 91.
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The Asantehene deliberately discouraged extensive commerce
with the English for fear it would sap the vitality of the nation
in war or lead to betrayal by ambitious merchants. 21 The Hausa
states did not go that far, nor did they even segregate the commer-
cial community from the rest of the people
,
as was common in many
African states. 22
In Hausaland, the major source of control lay in the state’s
own importance as a merchant. Secondly, all merchants traded at the
pleasure of the sarki and his agents. This was customary throughout
the sudan and the Sahara. The minute that merchants entered a new
domain, they sent a greeting or went in person to greet the king,
thus symbolizing their recognition of this right. 23 Their presence
could not in any case fail to be known, as the movements of strangers
were always reported by agents or villagers to their lords.
Prices were fixed and events in the market supervised by the
Sarkin Kasuwa (literally, chief of the market)
,
a political appointee
under the Ivan Bakin Kasuwa or national Minister of Commerce. 24 in
Fulani Zazzau (Zaria) the Magajin Kasuwa was the equivalent of the
Iyan Bakin Kasuwa of the Habe state. Any one of the high titles of
the Habe states before the word kasuwa (market) could be used for
this office. Each Sarkin Kasuwa had a number of assistants depending
on the size of the market. Their titles, like craft guild and vil-
lage offices, reduplicated the top titles in the state. 25 The Sarkin
Kasuwa visited every caravan as soon as it arrived and consulted with
the sarki or an assistant as to how goods should be sold. Anything
in which the king was interested was brought before him first, 2 6 and
the rest was divided among the dillalai, or official brokers, for
public sale.
The market officials were in charge of the dillalai, who like-
wise were public officials. 27 These were appointed to every section
of the market to supervise transactions in each commodity. They were
expected to insure that prices, quality and measurements were cor-
rectly observed. Clapperton found this system working very well in
21. T. Edward Bowdich, Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee
(London, 1966), 335-336.
22. This was the usual origin of the famous dual cities of the
sudan, like Koumbi-Saleh, the capital of ancient Ghana, or Kuka
in Bornu.
23. Horneman noted in his journal that when his caravan entered the
kingdom of Fezzan, the chief of the caravan sent a messenger to
give notice of the arrival of the caravan, and to bear a letter
of respect to the sultan from each merchant individually.
Bovill, Missions
.
I, 88.
24-. See "Constitution of the Habe Zazzau," Appendix A, in Smith,
Government
.
335.
25. Ibid
. .
list facing p. 36.
26. Denham, Clapperton, Oudney, Narrative, Clapperton, 9-3.
27. Nadel reports that in Nupe, whose market system was modeled on
the Hausa one, even to the use of Hausa titles, the dillalai
were organized into a guild like other craftsmen. They elected
a head or Sarkin Dillalai
.
who corresponded to the Sarkin Kasuwa
mentioned in the Hausa markets. Siegfried Nadel, A Black By-
zantium (London, 194-2)
,
330.
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Kano in 1823, or at least he must have been told how it was supposed
to work. He reported:
... The market is regulated with the greatest fairness and
the regulations are strictly and impartially enforced. If a
tobe or turkadee [man's robe], purchased here, is carried to
Bornou or any other distant place, without being opened, and
is there discovered to be of inferior quality, it is immedi-
ately sent back as a matter of course, — the name of the
dylala, or broker, being written inside every parcel. In this
case, the dylala must find out the seller who, by the laws of
Kano, is forthwith obliged to refund the purchase money. 2
8
Livestock products from the herds of pastoral Fulani, Tuareg
and Arabs were among the most active items in the Hausa markets,
since Hausaland supplied much of the rain forest area with meat, and
all markets with leather. The Sarkin Pawa
.
or Chief of the Butchers,
was among the few representatives of occupational guilds to have an
office on the national level. He was responsible for assuring a
steady supply and constant price of meat, procuring special orders
for the sarki, and overseeing the affairs of butchers 1 guilds. He
thus approximately paralleled the office of Iyan Bakin Kasuwa, but
had responsibility only over the butchers 1 section of the market.
His office existed in both Fulani and Habe Zazzau, but was held by
a Habe even under the Fulani. 29 Whether these market officials or
the sarki personally supervised state trading ventures is not known;
probably it depended upon the inclinations of the sarki.
Remuneration for state-level market officials came from fiefs
which were attached to their offices. 30 They were thus directly sup-
ported by the state, not by the proceeds of the markets. There was
also some income to the public officials from markets in the form of
a 2% commission on all sales and/or stall rents in the market. There
were also ferry fees (caravans were obliged to cross at ferries even
if there was a dry ford nearby)
,
33
- caravan tolls, and gaisuwa or
"greetings" received by all ranks of officials in expectation of fa-
vors.
Exactly how this income was distributed is very difficult to
determine. Clapperton wrote:
The sheikh of the soug [Ar. : suq — market] 3 2 also fixes the
prices of all wares, for which he is entitled to a small com-
mission, at the rate of 50 whydah or cowries, according to the
standard exchange between this silver money and this shell
currency. 33 There is another custom regulated with equal cer-
tainty and in universal practice: the seller returns to the
28. Denham, Clapperton, Oudney, Narrative, 53.
29. It lapsed after the first appointment, however. Butchering is a
Habe occupation, disdained by the Fulani. Smith, Government ,
n. 63.
30. Ibid .. 37-9-0.
31. Hugh Clapperton, Journal of a Second Expedition into the In-
terior of Africa (London, 1829)
,
79.
32. This is the Arabicized version of the Hausa title, Sarkin
Kasuwa.
33. See below, "Currencies."
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buyer a stated part of the price, by way of blessing, as they
term it. . . .This is a discount of 2% on the purchase money
but, if the bargain is made in a hired house, it is the land-
lord who receives the luck penny. 3*+
The reference to a hired house must mean either a dillalai’s stall in
the market or the establishment of a mai gida (a type of innkeeper
j
whose function will be discussed below) . Shabeeny, a Moroccan mer-
|
chant who was in Hausaland about 1787, said that "foreign merchants
always employ agents, or brokers, to trade to advantage; a man should
reside sometime before he begins. "35 If foreigners always used
agents, then the "luck penny" must, in practice, never have gone to a
foreign buyer. For transactions which occurred in the market place it
went to the dillalai whose stall was used, and for those in the com-
pounds of mai gida
,
it went to the host.
A portion of dillalai T s commission was probably remitted to
the Sarkin Kasuwa, either as an official obligation or as gaisuwa, to
assure that an appropriate amount of business was directed his
way. 36 A portion of the Sarkin Kasuwa T s income also found its way to
the fiefholder in whose territory the market lay, or to the state
official for markets, but it was probably not a significant amount.
High political officials gleaned most of their income from their
fiefs and the gaisuwa of their clients.
All ranks of market agents and officials, by virtue of their
power to control commercial contacts and profits, were very eligible
for gaisuwa from all interested parties. For trade, like politics,
was powerfully influenced by personal considerations. This probably
explains Shabeeny T s caution that "a man should reside some time be-
fore he begins." Shehu dan Fodio denounced the pervasive practice of
gaisuwa vigorously, and made it one of the moral justifications for
his jihad. ^7 It is possible that immediately after or during the ji-
had there was some improvement in this area, and that this is what
led Clapperton to comment on the inpartiality of the administration
of the Kano market. However, in the later nineteenth-century Fulani
domains it was as common as ever. 38
In addition to the public officials administering the market,
there were a variety of independent persons who provided for other
needs of traders. The focus of this network was the mai gida (lit-
erally, master of the house; plural: masu gida) who took in certain
foreign merchants, housed and fed them, provided storage for their
goods, and often found buyers for valuable items.
3M-. Denham, Clapperton, Oudney, Narrative , Clapperton, 51.
35. James G. Jackson, An Account of Timbuktoo and Hausa (London,
1820), cited in Hodgkin, Perspectives . 187.
36. Nadel says, "The Etsu [Sarkin] Dillali, placed in control over
all Bida brokers, levies a small fee from them, in return for
which he guarantees them equal access to the valuable and pro-
fitable goods which arrive in Bida from abroad. Nadel, Byzan-
tium , 330.
37. cUthman dan Fodio, Kitab al-Farq .
38. Smith, "Political Corruption."
110 LUCIE G. COLVIN
With regard to this institution, the personal experience of
the early explorers can be confusing, since they traveled sometimes
as ambassadors under royal protection, and sometimes as merchants.
When under royal auspices they were lodged, escorted and given beasts
of burden at the expense of the sarki, or rather via royal levies on
the local inhabitants for such services. When traveling as merchants
they camped in tents along the route, except at large cities where
they lodged with masu gida in the trans-Saharan merchants 1 wards.
The masu gida are identifiable in the explorers T journals as the per-
manently resident foreign merchants who were keepers of the traders 1
grapevine in the alien merchants quarters, people like Hat Salah in
Kano to whom Clapperton was given a letter of introduction by Sheikh
al-Kanemy, the de facto ruler of Bornu.39 Hat Salah provided Clapper-
ton with a palatial house first for three Spanish dollars and later
two dollars a month.^ The masu gida in the wards where indigenous
African traders stayed were probably either Habe or members of the
ethnic group which predominated in that ward.
Polly Hill has studied the institution of the mai gida as it
exists throughout West Africa today, and concluded that the mai gida
receives little regular remuneration from his guest, but is amply
compensated by the generosity of his guest and those local people to
whom the mai gida introduces his guest. This is certainly compatible
with what we know of the modus vivendi in other aspects of eighteenth
and nineteenth century Hausa trade.
The masu gida, both alien and indigenous, appear to have been
integrated into the political system informally, in a relationship
which resembled the clientship system. Denham and Clapperton found
some of their landlords to be special friends of certain government
officials, and others to be considerably influential with their rul-
ers.^ Occasionally one finds a note in the Kano Chronicle saying
that a sarki imitated the Arabs of Kano, in which case the "Arabs"
must refer either to visiting mallams or to persons involved in the
trans-Saharan trade. These played the role of personal confidants
and advisors, and sometimes of supervisors of the North African mer-
cantile community for the sarki.
We know very little of the activities of indigenous merchants
and other Africans at this time, since the explorers almost never
lived with them. Once, while traveling with a predominantly Hausa
caravan through Nupe, Clapperton commented that Hausa merchants al-
ways camped outside of the cities (in campgrounds maintained for that
purpose)
,
whereas the Bomu merchants stayed in the towns.^ They
traveled with their families in most cases, although nine-tenths of
the traders from south of the Niger were women, and he does not say
what they did with their families.
39. Denham, Clapperton, Oudney, Narrative
.
Clapperton, 40.
4-0. Ibid . . 41.
41. E.g., Mohammed Gomsoo, Chief of the Arabs at Sokoto. Denham,
Clapperton, Oudney, Narrative, Clapperton, 86-87.
42. E.g., Babba Zaki, 1768-1776. "Kano Chronicle," in Palmer,
Memoirs, III, 126.
43. Clapperton, Second Expedition , 137.
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Trade was one of the most prestigious professions in Habe so-
ciety. Successful merchants (Hausa: attajirai) ranked just below
mallams and nobility in the Hausa social scale, and above all other
professions.^ The most successful had an opportunity to invest in
slave villages, and to give lavish gifts to their lords, which might
win for them or their children a political career in Habe society.
In Fulani areas they were barred from high office by being members of
the conquered race.
The diplomatic relations which encouraged trade usually took
the form of formalized friendships, and sometimes of clientship-like
arrangements. They were established either by force or by diplomacy,
but it is often difficult to determine which was used. Historians
have searched in vain for the "conquest" which gave Bornu the right
to three centuries of "gaisuwa or tsare [a levy]" 1*-6 from the Hausa
states. The problem is that all that was required was actual mili-
tary superiority plus an initial show of strength to establish this
right. 4-7 The Kano Chronicle makes it clear that this relationship
was established in order to open a trade route from Bornu to Gwonja
in the north of present-day Ghana.
^
Another method of opening a road, but probably a more expen-
sive one, was to send impressive gifts and ambassadors to all of the
states on the route. One of the African explorers who wanted to go
to Timbuktu by a route where the Basha to Tripoli had no connections
wrote to London saying that he needed to make a £2000 present to the
Basha. The reason: the Basha would have to open up a new road with
presents to other African chiefs. ^9
Among the Hausa states, "treaty" relationships took the form
of abokan was
a
(literally, play friends or joking relations). 66 The
"friends" never fought with each other and sometimes aided or medi-
ated for one another. The alignments in the central Hausa states
corresponded exactly with the two main axes of trade. Zamfara was
friends with Katsina, and Kano with Zaria. In the eighteenth century
the western caravan route passed through Katsina and Zamfara, while
the eastern and southern route passed from Kano through Zaria. The
coincidence of friendship and trade routes surely was not an acci-
dent, but an integral interrelationship.
44. Smith, "Social and Economic Change," 51.
45. Smith, Economy of Zaria . 92. Richard Hull, from field work in
Katsina in 1966-1967, found that Habe were not allowed to hold
positions even as high as village chief after 1806 in Katsina.
(Field notes)
.
46. The terminology is from the Kano Chronicle, and expresses the
ambiguity of these semi-voluntary payments. Palmer, Memoirs
-
III, 109.
47. Ibid .. 109-110.
48. Ibid
.
49. Major Laing to Lord Bathurst, Tripoli, May 1825, in Bovill,
Missions
.
I, 204.
50. This is one of the four formalized relationships which obtain
between various kin in Hausa society. It also links ethnic
groups, states and occupational groups. Smith, Economy of
Zaria, 41.
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In the nineteenth century it seems that more formal, written
agreements were among the innovations introduced by the Islamic re-
vivalists in Bornu and Hausaland. Muhammad Bello, Sarkin Musulmi in
Clapperton T s time, mentioned several letters which Sheikh al-Kanemy
had written him, 51 and there are letters still in existence from the
Basha of Tripoli to Bello and al-Kanemy to Bello which reveal an un-
derstanding between Tripoli, Bornu and Sokoto.52 This entente, how-
ever, was not achieved without the help of embassies and gifts all
around, so the innovation was not particularly radical. 53
Routes
Although itineraries changed considerably during the period
1780-1833, the main axes of trade passing through Hausaland remained
the same. Only three axes are listed here; itinerary changes will be
discussed among the developments of the period (section two) . The best
known trade route of Hausaland is that with North Africa via Ghadames,
Murzuk, or Tuat. Another major axis, traversed partly by Saharan and
North African merchants and partly by merchants of the sudan, was the
route from Bornu through Hausaland and west along the edge of the
rain forest to Gwonja in the Ashanti hinterland. It was often known
as the salt and kola route, although many other articles passed along
it, especially leather goods and different varieties of native cloth.
The third major axis of trade was south from Hausaland through
Zaria to Nupe, Oyo or Dahomey and finally to the coast at Whydah,
Badagry or Lagos. The Hausa language was well known throughout these
regions, and known by isolated individuals in villages from Iboland
to the Ivory Coast. Traders and mallams evidently penetrated in all
directions to some degree, but regular large-scale trading was con-
fined to the above axes. 54
Ethnicity and Commodities
The commerce of Hausaland can be broken down according to eth-
nic groups and commodities. It is convenient to consider these two
51. Clapperton. Second Expedition
.
197.
52. See A. D. H. Bivar, "Arabic Documents of Northern Nigeria,"
BSOAS, XXII (1959), 332-334, 344-349.
53. Clapperton, Second Expedition . 170-171.
54. Research into the spread of commercial loan words from the Hausa
language supports this conclusion. The Hausa forms of words for
gold, gun, camel and horse had, by the mid-nineteenth century,
spread widely along the above axes, but not into the areas to
the southeast. L. A. G. Colvin, "Commercially Relevant Loan-
Words in West African Languages" (unpublished paper)
.
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aspects together, since they frequently overlapped. For instance,
the Kel Owi Tuareg of Agades had a monopoly on the natron (often
called trona) and salt of Bilma.55 This they distributed throughout
Hausaland and all along the route to Ashanti. They returned with
kola nuts from Ashanti and the grain and fine indigo-dyed cloth of
Kano to be carried to the Tuareg of the desert and to North Africa.
It must be noted, however, that their monopoly was secure only be-
tween Bilma and Agades. At Agades or in Hausa cities, much of the
salt and natron passed into the hands of North Africans, Hausa,
Gwonja and Bornu merchants.
Tuat, Ghadamsi, and Murzuk merchants generally handled the
products of Turkish and North African manufacture, as well as Eu-
ropean imports coming from the Barbary ports. They also brought
horses, which were preferred to those bred locally. These merchants
sometimes stopped in Agades or Bornu, and usually went no farther
than Hausaland. 5(5 Some more adventurous souls went on into the in-
terior, but generally they passed their goods on to Tuareg, Hausa or
other African merchants. Those who remained in the higher latitudes
had the choice of selling their goods outright or putting them out on
credit to local merchants. The latter was probably the more common
practice. Clapperton recorded several instances of merchants who
were delayed or hindered in trying to collect from their creditors. 57
Similar observations were made by Leo Africanus in the sixteenth cen-
tury, and have been repeated by travelers ever since.
Slaves were the item most in demand for export to the Arab
world. Denham said that the "Arabs" would take nothing else, and in
every list drawn up in the eighteenth century, slaves came at the
top. 58 At the end of the eighteenth century these came primarily
from Bornu, or rather, from Begharmi via Bornu. Begharmi was known
as the best source of eunuchs. 59 During the jihad the Hausa states
became major suppliers themselves, for it was customary for both the
Habe and the Fulani to sell their prisoners of war. The Zaberma-
Gurma-Dahomey area west of the Niger was also plagued by chronic
instability, which meant, of course, a large turnover in slaves.
Most of these probably went south to the coast, 50 but some also went
55. Natron is properly hydrated sodium carbonate, but sometimes re-
fers to either potassium nitrate (saltpeter) or sodium nitrate
(Chile saltpeter) . It is collected naturally in some salt lakes
in the desert, and was gathered by local residents. It was used
as a medicine, as a salt substitute, for making dyes, and to-
gether with snuff as a stimulant, Lucas reported the Kel Owi
monopoly in 1788 and later explorers verified it. Proceedings
of the Association
.
I, 167.
56. Ibid., 163.
57. Denham, Clapperton, Oudney, Narrative
.
Clapperton, 131.
58. Ibid., Denham, 330.
59. Horneman in Bovill, Missions
.
I, 118.
60. Hausa were among the largest suppliers to the Atlantic slave
trade in the early nineteenth century, according to Curtin and
Vansina T s analysis of Koelle T s informants. Philip Curtin and
Jan Vansina, "Sources of the Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Slave
Trade," JAH
. V, 2 (1964), 185-208.
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north — not to mention east and west into the slave villages and
slave armies of other African states. Women who were taken slaves
were not sent south, because the Atlantic slave traders had little
use for them. They were in demand throughout the Muslim world —
both African and Arab — for seraglios.
The indigenous African market for slaves must have exceeded
the number exported. All centralized West African states in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were built on slave labor and de-
fended by slave armies. Estimates of the proportion of slaves to
free men in Hausaland range from 30:1, the estimate given Clapperton
by Hat Salah in 1826, to 1:1, the estimate made by Barth in 1851. 61
The figure of Hat Salah was probably closer to the truth for both
periods. Barth was not familiar with the variety of positions held
by slaves, and probably mistook many of them for free men.
Who the main indigenous slave traders were is one of the major
mysteries of Hausa commerce in this period. Kirk-Greene mentions
that the Fulani (settled) were the main slave traders in the Adamawa
region. ^2 if that was also true in Hausaland, it has conveniently
been forgotten. It seems unlikely, however. The Fulani nobility
scorn trade of any kind as a worldly occupation, and today only a
small proportion of the merchants in Hausaland are Fulani. 63 Lander
however met an exiled ruler from Panda, near the confluence of the
Benue and the Niger Rivers, who said that the Fulani had come to his
domains as traders and then overthrown him. In this area, they are
most likely to have been selling slaves or ivory to the Igala and Ibo
who controlled the rest of the path to the coast.
A late eighteenth-century source remarked that the caravans to
Morocco brought:
a great number of slaves, purchased at Timbuctoo, from the
Wangareen [Mande], Houssonian [Hausa], and other slatees
[generic term for slave traders], who bring them from those
regions which border on the Jibbel Kumia, or Mountains of the
Moon, a chain which, with little or no intermissions, runs
through Hie continent of Africa from west to east, namely from
Ashantee in the West, to Abyssinia in the east. 64
Since assimilated Fulani would probably have been called Hausa by
strangers, this still does not establish whether Fulani or Hausa pre-
dominated *as slave merchants. Since, however, the Hausa did not carry
their slaves to the coast like the Mande in the far west and the
Nyamwezi in East Africa, there is no reason to assume that the slave
trade in Hausaland was the kind of specialized monopoly it was in
other areas. Probably slaves, like other merchandise, were carried
mainly by Habe, but also by other nationalities.
61. Clapperton, Second Expedition . 171-172; Heinrich Barth, Barth T s
Travels in Nigeria
.
A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, ed. (London, 1962)
,
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62. A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Adamawa Past and Present (London, 1958).
63. Smith, Economy of Zaria .'lOO.
64. James G. Jackson, An Account of the Empire of Morocco (London,
1808), 206. The Mountains of the Moon were the legendary source
of the Nile.
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In addition to slaves, trans-Saharan merchants returned north
with Hausa cloth, household utensils, leather work and a special kind
of seamless skin bag for water and other liquids. It must be added
that most of the grain consumed in the central desert was grown in
Hausaland, and had been since at least Leo Africanus* time.
Commodities of local manufacture and growth, moving within the
Sudan belt, appear to have been largely in the hands of indigenous
traders. These also distributed North African goods to other African
states. The most prominent in trade through Hausaland were native
Hausa, resident Tuareg, Dagomba, Gwonja, Pupawa (Nupe men)
,
and some
Mande and Bornuese. All of the long-distance traders of all nations
were reported to have been Muslims. 65 Ivor Wilks claims that they
belonged to supra-tribal Islamic trading associations, but says no-
thing of when these originated or how they functioned. 66
Unfortunately none of the explorers paid much attention to
ethnicity among the indigenous traders. Clapperton T s description of
his journey with a Habe caravan through territory independent of the
Fulani perhaps best typifies the nature of trade under the Habe re-
gimes. This caravan consisted of more than a thousand men and women,
and as many beasts of burden (bullocks, asses and mules) . Hausa and
Gwonja are the only two ethnic groups which he mentioned specifically
but others were probably present. 67 Most of the cargo of "these
Hausa traders," he wrote, was kola nuts. These they had exchanged on
the fringes of the Ashanti empire for natron, red glass beads, and a
few slaves, mainly unmanageable ones. Some of the merchants had
slaves to carry their loads, but some had "no more property than
they carry on their own heads. "68
In Nupe the caravan met with traders and other caravans from
Yoruba and Dahomey in the south, Bornu in the east, and several of
the Hausa states. They found large mercantile communities also in
Nupe and Borgu, bordering the Niger. 69 They were told that before
the jihad people from Benin, Ijebu (near Lagos) and southern Nupe
used to come there. 70 Many of these southern merchants must have
also frequented the southernmost Hausa markets before the jihad, al-
though the natural places where goods changed hands all around lay in
Nupe, along the Niger.
Some Hausa fatake (professional long-distance traders) then as
now probably specialized in certain products. The cattle traders and
kola traders are the best known today. As pastoral Fulani are loath
to slaughter or sell their own cattle, each herd owner had a Hausa
65. Denham, Clapperton, Oudney, Narrative , Denham, 80; Joseph
Dupuis, Journal of a Residence in Ashantee (London, 1966), ix,
xi.
66. Ivor Wilks, "The Position of Muslims in Metropolitan Ashanti in
the Early Nineteenth Century," in I. M. Lewis, ed.
,
Islam in
Tropical Africa (London, 1966)
,
327.
67. Clapperton. Second Expedition
.
7<+.
68. Ibid . . 68.
69. Ibid., 123, 129.
70. Ibid
. .
136.
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agent who came to him to buy and take the cattle to market. 71 When
the Fulani clan migrated to seasonal grazing lands, the Hausa agent
came to buy from it periodically. The Hausa was usually a butcher
himself or, if not, he sold the cattle to the butchers.
The kola traders traveled to the Gwonja and sometimes the
Ashanti markets to procure their supply. They loaded them in wide,
flat baskets packed with wet leaves for preservation, and carried
them on bullocks the long road home. To purchase the kolas they
brought cotton cloth, trans-Saharan imports, meat, leather products,
and North African and European goods.
Slave agents were employed by merchants of all nations to con-
duct various aspects of the trade. Denham noticed in Bornu that the
principle slaves of each merchant did the bargaining, while their
masters looked on. 72 for the masters the market was more of a social
occasion and opportunity to make contacts to further their various
business and political concerns. Clapperton reported that Nupe
slaves were most highly valued as trading agents in Hausaland.73
Neither the commodities exchanged nor the ethnic groups in-
volved changed significantly during the period from 1780 to 1833.
However, there were important changes in the markets and routes
accessible to traders of certain nationalities. These will be dis-
cussed in the appropriate chronological context.
Currencies and Credit
The currencies in use in Hausa markets throughout the period
under consideration were cowries (for small to medium-sized pur-
chases) and silver Maria Theresa dollars for larger items. These
functioned as standards of value, means of payment, and media of
exchange. They thus meet all of the criteria usually established to
distinguish currencies from bartered goods. 74 Currencies having
greater "face” value than intrinsic v,alue are sometimes distinguished
as "token" currencies. 75 Cowries qualified under this rubric, but
Maria Theresa dollars were a precious metal currency. In addition to
these there were other commodities of trade which can be described as
"special-purpose moneys" because they had only one or two of the
above-mentioned functions. Slaves, for example, had a standard value
in relation to horses, camels and guns. They could also be used as a
means of payment, for example as tribute or in payment of fines and
ransoms. However, they rarely functioned as a medium of exchange.
The same is true of the standard measure of grain, a mudu (a medium-
sized calabash)
,
which was used for purchases in a smaller value
71. Marguerite Dupire, "The Fulani — Peripheral Markets of a Pas-
toral People," in Paul Bohannan and George Dalton, eds.. Markets
in Africa (New York, 1965)
.
72. Denham, Clapperton, Oudney, Narrative, 70.
73. Ibid., Clapperton, 54.
74. Polanyi, Trade and Markets
.
264-266.
75. Kirk-Greene, "Currencies," 133.
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range. Smith has found that the average weight of a mudu of un-
threshed rice today is just under two pounds. 76 it was of this type
of money that Clapperton wrote when he said:
The value of commodities in barter seems to be maintained
with a certain stability, somewhat like the money rate of
exchange in Europe, by fixing a local standard price for those
articles in greatest demand, in lieu of the fictitious par of
exchange, which with all, powerfully influences and indirectly
regulates all money transactions. 77
Gold was reported to be one of the articles received by North Afri-
cans in the "Empire of Cashna" (Katsina) by Lucas in 1788. However,
he noted that it was more expensive there than in the Fezzan.78 The
implication of this is that gold was actually a currency, which Arabs
received in payment for their goods on occasion. Yet gold as a cur-
rency was unknown in Katsina or any other part of Hausaland according
to all subsequent reports. This confusion stems from the fact that
Lucas T informant mistakenly considered Agades part of the "empire" of
Katsina. 79 At Agades gold is known to have been used as a currency,
as it was also among the states between Borgu and Gwonja.80
Both of the regular currencies of Hausaland, cowries and Maria
Theresa dollars, were imported by Europeans beginning in the eight-
eenth century. Cowries were brought from the Maidive Islands and
sold on the Slave Coast for slaves and palm oil. From there they
were imported inland to the ever-expanding cowry currency area. 81
Some were also carried from Turkish and European ports to North Af-
rica and thence across the desert. 82
The silver Maria Theresa dollars, which were first coined in
Austria and Spain in 1780, were in use from the Barbary ports south-
ward until the end of the nineteenth century. They continued to be
minted for export by various European countries even after they went
out of circulation in Europe in 1854.83 This was a considerable ex-
pense to the Hausa states, which might have been spared had they »
minted their own currency. By importing a currency for local use,
they not only had little control over inflation, but they had to pay
with exports for every increase in the amount of money in circulation.
At present, virtually nothing is known of Hausa fiscal policy,
except that exchange rates were set by market officials responsible
to the ruler. 84 The rates fluctuated in response to changes in sup-
ply and demand, 85 but government officials had the power to determine
76. Smith, "Social and Economic Change," 290.
77. Denham, Clapperton, Oudney, Narrative
.
Clapperton, 5.
78. Proceedings of the Association
.
I, 169.
79. Ibid .. I, 167.
80. Dupuis, Journal, Pt. II, xli.
81. Hiskett, "Materials."
82. Jackson, Morocco .
83. Kirk-Greene, "Currencies," 146.
84. Denham, Clapperton, Oudney, Narrative
.
Clapperton, 5.
85. See Hiskett, "Materials."
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when they would adjust their prices. The official exchange rates
probably served to prevent short-term speculation, or at least con-
fined it to government officials. 86
The value of cowries in relation to English sterling was about
500 to the pound sterling according to both Lucas (1788) and Mungo
Park (1795). 87 When Clapperton was in Sokoto in 1823 they had sunk
in value so that it took 13,000 cowries to equal the value of a pound
sterling, and bv- the time he returned in 1826, a pound was worth
20,000 cowries. °8 This inflation was apparently both local and tem-
porary, for both Dupuis’ approximately contemporary figure for Ashan-
ti and Barth’s later (1851) figure for Hausaland showed a much slower
rate of inflation. Dupuis’ figures showed cowries to be worth about
7000 to the pound on the Niger at Hausaland, and Barth’s figures
work out to 12,500 cowries equivalent to the pound. ^ The circum-
stances surrounding this inflation will be discussed in the appropri-
ate chronological context.
There are no figures for the value of the silver dollar in the
eighteenth century, perhaps because it was coined only in 1780 and
did not reach Hausaland quickly. The first figure that we have came
from Morocco at about the turn of the century, and valued the dollar
at 4s. 5d. 90 At the time of Clapperton’s second journey (1826), it
was worth 3s., but when Barth was there it was again worth 4s. 91
Thus the dollar shows the same temporary devaluation in the first
quarter of the century, and a slower long-term devaluation. However,
presumably since it was a precious metal currency, the swings in
value were not so severe as those of the cowry.
Like currencies, credit was an essential part of the commer-
cial system. It functioned both to extend the amount of capital in
circulation and to overcome the obstacles of carrying valuables long
distances. Credit arrangements followed customary forms, but were
all originally specific and personal. Terms were bargained and agreed
upon for each extension of credit separately, even where the same
parties were involved. The agreements were enforceable in local
courts even where both parties were aliens. 92
The major creditors seem to have been North Africans and rul-
ers, although presumably wealthy Hausa traders followed their lead.
86. Denham found both the ruler and his ministers involved in spec-
ulation at the public expense in Bornu.
87. Proceedings of the Association
.
I, 167; Mungo Park, Travels in
the Interior Districts of Africa, 1795. 1796. and 1797 (London
,
1799)
,
199.
88. First figure based on Denham, Clapperton, Oudney, Narrative . 51;
second cited in Clapperton, Second Expedition . 173.
89. Dupuis, Journal
.
Pt. II, cxiii, cxiv; Barth, Barth’s Travels .
123.
90. Jackson, Morocco
.
208.
91. Barth mentioned that sixty dollars was the equivalent of £12
sterling.
92. Denham and Clapperton went before the qadi in Bornu to collect a
debt contracted in Murzuk, Fezzan. See Narrative . 149,
Appendix X.
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All were professing Muslims, although a few in Timbuktu were reported
to be converted Jews. The prohibition against lending money at in-
terest in Islamic law had little practical effect. Smith reports
that wealthy Hausa traders today lend freely, taking great risks,
which are ’’covered by a high and irreligious rate of interest (25%
per month) .*93 Wealthy Hausa traders during our period probably lent
money to smaller traders, and put goods out on credit among peoples
dependent on them, just as the trans-Saharan merchants did in Hausa-
land.
Trans-Saharan merchants with large amounts of goods had no
choice but to put them out on credit, since they could not sell them
in one place without drastically lowering the prices which they re-
ceived. The petty traders to whom they gave them spread out into the
small towns and villages to distribute the wares widely. When they
had sold all that they had received, they returned to pay off their
creditor, keeping a portion for themselves. Personal contacts and
credit guarantees were important in this arrangement, because the
trans-Saharan merchants were well aware of the risks involved. Once
he had received the goods, the petty trader might well abscond to
await the arrival of the rainy season. Then the merchant faced the
prospect of staying over- another year or returning without his pay-
ment. 94- Most states enforced debtor laws rigorously to prevent this,
but they were not always able to find the fugitives.
Another form of credit was that intended to overcome distances
or changes in currencies. North African merchants and rulers usually
contracted with explorers to extend them credit in the Sudan via
their agents there. Major Laing carried a guarantee of credit from
the Basha of Tripoli, and another from one of the Basha T s chief min-
isters, who was a wealthy merchant. The latter reads in part:
The bearer of the present, the English Traveller, if He is in
want of money during his present journey — any of our Friends
& correspond with [correspondents] & those who may have our
Funds in hand, they may advance to the said Englishman all
those Sums which He may want & take his Bill on the English
Consul in Tripoli, so that it may be paid here.
Date: 14- June, 1825
Signed: Mohamed D T Gheis95
Laing did not live to collect on this, so we do not know how he was
to be paid. Denham and Clapperton T s agreement with a Fezzan mer-
chant, however, specified that they were to be paid in the local cur-
rencies in Bornu and Kano. Thus this type of agreement saved the
traveler from the threat of robbery en route, and provided him with
ready money on arrival. What it cost is nowhere mentioned. It is
reasonable to assume that credit in any form was expensive, however.
93. Smith, Economy of Zaria
.
101.
94-. Clapperton met an unhappy merchant in Katagum, vexed by this
dilemma. Denham, Clapperton, Oudney, Narrative, Clapperton, 131
. Cited in Bovill, Missions
.
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And since the Sudanese were generally the debtors of the trans-
Saharan merchants, the burden of the expense was born by the econo-
mies of the Sudanese states.
In conclusion, the picture of Hausa trade which has been re-
created here fits very closely the model which Karl Polanyi calls
"administered trade" — as opposed to "gift trade" and "market
trade." 96 The main criterion differentiating administered trade from
market trade is that, in the administered ^form, prices are set by a
government official, whereas in market trade, the price mechanism is
essentially self-regulating. Clearly, the terms have nothing to do
with whether or not exchange occurs in a market place. As a matter
of fact, market places are more typical of administered than of mar-
ket trade. An outline of the characteristics of administered trade
is set out by Polanyi as follows:
Administered trade has its firm foundation in treaty relation-
ships that are more or less formal. Since on both sides the
import interest is as a rule determinative, trading runs
through government-controlled channels . . . This extends to
the manner in which business is transacted, including arrange-
ments concerning "rates" or proportions of the units of ex-
change; port facilities [in the Sudan the equivalent would be
the provision of necessary beasts of burden and lodging or
campsites for traders]; weighing; checking of quality; the
physical exchange of goods; storage; safekeeping; the control
of trading personnel; regulation of "payments" credits; price
differentials
.
9^
A corollary of this is that trading is a status occupation, and that
the motive for trading is to acquire status or goods which enhance
one T s prestige, rather than a pure profit motive. The only area in
which Hausa trade did not fit Polanyi r s concept of administered trade
is in the manner of government control which regulated it. Polanyi
pictured commerce as rigidly segregated and controlled through a
"port of trade," which was held aloof from the political center of
the state for security reasons. 9 ^ Hausa trade was more closely in-
tegrated into the life of the society than this, and regulated by
more informal relationships.
* * * * *
Developments of the Period 1780-1833
In reconstructing the material in this section I have relied
extensively on contemporary reports and on chronicles. Later ex-
plorers and traditions collected in the colonial period have been
used sparingly. The first accounts of value are those of Europeans
in North Africa in the final decades of the eighteenth century. 99
96. Polanyi, Trade and Markets
.
262 ff.
97. Ibid .. 262.
98. Ibid
. .
263.
99. Listed in the Introduction.
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Among other things, these reports help us to place the impor-
tance of Hausa cities in relation to each other in the North African
trade at the beginning of our period. Both of the Germans, Niebuhr
(1772) and Einseidel (1785) , mentioned Zamfara as the foremost center
of Hausa trade, and the earlier report noted that caravans from Zam-
fara passed through Katsina on the way north. 100 By the earliest
English report, in 1788, Katsina was second only to Bornu and had
recently been superior. 101 Since this statement seems to be the
source of much subsequent exaggeration about the importance of Kat-
sina (including Barth T s), it is important to note the context of this
information. The informant spoke of Katsina as including the city of
Agades in the Asben oasis, as well as most of the western and south-
ern Hausa states. It is clear from other statements that he consi-
dered Agades by far the most important commercial city, 1^2 but he re-
ferred to it under the loose rubric of "Cashna" even when only Agades
was meant. 103
Katsina and Air or Asben (of which Agades was the capital) may
well have been closely tied, and Katsina may have been the greater
military power, but there is no evidence that real sovereignty was
ever exercised. A late eighteenth-century note in the Asben Chroni-
cle mentioned a war by Katsina in Gobir in which a number of Asben
soldiers appear to have died fighting for Katsina. 1°^ This suggests
a tie between the two of either alliance or vassalage, most likely
alliance. At this time all of the Hausa states were in conflict with
Gobir, which was trying to expand. The fact that Lucas T informant
confused this alliance with an empire under Katsina reflects either
his confusion about various forms of diplomacy in Hausaland, or his
desire to enhance the glories of Katsina.
Close examination of the various testimonies collected by the
Association shows that Agades was actually the most important commer-
cial city in the central Sudan at the end of the eighteenth century.
Katsina city, Kano, and Birnin Zamfara were important secondary cen-
ters to which merchants might progress after stopping at Agades or
Bornu. Of the three Hausa towns, Katsina city seems to have been the
most important. However, one must not ascribe Agades T commercial
prominence to it, even if Katsina T s government was at one time more
powerful. Hausaland was regarded as the granary and textile center
for the desert people, but Agades was their great emporium.
This brings us to the problem of whether or not the Hausa
states may properly be described as "termini” in the trans-Saharan
trade. Barth did so and many subsequent writers have followed his
example, but one must seriously question whether the concept of a
"terminus" was still appropriate to the situation in the nineteenth
century. In the tenth through fourteenth centuries, termini were
100. Cited in Kurt Krieger, Geschichte von Zamfara: Sokoto-Provinz «
Nordnigeria (Berlin, 1959), 77.
101. Proceedings of the Association
,
I, 125-127.
102. Ibid . . 163.
103. Ibid
.. 167.
104-
. "An Asben Record," in H. Richmond Palmer, ed.
,
Bornu Sahara and
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literally stopping places
,
south of which Muslim merchants did not go.
At that time these "terminal" cities lay in the first fertile zone
south of the Sahara, and all of the produce of the south was brought
up to them for sale. They included such famous spots as Walata in
Ghana, Timbuktu in Mali, Gao in Songhay, and Njimi in Kanem, all of
which lay in a zone receiving markedly less rainfall than the Hausa
states. 105
The system of stopping at the edge of the Sudan had begun to
break down even by the early sixteenth century, when Leo Africanus
passed through Hausaland on his way between Agades and Bornu. At the
end of the eighteenth century, if there was a "terminus" in the old
sense on the Fezzan-Air route, it was Agades. There all of the pro-
duce of the Sudan could be purchased, and that of Europe and the Arab
world sold. However, as we have seen, the desert merchants had in-
filtrated far south of there, and some of them regularly passed on to
participate directly in the more diversified trade of the Sudan belt.
According to the caravan itinerary which Lucas solicited from an old
Fezzan merchant in 1788, "Many merchants go no farther [than Agades],
but most commit to the care of their agents the slaves, cotton and
senna which they purchased in the ten days in Agades. "106 The next
trading stop which he listed on the itinerary was Katsina city. The
informant offered to escort Lucas personally south and west of Kat-
sina, through Zamfara, and across the Niger to Ashanti, a journey
which he evidently had made before. 10
7
Within the fertile belt there were two major paths of trade
traversing Hausaland, and both were known to the trans-Saharan mer-
chants of the eighteenth century. One was the road from Ashanti to
Bornu and Begharmi, and the other was the slave route through Nupe
and Oyo to the coast at Whydah or Lagos. The former is said in the
Kano Chronicle to have been opened in the fifteenth century to Gwonja
(north of the later Ashanti state) .108 There is no reason to believe
that this is not substantially accurate. In the eighteenth century
kolas were still coming along the same route; the only change was
that the Ashanti state had arisen in the west, and the western end of
the route now dropped south to touch it.l°^ By this time kolas had
also become popular in North Africa, and were regularly imported
there via Hausaland.HO
The third major path of trade is the most mysterious and dif-
ficult for the historian. It led from Zaria south-southwest through
105. Only the approximate sites of some of the above cities are
known, but the sites suggested all lie within the 100-4-00 mm/yr
rainfall area, whereas the Hausa states receive an average of
600-1M-00 mm/yr. Africa: Oxford Regional Economic Atlas
(Oxford, 1965), maps pp. 56-57.
106. Proceedings of the Association . I, 163.
107. Ibid., 124-
.
108. Palmer, Memoirs, III, 109.
109. Proceedings of the Association
.
I, 168.
110. It took only another century for Americans to learn to make
Coca-Cola from them.
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Gwari to Nupe, thence usually through Katunga, the capital of Oyo,
then south-southwest to Whydah or Lagos. The lack of information
about the route stems largely from the fact that, since literate Mus-
lims did not regularly traverse it, no one has bequeathed us a book
of memoirs about his life as an inland slave trader. This is no
reason to think the route unimportant, however. There is evidence
that the increasing activity of Europeans on the coast in the eight-
eenth century had a noticeable effect on the trade of Hausaland. The
Kano Chronicle, recently more correctly translated by M. Hiskett,
reads, "In Sharif
a
T s time (1703-1731) cowries (kurdi) came to Hausa-
land, because he was zealous in raiding . . ."Ill At this time, cow-
ries were the established currency of Dahomey, Yoruba and Nupe, and
were being imported by the slaving ships in great quantity. The in-
flux into Kano probably came from there,H2 and increased whenever
Kano was particularly active in slave raiding. Lucas mentioned that
the Arabs call the cowries of Hausaland "Huedah," which certainly re-
presented "Whydah," and which lends credit to this hypothesis.H*
The most plausible explanation of the whole statement in the
Kano Chronicle, therefore, is that Kano at this time began selling
large numbers of slaves to the south. Moreover, this sale cannot
have been a single venture or even a temporary reorientation of Ka-
no’s slave trade, or the Hausa would not have accepted cowries as
payment. Since they are a token currency, their use had to be based
on the confidence that there would be a continuing supply of the
goods that the Hausa desired available from people who also used the
cowry. They were no good to the trans-Saharan merchants, for they
were not used above the Sudan, or even in Bornu.
This notice about cowries in the Kano Chronicle is accompanied
by a number of other signs which seemed to augur a basic reorienta-
tion of Kano’s trade toward the coast. This same sarki, Sharifa,
instituted seven forms of extortion, which the chronicler plainly
labels as such, including a tax on Kano’s major market for the trans-
Saharan trade, the "Jizian Kasua Kurmi."
In the next reign, between 1731 and 17M-3, the jizia or tax was
reported so severe that "it nearly killed the market."im- By this
time Kano was involved in constant defensive wars with Gobir, on the
north. Another note says that all of the Arabs left the town of
Kano. However, shields and most importantly, guns were brought from
Nupe in the south.H5 An old source of supply clearly had been lost
and a new one gained. Later, however, peace with Gobir was restored,
and Hie Arabs returned to the city.
In summary, it would appear from the above accounts that trade
southward to the coast first became significant for Kano sometime
near the beginning of the eighteenth century. The sarki who reigned
between 1731 and 17M-3 must have pursued this connection energetically
for it would have taken firm relations with intermediate states to ob
tain guns from the coast as far inland as Kano. This same sarki
111. Hiskett, "Materials."
112. Hiskett reached the same conclusion.
113. Proceedings of the Association
.
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nearly destroyed the main trans-Saharan market of his town with im-
posts, and drove all of the Arabs from the city. In the latter half
of the century, however, the favor of the trans-Saharan traders was
again courted, and some sort of balance between the two trades a-
chieved.
Kano T s trade with Nupe passed mainly through Zaria. One may
assume that Zaria was involved in trade to the south at least as
early as, if not before, Kano. Although all of the Hausa states sold
prisoners of war, Zaria was known as the slave raider par excellence ,
since she had access even in peace time to the pagan populations of
the Bauchi Plateau. Along with Gurma, Zaberma and Gobir she supplied
slaves to the markets of Zamfara, Katsina and Kano for the trans-
Saharan and east-west trades. Zaria, Gwari and the Bauchi area may
have supplied some slaves indirectly to the coastal trade before the
eighteenth century, but not enough is known of that time to determine
the question.
A generation or more after Kano T s initial flirtation with the
southern route, Gobir exchanged large gifts with Nupe.116 Bello
wrote in a work which appears to have been lifted almost directly
from a Gobir Chronicle:
Sarkin Nupe Maazu sent Bawa [Sarkin Gobir] five hundred fe-
male slaves and five hundred boys. Each boy carried twenty
thousand cowries. Bawa sent a still handsomer return present.
He sent a hundred horses of which twelve only were "Barabar
[Bornu] horses” and female slaves which in beauty outshone
[those from Nupe].H7
Since Nupe was known in Hausaland primarily as the site of the best
ferry and the major trading cities to the south, and was not close
enough to Gobir to have furnished military support, it is logical to
assume thalt this particular exchange served mainly to facilitate com-
merce. Following the description of this exchange in the Chronicle
is a statement which reinforces this assumption. It reads, "Bawa
[Sarkin Gobir] enforced a tax on Kaura [Kaura Namoda?] and developed
the town, as is well known. "118 It is unfortunate that the original
text is not available, as the Arabic word of which "developed” is
Palmer T s translation might be less ambiguous than the English. The
best interpretation of the sentence as it stands is that Bawa at-
tracted or forced a lot of people to settle in the town, and possibly
fortified it. The usual method of attracting people was to encourage
and protect the town T s market. Kaura Namoda lay just south of the
old Birnin Zamfara, which Gobir had just destroyed, so it is probable
that Bawa diverted the trade of Birnin Zamfara to the new center,
Kaura Namoda, to lessen the chances of revolt by the Zamfarawa.
It is tempting to speculate that Gobir 1 s consolidation of Zam-
fara (and even Zamfara T s previous conquest and incorporation of
116. Bello *s chronology places the reign of the Sarkin Gobir in
which this occurred in 1772-1790. Krieger T s has it in 1764-
1782.
117. H. Richmond Palmer, "Western Sudan History, Being the T Raudthat
ul-Afkari T of Bello of Sokoto," Journal of the African Society,
XV (1915-1916), 268.
. Ibid.118
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Kebbi) were inspired by competition for control of the southwestern
and southern trade routes. However, Kwame Arhin has recently sounded
a warning note against reading a commercial motivation into every as-
pect of Ashanti policy. 119 It is a point well taken, and equally ap-
propriate to Hausa history. The fact that it was not possible to
purchase sufficient arms and trade goods from the south as well as
the north does not mean that the Hausa states immediately began a
struggle for control of the southern trade routes.
The political reasons behind Gobir T s expansion are lost in
history, but it is possible to point out that the states to Gobir T s
south and east were militarily more vulnerable than those on the
north, so if she wanted to expand, the south was a logical direction
for power-political as well as commercial reasons. Also she had a
cultural affinity with the Hausa states, which she did not share as
deeply with her northern neighbors. Thus, although the real reasons
behind her expansion may never be known, it is necessary to avoid as-
suming that they were " economic” in the Western sense.
Gobir* s expansion was blunted at the end of the century, and
Hausaland enjoyed a brief decade of peace before the Fulani rose up
to seize the land. By a quirk of fate, the major battles of the ji-
had in Hausaland took place while the Napoleonic Wars were raging in
Europe. Thus there was a break in the European reports just at the
period when the Hausa sources were most garbled. The chronicles vary
somewhat, but the action of the jihad can be summarized briefly.
Shehu cUthman fled the court of Gobir and began rallying supporters
about lySG.i^O When hostilities broke out in 1803 or 1804-, they were
initially directed against Gobir, although local rebellions of Fulani
took place all across the central Sudan. In selecting Gobir, Shehu
set himself against the power which had antagonized all of its neigh-
bors thoroughly during the course of the last half century. He thus
secured the active assistance of Zamfara,121 and the tolerance of
Katsina, Kano, Zaria, and Bornu. After the initial campaign, how-
ever, he alienated them all, apparently by giving his blessings to
local revolutionary leaders. The Habe states then combined against
him and against the local Fulani, but failed to crush the revolts.
The Shehu T s army remained in western Hausaland through the jihad, 122
but within five years local revolutionaries had forced the main
cities in each of the Hausa states to capitulate. 123 in addition,
there were Fulani rebellions in northwest and southwest hornu, in the
south of Mandera, and in Bauchi, where Mallam Adamu consolidated a
new state.
119. Kwame Arhin, "The Structure of Greater Ashanti," JAH, VIII, 1
(1967), 65-85.
120. Sources and chronological problems are summarized in Marilyn
Robinson Waldman, "The Fulani Jihad: A Reassessment," JAH
, VI,
3 (1965), 333-355.
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123. The Kano Chronicle says that Fulani rule was established there
in 1807. Palmer, Memoirs
. Ill, 127. The Katsina Chronicle
ceases to mention effective resistance as of 1807. Ibid
. .
82.
The Chronicle of Abuja
,
F. Heath, trans. (Ibadan, 1952)
,
places
the fall of Habe Zaria at about the same time.
126 LUCIE G. COLVIN
Long-distance commerce must have slowed to a trickle during
this period. Every dry season, which was normally the time for jour-
neying, the Shehu T s army was ravaging the towns of western Hausaland.
All of the old trading centers on the way to Ashanti were either taken
or effectively cut off from time to time. After the main Hausa towns
all capitulated, in 1809 and 1810, the campaign was carried west a-
cross the Niger and south to Gwari and Nupe. For the next six years
the war continued to be prosecuted in these areas, which partially
block the trade routes to the south and west.
Not until the fourteenth year of the jihad (1817) does Bello
suggest that the conquests were in any way consolidated. Then, he
says, "The- rule of the Fulani was established, and all peoples were
overawed and obedient. "129- in the same year, however, Shehu Uthman
died. Immediately all of the Hausa states again revolted. Only in
1819-1820 was the area around Sokoto and Gwandu again consolidated,
and Bello T s position as successor to the title of Sarkin Musulmi as-
sured. Still-rebellious forces behind the dynasties of Gobir, Kat-
sina, Gwari, Kotonkoro, Kebbi, Zamfara, Yauri, Borgu, Germa and Zaria
ringed the new empire. Clapperton was told of their confederation in
detail when he passed through their still independent territory in
1826.125 Neither Nupe nor Bornu was kept within the Fulani fold.
Bornu and Sokoto had reached an entente when Clapperton was first
there,126 but by his second visit they were at war and the bitterest
of enemies.
On the subject of commerce, Denham and Clapperton made quite
detailed reports. Denham noted in Bornu what he regarded as the be-
ginning of new prosperity a short time before his arrival in 1823.
He reported:
The Bashaw of Tripoli ... obtained slaves almost exclusively
through the medium of the sheikh 1 s territory, which, since he
had held the reins of government, was sufficiently safe for
travellers, to induce merchants with large capitals for this
country to proceed by way of Bornou to Soudan [Hausa]. The
numbers of kafilas [Ar. qafila -- caravan] between that coun-
try and Fezzan had, within the last five years, greatly ex-
ceeded any former period; and in an equal proportion did the
respectability of those traders who now accompanied them ex-
ceed that of the merchants previously in the habit of passing
through Bornou.12
7
It is difficult to judge how far back in time to assume that Denham 1 s
"any former period" should extend. He seems to be merely passing on
rumors gleaned from the Fezzan merchants with whom he traveled. The
statement makes most sense if we assume it to span only the trading
careers of the persons with whom he spoke, i.e., not more than twenty
years. He cannot have had any basis for estimating the numbers of
caravans passing between Bornu and Fezzan in previous centuries, par-
ticularly since he was not very well read on the subject. What he
124. Palmer, "Raudthat ul-Afkari," 272.
125. Clapperton, Second Expedition
.
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127. Denham, Clapperton, Oudney, Narrative
.
Denham, 189.
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actually observed was undoubtedly the renaissance of commerce follow-
ing its near death during the two decades of turmoil.
Denham reported that both Sheikh al-Kanemy and Sarkin Musulmi
Bello were encouraging trade and doing their best to keep the roads
safe. Both must have known well the needs and preferences of
traders
,
since both reputedly had engaged in trade themselves . Al-
Kanemy is known to have made his start in life as a trader. It is
less well known that Bello also participated in commerce, forgetful-
ness being encouraged by the Fulani contempt for trade. The Sokoto
historian Hajji Sacid said only:
... He spent from his own earnings and did not spend from
the public Treasury. He had already said to his father at the
start of their Holy War — "Shaikh, lawful resources are lack-
ing, and it is essential that you should spend for necessary
expenses from this money; but, as for myself, I will earn my
own living as I am a young man." He was apprenticed to a
craft, by means of which he became independent of the Treas-
ury, 129
Smith says, more explicitly, "... Sultan Bello (Shehu T s son) is
said to have subsisted his household mainly through trade and there
are certain traditions about this."!®®
All of Denham and Clapperton T s remarks point to Hausaland (or
the Soudan, as they call it) as the main commercial attraction, even
for merchants coming first to Bornu. Denham writes that the Moors
bought chiefly slaves in Bornu, "but Bornu is scarcely anything more
than a rendezvous for kafilas from Soudan. "131 Some of the merchants
with whom Denham and Clapperton came from Murzuk passed on to Hausa-
land after they had sojourned briefly in Bornu. 1® 2 Denham and Clap-
perton 1 s official escort, a merchant and powerful political figure in
Fezzan named Abu Bakr ibn Khalum, or Boo Khaloom as Denham wrote it,
also wanted to go on to Hausaland, "to better sell his merchan-
dise. "133
Denham found, as had Horneman, that two large caravans of sev-
eral stages each still left Murzuk annually at the end of the rainy
season, one for Agades and another for Bornu. Most of the merchants
of each passed on to Hausaland, and some ventured beyond to Nupe or
to the west. The caravan to Agades met with merchants from Ghadames
at Ghat, and they followed the same route on to Agades. There they
met with the Agades merchants coming from Bilma with the annual cara-
van of salt. All proceeded to the cities of Hausaland.
There they found a land divided. Some of the old cities were
under seige or in revolt and could not be visited. In rivalry with,
or in place of them new centers had sprung up, under the guidance of
the Fulani. When Clapperton passed through Hausaland, Kano was
128. Ibid
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evidently the only one of the old trading centers which was stable
enough to accommodate the caravan with which he traveled. On the way
to Kano they stopped to trade at Hadeija and Katagum, then within the
eastern boundary of Kano emirate. These had been and remained entre-
pots between Kano and Bornu.
From there they passed on to Kano city. Clapperton was dis-
appointed at the size of the city, whose indigenous population he
estimated at 30,000-40,000 people.
I
34
- However, he noted that in the
dry season people came in crowds from all parts of Africa, "from the
Mediterranean, the Mountains of the Moon, and from Sennar and Ashan-
tee ."135
Clapperton T s disappointment on seeing Kano for the first time
should not unduly influence our estimate of its commercial importance.
The explorers of the sudan were almost invariably disappointed at the
sight of cities which had been described to them as great centers of
trade. The most noted example is Caillie T s disappointment on seeing
Timbuctu for the first time. Experienced travelers soon discovered
that even the most famous trading cities tended to be limited in size
by European standards. Thus Laing wrote in 1825 of Timbuctu that its
trade and cosmopolitan character met his every expectation, but he was
surprised to find it only four miles in circumference. 3-3 ^ By con-
trast, the walls of Kano were some thirteen English miles in circum-
ference (although much of the enclosure was taken up by gardens). 3-37
In every respect except appearance Kano fulfilled Clapperton’
s
expectations. He commented that the market was the best regulated in
all of Africa, and that it was filled seven days a week from sunrise
to sunset. 3-3 8 By contrast, the main market in Bornu, that of Angornou
(near the now abandoned capital of the Maghumi Mais)
,
convened only
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497 ff. He estimated that only Gao and Kano attained
a population of 75,000 both in the sixteenth century. Timbuktu,
he declared never to have exceeded 25,000 inhabitants. His
estimates for Kano and Gao are dubious, since they both rest on
the assumption that these cities once filled more of their walled
enclosures than they did in the nineteenth century. There are
no apparent grounds for this assumption. An equally logical ex-
planation is that Kano’s (and also Katsina’s and Zaria’s) walls
were larger than the living space needed, in order to make room
for more cropland, not more people. The Hausa cities were sur-
rounded by fertile land which could support an enemy army for a
much longer time than the land around Timbuktu. Therefore the
inhabitants inside had to have proportionately more food in case
of an extended seige. The population of all the Sudanese cities
was limited by the fact that there were no sanitation facili-
ties, so as soon as the rains came they became exceedingly un-
healthy. Thus, there is na reason to believe that the popula-
tion ever exceeded 30,000 or 40,000, which Clapperton and later
Barth estimated for it.
138. Denham, Clapperton, Oudney, Narrative, 51.
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once a week. Denham estimated that on that day eighty to one hundred
thousand people attended it. 13 9 A similar number might be assumed to
have attended the Kano market, although the number may have been
slightly smaller since the market was held every day. The Kano market
was apparently now inaccessible to Nupe, however. All the merchants
and merchandise which Clapperton enumerated came either from North
Africa or from the western route.
Between Kano and Sokoto there was no major town at which Clap-
perton could stop. He skirted south of Katsina about thirty miles,
and just south of "Zirmee" (Zurmi, the capital of Zamfara) . He no-
ticed many local inhabitants going into the city to market, but it was
apparently no longer a major rendezvous for foreign traders. Sarkin
Musulmi Bello sent Clapperton an escort of 150 mounted men for the
trip from Kano to Sokoto, whereas seventy men had been considered suf-
ficient to defend the party on the road between Murzuk and Bornu.
The dangers in Hausaland came from armies, rather than marauding bands
bands, which was at least a difference in degree, if not in kind. The
caravan stopped only in small villages, which were populated almost
entirely by Fulani. This must have limited the route greatly, for
Hausa far outnumbered Fulani in the countryside as a whole. When the
caravan passed Zamfara, it began a two-day forced march of seventy
miles to get past the Gobir army before it had time to seek them out.
They had to march past Zamfara and Gobir, and cross to the west only
100 miles south of the capital of Gobir, Alkalawa. Their caravan made
the journey without incident, but two subsequent caravans were devas-
tated in the same area by Gobir and Zamfara troops
.
Clapperton found Sokoto the most populous town in central
Africa, and rapidly growing. From the description he gave of its com-
merce, it appeared to have attracted some of the trade which pre-
viously passed through Yauri, Kebbi, Zamfara and Katsina. Here the
routes from Nupe and Gwonja now converged with those from the north.
Access to the southern and western routes was comparatively limited,
if we may judge by the warning Bello gave Clapperton. Clapperton was
not allowed to proceed to Yauri or Nupe as he so ardently desired,
ostensibly because of the dangers of the road. 1^0 Yet while Clapper-
ton was away, Denham met with a merchant who had crossed the desert
with them, who said that he had gone on to Kano and from there with
four or five Arabs to Nupe and Yauri, where he had stayed some
time. 1^1 That report certainly does not suggest that there was great
danger on the roads.
On the other hand, the man and his traveling companions may
well have been sharifs, i.e., descendents of the Prophet. As such, to
shed their blood would have been considered shedding the blood of the
Prophet, and their goods were considered sacred as well. 1^2 This ob-
servance is reported by Lucas befor the Jihad. Both the Habe and the
jihadists considered themselves Muslims, and respected this tradition.
Sharifs of all complexions were evidently quite numerous in North and
West Africa, and a large proportion of the mercantile community was
139.
140.
141.
142.
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made up of persons thus protected. Lander T s travels showed that even
avowedly pagan kingdoms respected sharifs as specially sanctified.
The only reason that this consideration has been invoked here
even though Denham made no mention of there being sharifs is that
there is good reason to believe that the territory along the Niger was
unsafe for most travelers. Three years later, when Clapperton came up
from the coast through that area, he found no communication between
hostile Habe and Nupe there, and the Fulani at Sokoto. Even if
Bello had been able to forward Clapperton to the Niger, he would
probably have had to provide a sizeable escort to do so. When added
to the fact that he was afraid that Clapperton might use the renowned
sea power of the English to conspire with his enemies instead of help-
ing him, this gave Bello good reason to refuse the request in any
case.l^
On his return from Sokoto to Bornu, Clapperton visited the
third major market city of Hausaland, Katsina. He found there two
markets, one in the north and one in the south. The northern market
was frequented by Tuareg who exchanged salt for locally grown
grain. ^ The southern market accommodated merchants from Ghadames
and Tuat, who exchanged goods from North Africa for cowries brought
up from the coast. It was apparently only because of the cowries that
these merchants came there. Clapperton said that they took the cow-
ries to Kano to buy Kano cloth. A good part of the North Africans 1
profit came from manipulating local market conditions
,
and this was
obviously what they were doing. Cowries must have been cheaper in
Katsina than they were in Kano, or there would have been no point to
the transaction. This was probably the result of a decline in the
commerce of Katsina, since the routes feeding it and the state itself
were constantly harassed by the Habe Katsinawa based at Maradi.
Clapperton did not provide a very detailed account of the Kat-
sina market, so it is difficult to estimate how seriously it had been
affected at that time. His party was ambushed by Gobir forces while
en route to Katsina from Sokoto, and he arrived there in a very des-
perate condition. Many of the men of his group were killed outright
or lost in the bush to die of thirst. It was this type of experience
which led to the eventual decline of Katsina. Even if deterioration
were not marked in Clapperton T s time, it was certainly incipient.
The itineraries collected by Bowdich in 1817 and Dupuis in 1820
from Hausa and North African merchants in Ashanti throw some light on
the state of trade from that point of view. They are limited, how-
ever, as neither of the authors stated explicitly how recently their
informants had been in Hausaland. Most of the informants were perma-
nent residents at the Ashanti court, and might not have been east
since their youth. The majority of the itineraries can be dated from
internal evidence to before the jihad. Two of Bowdich T s itineraries
and one of Dupuis T reflect more recent acquaintance, so these only
will be considered. Incidentally, this lack of currently traveling
14-3. Clapperton, Second Expedition
.
76 ff.
144. Bello had received a total of three letters from respected
sources telling him that the English planned to come up the
Niger and conquer all of the Sudan, as they had India. Ibid .
,
197, 238.
145. Denham, Clapperton, Oudney, Narrative, Clapperton, 121.
146. Bowdich, Mission , 196 ff
.
;
Dupuis, Journal , Appendix 10,
cxxxiii-cxxxiv.
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Hausa merchants at Kumasi should not be considered proof that trade
was slow. It was also due to the fact that Ashanti merchants them-
selves normally carried their produce north to the markets of Gwonja
and Dagomba.
The itineraries through Hausaland which Bowdich collected re-
veal that merchants traveled through both Fulani-controlled territory
and Habe-controlled territory, though usually not on the same circuit.
The main route to Hausa arched far north of Ashanti, through Salaga
and Yendi to "Matchaquawdie" (Matiakouali?) and the cities of "Goo-
roomaa" (Gurma) on the Niger. Two days (about 40-50 miles) beyond the
Niger one entered the state of TTGamhadi, ,T which I am unable to iden-
tify with certainty. 19-7 it probably refers to the Gimbana, who were
a people, not a state. They inhabited the market town of Jega, but
were driven out by the Fulani. 19-8 One of the three large towns which
Bowdich said belonged to that "state" can be identified as Dogondaji
(Bowdich, "Dognodaghi")
,
about eighteen miles south of Jega. From
"Gamhadi" the route branched into three, one route going northward
fifteen days (about 300 miles) to "Houssa"; a second to Katsina (Bow-
dich, TTKatinnee TT ) via Kwatarkwashi ; and a third through Fulani country
(probably Sokoto) to the kingdom of "Kallagher . " The latter surely
refers to the Kel Haggar, the Tuareg of the Haggar oasis, near Ghat.
It indicates that if one wanted to buy their products, one went to
Fulani territory, undoubtedly to the market at Sokoto. The informant
mentioned frequent war between the Fulani and Katsina, but implied
that Katsina had not yet fallen. If that was the case, then it was
ten years since he had last been there.
Bowdich also described an itinerary lying south of the Gurma
route, passing through Wawa, Yauri, Zamfara, Gobir, Katsina, Daura,
j
Kano, Hadeija and Nguru to Bornu. Unfortunately, it predated the
jihad, and must have been the grand tour of the old days.
Of the Hausa itineraries in Dupuis 1 appendices, only one, Num-
I
ber 10, was contemporary. It was provided by "a native of that coun-
!
try [Katsina]
,
but recently arrived at Coomassy on a trading specula-
: tion from the former city . . .”14-9 it can be followed back from Kat-
sina through Ruma (Dupuis, T,Rouma ,f) and Moriki (Dupuis, nMariki ,T ) to
Bakura (Dupuis, "Bokory") on the upper reaches of the Sokoto River.
!
From there the man appears to have followed the river route to Sokoto
(Dupuis, TTSaghara") and Silame (Dupuis, "Sala")
,
though these and all
subsequent identifications are uncertain. 150 The absence of familiar
147. It is some confort to know that Dupuis insisted that the Moors
of Ashanti had never heard of it three years later when he was
there. Some of the confusion with the names on the itineraries
of both Bowdich and Dupuis stems from the fact that they were
usually transliterations of Arabic documents, rather than pho-
netic spellings, and the Arabic was corrupt.
148. E. W. Bovill, "Jega Market," Journal of the African Society .
149. Dupuis, Journal
,
Pt. II, cxxxiii.
150. Dupuis: Kalabaina, the river Ghulbi, Cabi, Kooka, Dajy, Deby,
Kotobo, Fougha, Doua, Dosyrouga, Beledy, Redaba, the Koara,
Todo, Rougha, Maury, Alomoan, Sameya, Dabakou, Komosy, Lagamana,
Dawa, Alomagho, Atkali, Daghabo, Caya, Dansareka, Fadeseka, Gho-
gha, Togho, Yanboti, Kodeba, Yarmesy, Yanka, Dahegha, Fadaly,
Balagho, Tady, Magho, Kokojo, Todoge, Dajy, the Ghulby, Baki, Sa-
kogho, Cardosi, to Yandi. Perhaps a reader may be able to sug-
gest other identifications.
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towns on this route would suggest that he came, like Clapperton,
through small Fulani villages rather than the main towns. Even the
ferry where he crossed the Niger cannot be identified, although the
name which Dupuis wrongly transliterated as ,TKotobo ,T may well refer
to the small village of Kwakwaba (Kokobo, historically). In that
case, he probably crossed near there, for it is less than a day from
the Niger.
The Fulani evidently were in the process of building up a net-
work of trade routes to replace the old ones, which had become im-
passable for them. In order to be able to depend on villages for
lodging and food along the way, they had to stop in Fulani villages.
Where there were no towns to accommodate them, they sent out colonies.
Migrant Fulani penetrated throughout the south and west into areas
which had never been under Hausa rule. By 1833, when Lander was des-
cending the Niger, they had founded Jebba and Raba to replace the old
ferry at Rakah.^l They had also founded Ilorin, in the heart of Oyo
country, and it was draining off commerce and population from the
capital, Katungu. Near the confluence of the Niger and the Benue, the
Fulani had infiltrated, and then taken the capital of the Igbira state
of Panda or Fundah.
This penetration should not be regarded as the product of a
Napoleonic grand design. Rather, it could be compared to the ex-
pansion of Europe in its haphazard character. The initiative of local
rulers
,
small groups
,
and individuals on the fringes of the empire
had more effect than the government at Sokoto. Yet, when individuals
were insulted, or local rulers needed help, they could call on their
kinsmen at Sokoto to supply them with cavalry and rifles. Since the
old structures were breaking down, a large number of people were
forced to gravitate toward the areas of greatest opportunity. They
tended to congregate in commercial centers and around military strong-
men.
Meanwhile, many of the old centers of trade began a slow death.
Katsina was one of the cities, whose decline has already been men-
tioned. Its new rulers simply were not able to protect it adequately.
The attacking Habe forces were not organized until after Shehu Uth-
man T s death in 1818, however, so Katsina’s preeminence had only begun
to be affected when Clapperton was there. In Bowdich T s and Dupuis T
itineraries, it was still the most prominent entrepot.
The commercial picture in the land that was still held by Habe
was probably better than that of Fulani areas, until nearly the end
of our period. Clapperton T s second journey offers an invaluable in-
sight into the commerce which skirted Fulani territory to frequent
Habe cities. The thousand-member Hausa caravan which he joined was
on its way from Ashanti to Bornu through a series of villages and
previously little frequented towns lying south of effective Fulani
authority. Clapperton met the caravan at Kiama in Borgu, on the right
bank of the Niger, a traditional and still flourishing entrepot on the
Gwonja-Bornu route. Thereafter, however, the route was all new. In-
stead of turning north to cross the river at Bussa or Yauri, they cut
south and crossed into Nupe at a little village called Comie.152 Here
151. Richard Lemon Lander, The Niger Journal of Richard and John
Lander, Robin Hallett, ed. (New York, 1965)
,
91-92.
152. Clapperton, Second Expedition
,
89.
THE COMMERCE OF HAUSALAND, 1780-1833 133
they met another caravan going the other way, toward Gwonja.l-^ They
planned to proceed to Kulfu in Nupe, less than a day away, but heard
that a Fulani army was there and so waited for it to retire. 154
Kulfu had been an entrepot for the north-south traffic before
the jihad, and now had attracted much of the east-west trade as well.
Clapperton found there a caravan from Bornu on its way west and one
from Yoruba which was headed for Borgu.155 In the market were traders
from Yoruba, Kebbi, Yauri, Borgu, Zamfara, and Bornu (all hostile to
Sokoto)
,
as well as from Sokoto and "Hausa." He met merchants from
Yauri (just a day to the north)
,
who said that Dahomey merchants
brought European goods to Hausa, Yauri and Nupe. 156 others told him
that the people of Benin, Ijebu and southern Nupe used to come there
before the civil war broke out. 1^7
Clapperton himself seemed very confused about exactly what was
going on in the country. He knew that Kulfu was nominally subject to
the Fulani, and that they passed on their tolls to a Fulani puppet,
but he failed to appreciate that the Sokoto regime had little or no
authority there. He found traders there from both Sokoto and anti-
Sokoto areas, so he must have assumed that traders were not affected
by the hostilities. 158 At least he was surprised when told by the
caravan leader that he must say that he was going to Bornu, and not
Kano.
But he soon discovered the depth of the hostilities. To visit
the supposed Fulani overlord of Kulfu, he had to be spirited off by
night with two escorts on fast horses. 159 Later, when he finally left
the caravan in the Habe-controlled portion of Zaria, he had to be for-
warded into the Fulani-controlled portion through a wooded no-man T s-
land with only foot escorts. 160 The caravan remained in Habe-
controlled territory, and went on to Bornu, which was then involved
in war with Sokoto.
At this time, in 1826, it is evident that the Habe-controlled
areas were engaged in considerably more commerce than was the Sokoto
empire. Nearly all the indigenous traders which Clapperton met were
trading with Sokoto T s enemies, and they readily denounced the Fulani as
rapacious plunderers.
When Clapperton arrived in Kano he found even the North African
merchants very unhappy with Bello, because the war with Bornu had
brought their trade to a standstill. 1^1 Bornu had been the only road
open to Fezzan merchants for some years, because the Tuareg of Agades,
who controlled the Air-Ghat-Ghadames route, allowed only Ghadames
153. Ibid., 110.
154. Ibid.
,
118.
155. Ibid., 129.
156. Ibid., 123.
157. Ibid
. , 160.
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merchants to pass. 162 Even the far western route from Morocco to Tim-
buktu, which was dangerous and circuitous at any time, was reported
completely closed at this time. 16 3 it was undoubtedly this isolation
of Sokoto politically and commercially on all sides which was respon-
sible for the serious inflation which Clapperton found there.
By the end of our period, however, the Fulani were beginning to
recover. As Nupe and Oyo began to disintegrate politically, the
Fulani penetrated more deeply into their territory. In the south-
east of the Hausa states
,
which had always been a pagan area used by
the Hausa only for slave -raiding, new avenues of commerce were being
developed. As Lander reached Ibo territory just above the Niger
Delta, he heard that Sheikh al-Kanemy had invited traders to his do-
mains and that the roads were open all the way. 164- This road must
have passed through Adamawa or Bauchi, two new states, nominally sub-
ject to the Sokoto regime, but, in fact, largely independent.
In summary, at the end of our period, in 1833, we find that
the Fulani-Habe dichotomy brought about by the jihad was fully spelled
out in commercial patterns in the 1820 T s and 1830 T s. The Fulani were
beginning to develop a new commercial network extending into all of
what is today Nigeria, as well as to the east, west, and north. It
grew out of a combination of diplomacy, infiltration and conquest, and
had to contend with concerted opposition of neighbors on all sides.
The Habe traders, who were the great majority of the indigenous
merchants, continued their trade, but with their exiled brethren
rather than with the new masters of Hausaland. Sheikh al-Kanemy of
Bornu, the second great power in the central sudan, actively encour-
aged African traders to frequent his domains instead of Sokoto T s. ^6
5
For a brief period in the late twenties, he and his lesser allies
brought about the near total stoppage of Sokoto T s foreign commerce.
We know from later reports, however, that some of the Hausa cities
under Fulani administration by the middle of the nineteenth century
had recovered their commercial importance.
Denham and Clapperton had noted enthusiasm on the part of
trans -Saharan merchants for the new regime and its improved legal
protection for the period of about 1818 to 1823. Between 1804- and
that time, and again in the late twenties, however, the commercial
picture in Hausaland was one of severe disruption and gradual reloca-
tion. Caravans of traders on both sides of the quarrel traveled like
guerilla bands instead of cosmopolitan urban residents. By 1833, the
commerce of central Hausaland certainly had not regained the eclat of
its pre-jihad days, nor probably its prosperity.
As to the general nature of trade, two conclusions are neces-
sary. First, by the end of the eighteenth century it was already
inappropriate to call the cities of Hausaland "termini” for the trans
-
162. Ibid .
163. Ibid., 202.
164. Lander, Niger Journal , 228.
165. He personally had sent the message to Panda saying that he had
opened roads to his domains.
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Saharan trade, especially if that implied an attempt to account for
their commercial importance solely in terms of the trans-Saharan
trade. They actually lay in what Bello termed the "middle sudan,"
not in the "upper sudan" in which all of the famous medieval termini
had been located. The commercial importance of Hausa cities derived
rather from the intersection of three main axes of trade, each of
which was important in its own right.
Secondly, the availability of the specialized products of each
region was the primary object of commerce, not profit per se . Hence,
increased volume on one route could not substitute for the closing of
another. Each of the routes was important to Hausa states themselves,
and to the traders who frequented their markets, for its own particu-
lar commodities. This also explains the resilience of trade in Hausa-
land. Wherever and whenever there was not a seige actually in pro-
gress, goods passed from hand to hand. They were sought out from far
places by men who prided themselves on their professional skill in
procuring goods, either for their own use, or for their lord T s. The
state supported and encouraged them, so that where there was a strong
state, trade usually flourished. However, when the land was divided
against itself, rivalry and racial hatred broke down this system.

CHAPTER 7
THE NORTH AFRICAN TRADING COMMUNITY IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY CENTRAL SUDAN
Louis Brenner
Virtually every European traveler to the Central Sudan in the
nineteenth century remarked on the excessive political influence there
of North African merchants. 1 This was true in large capitals as well
as small. In Sokoto Hugh Clapperton found that his best entry to
Muhammad Bello was via Muhammad Gumsu, "the chief of the Arabs."
Clapperton had been advised by merchants in Kano to offer Gumsu "a
handsome present, and to endeavor by all means to keep him in good
humour, on account of his great influence. "2 The British traveler
most probably received this advice from his chief contact in Kano,
another Arab by the name of Hat Salah, to whom he had been recom-
mended by Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi, Shehu of Bornu.3 Clapperton 7 s
traveling companion and guide during most of his journey in Hausaland
was another Arab merchant, Muhammad al-Wardi, from the Fezzan. Hat
Salah and al-Wardi accompanied Clapperton when he visited the Amir of
Kano.
There seems to have been a "Chief of the Arabs" in most capi-
tals. In Katsina, Clapperton described one "Hadje Ahmed Ben Massoud"
with the same title. ^ Some thirty years later, Henry Barth was put
to great inconvenience by a Katsina official bearing the title Sarkin
Turawa, "Chief of the Whites," whose duty it was to oversee the ac-
tivities of North African merchants in the town. 5 Whether or not
those individuals whom Clapperton called "Chiefs of the Arabs" were
also government officials is not clear, but it is possible that they
were. Gustav Nachtigal noted that in Kukawa there were two men who
served as representatives of North African merchants : Muhammad al-
1. Several European travelers are quoted extensively in this paper.
As an aid to the reader, the dates when they were in North and
West Africa are as follows: Lyon, 1818-1820; Denham and Clap-
perton, 1822-1824; Clapperton T s second journey, with Lander,
1826-1827; Richardson, 1845-1846 and 1850-1851; Barth, 1849-
1855; Nachtigal, 1867-1874; Monteil, 1891-1892.
I
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by Dixon Denham, Hugh
Clapperton, and Walter Oudney (Cambridge, 1964-1966) [hereafter
DCO], 680.
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I 5. Henry Barth, Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa
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Titiwi, a Fezzani, and Bu Alaq, an Awlad Sulaiman Arab.^ Bu Alaq had
been made a member of the Bornu royal court. Barth mentions both men
in his description of Kukawa, but does not suggest any official poli-
tical role for either. 7 This may be because the functions of "Chief
of the Arabs" during the period of his visit had been assumed by the
all-powerful vizier of Bornu, al-Hajj Bashir. By the last decade of
the century, the office was held in Kukawa by one Sharif Shassimi, a
man of extensive influence. ^
The one important capital of the Central Sudan which may not
have appointed an alien official to handle the affairs of North Afri-
can merchants was Kano. Clapperton does not call Hat Salah "Chief of
the Arabs." Barth on his visits to Kano retained different agents to
handle his affairs and to accompany him to visit the Amir. One of
these agents happened to be a son of Hat Salah named Bawu, but his
services proved unacceptable
.
^ Another way in which Kano seems to
differ from its neighbors is that, according to Clapperton, the Amir
did "not usually admit Arab merchants into his presence. "10 Clapper-
ton notes that on the occasion of his royal audience, al-Wardi was
"specially favored" in being allowed to accompany him. Clapperton T s
comment leads to some confusion, because he was also accompanied by
Hat Salah, about whose presence at court he made no remark. Barth was
also accompanied on his visits to the Amir of Kano by Bawu and other
merchants resident in Kano. Perhaps Clapperton intended to say that
the Amir did not allow visits from itinerant Arab merchants. If so,
this was a singular restriction in the Central Sudan, where the pre-
dominant pattern was to encourage visits by all North African mer-
chants
,
not only to the markets but to the courts of Sudanese capi-
tals. It was only when merchants were welcomed at court that they
could insert themselves into local politics and gain the kind of in-
fluence which Muhammad al-Titiwi or Sharif Shassimi enjoyed at Kukawa,
or Muhammad Gumsu at Sokoto. In Katagum, Clapperton met a Tripoli
merchant named Hameda who was reputed to be extremely wealthy and was
considered "second only to the governor" in political power.
H
The extent to which Arab merchants could gain political influ-
ence can be seen in the example of Sharif al-Fasi of Zinder. He was
the agent in Zinder of Shehu Umar of Bornu. Exactly how the Sharif
acquired this post is not known; he was a native of Fez, and had lived
in Algiers and fought with Abd al-Qadir against the French. He pro-
bably reached Bornu in the course of trading activities and was much
respected there for his learning and piety. Not only was the Sharif
the local representative and "spy" for the Shehu in Zinder, but he
also was the agent of all North African merchants there. 12 Indeed,
according to James Richardson, "the Shereef is said to be the only
person who has any money in Zinder. This man monopolises all the
power and all the money. "H
6. Gustav Nachtigal, Sahara und Sudan (Berlin, 1879), I, 575,
580-581.
7. Barth, Travels, II, 77, 639.
8. P. L. Monteil, De Saint-Louis h Tripoli par le Lac Tchad (Paris,
n.d.)
,
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9. Barth, Travels , I, 490 ff.
10. DCO, 644.
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12. James. Richardson, Narrative of a Mission to Central Africa (Lon-
don, 1853), II, 182.
13. Ibid., II, 220.
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To what can we attribute the prominent political role of North
African, and especially Arab, merchants in West Africa? An important
clue is to be found in the fact that Hausa and other indigenous mer-
|
chants, whose contributions to commercial activity were significant,
[
are almost never observed in similar political positions. Although
j
European travelers observed numerous Arab, and occasional Tuareg or
Teda, merchants attending the courts of Sudanese rulers, there is no
mention of a West African merchant at court. As is often the case,
there is an exception which proves the rule. P. L. Monteil met a man
in Kano who originated from the eastern borders of Haus aland. This
man, named Ali, began his career as a student of religious science and
then decided to settle in Kano as a merchant. Success in business
brought him some wealth and prominence, and he managed to befriend Mu-
hammad Bello, future Amir of Kano, to whom he opened his home "as well
as occasionally his treasury." When Bello became Amir, he elevated
Ali to office in reward for his services and loyalty.l 1^ This process
of parlaying mercantile success into political office was not uncom-
mon and may be a partial explanation for Arab prominence in the Sudan.
Muhammad al-Mukni began his career as a merchant and commercial agent
of the Pasha of Tripoli and subsequently became Bey of Fezzan. Al-
Mukni T s leading retainer was another merchant, Abu Bakr Bu Khallum. 15
This is the same Bu Khallum who was charged by Yusuf Pasha of Tripoli
with escorting Denham, Clapperton and Oudny to Bornu where he lost his
life in a slave raid. His death was much grieved in the north, es-
pecially in Fezzan, where a merchant speculated to Denham about the
impact of the tragedy:
What will now become of Fezzan? . . . Boo Khaloom was the
cherisher of the whole population; he was young, rich, liberal
and fearless: no one but him could speak of the bashaw [Pasha]
in their favour; so great was his mind, that when a tax has
been laid on Fezzan, which she could not pay, to prevent her
children from flying to escape imprisonment, he would undertake
to be the mediator, and, with the gifts of a sultan, instead of
a merchant, in his hand, all furnished from his own coffers,
always carried his point. It was written, however, that he was
to die: — God is great! And God T s will be done.16
It is clear that Bu Khallum T s prominence resulted from qualities other
than wealth; and yet, without wealth it is doubtful if he could ever
have won the Pasha to his position.
If wealth could be translated into political influence, the
reverse also was true; political or social prominence often served as
a letter of credit to launch men into mercantile careers. Barth men-
tioned that Abd al-Qadir, a deposed Sultan of Agades
,
had moved to
Katsina and was involved in commercial transactions of large propor-
tions. 17 In Zinder, Richardson met Sidi Bou Baker, son of al-Hajj
Sudani, one of al-Kanemi T s companions in his rise to power in Bornu. 18
The Sudani family had claim to a titled office in the Kukawa court, a
14. Monteil, De Saint-Louis , 272.
15. G. F. Lyon, A Narrative of Travels in Northern Africa in the
Years 1818, 19, and 20 (London, 1821), 164.
16. DCO, 503.
17. Barth, Travels, III, 563-564.
18. Richardson, Narrative, II, 246-247.
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position which Bou Baker later attained; until that time, however, he
engaged in trade. Having established that there was a connection in
these states between wealth and political influence, we have not an-
swered the question as to why the Arabs generally benefited in this
arrangement and indigenous traders did not. One factor was certainly
related to Islam. North African traders came from, or had visited,
cities which were cultural centers of the Islamic world. Their pres-
ence at court thus lent prestige to its members; this was especially
so when a merchant was also a scholar or a Sharif, as was often the
case. But probably the most important factor in distinguishing among
members of the merchant classes was the goods in which individuals
traded.
Barth T s observations on indigenous trade offer evidence about
the distinctions among trade goods. In Baghirmi he encountered a
group of Hausa,
slender, active fellows, accustomed to fatigue, and content
with little profit, who were carrying on their heads, all the
way from Kano to Bagirmi, small parcels of indigo-dyed shirts,
and other commodities
,
in order to barter them for the fine
asses of Dar-Fur.l^
In western Bornu he met a group of ’’petty native traders’’ carrying
cotton for sale in the market of Muniyo; another group was trading
earthenware. 20 in western Hausaland Barth observed a caravan of trad-
ers carrying vegetable cakes called dodowa :
Three thousand of these cakes constitute an ass-load, and
each of them in general is sold in Sokoto for five kurdi
[cowries], having been bought on the spot for one uri [cowrie];
so that the profit, being not less than 500 per cent.
,
makes
this commerce attractive for poor people. 21
In Gurma country he met a caravan of Mossi traders carrying cotton
strips and kola nuts. 22 Barth’s observations are supported by
those of Clapperton who stated that Hausa traders carried to Bornu
tobacco, kola nuts, antimony, cotton cloth by the bolt or made into
shirts or dresses. They returned with natron, salt, beads, and some
items of Bornu clothing. Kanuri traders also carried similar goods
along the same routes. 23 Indigenous traders, then, dealt primarily
in goods which were marketed among the general population.
By contrast, north Africans imported into the Sudan various
types of cloth and clothing worn by the wealthier classes
,
such as
burnuses, kaftans, shawls, red caps, silk and linen cloth of European
and Mediterranean manufacture. They also brought rugs and carpets and
similar furnishings; horses were another important import. 24- This
19. Barth, Travels , II, 488.
20. Ibid., Ill, 44.
21. Ibid
. ,
98.
22. Ibid., 207.
23. DCO
,
615-616.
24. The nature of goods imported remained fairly consistent over the
century. For example, compare Lyon, Narrative, 152 ff. and
Nachtigal, Sahara
.
I, 698-700.
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merchandise could be purchased only by men of some means. Barth
states specifically that in Yola "striped Manchester, calico, cloth
bernuses, [were] generally sold privately to the wealthier people."25
Richardson concluded that the Fezzani Arabs sold their goods only to
members of the ruling classes in Sudan. In Muniyo he noted that they
sold a few items to "the Sultan and his chief officers"; 26 in Zinder
he said they sold all their goods on credit to the Sarki.27 It is
doubtful that Richardson T s general conclusion is justified, however.
Clapperton saw Ghadamsi and Tuati merchants in the Katsina market
selling goods for cowries which were then carried to Kano in order to
purchase the manufactures of that city. 28 And Nachtigal noted in
Kukawa that whereas the North African merchants retained most of their
I
goods to be sold from their residences, they also gave out goods on
credit to agents who traveled into the countryside. 29 a perusal of
the North African import lists will indicate that not all the items
were expensive luxury goods, although it would appear that the major-
; ity were. North African merchants therefore marketed goods which
were consumed by the wealthier inhabitants of the Sudan, that is,
men of political prominence.
Not only were Arab traders distinguished from indigenous West
• Africans by the goods they sold, but also by the goods they bought:
primarily slaves, ivory, and ostrich feathers. As Muhammad al-Tounsy
! observed early in the century, "It is only the wealthy merchants who
are able to export this merchandise. Other products of petty commerce
;
are the object of trade for people of more humble condition. "30 Of
i course, not all merchants engaged in trans-Saharan commerce were in-
dependently wealthy; but their activities were backed by the credits
of stationary North African and European merchants and trading houses.
Upon arrival in the Sudan they therefore had at their disposal the
means to engage in sizeable transactions, and also the wherewithal to
ease their way into favorable business deals through the judicious
distribution of gifts. West African merchants were not backed by
large capital investments and could not operate in the fashion of the
North Africans.
Exchange of gifts was an integral part of trans-Saharan com-
merce. Richardson was told in Ghadames that in traveling to Sudan one
j
is required to offer gifts to the various Tuareg chiefs of Ghat and
Air as a kind of transit duty, but that the chiefs of Sudan "do not
I demand presents as a matter of right, leaving it to the good pleasure
of the stranger. "31 It is highly unlikely, however, that North Afri-
cans ever failed to offer gifts to the chiefs of the towns where they
traded. The arrival and departure, as well as the freedom to trade,
of the North African merchants wete carefully controlled by Sudanese
governments. We have already mentioned the Sarkin Turawa of Katsina,
and the "Chiefs of the Arabs" in Sokoto and Kukawa, whose duties were
to oversee the activities of these aliens. During the rule of al-
25. Barth, Travels , II, 190.
26. Richardson, Narrative , II, 309.
27. Ibid., 251-252.
28. DCO, 709.
29. Nachtigal, Sahara , I, 700.
30. Le Cheykh Mohammed ibn-Omar el-Tounsy, Voyage au Ouaday , trans.
from the Arabic by Dr. Perron (Paris, 1851), 333.
31. James Richardson, Travels in the Great Desert of Sahara 1845 and
1846 (London, 1848), I, 175-176.
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Kanemi in Bornu, he took a personal interest in trade regulations so
that no caravan was "permitted to enter Kouka during [his] absence,
nor dare the merchants offer any goods for sale till they had his per-
mission. ”32 Information given to Lyon in Murzuk in 1819, at the time
al-Kanemi had emerged as the de facto ruler of Bornu, indicates that
merchants gravitated toward the centers of political power in the
Sudan. "All the traders from Fezzan,” he said, "carry tal-Kanemi]
presents, and consider him a far greater man than his master [the
Mai], who now lives in a very retired manner. "33 Lyon also observed
a social practice in Murzuk which is relevant to the Sudan: "The
better class of the people, or those who have some property, are dis-
tinguished from the poor by being admitted to the Sultan’s presence." 3^
The possession of wealth, even if it was borrowed, afforded a
man social prestige in the Sudan. Wealth, if properly managed, could
be translated into political power, as in the case of the Kano mer-
chant, Ali, and Bu Khallum, mentioned above. Luxury goods imported
from North Africa were consumed by members of the Sudan ruling clas-
ses, who were the only individuals able to afford such purchases.
Thus it seems natural that the Arabs should appear in Sudanic courts
:
they were wealthy and necessitated watching because of their political
potential; and their prospective customers were all men of political
prominence. It should be reiterated here that virtually no reference
appears in all the nineteenth-century literature to Hausa, Kanuri, or
other indigenous traders appearing at court. Presumably the movements
and transactions of these merchants were also controlled, but appar-
ently not directly by the court. As we have seen, indigenous traders
generally possessed very little means and did not deal in luxury
items. Their activities were confined to the markets, whereas the
Arabs often conducted business privately in their residences.
Slaves, ostrich feathers, and ivory were the chief products ex-
ported northward from the Sudan in the nineteenth century. Very lit-
tle evidence is available which indicates the way in which the latter
two items were collected and brought to market. 3 5 Information about
the slave trade, however, reveals that it was predominantly in the
hands of the Sudanese ruling classes. Barth accompanied a Bornu slave
raid led by al-Hajj Bashir, the vizier. The total booty was about
10,000 head of cattle, 3000 slaves captured plus a "sort of tribute"
of 800 slaves taken from the territories of an allied chief. The
vizier claimed one-third of the 3000 captives and all the "tribute";
no mention is made of the division of the cattle. Certainly a share
of the captives was reserved for the Shehu of Bornu. But even if the
Shehu’s portion were included among the slaves which the vizier
32. DCO, 377.
33. Lyon, Narrative, 128.
34. Ibid.
,
279-280.
35. The marketing of these products may have been controlled by the
ruling classes. Richardson (Narrative, I, 90-91) witnessed the
arrival in Murzuk of a Bornu caravan carrying 150 qantars of
ivory of which sixty or seventy qantars were brought by one un-
named Arab merchant, and "forty were on account of the Vizier
of Bornu," al-Hajj Bashir. Barth mentioned that in Baghirmi
ivory was not sold in the market but privately in houses, per-
haps an indication of marketing restrictions. Barth, Travels ,
II, 513-514.
36. Barth, Travels
.
II, 418.
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claimed this would leave about 2000 captives to be divided among the
sixty-five courtiers, royal slaves, and other chiefs who accompanied
this expedition as well as among the 13,000 troops who Barth estimated
were present. 37 it is not unwarranted to suggest that the chiefs and
courtiers would claim more slaves than their troops, and that there-
fore very few slaves indeed passed into the hands of Bornu commoners.
That the only booty which filtered down to the troops was "blind,
lame or broken-horned cattle," is an opinion currently expressed in
Bornu. Richardson observed a division of spoils in Zinder similar
to that in Bornu. During slave raids, he said:
The lesser chiefs act an important part and each gets a
share. A chief who fights under the Sarkee captures fifty
slaves, and gives up to the Sarkee, twenty-five or thirty,
keeping the rest for himself and people.
If a single undistinguished man captures five, the Sarkee
gets two of the five; another captures two, the Sarkee gets
one, and the captor one. 3
9
In his description of the commerce of Kano, Barth mentioned that only
a small percentage of the profits derived from the slave trade went to
the advantage of the common people of the city.^0
The North African demand for slaves and the Sudanese desire for
luxury imports complemented one another in a firm system of inter-
dependence. Al-Kanemi confided to Denham that "the Arabs who came [to
j Bornu] will have nothing else but slaves. "9-1 As the century pro-
Igressed, and European-imposed treaties in North Africa began to inter-
rupt the trans-Saharan slave trade, ivory and ostrich feathers became
increasingly important as exports. But these goods were destined for
European markets, which tied the Sudan into a foreign economy which
could not consistently absorb luxury imports. When European demand
collapsed, the Sudan was left without alternate markets. The slave
trade apparently had not been subject to such vicissitudes. North
Africa and the Middle East, especially Constantinople, were constantly
seeking slave imports; indeed, these areas did all in their power to
expedite this trade. Slaves destined for Constantinople paid no
transit duties in the Ottoman domains of Tripoli and the Fezzan.
Slaves sold in North Africa paid only a minor duty, whereas "objects
|
of legitimate commerce" paid 12 1/2 percent duty in both Fezzan and
Tripoli. 9-3 Similar privileges were extended in parts of the Sudan.
Arabs did not pay any duties in Zinder, although Tuareg and Sudanese
I traders did. 9-4 There is very little specific information about duty
[payments in Bornu, although Denham remarked that Arab merchants were
"encouraged and treated with great liberality" there. ^3 Barth
]
37 . Ibid., 638-640.
j
3 8 . Oral testimony collected in Bornu, 1966.
1
39. Richardson, Narrative, II, 231-232.
40. Barth, Travels
.
I, 515.
41. DCO, 533.
[42. See C. W. Newbury, "North African and Western Sudan Trade in the
Nineteenth Century: A Re-Evaluation,” Journal of African
History
.
VII, 2 (1966), 233-246.
43. Richardson, Narrative
, I, 92.
i44. Ibid., II, 194-195.
j
45. DCO
.
767-768.
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recorded that the sale of slaves in the Kano market was taxed, but
this was probably true in all markets; 1+6 what is not known is how many
slaves, if any, were sold privately outside the markets. The exchange
of gifts at court may have served as a kind of informal duty in that
presents were necessary in order to be allowed to trade.
The reciprocal interests of the North African merchants and the
Sudanese rulers resulted in the solid entrenchment of the trans-
Saharan trade, until European interference severed the relationship.
Sudanese leaders required these imports, not only to pander to their
own tastes, but also because they represented important assets to be
distributed as gifts among loyal followers. North African clothing
And furnishings were symbols of prestige because they were expensive
luxury items. Generosity was considered one of the cardinal attri-
butes of good leadership and members of all ranks in the ruling
hierarchy were expected to reward loyal service with gifts. Simi-
larly, men were installed into political offices with gifts of im-
ported clothing. Barth observed the installation of a chief as a
minor vassal to the Shehu of Bornu. "First he was dressed in an
fclephant shirt -- the large black shirt from Nufe [Nupe] — over which
p rich silk robe was thrown, and over all an Egyptian shawl. ,tl+8 Since
slaves were the primary export in demand, when the treasuries fell
low, a slave raid was launched in order to obtain new income. Barth
rather bluntly stated that when "the coffers and slave -rooms of the
great men [of Bornu] were empty; and, a new supply being wanted, from
whence to obtain it was a question of minor importance. "^9 Richard-
son was convinced that Sudanese rulers raided their own subjects:
"The sultan of a province foments a quarrel with a town or village
belonging to himself and then goes out and carries off all the people
into slavery. "50
An almost constant pressure toward slave raiding existed be-
cause the customers of the North Africans were perpetually in debt.
Usually, incoming merchants would hand over their goods on credit and
then either engage agents to collect for them, or wait around them-
selves for payment. The credit network was vast and complex; Denham,
Clapperton, and Barth all commented on their difficulties and suc-
cesses in operating in this financial system, and their experiences
reveal some insights into the system. However, only extensive re-
search into North African sources will lay open the intricacies of
trans -Saharan finance. The Europeans certainly became aware of the
general difficulty of collecting debts. An Arab acquaintance of
Clapperton found it impossible to leave Katagum being unable to col-
lect from his numerous debtors. 51 According to Richardson, Sarkin
Zinder was in debt to one merchant for 1600 Maria-Theresa dollars, a
sizeable sum in the Sudan; and this was not the Sarki T s only debt. 52
When al-Hajj Bashir was vizier in Bornu he took responsibility to see
4-6. Barth, Travels
,
I, 515; see also Clapperton T s description of the
Kano market, DCO , 651.
4-7. See Ronald Cohen, "Some Aspects of Institutionalized Exchange: A
Kanuri Example,” Cahiers d T Etudes Africaines , V, 3 (1965) , 353-
369.
48. Barth, Travels, II, 359.
49. Ibid., 316-317.
50. Richardson, Narrative, II, 205.
51. DCO
.
716.
52. Richardson, Narrative , II, 240.
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that debts were paid, but after his death merchants found it difficult
to collect until Shehu Abdurrahman intervened personally . 53 Later in
the century, merchants frequented Bornu less and less as that country
gained a reputation for being remiss in its financial responsibili-
ties. 54-
Bornu T s deficiency in caring for her foreign merchants in the
latter part of the century differs markedly from the policy which al-
Kanemi had adopted earlier. Denham correctly analysed a growing
interdependence between Tripoli and Bornu based on trade.
[Yusuf Pasha of Tripoli] obtained slaves almost exclusively
through the medium of [al-Kanemi f s] territory, which, since
he has held the reins of government, was sufficiently safe
for travellers, to induce merchants with large capitals for
this country to proceed by way of Bornou to Soudan [Hausaland].
The numbers of kafilas between that country and Fezzan had,
within the last five years, greatly exceeded any former
period; and in equal proportion did the respectability of those
traders who now accompanied them exceed that of the merchants
previously in the habit of passing through Bornou. 55
Al-Kanemi conscientiously developed friendly relations with the north.
He was born in Fezzan and had many connections there; his family
owned property in Murzuk. As he rose to political prominence many of
his friends and relatives from the Fezzan joined him in Bornu. Fez-
zani merchants, seeking favorable business arrangements also traveled
to Bornu where they often assisted in military campaigns. Denham re-
marked that in the battle against Baghirmi which he witnessed, al-
Kanemi T s forces had been weakened by the absence of about thirty Arabs
who had gone to Hausaland. 55 Some years earlier, in 1819, al-Kanemi
had been defeated by Baghirmi during a battle in which his eldest son
was killed; even in defeat he had praise for the Fezzani Arabs whose
courage he considered worth special mention. 5?
These political relationships between Bornu and its resident
merchants were complemented by a rather shaky political alliance be-
tween Yusuf Pasha and al-Kanemi. On at least one occasion Yusuf sent
troops from his domains to aid al-Kanemi in Bornu; this expedition was
led by the Governor of Fezzan, Mustafa al-Ahmar, in 1821. 5& An
earlier campaign was led by al-Mukni, al-Ahmar T s predecessor in
Fezzan. Considerable confusion surrounds this expedition. One source
suggests that al-Mukni was invited to Bornu by al-Kanemi to aid in
53. Libya Government Archives [LGA], ’’Letter from the Wali of Tripoli
to the Qa T imaqam of Fezzan,’’ dated Shacban 1270 (29 April to
May 1854)
.
54. Nachtigal, Sahara
.
I, 703.
55. DCO, 394.
56. Ibid
. ,
449. The military value of the Arabs lay in their posses-
sion of firearms.
57. University of Ibadan MS 82/233, ’’Letter from al-Kanemi to his
sisters Ruqayya and Fatima and his daughter Khadija,” 10
July 1819. The defeat occurred in February 1819.
58. For a description of this expedition see DCO , 539-554, and
Francis Rodd, ”A Fezzani Military Expedition to Kanem and Bagirmi
in 1821,’’ Journal of the Royal African Society
,
XXXV (1936),
153-168.
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disciplining recalcitrant subjects ;59 others, however, suggest that
al-Mukni had perpetrated a slave raid in Kanem against the wishes of
Bornu. 60 it Is possible, although not at this point proven, that
al-Kanemi allowed al-Mukni, in payment for his services, to raid cer-
tain of his enemies for slaves. There is no question that al-Ahmar T s
reward for assistance was captives both for himself and for Yusuf
Pasha. There is also no question that this political alliance was
closely connected with trade relations, because in September 1820
Yusuf wrote to al-Kanemi proclaiming their mutual friendship and prom-
ising to exempt him and his friends from all custom dues in Fezzan,
"even if they bring loads by the ton. "61 Even so, the alliance was
never sound; when Denham arrived in Kukawa, Yusuf was detaining two
of al-Kanemi T s children in Fezzan. And during Denham T s sojourn in
Kukawa there were several alarms to the effect that Tripoli might in-
vade Bornu. 62
Mercantile connections between North and West Africa were often
employed as channels of political and diplomatic communications
.
Much
of the diplomatic correspondence which crossed the Sahara concerned
trade. B. G. Martin has published translations of a number of letters
from the Tripoli archives
,
and several of these deal directly with
trade. 63 Other unpublished correspondence further supports the con-
tention that trade was a major subject of administrative correspond-
ence, at least under the second Ottoman regime in Tripoli. The fear
of Arab traders that Bornu was considering attacking Kano in the
1840 T s came to the attention of Ottoman officials who immediately took
measures to discourage any campaign. The merchants, of course, were
alarmed not only that warfare would interrupt trade, but also that
they might lose their property in the fighting and looting. 64 Any
report of political upheaval or change in leadership resulted in ex-
tensive efforts to determine the impact of these events on trade.
In the 185Q T s when Shehu Umar of Bornu was deposed by his brother
Abdurrahman, steps were taken in Tripoli to insure that trade rela-
tions remained favorable. 65 When Umar (who regained his throne from
Abdurrahman) died in 1881, reports were dispatched northward by resi-
dent merchants concerning the government of his son, Abu Bakr, the new
Sliehu.66
When Ottoman officials desired to obtain information about the
Sudan, they often sent merchants on fact-finding missions. When the
Wali of Tripoli wanted to cement relations with the Shehu Abdurrahman,
59. See B. G. Martin, "Five Letters from the Tripoli Archives,"
Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria , II, 3 (Dec. 1962),
358.
60. Lyon, Narrative, 124; Barth, Travels , III, 43.
61. Nigerian National Archives, Kaduna, 530/1917.
62. DCO, 394.
63. Martin, "Five Letters." Letter I concerns the desire of al-Hajj
Bashir of Bornu to purchase firearms from Tripoli; Letters IV and
V address the question of keeping the roads open and safe for
caravan traffic.
64. LGA, "Letter from the Qa T imaqam of Fezzan, Hassan Pasha, to the
Wali of Tripoli," 29 Dhu al-QaCda 1262 (18 November 1846).
65. See Martin, "Five Letters," Letter IV; also LGA, "Letter from the
Wali of Tripoli to the Qa’imaqam of Fezzan," Shacban 1270 (29
April to 27 May 1854).
66. LGA, "Letter from Mukhtar Hassan to Hajj Muhammad," 10 Shacban
1299 (27 June 1882) . The sender and receiver of this letter were
apparently traders.
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the Qa’imaqam of Fezzan sent one Sharif Barkan to accomplish this.
Sharif Abdurrahman Barkan was a merchant who eventually established
residence in Bornu and became influential in the Kukawa court. He
apparently became involved in collecting a gift of wild animals to be
sent to the Ottoman Sultan for his private zoo. 68 More important, be-
cause of his position in Bornu and his reputation in Fezzan, he became
a leading diplomatic envoy between the two governments. 69 On another
occasion, the Fezzani government sent al-Hajj Hussain al-Titiwi to
Bornu to investigate suggestions that Bornu might voluntarily pay
tribute to Constantinople. 70 Muhammad al-Titiwi has already been men-
tioned as a leading courtier in Bornu during Barth’s and Nachtigal ’s
visits. The Titiwi family was quite prominent in both the Fezzan and
the Sudan. Muhammad’s brother, Amin as-Sanduq, was the treasurer of
j
Fezzan; 71 and later in the century Muhammad al-Hachaichi noted that
Abdurrahman Titiwi was a leading figure in Murzuk.72
The larger and more successful trading houses or trading
families tended to spread their representatives and their influence
throughout North Africa and the Sudan. In the Fezzan, besides the
i Titiwi ’s was the Ben Alua family, mentioned by Nachtigal, al-Hachai-
chi, and Monteil.73 Various members of this family were also govern-
ment officials in Murzuk, influential courtiers in Bornu, and suc-
| cessful traders. The head of the family, Muhammad b. Alua, had come
to Fezzan from Aujila and had found success in trade and politics.
He married a daughter of the well-regarded Bu Khallum, who was a pro-
tege of both al-Mukni and Yusuf Pasha. 74 It may have been this mar-
riage alliance which set the Ben Alua family on the road to success.
We have also referred to the al-Wardi family of Fezzan, successful
; traders in Bornu from early in the century. Muhammad al-Wardi es-
corted Clapperton to Kano and Sokoto, and his son, Umar, provided
j
Richardson with a great deal of information about Bornu when the ex-
plorer was in Zinder.75
Perhaps the largest and most influential trading house was that
headed by the El-Tseni family of Ghadames (variably spelled as Etta-
nee, Tini, and Ettence) .76 The trading connections of this family
extended throughout Hausaland, to Timbuktu and also into North Africa
and the various desert oases. Al-Hachaichi had occasion to enter into
a business arrangement with a member of this family, El Hadj Ali
Belkassem el-Tseni. Al-Hachaichi ’s description of the man reveals the
manner in which his political and commercial connections were devel-
oped:
67. Martin, "Five Letters, 11 363.
|
68. See Martin, "Five Letters," 371-372. LGA, "Letter from Sharif
Abdurrahman Barkan to the Qa’imaqam of Fezzan," 15 Jumada al-Ula
1286 (23 August 1869)
.
69. Information about Sharif Barkan was also obtained in an interview
with his grandson, Sidi Abdurrahman Barkan of Tripoli, in 1966.
70. LGA, "Letter from the Qa’imaqam of Fezzan to the Wali of Tri-
poli," 12 Safar 1260 (3 March 1844).
71. Nachtigal, Sahara
.
I, 575.
72. Mohammed el-Hachaichi
,
Voyage au Pays Senoussia (Paris, 1912),
166.
73. Nachtigal, Sahara , I, 81 ff
. ; el-Hachaichi, Voyage , 158-160, 236;
Monteil, De Saint-Louis , 427.
74. See above, p. 139.
75. Richardson, Narrative , II, 257.
76. Barth, Travels , III, 375; Richardson, Travels , I, 32, 232-233,
260; el-Hachaichi, Voyage , 27, 113-114.
148 LOUIS BRENNER
Born in Ghat, where he grew up, descended from noble Tuareg
on his mother T s side, who is the maternal aunt of the Bey of
Ghat, with whom she now lives, he has for many years pursued
commercial activities in Ghadames and in this way gained
considerable fame in the regions of the Sahara and the Sudan.
Similarly he knows all the great traders in these countries
and among the Tuareg chiefs. 77
It was probably from a member of the El-Tseni family that al-Hachaichi
obtained his information about the distribution of Ghadames merchants
in North and West Africa. This listing is quoted here at length be-
cause it indicates the extent and nature of Ghadamsi influence.
In Bornu there are six [merchants], among them Mohammed B.
Mohammed B. Brahim, son-in-law of the Sultan of Bornu;
in Tchad, two;
in Zinder, six;
in Beled Bou Chebir, four;
in Ghat, 24;
in Waday there is only one, Mohammed Sayah, who is a person
enjoying great influence and who plays a role of minister
to the sultan;
in Kanem
,
two
;
in Murzuk
,
two
;
in Beled Darnerghou, six among who is Shaikh Mohammed el-Bechir
el Ouahchi, an important individual who enjoys great influ-
ence among the Ghadamsia;
in Kano, 19 among whom are the Shaikh Mohammed Bou Zemala, a
minister of the King of Kano; Ali ben Barka, a Negro slave
of the trader Mohammed b. Brahim El-Tseni; and the traders
Hamadou and Zaberma, freed slaves of El Hadj Ali b. Ahmed
El-Tseni
;
in Nupe, three;
in Adamawa
,
4
in Zaria
,
3
in Timbuktu, there are Hamou El-Belili; Abderrahman ben Kayari,
Mohammed ben Ali ben Rechid, Bechir ben Ahmed El-Ghandji,
Ahmed ben El-Hadj Brahim who is in the service of the El-
Tseni family, and Harmou El-Mezghanni
;
in Sokoto, 4 . . .
Finally, there are in Tunis 37 notable Ghadames traders who
still today carry on an important trade with the Sudan
via Tripoli. ^
8
At this stage of research it is not possible to know in any
detail the manner in which North African merchants influenced day-to-
day policy decisions in Sudanese courts. We have seen some examples
of political influence being employed in order to encourage trade,
which may have been always the overriding concern of all those in-
volved. Most of the information presently available derives from
European sources, and the impression gained from them is uniform:
that Arab traders tried every device to hinder the introduction of
European trade into their commercial territories. The Europeans con-
cluded that the North Africans feared any competition would erode
77. El-Hachaichi
,
Voyage , 27.
78. Ibid
. , 220-222.
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their trade and that their businesses would be ruined. Certainly this
was an important consideration, but it was not the only one. Richard-
son was confronted at the Ghadames court by a leading member of the
El-Tseni family who bluntly asked, "Why do the English go [to India]
and eat up all the Mussulmans? Afterwards you will come here. "79 The
same fear plagued al-Kanemi and Muhammad Bello. 80 Whatever the rea-
sons, numerous European travelers remarked on the manner in which the
Arab merchants upon occasion tried to interfere with possible future
European trade relations. Clapperton on his first visit to Sokoto
felt that he had been hindered from proceeding to Yauri by the influ-
ence of Arab traders upon Bello. 81 Clapperton also attributed to Arab
merchants his difficulties during his second visit to Sokoto, a view
shared by his servant and companion, Richard Lander. 82 We have men-
tioned Richardson T s meeting with El-Tseni; Barth reported that he had
no success in promoting a British trading agreement in Kukawa until a
report came from Murzuk that the Turks might be planning to extend
their authority southward. 83 Monteil was convinced that the Macintosh
mission to Bornu, sent by the Royal Niger Company, had been turned
away through the influence of the Arabs upon Shehu Hashimi^^
Although this paper has explored the close relationship which
existed between North African merchants and Sudanese rulers, one
should not conclude that the Arabs were always secure in their posi-
tions. Neither participation in the trans-Saharan trade nor member-
ship in an important family guaranteed the success of a merchant. Bu
Khallum T s brother, Ali, caused considerable difficulty not only for
Denham and Clapperton, but also for Muhammad Bello; the latter would
not admit Ali to the Sokoto court. ^ 8 When Lyon was in Murzuk word
came from Yusuf Pasha that hostilities had erupted with Aujila. Al-
Mukni was ordered to imprison all merchants from that town and to con-
fiscate their property. When Rabeh Zubair invaded Bornu in 1893,
the Arab merchant community was unsure of what course to pursue to
protect their lives and property. They decided to cooperate in a plan
designed to save at least some of their goods. Half the merchants
fled with Shehu Hashimi from Kukawa with their property; the other
half remained to offer allegiance to Rabeh. Whatever goods were saved
were to be divided among all survivors. Rabeh, however, took all.
Later reports stated that his booty from those who remained in Kukawa
was
:
500 alkimbas, 4000 pieces of white cloth, 3800 lb. gunpowder,
160 rifles (no cartridges), 100 flint blunderbuses ; from run-
away Arabs, 1000 large tusks of ivory, 70,000 dollars, 250-
100 lb. bales ostrich feathers, 1000 camels, 1000 cattle,
30,000 sheep and goats. 87
79. Richardson, Travels
.
I, 232-233.
80. Hugh Clapperton, Journal of a Second Expedition into the Interior
of Africa (London, 1829), I, 99.
81. DCO, 685.
82. Richard Lander, Records of Captain Clapperton T s Last Expedition
to Africa (London, 1830), II, 23.
83. Barth, Travels , II, 235.
84. Monteil, De Saint-Louis , 314-315. See also, J. E. Flint, Sir
George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria (London, 1960)
,
171.
85. DCO
.
683-684.
86. Lyon, Narrative , 198.
87. Sir Richmond Palmer, Gazetteer of Bornu Province (Lagos, 1929),
109.
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In conclusion, it would seem that for the merchants the posi-
tive results of the trans -Saharan trade, both in its political and
commercial aspects, far outweighed the negative. The trade served
the interests of all parties connected with it. The evidence here
presented suggests that the North African trading community and the
ruling classes in both the Sudan and North Africa constituted a kind
of unified community of interes J in which the activities of all mem-
bers tended to serve the needs all members. Indeed, the impression
is forthcoming that the Sudanese ruling classes were more oriented,
culturally and socially, toward this international and cosmopolitan
community than toward their own subjects.
CHAPTER 8
THE FIREARMS TRADE IN THE CENTRAL SUDAN IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Joseph P. Smaldone
The impact of firearms on the history of Africa has increas-
ingly engaged the attention of historians during the last decade.
Oliver and Fage signalized this interest in the effects of European
military technology on African societies by labeling the sixteenth
through the nineteenth centuries in African history as "The Era of
Firearms and the Slave Trade. "1 Other historians have dealt with a
number of case studies in greater detail: Yves Saint-Martin has
studied the use of artillery in the Tukolor state, 2 Martin Legassick
has examined the impact of firearms on Samori T s military organiza-
tion, 3 Richard Pankhurst has dealt with the history of firearms in
Ethiopian history,^ and S. Tenkorang has drawn attention to the im-
portance of firearms in the rivalry between Ashanti and the coastal
sthtes in the eighteenth century.
5
Despite this growing interest in the use of firearms in Afri-
can history, very little attention has been given to the subject of
the trade in firearms : to my knowledge the only published work is
R. W. Beachey T s study, "The Arms Trade in East Africa in the Late
Nineteenth Century. Yet it seems crucial that before one can under-
take an investigation of the effects of firearms on the military or-
ganization of African societies he must first examine the question of
the firearms trade; otherwise he will be tempted to make statements
regarding the traditional forms of African military organization and
the use or non-use of firearms. In this paper we will be concerned
with the nature and volume of the firearms trade in the Central Sudan
1. R. Oliver and J. D. Fage, A Short History of Africa (Baltimore,
1962), chs . 10 and 11.
2. "L TArtillerie d T el Hadj Omar et d TAhmadou," Bulletin de l T Insti-
tut Franyaise de l TAfrique Noire , S£rie B, XXVII, 3-M- (1965),
506-572.
3. "Firearms, Horses and Samorian Army Organization 1870-1898,"
Journal of African History , VII, 1 (1966), 95-115.
M-. "Fire-Arms in Ethiopian History (1800-193 5) ,” Ethiopian Observer ,
VI, 2 (1962), 135-180; "The History of Fire-Arms in Ethiopia prior
to the Nineteenth Century," Ethiopian Observer , XI, 3 (1968), 202-
225; An Inquiry into the Penetration of Fire-Arms into Southern
Ethiopia in the 19th Century prior to the Reign of Menilek,"
Ethiopian Observer , XII, 2 (1969), 128-136.
5. "The Importance of Firearms in the Struggle between Ashanti and
the Coastal States, 1708-1807," Transactions of the Historical
Society of Ghana , IX (1968) , 1-16.
6. Journal of African History , III, 3 (1962), 451-M-67.
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in the nineteenth century. 7 The conclusions reached herein will cor-
rect some of the erroneous assertions that have been made about the
nature of army organization in the Central Sudan and the use of
firearms.
The use of firearms had been known in Hausaland and Bornu long
before the nineteenth century, but there is no evidence to suggest
that guns were present in large numbers or that their use had notice-
able effects on military organization or the conduct of war.^ Even
in the nineteenth century, when the impact of firearms in other areas
of Africa was dramatic, the states of the Central Sudan remained rela-
tively unaffected by this new military technology. The persistence of
traditional patterns of Central Sudanese military organization, based
on the extensive use of light horse cavalry, has led some scholars to
conclude that this mode of army organization was unsuitable for the
adoption of firearms. It has been suggested for instance that the
Muslim emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate did not employ many guns
simply because the nature of cavalry warfare had ’’little place for
firearms, ”9 Another theory to account for the relative scarcity of
firearms in Sokoto contends that the ascendancy of the Fulani ruling
class
,
which rested in part on its control of cavalry as an instru-
ment of physical force, would have been endangered if firearms had
been introduced in large numbers. 1° These explanations cannot be
supported by direct evidence; in fact the evidence points unquestion-
ably to the contrary. As we shall see, the only reason why firearms
were not used extensively in the Central Sudan in the nineteenth cen-
tury is that trading conditions did not permit the states of this area
to obtain access to a source of guns. Furthermore, when the arms
7. This paper is based upon research done at Northwestern University
in preparation for the writer’s doctoral thesis, ’’Historical and
Sociological Aspects of Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate” (1970).
In this paper the Central Sudan will be taken to include the
Sokoto Caliphate, Bornu, and Wadai.
8. The earliest reference to firearms in the Central Sudan occurs in
’’The Kano Chronicle,” in H. R. Palmer, trans., Sudanese Memoirs
(3 vols.; Lagos, 1928), III, 109, which mentions guns being
brought to Kano by a Bornu prince during the reign of Dauda Bakon
Damisa (71421-1438) . This dating is so early that it must be
viewed with suspicion. By the end of the sixteenth century, how-
ever, it is certain that Mai Idris Alooma of Bornu acquired mus-
keteers from Turkey and organized slave detachments to handle
these guns. Ahmed ibn Fartua, History of the First Twelve Years
of the Reign of Mai Idris Alooma of Bornu (1571-1583) , H. R.
Palmer, trans. (Lagos, 1926), 11-12. ’’The Kano Chronicle” re-
cords that in Mohamma Kumbari’s reign (71731-17 M3) guns were
brought to Kano from Nupe (p. 124) , and that Babba Zaki (71768-
1776) was the first ruler of Kano to organize a bodyguard of mus-
keteers (p. 126). Although Palmer’s datings are suspect, these
two references fit well with the other data that suggest the
spread of trade inland from the Guinea coast in the eighteenth
century.
9. J. 0. Hunwick, ’’The Nineteenth Century Jihads,” in J. F. Ade
Ajayi and I. Espie, eds., A Thousand Years of West African His-
tory (Ibadan, 1965), 277, n. 10.
10.
R. A. Kea, ’’Fortifications and Siegecraft in the Fulani Empire"
(unpublished seminar paper. Institute of African Studies, Legon,
Ghana, April 1966), 32-33.
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trade did increase substantially in the last decades of the century,
these states quickly adapted themselves to the use of firearms.
* * * * *
There were two sources from which the states of the Central
Sudan could have imported firearms during the nineteenth century. The
first was from the Muslim states of North Africa via the trans-
Saharan caravan routes, and the second was from the European merchants
trading on the Guinea coast to the south. There were, however, impor-
tant reasons why both these sources were not exploited during the
greater part of the century, and why it was only in the last decades
that significant numbers of firearms began to be imported. We will
now examine these two sources to determine how and when the supply of
firearms became available.
The Northern Routes
The rulers of the Central Sudanese states were well aware of
the value of firearms and most anxious to acquire them from both
sources. Sokoto recognized very early the value of the trans-Saharan
contacts with the Muslim states to the north: in 1808 a treaty was
concluded with Sarkin Air Muhammad Kamna to keep open the trade
routes between Agades and the new capital of the Caliphate. 1 The
Caliph Muhammad Bello (1817-1837) also was in correspondence with the
Karamanli dynasty in Tripoli, endeavoring to maintain good relations
during their mutual hostility toward Bornu in the 1820 t s.12
The evidence is also clear that one of the main concerns of
these Sudanese states was to establish firm relations with Britain in
the hope of receiving firearms, artillery, and munitions. The Denham-
Clapperton-Oudney expedition of the early 1820* s, the first European
mission to the Sudan, distributed munitions of various kinds at the
courts of Bornu and Sokoto, arousing keen interest in these marvelous
weapons and whetting the desire of their rulers to obtain more. Rock-
ets created a particular sensation in Bornu, and when Clapperton
reached Katagum, in the Sokoto Caliphate, the Emir had heard reports
of these fabulous weapons and requested his European guest to supply
him with similar war materials. The Caliph Bello also persistently
entreated Clapperton for muskets, powder, ammunition, and rockets,
and later addressed a personal letter to King George IV requesting two
11. Muhammad Bello, Infaq al-maisur , E. J. Arnett, trans., in The
Rise of the Sokoto Fulani (Kano, 1922), 120-121.
12. See A.D.H. Bivar, "Arabic Documents of Northern Nigeria,”
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies , XXII,
2 (1959), 344-348.
13. D. Denham, H. Clapperton, and W. Oudney, Travels and Discoveries
in Northern and Central Africa in 1822, 1823, and 1824 (4 vols.;
London, 1831), I, 258, 272-273; II, 132, 140; III, 54, 253.
14. Ibid
. , IV, 107, 111-112, 132.
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cannon, powder and shot. 15 Indeed, one of the most revealing aspects
of this European exploratory mission was the "great demand in the
interior for arms of all kinds. . ."16
The importance attached to the acquisition of firearms by the
Sudanese states also impressed later European visitors. In 1851 Emir
Muhammad Bello (1844-1869) of Katsina asked Barth to give him two
things: "a medicine to increase his conjugal vigor" and some rockets
as "a medicine of war" to frighten his enemies. 17 The Vizier of Bornu
told Barth, perhaps facetiously, that Shaikh Umar would abolish slav-
ery if H. M. Government would supply him with 1000 muskets and four
cannon. 18 And in 1889 the Emir of Nassarawa begged H. M. Commissioner
Major Claude MacDonald to intercede for him and induce the British
Royal Niger Company traders to sell him modern rifles and ammunition
to enable him to raid the pagan tribes on the southern bank of the
Benue river. 19 These instances support beyond reasonable doubt the
argument that the Sudanese rulers
,
far from demonstrating a fear of
military innovations, showed themselves anxious to seize every op-
portunity to obtain new and advanced weapons.
Despite this obvious interest of the Central Sudanese states in
importing firearms, the northern route did not become an important
source of guns until the last decade of the nineteenth century, and
even then only for Wadai. As we shall see, the factors that affected
the flow of arms to the Sudan were beyond the control of the states of
that region.
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the
Saharan entrepots of Fezzan and Ghat were involved in the transship-
ment, from the Mediterranean ports into the desert, of guns, gun bar-
rels, gun and pistol locks, small shot, powder, and flints. 20 It is
clear, however, that these munitions were not among the major com-
modities in the trans-Saharan trade, and that most of the guns and
ammunition were purchased by the Arab and Tuareg merchants who con-
trolled the trade as well as the desert trade routes. This restric-
tion of a trade that was in itself small meant that very little if
15. H. Clapperton. Journal of a Second Expedition into the Interior
of Africa (London, 1829), xii-xiii; the letter is translated in
E. W. Bovill, ed.
,
Missions to the Niger (London, 1966), IV, 725.
16. A. Adu Boahen, Britain, the Sahara, and the Western Sudan, 1788-
1861 (Oxford, 1964), 67.
17. H. Barth, Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa
. . .
1849-1855 (3 vols.; New York, 1857), I, 468.
18. Ibid
. , II, 327.
19. A. F. Mockler-Ferryman, Up the Niger (London, 1892), 72-73;
C. MacDonald, "Exploration of the Benue and Its Northern Tribu-
tary the Kebbi," Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society ,
XIII, 8 (1891), 456.
20. Proceedings of the Association for Promoting the Discovery of the
Interior Parts of Africa (2 vols.; London, 1810), I, 188, and II,
136; G. F. Lyon, A Narrative of Travels in Northern Africa in the
Years 1818, 19, and 20 (London, 1821), 114, 153-154, 159; F.
Hornemann, The Journal of Frederick Hornemann T s Travels, from
Cairo to Mourzouk ... in the Years 1797-8 , in Bovill, Missions,
I, 100.
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any war material reached Hausaland or Bornu.21 During the jihad of
Shaikh Uthman dan Fodio in northwestern Hausaland in the first decade
of the century there appears to have been only a handful of guns. 22
In the 1820 T s Al-Kanemi’s arsenal at Kuka contained only about 200
muskets and pistols, 23 and in 1826 Clapperton counted only 42 muskets
among some 50,000 of Bello’s troops besieging the Gobirawa at Konya,
while the latter had but a single gun. 24
In the 1830 T s political changes in North Africa rendered it
even more difficult for the Central Sudanese states to obtain fire-
arms from this source. In 1830 a French expeditionary force occupied
the Ottoman province of Algiers, and five years later the Ottoman
Turks, in an effort to reassert their power in North Africa, reoccu-
pied Tripoli. 25 Both the French and Ottoman authorities proceeded to
extend their control over the desert hinterland in the next decades
and to regulate the arms trade. In many of the towns and oases of
the Algerian desert there existed domestic industries for the manu-
facture of gunpowder with local materials and imported ingredients
like sulfur and saltpeter, and the repair of firearm mechanisms. 26
There was also a regular but not large trade in firearms and related
munitions in the desert hinterland of Algiers; this commerce was, as
in the Tripolitan interior, carried by Tuareg merchants. 27 But as the
French progressively extended their control over these areas
,
they
proscribed the trade in firearms and registered those guns that were
possessed by the native population. 28 Most of the traffic in firearms
was thereby regulated, except for a small trade in munitions that
emanated from Tunis and Morocco, over which the French had no con-
trol. 29
A similar set of circumstances prevailed in Tripoli and its
hinterland after 1835, when an Ottoman force reoccupied Tripoli,
abolished the Karamanli dynasty, and incorporated Tripoli as a prov-
ince (vilayet) of the Ottoman Empire. This reassertion of Ottoman
21. Proc. of the Assoc .. I, 154, 180-181 and II, 194; Lyon, Narrative.
110-111; Hornemann, Journal
.
114-115.
22. See the context in which guns are mentioned in Bello, Infaq al-
maistir
. 59; Abdullah ibn Muhammad, Tazyln al-waracrSt
.
M. Hiskett,
ed. and trans. (Ibadan, 1963), 108, 112; and Diva’ al-sultan
.
M.D.W. Jeffreys, trans., African Studies
.
IX, 2 (1950), 80.
23. Denham, Clapperton, and Oudney, Travels
.
II, 218, 233.
24. Clapperton, Second Expedition
.
185 ff. ; forty-one of these guns
were used by the Kano contingent, and the other was a French
fusil possessed by the Zaria detachment.
25. In 1714 Tripoli achieved the status of a nominal dependent upon
Constantinople as a result of a successful coup by Ahmed I
against Turkish authority. The new ruling dynasty, the Karaman-
lis, ruled Tripoli until the Sultan’s troops reoccupied the
province in 1835.
26. M.J.E. Daumas, Le Sahara Alggrien (Paris, 1845), 61, 94, 148-
149, 150-153, 221.
27. Ibid
. . 68, 85-86, 96, 108, 136, 148-149, 200, 231, 266-268.
28. V. Largeau, Le Pays de Rirha, Ouargla. Voyage h Rhadames (Paris,
1879), 105, 110-112; E. C. Cat, A Travers le Ddsert (Paris,
1892) ,93.
29. Daumas, Le Sahara Alggrien
. 85-86, 108, 137, 148-149, 200, 266-
268, 296; H. Duveyrier, Sahara Alggrien et Tunisien
.
C. Maunoir
H. Schirmer, eds. (Paris, 1905), 140.
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power in North Africa was an attempt to compensate for the loss of
Algiers to France, to forestall any further annexations of Ottoman
territory by European powers, and to serve as an object lesson to re-
fractory dependents like the Egyptian ruler Muhammad Ali. Like the
French in Algiers
,
the Ottoman overlords sought to extend their
dominion over the lands in the interior. In 1841 the desert entrepot
of Fezzan was conquered and annexed to Tripoli; Ghadames and Ghat
followed in the next few years. 30 The Turks also imposed an embargo
upon the export of firearms outside the vilayet ,31 thus preventing the
savanna states of the Central Sudan from acquiring these weapons from
Tripoli.
The effectiveness of this prohibition against the trade in
firearms from the Tripolitan province may be demonstrated by compar-
ing the trade of Tripoli and the nature of Arab and Tuareg armaments
in the periods before and after the Ottoman occupation. We noted
above that during the half century before the Ottoman intervention
there was a small but regular trade in guns and ammunition to the
south. But after 1835 accounts of the trans -Saharan trade from Tri-
poli are conspicuously lacking in any reference to munitions, except
for a small contraband trade in gunpowder. 33 As we might expect, the
Arab and Tuareg merchants and desert tribes reflect this change in the
nature of their weapons. In 1818-1820 Captain G. F. Lyon described
the Tuaregs as "sure marksmen" with the long-guns they generally car-
ried, 3 4- and the large Arab escort that accompanied the Denham-
Clapperton-Oudney mission to Bornu a few years later was armed with
muskets. 35 But by mid-century the embargo had serious effects among
the desert peoples. In 1850 Richardson reported that the local popu-
lation south of Tripoli had been disarmed by the Turks, that munitions
were contraband items, ^6 and that consequently the arms traffic to the
Sudan was negligible. 37 Whereas Lyon had observed that the long-gun
was a common weapon among Tuareg tribesmen before the embargo, Barth
found that only a few Tuareg possessed muskets in 1850; 38 even the
forty armed Kel Owi who escorted Barth and Richardson across the
desert were forced to rely on their European clients for powder and
shot to defend the party against marauding Hoggar Tuaregs. 39
30. E. Rouard de Card, La France et la Turquie dans le Sahara Orien-
tal (Paris, 1910), 11-12, 14-18.
31. C. W. Newbury, "North African and Western Sudan Trade in the
Nineteenth Century: A Re-Evaluation," Journal of African History,
VII, 2 (1966), 237.
32. See C. H. Dickson, "Account of Ghadamis," Journal of the Royal
Geographical Society , XXX (1860), 255-260; and "Extract from
Vice-Consul C. H. Dickson T s Report of His Journey from Tripoli
to Ghadames," Journal of the Royal Geographical Society , XXII
(1852), 131-136; Daumas, Le Sahara Alggrien , 168, 172.
33. Daumas, Le Sahara Alggrien
,
200.
34. Lyon, Narrative , 111.
35. Denham, Clapperton, and Oudney, Travels , I, 38.
36. J. Richardson, Narrative of a Mission to Central Africa , Bayle
St. John, ed. (2 vols.; London, 1853), I, 19.
37. F.O. 881/59, p. 24.
38. Barth, Travels, I, 289-290, 337-338.
39. Richardson, Narrative, I, 212, 226-227.
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Thus the French annexation of Algiers and the Ottoman reoccupa-
tion of Tripoli closed the northern source of firearms to the states
of the Central Sudan. Throughout North Africa in fact the pattern was
the same: the Mediterranean powers, Muslim and European alike, re-
garded the interior of Africa as a slave reservoir and an area for
potential conquest, and not wanting to increase its capacity for mili-
tary resistance, restricted the trade in munitions to the Sudan. 40
Local geopolitical conditions also affected the ability of each
of the Sudanese states to obtain firearms. The Sokoto Caliphate for
instance was surrounded by hostile states along its northern and east-
ern frontiers, the most important of which were Zinder, Maradi, Gobir,
and Bornu. These states took advantage of their strategic location
with respect to the North African trade routes to control the supply
of munitions and prevent the shipment of war materials to Sokoto.
During most of the nineteenth century Zinder was tributary to
Bornu and pursued a policy of intermittent hostility toward the Fulani
emirates to the south. Emir Tanimu of Zinder (1841-1843 ; 1851-1884)
is reported to have built up a large army equipped with 6000 muskets
and forty muzzle-loading cannon. The firearms were purchased from
Tripoli, as was sulfur for powder and some of the brass for the can-
non. Saltpeter and carbon were obtained locally, and gunpowder, mus-
kets, cannon mounted on carriages, and projectiles were manufactured
at Zinder.
40. S. Comte d T Escayrac de Lauture, Le Desert et le Soudan (Paris,
1853), 434, 551. France, now in possession of Algiers, used this
base in North Africa to advance southward into the Sudan. In
1820, even before the Turkish intervention, the Pasha of Tripoli
had expressed his desire to conquer Bornu and the Sudan. F.O.
76/14, Warrington to Bathurst, 7 August 1820, cited by Kola Fola-
yan, ’’Some Economic Aspects of the History of Tripoli in the
Reign of Yusuf Pasha Karamanli, 1795-1832” (unpublished seminar
paper. School of Oriental and African Studies, University of Lon-
don, Feb. 1969) . We have already observed that the Ottomans pur-
sued an imperial policy with regard to the Saharan oases and com-
mercial centers. The Egyptian Khedives also monopolized the
trade in firearms as a means of controlling the slave trade in
the southern Sudan, and of preventing states such as Darfur from
obtaining weapons with which to resist an Egyptian expedition.
See H. J. Fisher and V. Rowland, ’’Guns and Gunpowder in the
Central Sudan" (unpublished paper. School of Oriental and African
Studies, University of London, Feb. 1969), 6. I am grateful to
Mr. Fisher and Miss Rowland for permission to cite this paper.
41. Documents Scientifiques de la Mission Tilho (1906-1909) (3 vols.;
Paris, 1910-1914), II, 444-445; M. Abadie, La Colonie du Niger
(Paris, 1927), 125-126. I am unable to explain satisfactorily
how Tanimu was able to acquire these firearms. The guns must
have been obtained during the later years of his second reign,
because although Richardson heard reports of cannon at Zinder
(Narrative, II, 258), he observed that the army was equipped with
swords, spears, and bows (p. 194) and that none of the Emir T s
troops had guns (p. 239). It is significant that Tanimu did not
get his firearms from the regular caravan trade; he purchased
about 1000 camels from Tuareg herders and organized his own cara-
vans for Tripoli and Egypt (Mission Tilho , II, 446). It is also
probable that Tanimu encouraged Arab and Tuareg merchants to
158 JOSEPH P. SMALDONE
The independent Hausa state of Maradi was established after the
ruling dynasty of Katsina fled northward after being ousted by the
Fulani during the jihad . In the reign of Dan Baskore (1854-187 5) ,*+2
which coincided with that of Tanimu at Zinder, Maradi purchased flint-
locks and ammunition from Zinder. Gobir, another independent Hausa
state that successfully resisted the j ihad and subsequent efforts by
Sokoto to eliminate it, remained throughout the nineteenth century a
close ally of Maradi, and they frequently joined forces in military
campaigns against the emirates of Sokoto. The situation of Zinder,
Maradi and Gobir astride the main caravan routes from the north en-
abled them to monopolize the trade in firearms.
To the east of the Sokoto Caliphate was the state of Bornu,
which was the southern terminus of the principal caravan route from
Tripoli, and where the court strictly controlled the firearms supply.^
Bornu received several hundred guns from its client-state Zinder, and
two cannon to serve as models for Bornu blacksmiths to copy. 1^ But
Bornu T s supply of firearms was also restricted by the unwillingness of
the Turkish authorities in Tripoli to sell guns to the Sudanese
states, and by the general commercial depression that beset the
trans-Saharan trade in the 1850 T s.^ By the 1870 T s Shaikh Umar T s army
smuggle guns from the north (I am indebted to R. Ann Dunbar for
her comments and suggestions regarding Tanimu T s supply of mus-
kets. Miss Dunbar is currently writing her Fh.D. thesis on
Zinder in the nineteenth century). Tanimu T s successors were un-
able to maintain the trade relations necessary for a continuous
supply of guns. When the French occupied Zinder in 1899 Emir
Ahmadu T s force included only 800 gunmen: see J. Joalland, Le
Drame de Dankori (Paris, 1930), 107; and Cmdt. Chailley, ”La
Mission du Haut-Soudan et le drame de Zinder,” Bulletin de l T In-
stitut Franyaise de l T Afrique Noire
.
XVII, 1-2 (1955), 37.
42. These dates are given by M. G. Smith, "A Hausa Kingdom: Maradi
under Dan Baskore, 1854-75,” in D. Forde and P. M. Kaberry, eds..
West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1967)
,
93-122; no indication is given of how they were determined.
Mission Tilho
.
II, 463, gives 1858-1879.
43. Smith, ’’Maradi,” 114.
44. See Denham, Clapperton, and Oudney, Travels, IV, 111-112. Louis
Brenner of Boston University, whose recently completed thesis on
Bornu in the nineteenth century is to be published by Clarendon
Press, has confirmed this point in a personal communication, 12
February 1968.
45. Mission Tilho
.
II, 445, 447.
46. See B. G. Martin, ’’Five Letters from the Tripoli Archives,”
Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria
.
II, 3 (1962), 354-
359. One of these letters from the Pasha of Tripoli to his son,
the Governor of Fezzan, refers to a Bornu request for firearms
that could not be honored without referring the matter to the
Porte in Constantinople.
47. In 1869 Nachtigal reported that ’’the direct trade between Bornu
and the coast of the Mediterranean had for many years been
greatly reduced.” ’’Journey to Lake Chad and Neighbouring Re-
gions," Journal of the Royal Geographical Society , XLVI (1876),
398. See also Boahen, Britain
.
107-108, and A. Adu Boahen, ’’The
Caravan Trade in the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of African
History
.
Ill, 2 (1962), 351-352.
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included about one or two thousand gunmen, but it appears that a large
portion of these muskets were obtained from Zinder and the production
of the local blacksmith industry.^
In the state of Wadai the situation at this time with respect
to commerce and firearms was similar. Unlike the states of Hausaland
and Bornu, whose trans -Saharan commercial contacts were of great an-
tiquity, Wadai seems to have opened regular trade with North Africa in
the early nineteenth century. Yet even in the 1850 T s trade between
Benghazi and Wadai was insignificant, 50 and the arsenal of the Sultan
was estimated by Barth to contain only about 300 guns. 51
Thus at mid-century trading conditions in the Central Sudan
were not conducive to the importation of firearms. The North African
states had rather effectively enforced a prohibition against the sale
of munitions to the south, and the trans-Saharan trade had fallen off
considerably. The states of Zinder, Maradi, Gobir, Bornu, and Wadai
were able to obtain small quantities of firearms from private traders
or contraband shipments, but the Sokoto Caliphate was isolated by
these hostile states and barred from access to the already restricted
firearms supply from the north.
But at the same time changes were occurring which would dras-
tically alter these conditions. The introduction of the Muslim Sanusi
Order in Cyrenaica in 1843 and its subsequent spread throughout the
Libyan desert and hinterland had important consequences for the com-
mercial and political situation of the eastern Central Sudan. Members
of the Order engaged in trade and transport, and intesive missionary
efforts were extended into Fezzan, Tibesti, Borku, Ennedi, Baghirmi,
Wadai, Darfur, and among the desert Tuareg. The Sanusi lodges fzawi-
yas) formed a network of commercial posts, and Kufra, the "Capital" of
48. In 1866 G. Rohlfs estimated that Shaikh Umar had 1000 infantry
and 1000 cavalry armed with flintlocks, and twenty cannon, some
of which were cast in Bornu. R. E. Ellison, "Three Forgotten Ex-
plorers of the Latter Half of the 19th Century with Special Ref-
erence to Their Journeys to Bornu," Journal of the Historical
Society of Nigeria , I, 4 (1959), 323. Several years later Nach-
tigal, who visited Umads arsenal, estimated that it contained
about 1000 guns of all kinds. Sahara et Soudan , J. Gourdault,
trans. (Paris, 1881), 351. 0. Temple claims that there were six-
teen units of gunmen in the Bornu army. C. L. Temple, ed.
,
Notes
on the Tribes. Provinces. Emirates and States of the Northern
Provinces of Nigeria (Lagos, 1922), 437. Bornu seems not to have
been able to increase its supply of firearms after this time; at
the end of the century the army was still reported to have about
1500-2000 guns of all kinds. See C.O. 879/58/580, end. 1 in No.
44, Wallace to Chamberlain, 5 March 1901, p. 104; C.O. 879/72/
684, No. 22, Lugard to Chamberlain, 17 May 1902, p. 55. We noted
above in note 45 that Zinder supplied Bornu with several hundred
muskets. It also seems that local blacksmiths were able to fab-
ricate firearms; an eyewitness reported that when Rabeh entered
Kuka he found very few European guns, but 1100 native guns. F.O.
101/86, end. to Africa No. 2, Jago to Salisbury, 10 April 1896.
49. See Barth, Travels , II, 645.
50. J. Hamilton, Wanderings in North Africa (London, 1856), 176-177,
197.
51. Barth, Travels , II, 658.
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the Order, became a great desert emporium for monitoring trade
throughout the eastern Central Sudan. 52 in Wadai the Sultan acknowl-
edged the spiritual authority of the Grand Sanusi and instituted a
regular direct caravan traffic between Wadai and Cyrenaica, in which
the ivory and slaves of the Sudan were exchanged for arms and ammuni-
tion from the north. 53
Thus one of the results of these changes was that by the 1890 T s
munitions became for the first time important items in the trans-
Saharan trade. Most of this arms trade was contraband and confined to
the Cyrenaica-Wadai route. Some of this contraband trade originated
at Alexandria and certain towns in the Egyptian interior, but most of
the munitions were carried from Greece and the Mediterranean islands
of Malta, Crete, and Cyprus. The trans -Mediterranean trade was car-
ried mostly by Greek sponge fishers who took advantage of the lack of
coastal surveillance to disembark their stores of smuggled munitions
at various points on the long coastline: Benghazi and Tobruq were the
most important ports for the arms trade, but Misurata, Derna, Tokra,
and Tripoli itself also served as points of entry. Ottoman barques
and steamers were involved also in this illicit trade: the smuggled
munitions were transshipped at sea onto smaller vessles which then put
in along the unprotected coast. The Turkish police and customs agents
were notoriously inefficient and corrupt, and overlooked the arms
shipments that came through regular import channels. Even the Turkish
soldiers who were supposed to enforce the prohibition against the
trade in munitions participated in the arms smuggling. It was there-
fore relatively easy for well known professional smugglers to conduct
the contraband trade with impunity by means of bribes.
^
Once the smuggled munitions arrived on the Tripolitan coast,
they were transported to the hinterland and sold. It seems that
Sanusi adherents dominated this trade; the guns were stored in their
52. For more detailed treatments of the Sanusiyya and the Cyrenaica-
Wadai trade route, see E. E. Evans -Pritchard, The Sanusi of
Cyrenaica (London, 1949), 21-22; Boahen, Britain . 110-111; Boa-
hen, "Caravan Trade," 3 52 -3 59- ; E. A. Tarverdova, "Role of Senus-
sites in Monitoring Caravan Trade of People of Chad Basin with
the Countries of North Africa in the Second Half of Nineteenth
Century" (paper presented at the Second International Congress of
Africanists, Dakar, 1967).
53. Hamilton, Wanderings
. 197; A. S. White, From Sphinx to Oracle
(London, 1899), 119-121; H. M£hier de Mathuisieulx, A Travers la
Tripolitaine (Paris, 1903), 188; R. Forbes, The Secret of the
Sahara: Kufara (London, 1921), 14-15, 63, 228, 324-327.
54. Some of the information in this paragraph on the contraband arms
traffic is derived from the detailed reports contained in the
F.O. 101 Tripoli files for the 1890 T s, and it would be tedious to
document them individually. These Tripoli files, especially
those of the 1890 T s, contain a wealth of information on the
Central Sudan, most of it coming by way of the caravan traders
who had recently been to Kano, Kuka, Dikwa, or Wadai. Some of
the more accessible data on the arms trade can be found in White.
Sphinx
.
123-124; M£hier de Mathuisieulx, Tripolitaine . 6, 13-14,
89; Forbes, Sahara , 327; H.K.W. Kumm, From Hausaland to Egypt
(London, 1910), 112-115; H. Vischer, Across the Sahara from Tri-
poli to Bornu (London, 1910), 168, 187.
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zawiyas and carried to the interior by Sanusi caravans. These were
weapons of every conceivable make and description: old flintlock
muskets, double-barrelled fowling pieces, assorted handguns and pis-
tols, as well as modern precision rifles of various kinds — Reming-
tons, Winchesters, Martini-Henries
,
Lebels, Mausers, Gras, Sniders —
and other varieties of carbine and repeating weapons
. Most of the
firearms trade was directed toward Wadai, where the Sultan T s arsenal
increased rapidly from about 4000 flintlocks in the 1870 T s to 10,000
guns thirty years later, one-quarter of which were modern repeaters. 55
Some of the munitions carried in this trade inevitably were
sent farther afield. The desert Tuaregs were able to arm themselves
with precision weapons in some quantity. At Murzuk in 1906 Vischer
noted the large traffic in firearms with the coast and observed that
the Azgar Tuaregs were armed with modern repeating weapons. 56 In the
late 1890 T s the Hoggar Tuareg, anned with newly acquired rifles,
launched many successful raids against the Ulemiden and Azaouac, and
extended their domain as far south as Adar.57 In the Algerian hinter-
land also the Tuareg groups equipped themselves for the first time
with modern rifles. 5»8 Guns and ammunition found their way even as far
as the Niger bend and Tuat in the western Sahara. 59
Although there was a general expansion of the arms trade in the
Central Sudan in the 1890 T s, the Sanusites and Wadai controlled most
of this traffic to the disadvantage of Bornu and the Sokoto Caliphate.
We noted above that by the 1870 T s Shaikh Umar of Bornu had increased
his arsenal to more than a thousand muskets. After the conquest of
Bornu in 1893 by Rabeh the latter continued the policy of the Shaikhs
by controlling the flow of firearms into Bornu and preventing muni-
tions from being exported outside his domain. Nevertheless, Rabeh had
difficulty in obtaining firearms and ammunition. His ravages in the
region of Bornu shut down the Tripoli trade for several years, 60 and
55. Nachtigal, Sahara und Sudan (3 vols.; Berlin, 1879-1881), III,
240; H. Carbou, La Region du Tchad et du Ouadai (Paris, 1912),
263. Both of these sources are cited by. Fisher and Rowland,
,TGuns and Gunpowder,” 7, n. 1.
56. Vischer, Across the Sahara , 168, 187.
57. Capt. Fonferrier, "Etudes historiques sur le mouvement caravanier
dans le Cercle d T Agadez,” Bulletin du Comitd d T Etudes Historiques
et Scientifiques de l T Afrique Occidentale Fran^aise , VI , 2
(1923), 307; Y. Urvoy, "Histoire des Oulliminden de l T est," Bul-
letin du Comity d T Etudes Historiques et Scientifiques de l TAfri-
que Occidentale Franyaise
.
XVI, 1 (1933), 81; Y. Urvoy, Histoire
des Populations du Soudan Central (Colonie du Niger) (Paris
,
1936), 210.
58. Cat, A Travers le Desert
.
231.
59. L. Binger, "Les Routes commerciales du Soudan Occidentale,” La
Gazette Ggographique , XXI, Part 1, 11 (1886), 204; C. Sabatier,
Touat. Sahara et Soudan (Paris, 1891), 191.
60. After 1885 the Tripoli-Bornu caravan traffic suffered a severe
depression, probably as a result of the siphoning off of much of
the trade to the Cyrenaica-Wadai route to the east. The destruc-
tion of Bornu by Rabeh in 1893 dealt the death blow to this his-
toric caravan traffic. Trade remained completely paralyzed until
1896-1897, when the first caravans since the fall of Bornu were
reported to be on the move; but this commerce was never revived.
The documentation of the trading conditions on the Bornu-Tripoli
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despite Rabeh T s early collaboration with the Sanusi, both the latter
and Wadai severed severed his contacts with Benghazi by refusing to trade
with him. 61 There is no evidence that Rabeh T s supply of guns in-
creased measurably after his conquest of Bornu, and of the two or
three thousand firearms possessed by his army only a few hundred were
modern repeaters. 62 The scarcity of firearms in Bornu is also sug-
gested by the prices current at his capital of Dikwa in 1895:
Martini-Henry rifles were selling for 100 Maria Theresa dollars, and
double-barreled fowlers for fifty dollars, while slaves cost only
three to seven dollars. 63
In the emirates of Sokoto the situation with respect to the
northern trade routes was even more unfavorable. Kano, which enjoyed
the most direct and substantial commercial contact with Tripoli, was
unable to import large numbers of firearms due to the control of the
arms trade by its northern hostile neighbors, especially Zinder, and
to Rabeh T s similar policy in Bornu. 64 Moreover, in the late 1890 T s
the caravan trade with Tripoli was seriously disturbed by desert
marauders. 6 5 jn 1897 it was estimated that only about eight to fif-
teen Winchesters reached Kano from the north. 66 At about the same
time in Zaria there was a great demand for modern rifles and ammuni-
tion, but almost none could be found. 67
In summary, the firearms trade from the north during the nine-
teenth century was not very important for the Central Sudan. In the
first quarter of the century the trade was small, and monopolized by
route is plentiful, and cannot be indicated here in detail.
Abundant information can be found in the F.O. 101 files after
1885, and in the commercial reports of the British consuls at
Tripoli and Benghazi which were published annually in the
Parliamentary Papers .
61. F.O. 101/88, Africa No. 4, Alvarez to Salisbury, 12 July 1898;
C.O. 446/2, Northern Nigeria No. 12314, end. to letter of 1 June
1898, Alvarez to Salisbury, 12 April 1898.
62. F.O. 101/86, end. to Africa No. 2, Jago to Salisbury, 10 April
1896; and end. to Africa No. 4, Jago to Salisbury, 2 May 1896.
After the death of Rabeh in 1900, his army was depleted by
desertions, but his son and successor, Faderalla, continued to
command about 2000 gunmen (C.O. 879/58/580, No. 44, Wallace to
Chamberlain, 12 April 1901, and end. 1 in same, 5 March 1901;
end. 1 in No. 82, Wallace to Chamberlain, 28 July 1901). Some
estimates of Rabeh T s force of gunmen, such as that by Sir Alan
Burns which puts the number at 5000, must be regarded as exag-
gerations. History of Nigeria
.
6th ed. (London, 1963), 57.
63. F.O. 101/86, Commercial No. 6, Alvarez to Salisbury, 19 Sept.
1896.
64. C. H. Robinson, "News from Kano," Niger and Yoruba Notes , II,
14 (1895), 15.
65. F.O. 101/88, Africa No. 2, Jago to Salisbury, 1 Dec. 1898; Africa
No. 3, Jago to Salisbury, 16 Dec. 1898; F.O. 101/91, Africa No.
1, Jago to Lansdowne, 20 April 1901; F.O. 101/92, Africa No. 5,
Jago to Lansdowne, 6 Oct. 1902; C.O. 446/5, end. in Northern
Nigeria No. 481, 4 Jan. 1899.
66. F.O. 101/88, Consd-General Jago T s Supplementary Report for the
Year 1897 on the Vilayet of Tripoli
,
Confidential, printed for
use of the Foreign Office, June 1898, p. 20.
67. C. H. Robinson, Hausaland (London, 1896), 87.
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Arab and Tuareg merchants. After the third decade of the century Al-
giers and Tripoli ceased to export munitions, except for a very small
contraband trade. Furthermore, the general unwillingness of the North
African powers to supply their southern neighbors with military stores
ensured that the flow of munitions to the Central Sudan was minimal.
In the last decade of the century there was a remarkable expansion of
trade between Cyrenaica and Wadai, but neither Rabeh in Bornu nor
Sokoto were able to tap this Sanusi-controlled commerce. As we will
see in the next section, Rabeh and the Sokoto Caliphate depended on
the southern source for munitions.
The Southern Routes
In the preceding section it was shown that the states of the
Central Sudan, especially the Sokoto Caliphate, were isolated from the
I
supply of firearms from the north during most of the nineteenth cen-
tury. The situation along the southern frontiers of the savanna zone
was similar, that is, the Sudanese states were denied direct access to
the European arms trade on the Guinea coast by the presence of the
forest kingdoms which controlled seaborne commerce. As we shall see,
however, the Sokoto Caliphate did eventually gain access to this
southern source of guns, but it was due more to European enterprise
which broke the coastal monoply than to the willingness of the forest
states to trade with the states to the north.
From the region of the Gold Coast to the Cameroons the coastal
kingdoms of West Africa controlled the valuable trade in European
firearms, to the access to which many of them owed their ascendancy.
The effectiveness of the restriction by the coastal states of the ex-
portation of firearms to the northern hinterland was noted by Euro-
peans before the nineteenth century. Simon Lucas, on the basis of
testimony from North African traders, reported that:
Fire arms are unknown to such of the nations on the Niger as
the Shereef has visited; and the reason which he assigns for
it is, that the Kings in the neighbourhood of the coast, per-
suaded that if these powerful instruments of war should reach
the possession of the populous inland states, their own inde-
pendence would be lost, have strictly prohibited, and by the
wisdom of their measures have effectively prevented this dan-
gerous merchandize from passing beyond the limit of their
dominions. 68
In the powerful state of Ashanti the monarch monopolized the
firearms trade, and forbade the exportation of munitions to the
north. 69 Likewise in the kingdom of Dahomey the firearms trade was
controlled by a royal monopoly. 70 Farther to the east the states of
68. Proc. of the Association , I, 179; also quoted in R. Hallett, ed.
,
Records of the African Association 1788-1831 (Edinburgh, 1964)
,
99.
69. S. Tenkorang, "The Importance of Firearms"; J. Dupuis, Journal of
a Residence in Ashantee (London, 1824), pp. L, LI, cxxxii; T. E.
Bowdich, Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee (London,
1819), 335; I. Wilks, "Ashanti Government," in Forde and Kaberry,
eds.. West African Kingdoms , 218.
70. Dupuis, Journal
, p. LI; J. Lombard, "The Kingdom of Dahomey," in
Forde and Kaberry, West African Kingdoms , 89-90.
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Niger delta and Oil Rivers monopolized the supply of firearms from
European traders. 71 And in the southern Cameroon grasslands also
local kings and chiefs controlled the trade and distribution of fire-
arms purchased from European merchants on the Cross and Nun rivers. 7
2
Under these conditions, in which the traffic in firearms along the
Guinea coast was strictly regulated by the coastal kingdoms, it was
virtually impossible for the states to the north to obtain a direct
access to the southern supply of munitions.
By the 1820 T s, however, the Yoruba states began to acquire
firearms, the Ijebu coastal Yoruba who traded with Europeans being
the first to so arm themselves. 7 3 Richard Lander observed at this
time that "quantities of muskets are procured from the coast, but
they are of comparatively little use to the [Yoruba] people, who know
not how to handle them with effect.
"
7L
* Thus during the third decade
of the nineteenth century the "gun-frontier" began to move inland from
the coast. As Lander T s remarks indicate, the number of firearms in
the immediate interior increased but did not as yet affect materially
the character of warfare. Guns were still scarce in the northern
emirates, 75 and virtually nonexistent in Nupe following the inter-
vention of the Fulani, whose troops were armed oi^Ly with spears,
swords, and bows and arrows. 75
But by the middle of the century most of Yorubaland had been
brought within the gun-frontier and muskets were the standard weapons
of Yoruba warriors. 7 In the early 1850 T s it was reported that "most
of the [Yoruba] people have inferior smooth-bored guns, which are sold
to the Guinea negroes by European traders, and sent off to be sold
again in the interior,"/ 5 yet even by the end of the decade the use
of guns had not become general north of Abeokuta. 7 ^ The firearms
trade in the Yoruba states was an overland commerce, originating on
the coast and being carried largely by traders of Lagos and Ijebu,
and after the Ijebu monopoly was broken by the Egba, through Abeo-
kuta.SO But with the Yoruba states engaged in intesive trade compe-
tition and internecine warfare after the breakup of the Oyo empire,
it was impossible for the Muslim emirates to the north to acquire
munitions via this overland route.
71. K. 0. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885
(London, 1956), 107; G. I. Jones, The Trading States of the Oil
Rivers (London, 1963), 72, 88.
72. E. M. Chilver, "Nineteenth Century Trade-in the Bamenda Grass
-
fields. Southern Cameroons," Afrika und Ubersee , XVI, 41 (1962),
242-243.
73. S. Johnson, The History of the Yorubas (London, 1921), 208;
J.F.A. Ajayi and R. Smith, Yoruba Warfare in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury (London, 1964), 17.
74. R. Lander, Records of Captain Clapperton T s Last Expedition to
Africa (2 vols.; London, 1830), II, 222.
75. See above, n. 24.
76. M. Laird and R.A.K. Oldfield, Narrative of an Expedition into
the Interior of Africa (2 vols.; London, 1837), II, 86-87.
77. Ajayi and Smith, Yoruba Warfare , 18.
78. T. J. Bowen, Adventures and Missionary Labours in Several Coun-
tries in the Interior of Africa from 1849 to 1856 (Charleston,
S.C., 1857), 319.
79. R. Campbell, A Pilgrimage to my Motherland (New York, 1861), 66;
see Ajayi and Smith, Yoruba Warfare , 20.
80. Ajayi and Smith, Yoruba Warfare
.
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After 1830, however, when the Lander brothers opened the Niger
river to European trade, it was possible for European merchants to
bypass the coastal states’ commercial monopoly and sell directly on
the inland markets. These radically new trading conditions enabled
Nupe to emerge after the 1840 ’s as the principal source of munitions
for the emirates farther to the north. The Niger mission of 1841
found that gunpowder was being sold in the main Nupe market at Egga,
and so great was the local pagans’ fear of the Nupe army that they
told the European visitors that "every Fulatah is armed with a gun. "82
Ten years later Richardson, while in Zinder, was told of South Ameri-
can traders who were exchanging powder and shot for slaves in Nupe. 83
At about this time Nupe began to export muskets and powder to the
north: guns and powder were shipped to Kano, 84 and English and Ameri-
can gunpowder to Bornu.85 Guns from the coast were reported to be
reaching Air in the Sahara. 86 in the 1850’s and 1860’s muskets cost-
ing 10-16 s. in England were selling in Nupe at 10-12 thousand
cowries, or about one-sixth the price of slaves. 87
Although the quantity of munitions reaching the emirates of the
Sokoto Caliphate was still small, it is evident that a regular trade
was developing. By the 1850’s the gun-frontier had almost absorbed
the Yoruba states and had begun to advance through Nupe. The impor-
tance of Nupe is that it was the first emirate to fall within this
widening zone of gun-warfare. As such it became the main port through
which munitions were exported to the northern emirates. During the
next decades Nupe itself fell within the gun-frontier and the other
emirates began to be engulfed by the steadily northward-moving gun-
belt.
81. W. Allen and T.R.H. Thomson, A Narrative of the Expedition . . .
(2 vols. ; London, 1848), II, 99; Parliamentary Papers , XLVIII
(1843), 127.
82. J. F. Schon and S. A. Crowther, Journals ... of the Expedition
up the Niger in 1841 (London, 1842), 207; the Nupe army was also
reported "having a great number of horses, guns, cutlasses, bows,
and arrows" (pp. 138-139). Allen and Thomson, Narrative, II,
116, record the same story of Nupe firearms: "Fire-arms are used
by the Filatahs: each has his musket." These are certainly ex-
aggerated reports, but the point is clear that the possession of
guns was giving Nupe a decided advantage over its enemies.
83. Richardson, Narrative , II, 278, 349. Richardson also noted that
many slaves from Zinder were sent to Kano (p. 274) or to Nupe
(pp. 203, 228-229), whence American merchandise was beginning to
drive out the goods of the north. Barth also complained that
South American goods were flooding the Sudan. Travels, I, 516-517.
84. Richardson, Narrative, II, 260. Barth, Travels, I, 520, observed
that a few firearms were being imported to Kano from Nupe and
that pistols and blunderbusses were sold only privately to
wealthy men.
85. Richardson, Narrative, II, 264.
86. Ibid., I, 316.
87. F.O. 97/334, Baikie to Russell, No. 4 of 1862, 13 Feb. 1862;
Dike, Trade and Politics
.
Tables A and B, 105, 106; S. A. Crow-
ther and J. C. Taylor, The Gospel on the Banks of the Niger
(London, 1859), 393; W. B. Baikie, Narrative of an Exploring
Voyage (London, 1856), 294, 317.
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W. B. Baikie T s establishment of Lokoja in Nupe territory in
1859 further enhanced the position of Nupe as middleman in the arms
trade. Emir Masaba (189-1-1850; 1859-1873) welcomed the British con-
nection and the advantages to be derived from the permanent European
trading post in his territory. As one British trader reported of
Masaba:
His great virtue was his attachment to white traders. He
gave them every accommodation, encouragement, and protec-
tion, to facilitate the establishment of trading factories on
his part of the "Kwara" -- the native name here for the
Niger .^8
In 1870 Masaba signed a decree officially encouraging the settlement
of Lokoja, hoping it would become the most most prosperous market
confluence of the Niger and Benue. 89 By the late 187
0
T
s there were
four British commercial firms trading regularly up the Niger, and
eight or ten steamers did business at Nupe every year. 90 Masaba also
sold slaves down the Niger at Idda in exchange for gunpowder, at the
rate of one good male slave for a small keg. 91
The British post at Lokoja also served as a diplomatic channel
for the Emirs of Sokoto to establish contact with Britain in the hope
of obtaining firearms. Masaba wrote many letters to the British con-
suls at Lokoja and Lagos and to Queen Victoria, asking repeatedly for
muskets, rifles, powder, and ammunition. 92 Ilorin also opened direct
contact with Britain through the consular authorities at Lagos. 93 Emir
Abdullah (1855-1882) of Kano wrote to the English Queen through
Baikie, requesting a skilled technician to manufacture firearms and
ammunition for his army, and offering to pay the expenses of his
transportation. 99- Baikie communicated with Gwandu and the Caliph at
Sokoto, expressing his desire to open extensive commercial contacts
and to sell guns and powder. 95 Baikie also opened Abuja and Zaria to
British trade. 96
88. J. Whitford, Trading Life in Western and Central Africa (Liver-
pool, 1877), 218.
89. F.O. Confidential No. 1871, pp. 15-16. For the history of
Lokoja, see H. J. Pedraza, Borrioboola-Gha (London, 1960).
90. A. Burdo, The Niger and the Benueh
,
G. Sturge, trans. (London,
1880)
,
2*+4— 29-5; Pedraza, Borrioboola-Gha , 72.
91. Whitford, Trading Life , 218-219.
92. See for instance F.O. 97/9-35, Masaba T s letter to Victoria, 20
April 1865, and Victoria T s letter to Masaba, 20 July 1865; F.O.
97/436, enclosures 3, 4, 5 in Glover to Clarendon, 19 April 1866.
93. See F.O. 97/436, enclosures 1 and 2 in Glover to Clarendon, 19
April 1866.
94. F.O. 97/334, end. to No. 26 of 1862, Baikie to Russell, 25 July
1862.
95. F.O. 2/32, end. 2 to No. 55 of 1859, Baikie to Malmesbury, 6
August 1859.
96. Mallam Hassan and Mallam Shuaibu, A Chronicle of Abuja , F. Heath,
trans. (Ibadan, 1952), 28. Baikie T s own account of his mission
was published as "Notes of a Journey from Bida in Nupe, to Kano
in Haussa, performed in 1862," Journal of the Royal Geographical
Society
,
XXXVII (1867), 92-108.
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The military power of Nupe was expanded considerably under the
direction of Masaba. Munitions constituted a large portion of imports
and by 1871 the army of Nupe was reported to have rockets, 2000 fire-
arms, and eight cannon, two of them six-pounders . The cannon were
mounted and Masaba* s gunmen had been trained to fire them by members
of the Niger mission. ”7 Masaba and his successors enforced a strict
monopoly of the arms trade and forbade the reexport of munitions.
Masaba, recorded John Whitford, "forbids his subjects, on pain of
death, to purchase powder or guns, keeping deadly weapons and war
material only for his regular army at Beda [sic]."98 Nupe supplied
its allies with munitions to subdue mutual enemies. In 1878 the
traveler Burdo observed canoes "full of arms and ammunition" being sent
by Nupe to aid its pagan tributary ally Imaha in an offensive against
the pagan village of Amara." Nupe also provided Sokoto, Gwan-
du,l0l Missau,l”2 and Abuja^3 with muskets.
In the last two decades of the nineteenth century further
changes in the commercial situation on the Niger brought concomitant
changes in the nature of the trade in war materials. French com-
mercial competition with Britain on the Niger and Benue became acute
after 1880, and by 1884- the Compagnie Fra^aise de l T Afrique Equa-
toriale (CFAE) seriously challenged the British trading position.
This commercial rivalry was finally resolved at the Berlin West Afri-
can Conference of 1884—1885, at which Britain was awarded the exclu-
sive right to administer the provisions of the Conference on the lower
Niger. In 1886, Sir George Goldie, who bought out the French interests
on the eve of the Conference and thereby engineered the British coup,
succeeded in obtaining a royal charter for his Royal Niger Company
and with it a de facto monopoly of European commerce on the Niger and
97. F.O. Confidential No. 1871, p. 8; F.O. Confidential No. 2023,
W. H. Simpson 1 s Report of the Niger Expedition, 1871
. pp. 17,
19 (also quoted in T. Hodgkin, Nigerian Perspectives [London,
I960], 294—295, and cited by J. E. Flint, Sir George Goldie and
the Making of Nigeria [London, I960], 25); S. A. Crowther, Report
of the Overland Journey from Lokoja to Bida, on the River Niger,
and thence to Lagos, on the Sea Coast, from Nov. 10th, 1871, to
Feb. 8th, 1872 (London, 1872), 13.
98. Whitford, Trading; Life
. 250; see also F.O. Confidential No.
2023, p. 7; Flint, Goldie . 25; J. E. Flint, "The Chequered
History of Nupe," West African Review , XXX, 382 (1959), 588; A.
Mattei, Bas -Niger, Bgnoug' et Dahomey (Grenoble, 1890), 14-1; J.
Thomson, "Niger and Central Sudan Sketches," Scottish Geographi-
cal Magazine , II, 10 (1886), 586; J. Milum, "Notes of a Journey
from Lagos up the River Niger to Bida . . .," Proceedings of the
Royal Geographical Society , III, 1 (1881), 31.
99. Burdo, Niger
,
222 ff.
100. F.O. Confidential No. 2023, p. 17.
101. E. J. Arnett, Gazetteer of Sokoto Province (London, 1920)
,
41;
E. J. Arnett, "History of Sokoto," in Sokoto Fulani , 41; M.
Last, The Sokoto Caliphate (London, 1967), 73.
102. J. M. Fremantle, "A History of the Region Comprising the Katagum
Division of Kano Province," Part IV, Journal of the African So-
ciety , XI, 42 (1912), 188.
103. Hassan and Shuaibu, Abuja , 15-16. A. regular trade soon devel-
oped between Abuja and Nupe and Ilorin, Abuja selling slaves and
purchasing muskets and powder (p. 79). E. Viard also reported
that Nupe traders were the intermediaries in the arms trade from
Europe to the northern interior. Au Bas -Niger , 3rd ed. (Paris,
1886), 89, 92.
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Benue. 10^ Trading stations now extended from the Niger delta to the
upper reaches of the Benue, thus providing such emirates as Nassarawa,
Zaria, Bauchi, Muri, and Adamawa with direct access to the arms trade.
Nupe took full advantage of the European competition in the
early 1880 T s to exact concessions from the rival parties. Emir Umar
(1873-1882)105 continued the policy of military expansion inaugurated
by his predecessor Masaba.106 In 1882, with the assistance of British
and French steamers, he crushed the Kyedye revolt with an army that
numbered in its ranks at least 550 gunmen. 107 Umar also employed
rockets and an unknown European military adviser in an attack on Ig-
birra country. 108 Emir Maliki (1882-1895) was equally concerned with
military affairs. In 1882 he demanded and received 200 barrels of
powder and 200 guns from Commandant Antoine Mattei as the price of a
trading concession for the CFAE,109 and in 1886 alone he received at
least 9-00 guns and 9-00 barrels of powder as trade goods.HO
The arms trade on the Benue, hitherto of little importance,
reached considerable proportions after the 1880 T s. From the Royal
Niger Company trading stations on the river the Emirs of the eastern
Caliphate purchased muskets and powder. A regular caravan traffic
developed from the Benue river posts, through Bauchi and Missau, to
Rabeh T s capital at Dikwa, and from this source Rabeh obtained guns and
powder.HI Tibati and Banyo, both vassals of Adamawa, at this time
entered direct trade relations with Europeans and began to import
109-
.
On the Niger Company and French competition see Flint, Goldie;
C. W. Newbury, "The Development of French Policy on the Lower
and Upper Niger, 1880-98," Journal of Modern History , XXXI, 1
(1959), 16-26; A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, "Expansion on the Benue 1830-
1900," Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria , I, 3 (1958),
215-237.
105. The standard work on Nupe, S. F. Nadel T s A Black Byzantium
(London, 199-2), gives the dates of Umar T s reign as 1873-1884,
and that of his successor Maliki as 1889—1895. Yet it is clear
from contemporary sources that Umar died in 1882. Mattie,
agent-general of the CFAE, was told in the autumn of 1882 of
the death of Umar and the accession of Maliki. Bas -Niger , 55.
106. Nadel, Black Byzantium . 86. Nadel claims that Umar f s flintlocks
were imported from the north (pp. 82, 86). This is incorrect.
As we have seen, Nupe imported its weapons from the south.
107. Ibid . , 110. See Flint, Goldie , 38-39, for the background and
details of this rebellion. For a study of the Kyedye see
Nadel, "The Kede: A Riverain State in Northern Nigeria," in
M. Fortes and E. E. Evans -Pritchard, eds., African Political
Systems (London, 199-0)
,
169—195.
108. C. R. Niven, "The Kabba Province of the Northern Provinces,
Nigeria," Geographical Journal
.
LXVIII, 4 (1926), 300.
109. Mattei, Bas -Niger
.
55.
110. D.J.M. Muffett, "Sokoto: Fulani-Hausa Resistance to British
Occupation," in M. Crowder, ed.
,
West African Resistance: The
Military Response to Colonial Occupation (New York, 1971). I am
indebted to Professor Muffett for allowing me to see a type-
script of this paper.
111. F.O. 101/86, end. in Africa No. 2, Jago to Salisbury, 10 April
1896; and Africa No. 9-, Jago to Salisbury, 2 May 1896.
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larger quantities of guns;112 Rabeh also sought to trade with Yola to
purchase more munitions from the Niger Company post there.H3 Emir
Haji (1868-1896) of Katagum, defying the instructions of Caliph Abd
al-Rahman (1891-1902) to deny Rabeh access to trade, moved his main
market to Gamawa on the Bornu-Kano road, and opened an extensive trade
with Dikwa. Gamawa specialized in trade with the conquerer of Bornu,
and under the stimulus of the new commercial prosperity doubled in
size; gunpowder was among the most important items exchanged for
horses, slaves, and weapons from Bornu.
H
1
*’
After about 1880 also the political situation in Yorubaland
provided the occasion for Ilorin to acquire firearms from several new
sources. Ilorin had joined the Ekiti Confederation against Ibadan
about 1880, and by exchanging troops with its Yoruba allies had gained
a temporary access to the musket supply from Benin. After 1888,
however, Ilorin opened direct trade with Abeokuta and the coast, and
began to import American-made Snider breechloading rifles and to use
them against the Ibadans.!^ jn 1889 the Ilorin army of 2000 troops
besieging the Ibadans at Ofa had many muskets but only twenty-eight
Sniders without ammunition. The besieged Ibadans, on the other hand,
were believed to have 300 Sniders with ammunition, but were untrained
in their use.H7 By the early 1890 T s weekly caravans were moving be-
tween Ilorin, through Abeokuta, to the coast and the British Colo-
nial Office authorities in Lagos, hostile to the Royal Niger Company,
turned a blind eye to the arms trade with Ilorin.-1-1^ Nupe also en-
tered this contraband trade in rifles
,
and supplied Ilorin with guns
from its own stockpile. 120 The Alafin of Oyo, fearing the power of
Ibadan 1 s general Ajayi and therefore anxious to keep the Ibadan army
112. Chilver, "Nineteenth Century Trade," 233-234-, 238, 242-243; see
C. Maistre, A Travers l T Afrique Centrale du Congo au Niger.
1892-1893 (Paris, 1895), 231; M.D.W. Jeffreys, "Some Historical
Notes on the Ntem," Journal of the Historical Society of
Nigeria , II, 1 (1961), 275-276.
113. F.O. 101/86, end. in Africa No. 2, Jago to Salisbury, 10 April
1896; P. L. Monteil, De Saint-Louis h Tripoli par le Lac Tchad
(Paris, 1895), 346; see also L. Mizon, "Les Royaumes Foulb4 du
Soudan Central," Annales de Ggographie , IV (Oct. 1894-July
1895), 358-360; and P. F. Lacroix, "Mat^riaux pour servir &
l Thistoire des Peuls de l T Adamawa," Etudes Camrounaises , V,
37-38 (1952), 36.
114. Fremantle, "A History," Part III, Journal of the African Soci-
ety , XI, 41 (1911), 64-65; V. N. Low, "The Border States: A
Political History of Three Northeast Nigerian Emirates, ca.
1800-1902" (unpublished Fh.D. thesis. University of California,
Los Angeles, 1967), 286-289.
115. Johnson, Yorubas
. 448; C.O. 879/33/399, p. 101.
116. C.O. 879/33/399, p. 40; Johnson, Yorubas , 577; H. B. Hermon-
Hodge, Gazetteer of Ilorin Province (London, 1929), 72; S. J.
Hogben and A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, The Emirates of Northern Ni-
geria (London, 1966), 297; Flint, "History of Nupe," 589.
117. C.O. 879/33/399, pp. 12, 20, 21; Mockler-Ferryman, Up the Niger ,
204, n.2; see Johnson, Yorubas , 505.
118. C.O. 879/33/399, p. 6; Johnson, Yorubas , 649. In 1894 Lugard
also noted this arms trade with Lagos. See M. Perham and M.
Bull, eds., The Diaries of Lord Lugard (4 vols.; London, 1963),
IV, 142, 149, 189, 196.
119. Flint, "History of Nupe," 589.
120. Ibid.
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occupied in the field, was reported to be secretly providing arms to
both Ibadan and Ilorin to prolong the wars. 121
In this section we have been concerned mainly with the intro-
duction and spread from the south of flintlock muskets, that is,
smooth-bored, single-shot, muzzle -loading, iron-barrelled, ball-
shooting weapons. This sort of gun, the standard firearm in Europe
from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, was superseded by
various forms of more advanced weapons by mid-century, and large
quantities were Ttdumped tT on the African market. It was this type of
obsolete weapon that pushed the gun-frontier through Yorubaland and
the emirates to the north. By about 1880 breechloading repeating
rifles with rifled steel barrels that fired metallic cartridges were
appearing on African markets
,
and a second wave of military technology
— the ,Trifle-frontier ,T -- began to sweep over the same territory tra-
versed by the gun-frontier only half a century earlier. Modern rifles
of the Snider type first became important in Yorubaland during the
Ekiti wars (1878)
,
reaching Ibadan in 1881, but costing £10-£15
each. 122 As we have seen, this new rifle-frontier reached Ilorin
by the late 1880 T s. But here the rifle -frontier stopped.
In 1890 at the Brussels Conference a decision was taken by the
participating European powers to regulate the arms trade to Africa.
The fifteen signatories of the Brussels Act, in an effort to eliminate
the remnants of the slave trade, pledged to forbid the sale of modern
precision rifles in tropical Africa; flintlocks, unrifled guns, and
common gunpowder were exempted from this restriction. In the terri-
tories of the Niger Goldie T s Company rigidly enforced these provi-
sions. So stringently were these rules applied that C. H. Robinson,
after his excursion through Hausaland in 1894-1895, was able to boast
that "in the course of a journey of over a thousand miles through the
Hausa States, I do not remember seeing . . . more than half-a-dozen
rifles. "123 a small number of muskets and common gunpowder continued
to be exported to the northern emirates until the beginning of the
twentieth century, 124 but the trade in modern firearms from the south
had ceased.
The containment of the rifle-frontier before it reached most
of the Sudanese states meant that a thorough revolution in military
techniques and organization was stillborn. The armies of these states
could acquire only limited numbers of outmoded muskets, which were, in
the words of F. D. Lugard, "the very worst and most rotten class of
flint locks, more dangerous to the owner than to the enemy, and less
dangerous than bows and poisoned arrows. "125 R. w. Beachey, in his
study of the arms trade in East Africa, has also pointed out that so
"perilous were they to the user that a plausible defence of gun-
121. C.O. 879/33/399, pp. 1-2; there is a general discussion of the
arms trade in the Lagos hinterland in P. F. Teba, ’Britain T s
Role in Regulating the Arms Traffic in West Africa, 1873-1919"
(unpublished M. Litt. thesis, Cambridge University, May 1967),
ch. III.
122. Johnson, Yorubas
, 492; Ajayi and Smith, Yoruba Warfare , 18, 21.
123. Robinson, Hausaland
, 11.
124. C.O. 465/2 (1901); C.O. 465/3 (1902); Annual Reports. Northern
Nigeria : No. 377 (1901), pp. 52, 54; No. 409 (1902), p. 166.
125. Perham and Bull, Diaries, IV, 109.
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running was that the natives were being led to exchange their effec-
tive spears and assegais for a decidedly less dangerous if more noisy
weapon. ”126 it was the scarcity and poor quality of muskets, and the
restriction of the trade in modern firearms that prevented the states
of the Central Sudan from adopting the technology of gun-warfare.
The gun-frontier, advancing from the south, did not begin to spread
across large areas of the Sokoto Caliphate until the 1870 T s, and the
rifle-frontier was delimited before it reached the regions of the
western Central Sudan. This withholding of modern rifles from Africa
contributed to the preservation of traditional forms of military
organization in the Central Sudan and facilitated the conquest of the
area by British and French armies equipped with repeating rifles,
artillery, and machine guns.
Summary and Conclusion
External conditions determined the sources
,
nature
,
and volume
of the firearms trade to the Central Sudan throughout the nineteenth
century. The states of the Central Sudan were unable to import large
quantities of firearms until the last decades of the century. The
munitions trade from North Africa — a contraband trade — became im-
portant only after about 1890, was controlled by the Sanusi, and
flowed mainly between the Sanusi centers in Cyrenaica and Wadai. The
firearms traffic from the Guinea coast began to penetrate the Sokoto
Caliphate after about 1870, with Nupe acting as the principal port of
entry and distribution. In the 1880 T s the Benue regions gained direct
access to the gun trade as a result of Anglo-French commercial ri-
valry; Nupe and Ilorin also benefited during the last two decades of
the century from the new overland route opened to the coast.
Whereas the northern trade in firearms after 1890 consisted
largely of modern precision weapons, the southern source yielded only
muskets, the trade in repeating rifles having been stopped after the
Brussels Conference. The Sokoto Caliphate depended almost entirely
on firearms imported through Nupe. Wadai obtained most of its fire-
arms from Cyrenaica, and Bornu its guns from Tripoli, Zinder, and
local manufacture. Rabeh seems to have acquired the bulk of his fire-
arms before conquering Bornu; afterward, although he was able to im-
port some munitions from the Niger Company posts on the Benue, the
northern source of firearms in Cyrenaica was cut off by the refusal of
Wadai and the Sanusites to trade with him.
126. Beachey, ’’The Arms Trade,” 9-51.

CHAPTER 9
SLAVERY IN THE HAUSA-FULANI EMIRATES
1
Allan Meyers
Introduction
This essay contributes substantively and methodologically to
the solution of an ethnological and historical problem — the compara-
tive study of slavery — by discussing the slave system of a group of
nineteenth-century West African kingdoms^ and by evaluating the types
of sources used in this reconstruction. The goal of ethnologists and
many historians is comparative: an analysis of human behavior without
reference to any one cultural or temporal context. To this end, it is
necessary to establish analytical categories which apply universally.
Too often the constraints of culture-specific thought categories have
prevented a complete understanding of behavior in other historical or
geographical settings. A case in point is the study of slavery: fre-
quently, historians 1 notions of slavery have been shaped by the ex-
perience of Western Europeans as slave-keepers in the New World.
Comparative studies have shown the inadequacy of this model for
the analysis of slavery in different historical and ethnographic
settings. ^ This conclusion pertains equally to Africa, where even the
earliest European observers recognized the differences between African
systems of slavery and the plantation slavery of the Americas. Con-
temporary Africanists have re-emphasized these differences, 1* and have
also indicated the differences between different slave systems in
Africa.^ Generalizations, then, to all cultural practices described
1. Early forms of this paper were presented to the Cornell University
Seminar on Ethnohistory
,
May 1969, and the annual meeting of the
American Society for Ethnohistory, September 1969. Many thanks
are due the participants in the Cornell Seminar, and especially
its instructor, John Murra, who carefully read and criticized
earlier drafts. Daniel McCall made helpful comments and sugges-
tions. The author alone bears responsibility for all shortcomings.
2. For historical and ethnographic summaries of the Fulani jihads
and the Hausa-Fulani emirates, see S. Hogben and A. Kirk-Greene,
The Emirates of Northern Nigeria (London, 1966)
,
and H. Johnston,
The Fulani Empire of Sokoto (Oxford, 1967).
3. For example, M. Finley, "Between Slavery and Freedom,” Comparative
Studies in Society and History , VI (1964-); H. Nieboer, Slavery as
an Industrial System (Gravenhage
,
1910)
.
4. B. Davidson, Black Mother (London, 1961); M. G. Smith, "Slavery
and Emancipation in Two Societies," Social and Economic Studies ,
III (1954), 239.
5. R. Cohen et al
. , "Slavery in Africa," Trans -Action , IV (1967), 44.
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as slavery are premature. They must await the study of practices
described as slavery in a variety of contexts and the distillation
from these studies of more or less universal criteria.
Such comparative studies depend equally upon the contributions
of history and descriptive ethnography. For non-literate peoples,
however, who lack extensive written records, historical reconstruc-
tions present special methodological problems, which are best ap-
proached by a strategy characterized as TTethnohistory . ”6 The present
analysis seeks not so much to compare Hausa-Fulani slavery with other
forms, as to illustrate the feasibility of historical reconstructions
of poorly documented cultures and to describe one variety of slavery.
To these ends ethnographic research, oral histories, and personal ac-
counts are valuable data. Like all sources, they are subject to
various biases ; but when combined with written sources , they solve
important problems.
Sources
Since this study involved no original fieldwork, the primary
sources are written accounts by nineteenth-century Europeans. These
are supplemented by translations of local (i . e
. ,
African) documents
,
post-conquest ethnographies, and biographical testimonies. To estab-
lish the respective merits and shortcomings of these different types
of sources
,
I shall briefly evaluate each and shall then show how
their combination elucidated the most important aspects of Hausa-
Fulani slavery: the extent of slavery, the recruitment and disposi-
tion of slave personnel, and the sanctions enforcing the slave system.
The analysis relies most heavily upon the accounts of
nineteenth-century Europeans who, for a variety of reasons, visited
the regions controlled by Fulani emirs. For purposes of this study,
their principal biases are of two types: (1) a failure to separate
facts from their own opinions ; and (2) a tendency to make facile
assumptions about Hausa-Fulani social structure. In the first case
nineteenth-century explorers generally tended to philosophize as well
as record facts : that is
,
they tried to use their data to illustrate
some particular pedagogical or moralistic theory. They did not, in
so doing, always distinguish objective observations from their own
opinions. Without knowing the biases of individual authors, it is
difficult to determine the extent of such factors as selective report-
ing and outright distortions. All, however, had certain preconceived
notions which, no doubt, affected the accuracy of their reportage.
It must also be remembered that European racial and cultural biases
would be especially strong in discussions of Africa and Africans.
^
6. J. Vansina, Oral Tradition (Chicago, 1965).
7. To illustrate the importance of this bias, I cite the following
apology from the introduction to a posthumous publication of the
journals of H. Clapperton: "Clapperton was evidently a man of no
education; he nowhere disturbs the progress of a day T s narrative
by any reflexions of his own, but contents himself with noticing
objects as they appear before him, and conversations as they were
held. ,T H. Clapperton, Journal of a Second Expedition into the
Interior of Africa . .
.
(reprint of 1829 ed. : London, 1966),
xviii. Although this makes Clapperton an ideal historical source.
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Distortions are especially likely in considerations of slavery;
for European travelers seem to have shared in the abolitionist spirit
of their respective times. Perhaps in regard of this spirit, many in-
cluded among the stated aims of their travels the suppression of the
slave trade and of African slavery. Their published accounts contain
lengthy discussions of the slave trade (which all held as most odious)
and various schemes for its abolition. t Heinrich Barth, a nineteenth-
century explorer, even records a conversation with the vizier of the
emirate of Bornu about the feasibility of abolishing slavery in that
region. 8 With this predisposition, the lengthy treatments of the more
gruesome aspects of the slave trade seem hardly objective. Even so
careful an observer as Barth frequently reports the havoc wrought by
African slave raiders but rarely gives even the barest details. This
is not to suggest that Europeans never witnessed atrocities associated
with slave raiding but only that they shared a strong abolitionist
bias which probably affected the accuracy of their reports about
slavery. It is thus significant to note their generally favorable
opinion of the conditions of African domestic slavery.
^
My final criticism of these accounts concerns their ethno-
graphic sensitivity: how did these Europeans know who was a slave
or what constituted slavery? Though slaves are reported in a variety
of contexts
,
there are remarkably few descriptions of what slavery en-
tailed and how one distinguished slaves from free men. Though Barth,
for example, distinguished between the slaves and the free servants of
a minor official,10 he never stated the visible indicators of slave
status. Except for those instances when social status was unmistake-
able (e.g.
,
residence in a slave village), it is never clear whether
the reports reflect social reality or the writer T s impression. On the
basis of more recent fieldwork,H such criteria of slave status
clearly exist and existed in the past: for example, special terms of
reference, facial scarification, and occupation. That the historical
data do not mention them raises this methodological problem.
The second, and much less extensive form of documentation comes
from those native documents (written originally in Hausa, Fulani, or
Arabic) which have been translated. With these a major problem is
their authenticity. Although certain literary canons exist, 12 the
possibility of forgeries is very clear. Even when they appear authen-
tic, these documents are more often records of royal succession and
conquest or religious polemic than they are social histories. Nonethe-
less, they provide such important evidence as the existence of large
it causes one to question the objectivity of other, and presum-
ably more erudite, travelers. Consider, for example, the dis-
cussion of Dr. Robinson (traveling some sixty-five years after
Clapperton) of the failure of self-government in Liberia. C.
Robinson, Hausaland (London, 1896).
8. H. Barth, Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa ,
III (London, 1857), 132 ff.
9. For example, A. Burns, History of Nigeria (London, 1963), 203.
10. Barth, Travels
.
II, 363.
11. For example, M. G. Smith, Government in Zazzau (London, 1964) ;
M. F. Smith, Baba of Karo (London, 1954).
12. A. Bivar, ”A Manifesto of the Fulani Jihad,” Journal of African
History , II (1961)
,
235; M. Hiskett, ’’Kittab al-Farq: A Work . . .
Attributed to ’Uthman dan Fodio,” Bulletin of the School of Ori-
ental and African Studies
.
XXIII (1960), 559.
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slave raids
,
the regions victimized by raiders
,
and the disposition
of slaves in the community. The Chronicle of Abuja , for example, de-
scribes in detail the use of slaves as household servants, farm work-
ers, chiefs, and royal title-holders .13 As more of these documents
are located and translated, particularly those from smaller towns and
villages, they may reflect more the way of life at the local level,
perhaps in relation to the slavery system.
As might be expected, then, the more conventional documentary
evidence for the history of the Hausa-Fulani emirates is, at best,
scanty. Fortunately, these are supplemented by some biographical ma-
terial, published oral accounts, and post-conquest ethnography. The
former two sources depend largely upon the work of the missionary-
linguist S. Koelle, who interviewed freed slaves in Sierra Leone,
while the latter results from efforts begun at the turn of the century
which continue until today.
Much has been written of the merits and disadvantages of these
non-conventional historical sources
,
and since the problem has been
thoroughly reviewed elsewhere ,1^ I shall criticize them only briefly.
To be of value, these data must be collected and analyzed with great
care and with careful attention to any biases of the ethnographer or
informant. The possible sources of these biases will vary consider-
ably, depending upon such factors as the informant himself, his social
status
,
and the relationship of the local group to the tribal or na-
tional government. Thus, for example, older people may have poorer
memories than young ones or contemporary politics may affect the re-
collection of past events, particularly in regard to such sensitive
topics as slavery. Despite these many possible biases, oral accounts
and ethnographic reports are especially valuable for the reconstruc-
tion of social history and have amplified areas which written accounts
treat ambiguously or not at all. Rather than evaluate the sources
used in the present study at this point, I shall criticize each in-
dividually, as it applies to the development of the discussion of
Hausa-Fulani slavery.
Magnitude of Slavery
About the actual magnitude of slavery, European travelers told
very little. Judging from all accounts, slavery was certainly exten-
sive — estimates of the size of the slave population range from at
least fifty percent of the population of Kano emiratelS to greater
than ninety-five percent of its capital city. 16 Except for extraor-
dinarily large slaveholders, however, these sources rarely make refer-
ence to individual cases.
Michael and Mary Smith, on the other hand, are able to make
far more accurate estimates for the southern part of the emirate of
13. A. Hassan and S. Na Tlbi, A Chronicle of Abuja , F. Heath, trans.
(Lagos, 1962).
14. D. McCall, Africa in Time Perspective (Boston, 1964) ; Vansina,
Oral Tradition .
Barth, Travels , II, 144.
Clapperton, Second Expedition , 171.
15.
16.
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Zazzau. On the basis of their fieldwork they could, for example, dis-
tinguish the descendants of slaves and free menl7 and thus construct
rough retrospective censuses. Mary Smith found that her informant
could give the composition — in terms of slaves and free people — of
both her father T s and grandfather T s households .18 From this fieldwork
they determined not only upper limits for individual slaveholders^
but also the approximate ratio of slaves to free men in nineteenth-
century Zazzau (about 1 : 1). 20 Potentially, this type of fieldwork may
also resolve such difficult problems as changes in local slave systems
over time and the pervasiveness of slave keeping. Though the use of
any historical records to determine numbers is necessarily impre-
cise, 21 the Smiths T intensive fieldwork gives a much more satisfying
reconstruction than the written documents.
Whatever the exact number, the apparent magnitude of slavery
raises a number of problems having to do with the recruitment and dis-
position of slave personnel and the sanctions which both maintained
the slaves 1 discipline and protected their masters. A combination of
the two types of data permits a partial solution to these problems, a
solution which either, alone, does not provide.
Recruitment
An important consideration in such a large system is the
sources of slaves. Of the several sources apparently tapped, slave-
raiding seems to have been the most important. All European visitors
remarked upon the devastating effects of such raids, which they occa-
sionally witnessed, 22 and local documents also describe them. 23 On
the basis of this evidence it is possible to distinguish three types
of slave raids.
The nineteenth century was a time of great political and social
instability with almost constant warfare in the Hausa-Fulani terri-
tories, 24- and in these wars slaves were often the booty. Europeans
17. M. G. Smith, The Economy of Hausa Communities of Zaria , Colonial
Research Studies 16 (London, 1955), 3.
18. Smith, Baba of Karo .
19. Smith, Zazzau
, 157 ff.
20. Smith, "Slavery," 240.
21. This imprecision is most pronounced in the treatment of extraor-
dinary behavior. M. G. Smith, Zazzau , 157, for example, reports
a slave village reputed to have a population of perhaps 3000.
This seems unreasonably high, especially since there is no indi-
cation that it comes from any source other than the informants
head. Though it is certainly possible that there was such a vil-
lage, an estimate like this should not be accepted uncritically
unless one has some idea how it was made. This is not a specific
criticism of Smith T s work or of oral sources, but a general com-
ment about population estimates. Though I doubt such a large
population, even as an upper limit, it does not affect the de-
scription of slavery in general. In such cases, archaeological
investigation would prove valuable, since a village of this size
would probably leave noticeable remains
.
22. For example, Barth, Travels
.
Ill, 194 ff.
23. M. Hiskett, ed.
,
Tazyin al-Waracjat . . . (Ibadan, 1963), 125.
24. See Hogben and Kirk-Greene
,
Emirates ; Johnston, Sokoto .
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claimed that the desire for slaves motivated these wars — including
holy wars^S — even between previously friendly neighbors. 26
Two considerations, however, would seem to limit the frequency
of wartime slave raids. The first is a religiously motivated reluc-
tance to enslave free people, or at least free Muslims. Of those
available to us
,
many documents of the Fulani .jihad express mild op-
position to the enslavement of free people -- a thing distinct from
hereditary slavery. 27 One interpretation of the origins of the jihad
suggests that the Fulani reacted to the excesses of the Hausa kings,
among which was the enslavement of free Muslims. 28 Thus, religious
considerations may have curtailed the slave-taking of at least the
more zealous soldiers.
In addition, strategic considerations almost certainly limited
the number of wartime slave captures. The armies needed great mobil-
ity, and the presence of many captives -- including able-bodied men —
would have presented logistical and security problems. Consequently,
captured populations or at least their adult males were often killed
rather than enslaved. Both African29 and European sources^ describe
this practice.
Raids organized with the express object of slave capture^l seem
much more likely sources of large numbers of. slaves. All documents
indicate that these raids were widespread, both geographically and
temporally — slave raids are reported in Adamawa emirate as late as
the 19 20 T s. ^ 2 Such raids often involved the coordinated efforts of
several political units: one source, for example, speaks of TTpolyglot
raiding confederacies."^ Organized raids took place both periodi-
cally — to satisfy domestic needs or to pay tribute — and sporadi-
cally, as when an outstanding debt required prompt settlement. 34
Not all slave raiding was so coordinated. Often individuals or
small bands kidnapped travelers or war refugees, later selling their
victims as slaves. 35 No doubt the social disruption attendant upon
the almost constant warfare of the nineteenth century as well as the
ready market for slaves encouraged this practice.
The seizure of slaves was, however, beyond the capacity of many
villages. Either their own military weakness or the absence of a tar-
get population doubtless prevented many from slave raiding. Since
25. A. Kirk-Greene, Adamawa Past and Present (London, 1958)
,
130.
26. A. Mockler-Ferryman, British Nigeria (London, 1902), 240.
27. Hiskett, T,Kittab al-Farq, M 577; Bivar, "Manifesto.”
28. P. Morton-Williams
,
"Fulani Penetrations into Nupe and Yoruba,"
in I. M. Lewis, ed.
,
History and Social Anthropology , A.S.A.
Monograph no. 7 (London, 1968), 8.
29. Hiskett, Tazyin al-Waraqat , 126.
30. Barth, Travels, III, 203.
31. It is not clear to me whether these occurred more often in time
of war or peace. If they were wartime raids, however, the raid-
ing parties were most likely very specific in their purpose.
32. Kirk-Greene, Adamawa, 84.
33. E. Chilver and P. Kaberry, "Sources of the Nineteenth-Century
Slave Trade: Two Comments," Journal of African History . VI
(1965)
,
119.
34. Barth, Travels , IV, 56.
35. For example, Mockler-Ferryman, Nigeria, 242.
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local villages often had to contribute slaves to a regional tribute,
they nonetheless required a reliable source of slaves.
The custom of judicial or statutory enslavement provided one
such source. This refers to the custom of punishing criminals or
social deviants and sometimes members of their families by enslaving
them. Clapperton, for example, reported that the residents of one
village enslaved violators of post-partum sex restrictions . 36 Ethno-
graphic data confirm the frequency of this type of punishment for a
variety of infractions .37 Some of these statutory slaves were, of
course, retained by their villages for local use. Many, however, be-
came part of the regional or international trade in slaves.
This particular problem of "sentencing" people to slavery seems
especially susceptible to fieldwork solution. Apart from informants’
testimonies, this practice may be diagnosed by characteristic social
behavior. In one instance a person’s mother’s brother -- and only his
mother’s brother — could sell him out of the community for "crime or
reckless living. "38 This custom would probably be reflected in marked
deference to one’s mother’s brother, a deference which might persist
even after the abolition of the slave trade. This does not suggest
that extreme deference to mother’s brother (or anyone else) neces-
sarily implies the right of enslavement but only that such a form of
social control in regions characterized by participation in the slave
trade offers a possible source of slave personnel.
In conclusion then, the slaves of the Hausa-Fulani emirates
came from a number of sources as evidenced by documentary and ethno-
graphic material. Of the sources described, organized slave raids
seem to have contributed the greatest number of slaves, followed by
war captures, smaller raids, and punitive enslavement.
A unique collection of oral accounts gives some confirmation
to this conclusion. As mentioned above, S. Koelle, a missionary and
linguist, recorded over 200 short biographies of African slaves who
had been liberated by the British and brought to Freetown, Sierra
Leone, in the mid-nineteenth century. 39 In addition he trained cer-
tain slaves who later recounted their own stories. Among these latter
was one Ali Eisami, a native of Bornu who had been enslaved by Fulani
raiders during the holy war in this kingdom. His life story includes
a description of how he became a slave, his disposition by his various
masters, and the direction of the movement of slaves from Bornu to the
coast. As more of these life histories are published, they will
provide increasingly valuable data.
For the present study an analysis of the mode of enslavement of
Koelle ’s informants indicates that about one-third each had been kid-
napped or taken as war captives, with smaller proportions having been
36. Clapperton, Second Expedition , 95.
37. For example, C. Meek, Tribal Studies in Northern Nigeria (New
York, 1950), I, 419, II, 78; J. Wilson-Haffenden. The Red Men of
Nigeria (London, 1967), 227.
38. Meek, Studies , I, 419.
39. S. Koelle, Polyglotta Africana (reprint of 1854 ed.
,
Graz, Aus-
tria, 1963).
40. H. Smith, D. Last, and G. Gubio, "Ali Eisami Gazirmabe of Bornu,"
in P. Curtin, ed.
,
Africa Remembered (Madison, 1968)
,
199 ff
.
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sold by relatives or superiors as debtors or criminals
.
4-1 Although
grossly unrepresentative, ^2 this sample corroborates certain con-
clusions drawn from other data and illustrates the potential use of
similar information. Though the categories are not equivalent —
what I call organized slave raiding could, for example, refer to
either kidnap victims or war captives — these data confirm that
judicial sources of slaves supplemented forcible captures.
Disposition
Once recruited, masters employed their slaves in a number of
ways, the most important distinction being between those retained for
domestic use and those sold. Although the slave trade with Western
Europe and the New World is well documented, little is known of the
trade with the Maghrib, and there is some indication that for the
Africans involved this latter trade was the more profitable. ^3
Slaves could be traded for "currency” — i.e., cowry shells —
or in kind.^ As marketable items the value of slaves showed con-
siderable variation with the slave T s age, sex, and health, and with
the local or international supply and demand. Two sources illus-
trate the relative value of slaves and its fluctuation over time.
When Clapperton visited the slave market in Sokoto, he found that a
"prime slave" cost between 40,000 and 60,000 cowrie shells, about mid-
way between the cost of a cow and a horse. Many years later Robinson
found slaves in Zaria to be between 100,000 and 300,000 cowries. He
traveled, however, after the decline in the power of the emirates and
the consequent decline in their ability to recruit slaves. What re-
mained constant, however, was the sale of slaves for currency. In
addition, slaves themselves often functioned as currency; indeed,
schemes to end slavery often included the introduction of gold or
paper currency as an alternative to this function. Merchants sold
slaves en route, either to buy necessities or to finance personal ex-
travagances. 1^ In any case, the sale or trade of slaves brought
41. P. Hair, "The Enslavement of Koelle T s Informants," Journal of
African History
.
VI (1965), 193.
42. Its unrepresentativeness derives from several factors: (1) be-
tween 60,000 and 70,000 slaves had been liberated to Freetown —
the selection of the informants was certainly not random; (2) the
slaves came originally from all parts of Africa, not only from
the Hausa-Fulani emirates; (3) the sample was overwhelmingly
male; and (4) the sample included only slaves who had been sold
to Europeans (rather than retained for domestic use) . Nonethe-
less, it is interesting to note that a number of those listed as
war captives were natives of Adamawa emirate and had been taken
by Fulani. See Hair, "Enslavement."
43. See P. Curtin and J. Vansina, "Sources of the Nineteenth-Century
Atlantic Slave Trade, Journal of African History , V (1964) , 190,
for a description of the trade network which brought slaves from
the Hausa-Fulani emirates into the intercontinental slave trades.
See also. Smith, Last, and Gubio, "Ali Eisami."
44. Clapperton, Second Expedition . 59; Wilson-Haffenden, Red Men , 57.
45. Robinson, Hausaland , 131.
46. Mockler-Ferryman, Nigeria , 247.
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considerable revenue to the Fulani emirates and also contributed to
the circulation of slave personnel.
Not all movement of slaves, however, was in the form of trade
or sale, for there was also an extensive system of political tributes,
parts of which could be paid in slaves. According to Kirk-Greene,
both the tributes themselves and the idea of payment in slaves date
from the beginnings of the jihad, when the granting of a T,flag ,T (sig-
nifying official sanction) was contingent upon a promise to send "a
yearly deputation to Sokoto with a regular quota of slaves. Though
tribute often took other forms, slave tributes were common. Clapper-
ton, for example, described the dues to Sokoto of ten emirates. Seven
of these sent slaves as part of their tribute, and the emirate of
Adamawa sent only slaves. ^8 Though the magnitude of slave tributes
is not known, estimates range as high as 10,000 slaves annually.
Whatever the exact figure, it is clear that political tribute, along
with the regional and intercontinental slave trades accounted for much
of the personnel recruited into slavery.
Not all slaves, however, were equally susceptible to sale or
alienation. An early European visitor reports the general tendency
to sell only T,those taken in war, or refractory and intractable
domestic slaves.
’
,L*9 Others report that masters sold newly taken
slaves and "outsiders" or "unbelievers" in preference to second-
generation slaves and Muslims (in many cases second-generation slaves
had become Muslims) . 50 No doubt, religious interdictions against the
forcible alienation of Muslims partially accounts for this preference.
More than religious sanctions, however, protected the status of
domestic slaves. Often they were integral parts of household and
regional economies and political systems, and their sale would have
entailed considerable hardship. This was especially true of those
slaves with important domestic or military specialties. Slaves were,
for example, trusted bodyguards , 51 masters of agricultural villages, 52
and army captains. 53 in certain emirates statute required that some
office-holders be either slaves or eunuchs, each of which often had
military, religious, and civil service functions, including positions
both with and without attendant fiefs. 54- Slaves also performed other
specialized domestic tasks, such as, for example, butcher, musician,
or wet-nurse; though not indispensible, these were important household
members
.
More important, however, slaves were productive, and, once
they had been trained, their resale and replacement would be costly.
Agriculture55 and manufacture56 required considerable slave labor,
and frequent sale of slaves would have affected both morale and pro-
ductivity. In regions of low population density slave villages
47. Kirk-Greene, Adamawa , 129.
48. Clapperton, Second Expedition , 216.
49. Ibid., 95.
50. Davidson, Black Mother , 41; Smith, Zazzau , 86.
51. Barth, Travels , II, 340.
52. Kirk-Greene, Adamawa, 149.
53. Smith, Zazzau
,
100.
54. Ibid
. ,
ch. 4.
55. Barth, Travels , II, 410.
56. Robinson, Hausaland , vi.
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increased the effective power of an emir or individual holder. 57 The
loyalty of these villages was especially important to the Fulani con-
querors, who, it must be recalled, were a beleaguered minority. Even
when unemployed, slaves were a source of wealth. In Kano, for ex-
ample, masters freed unproductive slaves to work their own lands in
return for a monthly tax to the former master. 58 it seems, then, that
once a slave settled into a "gainful” occupation and performed satis-
factorily, he had only a small chance of resale; the more important
his occupation the smaller the risk.
Sanctions
As suggested earlier, the practice of Hausa-Fulani slavery dif-
fered considerably from New World slavery: consider, for example, the
variety of social roles open to slaves in the emirates. Just as the
entire notion of slavery must be redefined to include this African ex-
ample, so must the notion of the sanctions supporting the slave sys-
tem. 59
As with its New World analogue, strong negative sanctions sup-
ported West African slavery. Depending upon the locale, masters
threatened intransigent slaves with imprisonment, 50 execution, or
resale to Europeans. Since white men were commonly considered can-
nibals, this latter was an especially potent threat.
These negative sanctions, however, had only limited applica-
tion. As already mentioned, alienation or execution of slaves had
religious and economic consequences. More important, however, slaves
could easily escape these sanctions. Slaves often lived in their
masters* households^ Qr in isolated slave villages and in neither
case were they closely policed. Nonetheless, and despite the fact
that fugitives were rarely caught, few slaves escaped. 53
Escape, of course, did not necessarily mean freedom. As M. G.
Smith has pointed out, 54- a fugitive slave, who might originally have
come from a far-away home, may have been unfamiliar with local cus-
toms and language and might in fact have been unsure of his where-
abouts. As a lone traveler he always faced the risk of recapture by
slave raiders and sale into an even more unpleasant situation. Fi-
nally, slave raiders often burnt fields and villages after their
raids, making a fugitive *s return home, even it if were nearby, an
unpleasant prospect. It is difficult to determine how effectively
these factors deterred escapes
,
but it is clear that generally masters
had little recourse to the penalties available to them and little need
to guard their domestic slaves.
57. Kirk-Greene, Adamawa , 132; Smith, Zazzau, 2.
58. Robinson, Haus aland , 132.
59. Smith, "Slavery," compares the sanctions supporting Hausa-Fulani
and West Indian slavery.
60. Clapperton, Second Expedition , 210.
61. Ibid
. .
94.
62. Mockler-Ferryman, Nigeria , 225.
63. Smith, Baba of Karo , 39 ff.
64. Personal communication.
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Instead, Fulani masters relied upon positive incentives to re-
tain their slaves. At least in part the precarious status of the
Fulani necessitated this reliance upon positive rather than negative
sanctions. I have already mentioned their demographic status vis-a-
vis the conquered Hausa. Given their minority status and the fre-
quency of challenges to the sovereignty of the jihad, a discontent and
potentially rebellious slave population would have been intolerable.
Although virtually unknown in Hausa-Fulani emirates
,
slave rebellions
in neighboring regions inflicted terrific damage. 65 In addition, suc-
cessful contenders to domestic power often relied upon the support of
their slave villages, 66 and positive incentives seemed better able to
rally this support.
Among such incentives, manumission seems to have been most com-
mon. Slaves could ’’earn" their freedom by excellence in a variety of
military, domestic, or commercial tasks, and masters often freed con-
verts to Islam as a charitable gesture. 67 Often, however, manumission
made little material difference, for in a sense a slave’s social
mobility depended upon the status of his master. Thus, the slave
of a wealthy master might become headman of a village, perhaps even
passing this title to his son, or a royal slave might acquire an im-
portant governmental post. But in either case, his mobility would be
within the slave status. On the other hand, little seems to have dis-
tinguished the material condition of poor freemen from that of their
slaves. 68 Free status may, of course, have been an important emo-
tional incentive.
Materially, however, the security of slavery seems a much
stronger motivation to obedience and service. Masters provided their
slaves with physical, fiscal, and social security in socially and
politically precarious times. Masters protected their slaves from
raiders and robbers, even to the extent of moving entire villages. 69
In addition, masters guaranteed their slaves’ subsistence, if not
abundance. Here again, the material conditions of the slave reflected
in large part the economic status of his master. Treatment of slaves
varied between masters. 70 Although few lived the lives of indolence
attributed to the court slaves in Kano, 71 even the most militant abo-
litionists agreed that most domestic slaves were well treated. 72 in
some cases, slaves were regarded as members of the household73 and
were even referred to by kin terms. 79- In return, then, for their loy-
alty, slaves received adequate food and clothing — perhaps equivalent
to that of their masters.
In the emirate of Zaria masters also gave their slaves voca-
tional training, provided them with wives, and permitted them to
divide their labor between their own and their masters’ lands. 7 5
65. Clapperton, Second Expedition , 25 ff.
66. Smith, Economy
.
70 ff.
67. Smith, Baba of Karo , 40.
68. Davidson, Black Mother , 37; Clapperton, Second Expedition . 139.
69. Smith, Economy , 82.
70. Robinson, Hausaland , 132 ff.
71. Barth, Travels , II, 104.
72. For example. Burns, History
.
201.
73. Barth, Travels , II, 151.
74. Smith, Baba of Karo , 40 ff.
75. Ibid.
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Frequently too, slaves became Muslims, adding a spiritual dimension
to social and material security. Although data from no other area are
so conclusive as those from Zaria, slaves in other emirates appa-
rently derived similar material, religious, and social benefits from
their masters. 76
In return for obedience and service, then, slaves might expect
to be protected, fed and clothed, converted, and perhaps married.
Positive incentives of this sort seem to me to have enforced the sys-
tem of slavery in the Hausa-Fulani emirates. 77 in a region charac-
terized by strife and uncertainty, masters could maintain the loyalty
and services of their slaves by providing protection and subsistence.
Given the precarious nature of the times, these minimal guarantees
sufficed.
Summary and Conclusions
As suggested earlier, this paper has both substantive and meth-
odological implications. From the substantive inquiry into Hausa-
Fulani slavery emerges a picture of a slave system characterized by
great numbers of slaves -- often outnumbering the free population —
recruited in a variety of ways. Once enslaved, many became part of an
intra- and inter-continental slave trade while others settled into a
wide range of domestic occupations. Finally, it appears that the
masters had only infrequent recourse to violent sanctions to enforce
their status, relying more often upon positive sanctions.
Equally significant, however, is the variety of sources used in
this reconstruction. Documentary evidence alone permits only a par-
tial understanding of slavery in the Hausa-Fulani emirates and must be
supplemented by oral accounts
,
autobiographies
,
and ethnographic
fieldwork. Nor has the present analysis exhausted the potential value
of field studies. Studies of local archaeology and human geography
may, for example, reveal the consequences for settlement pattern of
slavery and slave raiding. 78 Though this discussion considers only
the practice of slavery, opportunities are as great for the fieldwork
solution of other ethnographic and historical problems.
Thus
,
although both local and European written sources will un-
doubtedly become increasingly accessible, these will not obviate the
need for careful field studies. For reconstructions of African his-
tory, local "documentation,” in the form of oral traditions, biogra-
phies, archaeology, and contemporary custom, clarifies points derived
from written sources and can no longer be easily ignored.
76. For example, Clapperton, Second Expedition ,; Robinson Hausaland .
77. In this interpretation, I follow Clapperton, Second Expedition ,
and Smith, "Slavery."
See Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, especially their discussion
of Kebbi.
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PART III
MODERN AND GENERAL STUDIES

CHAPTER 10
FRENCH MUSLIM POLICY AND THE SENEGALESE BROTHERHOODSl
Lucy Behrman
The subject under consideration in this paper is the policy of
the French in regard to the Senegalese Muslim brotherhoods in the
twentieth century. The leaders of these brotherhoods play a predomi-
nant role in current Senegalese politics, a role which cannot be un-
derstood without an examination of the historical position of the
Muslim orders in the area. Of course, to understand the orders’ rise
to political power one must take into account the innate political
potential of the brotherhoods which spread from North to West Africa
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the specific social
and economic conditions in Senegal when the brotherhoods became estab-
lished. These factors, however, will not be considered here. 2 Nor
will there be any effort to discuss the major themes of French colo-
nial policy although this subject is a relevant background to the
French actions in Senegal. 3 Rather, the specific theoretical goals
and practical policy of the French in regard to the brotherhoods in
Senegal in the 1900 T s are all that will be touched on here. The goals
and actions of the French illustrate the working of the colonial
regime in Senegal. More importantly, however, these matters consti-
tute in themselves a factor of importance in Senegalese political
development. Some scholars have assumed that because of their brief
stay, their small numbers, and their separation from the people they
ruled, the colonial rulers had little direct effect on the population
under their control. On the one hand this is undoubtedly true — the
French did not transform the Senegalese social, economic, and politi-
cal system. On the other hand, the colonial rulers did reinforce or
undermine or otherwise influence the existing tendencies in the
political situation. Thus, their relationship with the brotherhoods
1. I am grateful to the Foreign Area Fellowship Program for grants
in 1964-1965 and 1965-1966 which enabled me to undertake a year
of intensive Arabic and background study in Boston and then to
spent eight months in Senegal during which time the major part of
the research for this paper was conducted. I am grateful also to
Alfred G. Gerteiny for his many helpful criticisms and suggestions.
2. See Lucy Behrman, "The Political Significance of the Wolof Ad-
herence to Muslim Brotherhoods in the Nineteenth Century," African
Historical Studies
.
I, 1 (1968), 60-77.
3. See Robert Delavignette, Freedom and Authority in French West
Africa (London, 1950); Stephen H. Roberts, History of French Colo-
nial Policy (1870-1925) (London, 1929) ; and Ruth Schachter Morgen
-
thau. Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa (Oxford,
1964) .
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had an important effect on the position of the marabus (Muslim lead-
ers) who had emerged by the end of the nineteenth century as the
political leaders of various Senegalese ethnic groups, in particular
of the majority Wolof.
The Theoretical Goals
The French learned from their nineteenth-century experiences
in North and West Africa that Islam was an important force in their
empire. Thus, they attached an officer to the Bureau Politique of
the French West African Federation (the AOF, formed in 1904) whose
sole job was to deal with Muslim problems.^ Administrators were
ordered to record in detail their knowledge of all marabus in their
regions. In addition, every political report sent to the Governor
General of the AOF, and then to the Minister of Colonies, contained
a section on Muslim affairs in the Federation and on specific problems
in Senegal. In turn masses of letters and circulars went from the
Governor General to the Lieutenant Governor of Senegal and elsewhere
(and to the lower officials such as the commandants de cercle) out-
lining the way to treat the marabus. The various instructions were
often contradictory and unclear so that P&re Moreau, a careful ob-
server of the situation, concluded that there was no Muslim policy.
Despite all the official declarations of yesterday the
colonial authorities did not have a . . . Muslim policy.
This was mostly an administrative and police policy of
maintaining order and, in recent times, an electoral
policy.
5
It is possible, however, to isolate certain themes which were empha-
sized and which, if taken together, seem to form a quasi-coherent
theoretical framework which the French officials applied to the
brotherhoods
.
The early twentieth-century colonial authorities were aware
that their presence in West Africa had actually helped the spread of
Islam. 6 They recognized that they had contributed to the breakdown of
the tribal system and thus enhanced the appeal of the tariqas . They
knew that the imposition of peace on the Western Sudan had facilitated
the spread of Islam by allowing missionaries to travel unmolested.
Moreover, the officials had underlined their belief in the superiority
over other Africans of the literate Muslims by choosing them as
4. One of the first of these was Robert Arnaud; he was followed by
Paul Marty and in the twenties by P. J. Andr£. These three men
were the best known of the French authorities on West African
Islam and their theories became the basis for many of the policy
decisions on the Muslim question in Senegal.
5. R. L. Moreau, "Les Marabouts de Dori," Archives de Sociologie des
Religions (1964), 123.
6. Robert Arnaud, "L T Islam et la Politique Musulmane Franqaise en
Afrique Occidentale Fran^aise," Renseignements Coloniaux et
Documents Publides par le Comitd de l T Afrique Frangaise (1912)
,
4 .
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clerks, guides and interpreters. Indeed, as Paul Marty, a recognized
authority on Islam, wrote:
Through our administration ... we have done more for
the spread of Islam during the last half century than
the marabus were able to achieve during three hundred
years .
7
But in the early twentieth century the decision was made to
cease deliberate support of Islam because this religion, especially in
the form of brotherhoods, constituted one of the last threats to the
French West African Empire. 8 However, open opposition to Islam was
considered unwise, avowedly because the French recognized the right of
Africans to practice whatever religion they chose. 9 More importantly,
the French avoided opposing Islam because they believed the persecu-
tion of Islam would have more dangerous results than had had encour-
agement. Persecution would provoke, "not open revolt . . . [but] the
state of spirit natural to peoples of all races disturbed in their
faith, the thirst for persecution . . . and a more intensive proselyt-
ization."10
French policy, then, was to be neutral, although this did not
mean allowing Muslims to spread their religion as they wished.
Rather, proselytization was to be restricted to prevent Islam from
becoming a unified anticolonial force. The "politique des races"
which had been used elsewhere in the French Empire (for example in
Madagascar) was to be followed. This policy was an effort to keep
separate various ethnic and religious groups. Islam, which the French
saw as a religion divided into small warring sects, was to be kept
divided.il Divisions between ethnic and religious groups were to be
maintained by ceasing to appoint indigenous chiefs to rule over large
territories since these chiefs often favored their own group and im-
posed their religion over the area they controlled. According to the
new policy, each ethnic group was to be ruled by someone from within
it whenever possible. The ethnic units would relate directly to the
French administrators without the intermediary of African provincial
chiefs. The cercle , with its French commandant , was to be the sig-
nificant administrative unit in the AOF. The commandant would be in
direct contact with the various ethnic and religious groups thus pre-
venting any interterritorial tribal or Muslim (anti-French) buildup,
as well as facilitating tax collection and other administrative
tasks .12
7. Paul Marty, Etudes sur 1 T Islam au Sdndgal
.
Vol. II: Les Doctrines
et les Institutions (Paris, 1917), 374.
8. Alain Quellien, La Politique Musulmane dans l T Africrue Occidentale
Francaise (Paris, 1910), 137; and J. Brevid, Islamisme contre
"Naturalisme" au Soudan Francais: Essai de Psychologie Politique
Coloniale (Paris, 1923).
9. Dakar Archives, William Ponty (September 14, 1909), 19G 1.
10. Dakar Archives (May 11, 1914)
,
19G 1; also Quellien, La Politique
Musulmane
, p. VII.
11. Dakar Archives, Robert Amaud, "Situation Gdndrale de l T Islam en
Afrique Occidentale Franqaise," 19G 1.
12. Dakar Archives, Governor General, "Sur la politique indigene du
Sdndgal ..." (September 22, 1909) , 19G 1; also Governor Gen-
eral, Circulaire sur la politique indigene" (September 22, 1909),
No. 186, 13G 72; and Governor General to Minister of Colonies,
"La Politique Indigene en AOF" (1912), 13G 72.
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The second part of the Muslim policy emphasized that French
language and cultural values were to be spread throughout West Africa.
This strand of policy was connected to the French belief in their
civilizing mission and maintained that Muslim culture, although
superior to pagan ways of life, was inferior to French culture. More-
over, Islamic culture was seen as foreign to West Africa and Arabic
was believed to be more difficult to learn for Africans than French.
Furthermore, the spread of French culture would have direct political
significance because the adoption of French customs would make Afri-
cans amenable to French rule and help the development of the AOF
according to French plans. 13
One of the first moves to implement the spread of French cul-
ture at the expense of Muslim customs was the attempt in 1903 to
abolish the Muslim courts in Senegal. The first Muslim courts had
been opened in St. Louis in 18M-8 (and revised in 1857) at a time when
Islam was still favored by the French administrators. The courts had
had jurisdiction over civil matters like marriage, inheritance, wills,
and donations. The 1903 law attempted to place all Africans under the
same secular French court system and end the privileged position of
the Muslims who had been able to choose whether or not they would be
tried by the Muslim court. However, Muslims in St. Louis protested
violently that they were being discriminated against since their
Muslim brothers elsewhere in French territories (i.e.. North Africa)
had an Islamic court system. The colonial rulers gave in to the
pressure and, in 1905, a Muslim tribunal was reopened in St. Louis
and Dakar, and in 1907 in Rufisque.l^ However, the jurisdiction of
the Muslim courts remained restricted to a small number of civil mat-
ters and only affected the inhabitants of the communes in which the
courts were located. In other areas Muslims and animists alike were
tried by French courts although, in cases where Muslims were involved,
qadisl S were used as assessors in the French courts.
A further attack on Muslim culture in Senegal was made in 1911
when the use of Arabic in the Muslim courts and in administrative cor-
respondence was forbidden. All judgments and correspondence were
thereafter to be conducted in French. As the Governor General ex-
plained, Arabic was the principal element in the success of Muslim
proselytization. Developing the knowledge of French would limit Islam
and would forge:
The most sure weapon with which successfully to fight
against our ineluctable adversaries: marabus or defeated
former political chiefs . . . who will not forgive us for
tour] substitution of a regime of liberty and justice for
the shameful exploitation of the masses by a few privileged
ones .16
The greatest hope for the establishment of French culture lay
in the introduction of French education in Senegal and the ending, or
13. Arnaud, "Situation G6n6rale de 1* Islam.”
1M-. Ren6 Pautrat, La Justice Locale et la Justice Musulmane en AOF
(Rufisque, 1957)
,
105; Quellien, La Politique Musulmane , 218-2M-2.
15. A cradi is a Muslim who is acquainted with Muslim law (according
to one^of the four major schools) and who therefore is qualified
to judge in a Muslim court.
16. Dakar Archives, Governor General to Interim Governor General
(January 12, 1912), No. 59 bis, 17G 39.
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diminishing of the number of Qu'ranic schools. Exposure to French
education would lead to the "taming” of the "indigene. ”1? At this
time in the rural areas the only formal education received came from
the marabus T Qu’ranic schools. There was a large number of such
schools — in 1912 Marty estimated approximately 1700 schools in
Senegal. 18 But the general level of the Qu’ranic education offered
was very low. Leaving aside a few exceptional marabus who were well
educated, the majority of the teaching marabus had scant knowledge of
the Qu T ran or Arabic. Most of them were largely preoccupied with
other activities. The marabus were poor farmers or traders who lived
as did their neighbors. The marabus T only advantage came from their
ability to pass on a smattering of Arabic and Islam to children in
return for gifts and labor. Thus, the children were sent to beg
and/or to work for their teacher in his fields, and often spent most
of their time in these occupations rather than in study. Under these
conditions the majority of the children learned very little. Marty
estimated that 95 out of 100 pupils who had finished a Qu’ranic school
could not read or write or understand Arabic at all. 19
The French wished to reform the Qu T ranic school system radi-
cally and, concurrently, to draw pupils into schools in which French
language and ideas were taught. Thus, an important decree in 1903 de-
clared that no one in Senegal could have a Qu’ranic school without the
authorization of the Lieutenant Governor. Each marabu had to submit
to the Secretary General a copy of his judicial record, a certificate
of good moral conduct, and proof that he was a French citizen or sub-
ject. The necessity of such documents could exclude many marabus from
teaching because many had been involved in anti-French campaigns. The
1903 decree went on to require each applicant marabu to take an ex-
amination administered by the qadi in St. Louis or by administrators
advised by recognized Arabic scholars. This examination, depending on
the requirements established, could eliminate all but a handful of
teaching marabus since very few knew Arabic well. In addition a com-
mission was set up to inspect Qu T ranic schools, and each marabu was
required to keep a registry in French of his pupils. Since most mara-
bus knew no French, the latter provision would have been difficult to
fulfill. The marabus also had to have a certificate proving their
pupils attended French schools. Most Qu T ranic students did not go to
French schools, so almost no pupils would have been left to the mara-
bus by this requirement. Finally, any school with less than twenty
pupils was to be closed, which provision would have eliminated most
Qu T ranic schools as these generally had well under twenty students. 20
In this same year, decrees were passed establishing primary
schools in villages, in regions, and in urban centers, where French,
reading, writing, and arithmetic would be taught. An arrfetd of 1906
offered 300 francs maximum subsidy to any marabu who would spend at
least two hours a day teaching French. 21 Above the primary school
level a superior primary school was established for students of urban
17. Dakar Archives, Governor General (September 14, 1909), No. 982,
19G 1.
18. Paul Marty and Jules Salenc, Les Ecoles Maraboutiques du S£ndgal,
La Mddersa de Saint Louis (Paris, 1914), 29.
19. Ibid
. , 32-57. Marty T s criticism may have been too harsh. See
Ivor Wilks, "The Transmission of Islamic Values in the Western
Sudan" (unpublished paper. Northwestern University, 1968), 7.
20. Journal Officiel du S£ndgal thereafter J.O.] (August 15, 1903),
481-482.
21. Marty and Salenc, Les Ecoles Maraboutiques
. 81.
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areas which offered a CEP. There also were to be higher professional
schools for master workers and a normal school to train teachers, in-
terpreters, qadis , and chiefs. The latter was divided into two sec-
tions: the first for teachers and the second for cradis , chiefs, and
interpreters. The second section, a continuation of Faidherbe’s
Ecole de Fils de Chefs (established in 1856)
,
was attached to the
madrassa (Muslim school) of St. Louis created by decrees in 1907 and
1908 . ^2 The madrassa was supposed to train marabus and other Muslims
in the elements of Arabic and Muslim law while they were also learning
French and their civic duties to the colonial state. It was hoped
that the products of the madrassa would gradually replace existent
marabus of Senegal who were believed by the French to be ignorant and
hostile. 23
The third major part of the French Muslim policy was to end the
exploitation of the masses by the marabus. Foremost on the list of
such exploitations were the alms collections of the marabus who openly
solicited money and gifts from their followers. Traditionally the
Senegalese people gave what they could to their marabu as fees for
their children’s education, or as contributions after harvest or when
they went to ask a favor of the holy men. Frequently also the mara-
bus would send representatives among their followers or visit the
latter themselves, in order to collect money. This system constituted
the worst kind of extortion to the French and had to be stopped.
Therefore, part of the 1903 law regulating Qu’ranic schools forbade
the marabus to send the children out to beg under the threat of im-
mediate closure of the school if this provision were not obeyed. 24-
In addition, in 1906 the Governor General demanded that all marabus
foreign to a region be placed under immediate surveillance and re-
ported to the central authorities. 25 jn 1911 William Ponty stated in
a circular that if a marabu with no physical incapacity should be
found extorting gifts under the pretext of religion and living off
alms alone he should be imprisoned for vagabondage. 26 The Lieutenant
Governor of Senegal, M. Cor, in that same year proposed a law requir-
ing that all public subscriptions and even private collections of
money get official authorization. He stated that many thousands of
francs each year went into the trunks of the marabus, money which was
often used in campaigns against the French. The draining off of money
by the marabus was, according to the Lieutenant Governor, a serious
loss for commerce and for the economic development of Senegal in
general. Local officials who had tried to fight the marabutic col-
lections had met with little success not only because of the ruses
adopted by the marabus, but also because of the "obstinate silence"
of the victims, who insisted in court that their contributions were
voluntary. The Lieutenant Governor’s proposed law should have made it
possible to end the marabus’ collections, even if the donor claimed he
wanted to give his money to the religious leader, for any subscription
without the authorization of the Lieutenant Governor was prohibited. 27
22. Quellien, La Politique Musulmane , 252-256.
23. Ibid., 255.
24. J.O. (August 5, 1903), 481.
25. Dakar Archives, Governor General to Lieutenant Governor (Febru-
ary 10, 1906), No. 262, 19G 1.
26. Dakar Archives, Governor General, Circular (December 26, 1911),
No. 117, 19G 1.
27. Dakar Archives, Decret (1911), 19G 3.
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The marabus, then, were to be cut off from one of their primary
sources of wealth: their collections of alms. In fact, the French
fully intended to destroy not only the economic power of the marabus
but all of their temporal power. The French envisaged a gradual re-
duction of the power of all chiefs including traditional non-Muslim
leaders and marabus. William Ponty described his theory in the re-
gard in an angry letter to the Lieutenant Governor of Senegal in whose
colony the reduction of the authority of the chiefs was not being
satisfactorily pursued. The letter states:
In a letter of last September fourteenth, I tried especially
to define the attitude which we should adopt in regard to
these chiefs. According to my instructions we should con-
tinue to surround them, as formerly, with exterior marks of
honor and of consideration, acquit ourselves of the obigations
which we have contracted to them, use their services in making
them auxiliaries of our administration, but occupy ourselves
constantly with attenuating their authority over the people. 28
Thus
,
the final and perhaps most important part of the French Muslim
policy is stated. Marabus were to be used when needed. They were to
be courted with medals and symbolic honors
,
but their power was to be
continually reduced.
Had this Muslim policy been carried out, it is probably that
there would be few politically important marabus left in Senegal. The
prohibitions against collections, if implemented, would have removed
the basic source of wealth of the marabus. The restrictions against
the Qu T ranic schools would have eliminated the primordial teaching
function of the marabus through which they gained respect, money, and
free labor, and would have impeded the spread of Islam by brother-
hoods. If the marabus, like the chiefs, had been successfully re-
moved from all important ruling positions, they would have lost a
large part of their control over the people. Finally, if the' French
language and culture had replaced Arabic and Muslim culture, Islam in
Senegal would have been seriously weakened. In sum, French Muslim
policy, if successfully implemented, should have demolished the power
and influence of the marabus, restricted the area of Muslim proselyt-
ization and even undermined the faith of those who remained Muslim by
orienting them to French values and morals.
Daily Relations with the Marabus
Not surprisingly, in light of their Muslim policy, throughout
the twentieth century the French officials never trusted the marabus
and never were sure when or where a marabu-led uprising might occur.
The mistrust of the officials is shown in the continuous admonitions
of the Lieutenant Governors of Senegal and the Governors General of
the AOF that the marabus be kept under close surveillance at all
times. These admonitions were constantly repeated in the admin-
istrative reports between 1900 and the end of the second world
28. Dakar Archives, Governor General to Lieutenant Governor (August
27, 1913), 13G 75.
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war. 29 As time went on the French gained more confidence in their
ability to control the areas they governed but they still dreaded the
unrest which a rebellious marabu could stimulate in a particular
region. Such minor uprisings did continue to occur throughout the
period. Almost every year in some part of Senegal a mahdi3 0 would
emerge with the mission of expelling the French infidels. In most of
these instances the ensuing revolt was repressed quickly since the ad-
ministrators wished to avoid protracted disturbances which were ex-
pensive and called down reprimands from the Colonial Office in France.
Indeed, their fears of such rebellions apparently sometimes caused
them to overreact to potential threats to their rule and to punish the
offending marabu in an unnecessarily severe fashion. But the dispatch
with which the French disposed of the rebellious marabus can be con-
trasted with the normal course of relations between the colonial au-
thorities and the brotherhoods. Only when the French were forced to
act, that is, when they were convinced that an uprising was about to
occur, did they mobilize their strength against a marabu who then was
killed or exiled while his following was dispersed.
Fod,e Soulayman Bayaga is one of numerous marabus who pitted
himself against the French and was eliminated quickly from the politi-
cal scene. Bayaga led a revolt in the upper Gambia region in 1908.
He was a Sarakolle marabu who had founded a village formed of his
Sarakolle disciples in an area inhabited by pagan Peul tribesmen a
short time before his revolt. Already the elements of a dangerous
situation were present, for his village was in an isolated district
which was difficult for the French to control. Bayaga built himself
a fortresslike mosque against the order of the French, who considered
the action provocative. Consequently, an administrator was sent to
the village and some of the Peuls were ordered to destroy the mosque.
At this point the situation developed into a crisis. Bayaga, who was
in Gambia when he learned that his mosque had been razed, mobilized
his Sarakolle followers and marched back to his village. Accompanied
by two hundred disciples, he arrived in his village, proceeded to
murder several Peuls, and took their leaders prisoner. The French
sent a veteran administrator to lead a military column against the
marabu, and on the twelfth of October 1908 a full-scale battle took
place. Bayaga and his followers were killed in fierce fighting, his
disciples were scattered, and his village was destroyed. 31
The French felt totally justified in their action since they
viewed Bayaga as "an audacious bandit with a band of accomplices , " a
bandit who was guilty of criminal acts including murder, theft, and
29. Arnaud, ,TL T Islam et la Politique Musulmane," 148; also Dakar
Archives: No. 982 (September 14, 1909), 19G 1; "Chapter IV" (May
14, 1914), 19G 1; "Rapport Politique du Sdn^gal," 2G 18.1: No.
1631 (July 10, 1918); "Rapport Politique de l’AOF," 2G 24.13;
"Rapport Politique du Sdnggal," 2G 39.34; "Rapport Politique de
1 T AOF, " 2G 43.1.
30. A mahdi is an envoy from Allah. The word was broadly used by the
French to denote the rebellious in their territory.
31. Dakar Archives, Letter (November 13, 1908), "Operation de police
dans Haute Gambie," 13G 74 and Brunot, Letter (May 10, 1908), No.
43, 13 G 74; also Telegram No. 220 (September 2, 1908), 13G 74;
Telegram (September 9, 1908), 13G 74; Telegram (September 14,
1908), 13G 74; "Report to the Minister of Colonies" (November 20,
1908), 13 G 74.
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rape. 32 Possibly the French were partially to blame for the many
deaths in the final outcome since the administrator’s decision to
destroy the mosque could easily be construed by the fanatical marabu
as an anti -Muslim coalition of French and Peul. In fact, all the
criminal acts of which Bayaga was accused took place after the mosque
was razed. In any case, however much the French may have been at
fault, the Bayaga incident shows the manner in which the French acted
when their authority was directly challenged. 33
In most cases, however, major marabus in Senegal did not choose
to act as Bayaga had done, possibly because they recognized the futil-
ity of attacking the French. Therefore, the French and the Muslim
leaders usually were able to cooperate peacefully (however much they
mistrusted each other) as the following examples should demonstrate.
One of the best known Muslim leaders in West Africa in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was Shaykh Sidya Baba, whose
actual home was in Trarza, Mauritania, but whose influences extended
to the northern region of Senegal. He is a good example to illustrate
the cooperative relations between the colonial administration and the
marabus, because he was established firmly as a famous Muslim leader
by virtue of his inherited position and his own learning and piety
before he began to deal with the French in an extensive manner. Thus
his behavior indicated that even successful marabus saw the necessity
and the advantage to be gained from cooperating with the French.
Shaykh Sidya headed a branch of the Qadiri brotherhood (derived
directly from the Qadiri motherhouse north of Timbuktu) . The first
Shaykh Sidya who actually founded the Qadiri branch (known as A1 Kabir
or The Great) lived from approximately 1780 to 1869. It was his
grandson, Sidya Baba, however, who was to come into close contact with
the French. He was educated in Qu’ranic traditions and sciences and
was renowned for his learning. He was also respected by his disciples
for his supernatural abilities (indicating his holiness) . He had been
known, for instance, to call down divine vengeance on a tribe which
had dared to attack Sidya’s own tribe. 34- Although Sidya’s grandfather
had distinguished himself in war against the French, Sidya became the
"right hand" and "intimate councillor" of the French administrator
Coppolani. Sidya’s aid was extremely important in the pacification of
Mauritania which was not accomplished until 1910 (when the warrior-
marabu Ma A1 Ainan was defeated). 3 5 Sidya Baba, in return for his co-
operation with the French, was allowed and even helped to spread his
branch of the Qadiri to surrounding areas under French control. The
32. Dakar Archives, Letter, "Operation de police dans Haute Gambie."
33. One thing which Bayaga did not do was to attack a European-led
post. This was the secret dread of administrators in outlying
regions which now and then did materialize. One such case took
place in 1907 when a Sudanese marabu led an attack in S£n£gal
Oriental. The French administrator was decapitated by the mara-
bu’ s followers while the marabu remained on his horse chanting
verses from the Qu’ran. Dakar Archives, Administrator to Lieu-
tenant Governor, No. 159, 13 G 382.
34. Paul Marty, Etude sur l’Islam Maure-Cheikh Sidia, Les Fadelia.
Les Ida Ou Ali (Paris, 1916), 16-17.
35. Ibid
. , 33-35, 133-142. Also reference to Sidya’s role in Dakar
Archives
,
Governor General to Lieutenant Governor (August 13
,
1912)
# ,
No. 1504, Dossier on Ahmadu Bamba in office of Archivist
[hereafter Dossier],
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French gave his representatives free passage throughout their terri-
tory and made gifts in money and kind to the shaykh . Moreover, they
supported him against those members of his family who had been known
to oppose him, and in this way helped him to consolidate his author-
ity.
An even more striking example of this kind of collaboration
between marabu and French, leading to the consolidation of the power
of the former, can be seen by looking at the specifically Senegalese
brotherhood, the Muridiyya. The founder of this brotherhood, Ahmad
Bamba (1850-1927)
,
was viewed by the French with considerable sus-
picion especially in the very early twentieth century. Bamba was
twice exiled, once to Gabon for seven years and once for four years
to Mauritania to live under the supervision of Shaykh Sidya. (Bamba
returned to Senegal for good in 1907.) It would seem to have been in
the interest of the French to undercut the position of this marabu
and to undermine his brotherhood as a whole since it was clearly iden-
tified in the minds of the Africans with resistance to the French.
Nonetheless
,
although the French never lost their suspicion of Ahmad
Bamba whom they kept in restricted residence until his death, they
still found him useful. They went to him to ask for help in control-
ling the action of his disciples and for specific requests such as to
raise troops for the French during the first world war. 36 The mara-
bu responded with obvious reluctance to cooperate in many cases, but
he did cooperate.
The French were aware that by paying too much attention to the
authority of the Murid founder, they would only help to increase his
power. The Governor General in 1912 warned that the Murids must not
be treated differently from other groups. Ahmad Bamba might be useful
in recruiting soldiers, but the Lieutenant Governor (and his assis-
tants) must be very careful not to increase the Murid leaders’ author-
ity.
We must guard equally against enlarging the role and adding
to the authority of Ahmad Bamba by making our orders . . .
pass through him as intermediary. We must not forget that if
this indigene has a certain authority over the Murids, his
influence should conserve a purely religious character. 37
But the French did not find it convenient to stop using the Murid
founder and his subordinate marabus. As the colonialists became more
confident in their power to control Bamba, they made use of him as an
intermediary with even greater frequency. They openly recognized his
usefulness and on a number of occasions showed him marks of favor.
Thus
,
Bamba was named in 1916 as a member of the Consultative Commit-
tee of Muslim Affairs, a largely honorary position given to marabus
known for their loyalty and service to France. In 1919 in recognition
of his services during the war, Bamba was made a Chevalier de la
Legion d’Honneur.38
36. Bamba is credited with recruiting four hundred troops in the
Tivaouane area. Dakar Archives, F. Lanet, "Rapport Confidential
sur les Mourites. . . Janvier 1914," Dossier, and F. Lanet, "Rap-
port du mois de Novembre 1913 sur Ahmadou Bamba," Dossier.
37. Dakar Archives, Governor General to Lieutenant Governor (Novem-
ber 8, 1912), No. 2099, Dossier.
38. Dakar Archives, Governor General to Lieutenant Governor (Novem-
ber 27 , 1918)
,
Dossier.
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The choice was again put to the French of not continuing to
support any one Murid marabu (and therefore not helping to build up
the position of any one Murid leader) when Bamba became very old and
feeble. The question at the time was who would succeed the founder.
An unusually frank report in 1926 stated that position in which the
administrations felt themselves placed. First, the French could stay
out *of the succession quarrel and allow the influential members of the
family to dispute among themselves which would result in splits and
divisions in the brotherhood and doubtless would reduce the order’s
prestige. The second choice would be to give official support to a
candidate who would accept French sponsorship and follow French di-
rections and would keep the brotherhoods as a useful adjunct of
French authority. 39 it was apparently the second alternative which
the administration chose. After Bamba died in 1927, a Murid Council
met and after "a discreet intervention by the administration,"^0
chose the eldest son as khalif (head of the order) . This son, Mamadu
Mustafa, had been designated successor by Bamba himself, so it is
doubtful that the French had to do more than let their support of
Mamadu Mustafa be known to the Council through the French Resident
in Diourbel. However, the French acted most decisively when they
removed Bamba T s troublesome and powerful brother, Shaykh Anta, from
Senegal. The latter had openly agitated against the succession of
Mamadu Mustafa since he wanted the position of khalif for himself. ^2
Eventually, in 1930, the French exiled Shaykh Anta to Mali to prevent
him causing their favorite further trouble. 4-3
The French played even more of a definitive role when Mamadu
Mustafa died in 199-5. Another Murid Council was called, at this time
made up of the surviving brothers of Ahmad Bamba, the heads of the de-
ceased brothers’ families, Mamadu Mustafa’s brothers and his eldest
son, and other leading members of the order. ^4 The 1945 council chose
Falilou M’Backe, the next eldest son of Ahmadu Bamba. It is inter-
esting that in this instance the brother of the khalif succeeded and
not his eldest son, who hotly contested the election of his uncle.
According to traditional Wolof custom, the eldest brother should suc-
ceed as head of the family, but this custom had long been modified by
Muslim law. The precedent, then, was unclear, but Shaykh M’Backe
and numerous supporters felt that he should follow his father as
khalif . The French let the council know through the intermediary of
the Lieutenant Governor of their preference for Falilou. They were
well aware that the succession of Falilou was not according to the
39. Dakar Archives, "Rapport Politique du S6n£gal" (1926), 2G 26.10.
40. Lucien Nekkach, "Unpublished Report on Ahmadu Bamba and the
Murids," Dakar Archives, Office of Archivist (classification num-
ber 1G 56).
41. Dakar Archives, "Rapport Politique du Sdndgal" (1927), 2G 27.18.
42. Dakar Archives, "Rapport Politique du Sdnggal" (1928), 2G 28.8.
43. Dakar Archives, Decret 1930, "Rapport Politique du S4n£gal"
(1930), 2G 30.4 and "Rapport sur l’Incident de Diourbel (Affaire
Cheikh Anta M’Backe)" (February 14, 1930), 13G 2.
44. Nekkach, "Unpublished Report."
45. Maghetar Samb, La Succession en Droit Musulmane (St. Louis),
D£pot L£gal No. 1806, N.D.
,
and Interview with Amadou Samb, qadi
in Muslim Court, St. Louis, March 10, 1966. See also Nekkach,
"Unpublished Report" and L. Geismar, Rgcueil des Coutumes Civiles
des Races du Sgnggal Etabli par L. Geismar, Administrateur en
Chef des Colonies (St. Louis, 1933), 113-136.
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principle established at the death of Ahmad Bamba. In fact, it was
admitted, although not publicly, that his succession "could be con-
sidered apparently as a departure from strict neutrality."^ However,
the officials were pleased with the outcome. The only problem now
remaining was to eliminate the threat posed by Shaykh M T Backe who, to-
gether with his uncle Bassiru,^ now fought Falilou. The administra-
tion would not tolerate this opposition as they had not tolerated
Shaykh Anta T s. The Director of Political Affairs warned Shaykh
M T Backe that he could be exiled as his uncle had been. The Director
reported:
I . .
.
put him on guard against the intrigues which were
planned and which were liable to create regrettable incidents.
I warned him very clearly that we would not tolerate any
agitation and that, these intrigues coming from certain of
his disciples
,
he had all the interest in using his influence
to stop them, in order that he would not be considered their
originator .and would not risk finding himself one day in the
situation of his deceased uncle Shaykh Anta. ^8
Shaykh M T Backe was forced, as a result of French pressure, to restrict
his opposition to his uncle although his attitude never completely
changed. The whole situation became further complicated when Senegal-
ese politicians, seeking support throughout the countryside, sided
with the new khalif or his opponents. Falilou, however, remained
khalif of the Murids and was able to build his position up to one of
considerable strength. Clearly, the French administration had played
a very important role in his rise to power.
The trend to be discerned from the relations described above
between the Murids and the French is the trend toward cooperation.
This was true for the marabus as much as for the French. In the early
years of the Murid order the gap between the two sides was very wide
and the French scorned the Murid founder and his shaykhs
.
Quite pro-
bably the Murid marabus disliked and feared the French. The marabus 1
attitude may never have changed (that cannot be seen from the records
now in existence)
,
but they were willing to take what they could get
from the French. Even Shaykh Anta, who was mistrusted by the French,
managed to get favors from the administration. Thus the list of re-
cipients of money from the administrative Fonds Secrets notes in
August 1910 that Shaykh Anta had received 500 francs, and certain
administrators remarked in their reports that Shaykh Anta used his
dealings with the French to build up his position among the Murids.
The trend toward cooperation which can be discerned from the
history of the early relations between the Murid brotherhood and the
French was intensified because of the emphasis which both sides placed
on the importance of the growth of peanuts. From the earliest days of
9-6. Dakar Archives, Director General of Political, Administrative and
Social Affairs, "Note pour M. le Gouverneur G£n£ral" (September
1945)
,
19G 2 (1)
.
47. Nekkach, "Unpublished Report."
48. Dakar Archives, Director General of Political, Administrative and
Social Affairs, "Note pour M. le Gouverneur G£n4ral" (September
1945)
,
19G 2 (1)
49. Dakar Archives, Decree (March 22, 1913), Fonds Secrets — see
list of expenditures, 17G 24.
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the movement the Murid shaykhs had encouraged their followers to grow
peanuts in their fields and had established colonies of their follow-
ers on new lands throughout Senegal. Gradually the French began to
realize the potentialities of the new group for the economic develop-
ment of Senegal. A 1911 report had been one of the first to recognize
the positive potential of the group. 50 Other reports around that
time stressed the economic danger of the group. In 1906 a report
noted that Shaykh Anta on the pretext of having dug a well at Gavou-
ane, was trying to take over the neighboring territory from its pre-
vious owners, which action the author of the report apparently felt
unwarranted. 51 In 1913 the administrator at Diourbel warned that
Shaykh Anta T s concession at Gavouane was the center of a large area of
deforestation which threatened wooded areas nearby. 52 a report in
1916 repeats the warning that the Murids (in the Petite C£>te) were
destroying the wooded area in their search for lands on which to grow
peanuts . 53
Despite these negative reports, the French did not really
attempt to control the Murids T economic expansion. Even Shaykh Anta
was able to expand as he wished and became the proprietor of vast
estates cultivated by his disciples. Gradually the positive economic
contribution of the Murids was more heavily stressed. Thus, in 1926
the political report noted that:
If it is possible to regret having allowed this Murid power
to be established ... it must be realized that, from the
economic point of view, that action of Muridism has power-
fully contributed to the so accentuated development of agri-
cultural production in the region of Baol. And this action,
which is beneficial from this point of view, forms a serious
counterweight to the eventual difficulties which may come. 54
In 1927 the Lieutenant Governor wrote even more glowingly:
The Murids do not disdain material progress in any way.
They are as good commercial agents as they are good farmers
and speculation does not scare’ them. It is not among them
that one risks finding that tendency to lethargy which . . .
characterized certain regions of Islam. 55
The French now began actually to encourage the Murids
,
giving
the marabus special privileges and concessions of land. Economic col-
laboration, particularly in the thirties, was openly pursued by the
French authorities who even saw the election of Mamadu Mustafa as
economically beneficial to Senegal. 56 Now and then observers warned.
50. Dakar Archives, "Rapport Politique du S£n£gal" (May 5, 1911),
No. C 577, 2G 11.7.
51. Dakar Archives, "Rapport Politique du S^ndgal" (1906), 2G 6.4.
52. Dakar Archives, Commandant of Baol, "Rapport de Novembre 1913,"
Dossier.
53. Dakar Archives, "Rapport Politique du S£n£gal" (1916), No. 1178,
2G 16.5.
54. Dakar Archives, "Rapport Politique du S£ndgal” (1926), 2G 26.10.
55. Dakar Archives, "Rapport Politique du S6n£gal" (1927), 2G 27.18.
56. Dakar Archives, "Rapport Politique du S£n£gal" (September 19,
1929), 2G 28.8.
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as did the 1927 report, that despite the economic contribution of the
Murids
,
the French should be careful not to "enthrone” new Ahmad
Bambas in other regions of the AOF, thus pointing out the help the
French had given unwittingly to the power of the Murid founder. 57
This type of warning, however, went generally unheeded, for the French
seemed most interested in increasing the production of peanuts in
Senegal by whatever method possible.
The relationship which developed between the Murid leaders and
the French authorities was quite similar to that between the other
brotherhoods* leaders and the French. The Murids, due to an intense
group loyalty and discipline, were more powerful than other brother-
hoods, but in general the same cooperative pattern was established
between the French and the other marabus. In fact, the colonialists
were more lenient in the early twentieth century with the major Tijani
marabus than they were with Ahmad Bamba, because they did not consider
the Tijani as much of a threat to their authority. Thus, the Tijani
(and Qadiri) marabus were able to establish themselves with the aid of
the French in secure positions as spiritual and temporal leaders
throughout Senegal.
The Exchange of Services
The French found numerous ways to use the marabus. One typical
service which the marabus performed was to help to recruit soldiers
and to give general support to the French cause. Thus, Ahmad Bamba
recruited 4-00 Murid tirailleurs during the first world war. 58 Thus,
too, A1 Hajj Malik Sy, the venerable head of the largest Wolof Tijani
branch in the early twentieth century, gave speeches such as the fol-
lowing on behalf of the French war effort:
Adhere completely to the French government. God . . . has
given grace and fervor especially to the French victory. He
has chosen them to protect our persons and our goods . . .
My brothers
,
do not let yourself be seduced by the fools who
say . . . "the day of the defeat of French power is coming."
These are pernicious rumors. An affirmed knowledge in God
shows the opposite. 59
Malik Sy reportedly also had special prayers read at his mosque for
the French fighting in Europe.
An interesting sidelight to the colonial uses of the marabus to
inspire loyalty to the government in crisis periods was the exagger-
ated (in light of the actual situation) French fear of pan-African and
pan-Islamic movements. The Senegalese marabus were used as instru-
ments to help keep such movements from forming. They were also re-
garded as barometers of local sentiment. Since the Senegalese marabus
57. Dakar Archives, "Rapport Politique de 1 T Ensemble -AOF" (September
22, 1928).
58. Dakar Archives, "Rapport Confidential sur les Mourites" (January
1914)
,
Dossier.
59. Dakar Archives, Malik Sy (4 Ramadan 1330 AH, reported April 23,
1913), 19 G2 . Malik Sy*s Center was at Tivaouane; he died in
1922.
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apparently knew very little about the rest of the Muslim world (and
in any case were divided among themselves) they usually registered
favorably, but the French fears did not die down over the years. The
official correspondence concerning the dangers of such movements is
particularly voluminous around the time of the first world war because
of the German and Turkish use of Islam in the Middle East. Then, in
the 1920 T s, the authorities were concerned greatly by the explosive
Middle Eastern debate over the Muslim khalifat (although only the
Syrians in Senegal seemed to be acquainted with the issue). 60 The
Director of Political Affairs could write with confidence in 1940 that
Muslims in Senegal were generally out of touch with the major inter-
national political currents, 61 but a constant fear of the potential
dangers of a pan-Islamic movement throughout the interwar period had
pushed the French to depend even more heavily on the Senegalese mara-
bus.
The single most striking example of the multiple services per-
formed by a marabu is provided by Saidou Nourou Tall, who is still one
of the most famous Muslim leaders in West Africa as a result. A two-
volume book of testimonials written by thousands of officials in
France and all over West Africa indicates the way he served the
French. He traveled all over West Africa acting as a mediator in dis-
putes among Muslims and non-Muslims as well. He endorsed health and
sanitation campaigns, encouraged the payment of taxes, and, in line
with the French preoccupation of the period, placed great emphasis on
peanut production. During the pre-World War Two period and the war
years themselves he gave numerous talks supporting France and French
recruitment. When France fell, he adjusted immediately and began to
lecture for the Vichy regime, preaching "peace, calm, confidence and
faithfulness in the work of the great Marshal P£tain." When Africa
was liberated, he reversed himself again and led the campaign for
General de Gaulle. 62
In return for the multiple services performed for them, the
administrative officials allowed Saidou Nourou numerous privileges
,
such as free travel on the railway or ships, and awarded him many
honors (by 1957 he had been the recipient of twenty-four different
60. The administrators in France were apprently more concerned than
their subordinates in Senegal. See the argument over a Syrian
demonstration in Dakar — Dakar Archives
,
Minister to Governor
General (December 10, 1933), No. 305, 19G 63 (108) FM. However,
even those administrators who were stationed in Senegal seemed
more alarmed than the actual facts warranted. See P. J. Andr£,
"Rapport No. 2 h M. le Gouverneur G£n£rale" (March 26, 1923);
also P. J. Andr6, "Rapport sur les tendences actuelles de
1 T Islam" (January 5, 1923) and "Deux Rapports du S£n£gal" (March
29, 1923), 19G 25 (108) FM.
61. Dakar Archives, Director of Political and Administrative Affairs
to Inspector General of Education (January 10, 1940), No. 77,
AP/2
,
19 G 63 (108) FM.
62. See Dakar Archives, Weygand (May 19, 1941) and other letters in
untitled book on Saidou Nourou Tall (2 vols.), 19G (108) FM.
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medals). 63 Most importantly, Saidou Nourou became identified with the
power of the French. Consequently, when people wanted a favor from
the administration they went to Saidou Nourou, whose intervention with
the colonial rulers seemed to be effective. His stature, like that of
Ahmad Bamba or Shaykh Sidya, was enhanced and he became more powerful
than before. In territories where anticolonial struggles were partic-
ularly violent and bitter, Saidou Nourou T s collaboration might have
undermined his position. But in Senegal, where such a struggle was
not widespread in the early twentieth century, Saidou Nourou’ s tem-
poral power was reinforced. 64
Indeed the French had various ways of rewarding and reinforcing
their allies such as Saidou Nourou. They gave gifts in money which
sometimes included large amounts. Such political donations dated back
to the earliest days of French colonialism and were expected to help
keep the marabus tied to the French regime. It became a matter of
habit for families of the great marabus to expect money from the
government. As late as 1946 the head of Shaykh Sidya’ s family
63. His honors were Grande Croix de la Legion d’Honneur, Grand Offi-
cier de l’Etoile Noire du B£nin, Grand Cordon de Comores, Comman-
deur de la M£daille du M£rite Agricole, Grand Officier de l’Etoile
d’Anjouan, Commandeur de la M4daille de Nichan et Anouar, Com-
mandeur de la M£daille de la Sant£ Publique, Commandeur de la
M6daille de 1’ Humanity, Commandeur de la M£daille de Bienfai-
sance, Commandeur de la M£daille de Philanthropic, Commandeur de
la M£daille des Oeuvres de la R£publique Franqaise, Officier de
1’ Instruction Publique, Officier de l’Ordre Royal de Cambodge,
Officier d’Academie, M£daille Coloniale, M£daille des Epidemies,
Capitaine Aumonier, Commandant de Nichan Iftikhar, Commandant de
Nichan Alavit, Commandeur du M£rite Saharien, Commandeur de 1’ En-
couragement de la Rgpublique, Grand Cordon de l’Ordre des Pion-
niers (Liberia), Grande Croix de l’Ordre National du S4n£gal, and
Commandeur de Palmes Acad£miques. (He later received the Order
of Tunisia in 1965-1966.) See Service de la Presse et de Docu-
mentation du S6n£gal, El Had.i Saidou Nourou Tall . It is inter-
esting that the Vichy regime, which also used Saidou Nourou, did
not really trust him. Consonant with their harder line toward
marabus
,
they were critical of him in a number of ways . He was
accused of having relations with Morocco and Bathurst and of sup-
porting people whose loyalty was not above suspicion. Dakar
Archives, "Rapport Politique du S4n£gal" (1940), 2G 40.26.
64. Modernist Muslim groups have been very critical of Saidou Nourou
Tall, because he became so identified with the French. One of
the most negative notes about him comes from Guinea. In this
note the authors insist that he had insulted the name of marabu
by acting as a political agent for the French. Interestingly
enough, one of the signatories of the note is Sekou Toure, then
head of the Union Malink£. Dakar Archives, "Motion d’ Indignation
et Protestation," by representatives of the Groupement Sousou,
Amicale de Gilbert Veillard (Foulah)
,
Union Malink4, Union Fores-
tifcre. Parti Progressiste Africain de Guin6e, Victimes de Vichy,
19G (1) FM.
65. Dakar Archives, Decree (March 22, 1913), Fonds Secrets, see List
of Expenditures, 17 G 24.
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received 2000 francs as a political gift on the occasion of a trip
through Senegal. 66
More important than outright gifts of money to the marabus was
the increasing French involvement in what had been strictly intra-
brotherhood affairs. Their involvement was a matter of discontent for
some marabus, but individual marabus found various uses for the colo-
nial authorities. The French became agents for the Muslim leaders,
providing advice, material assistance (for certain projects), and
sometimes force to settle a quarrel as in the case of the Murids’ suc-
cession crisis. Thus, too, the Qadiri marabu Bu Kunta asked for
French support for his son and heir Bekkai. Accordingly, when Bu died
in 1914, the French were saddled with an enormously complicated suc-
cession problem. Bu had been very wealthy (he had left approximately
one million francs)
,
and his heirs fought among themselves over their
rights. More than four of his numerous consorts claimed to be his
legal wives (and not concubines)
,
and several of them refused to ac-
cept Bekkai as the administrator of the estate and guardian for the
minor children. Eventually, the French, with the help of Paul Marty,
straightened the matter out, but not before large numbers of com-
plaints and accusations had been ruled on by the administrators. 67
The French also became the source of authorization for mosques
,
which were prestige symbols for the marabus. The colonial officials
were drawn into quarrels over who should build a mosque and who should
become its imam (nominal leader of the parish and director of the
Friday prayer) . In principle they attempted to remain neutral in
these matters, but in practice they gave preference to marabus who
aided them. The Dakar Archives contain a large correspondence relat-
ing to the mosques, a correspondence which indicates the considerable
number of transactions involved. 68 The letters also show that the
French were trying to appear as the benefactors of Islam in their
dealings over the mosques. Therefore, the administration frequently
gave money for the mosques
,
although usually in small amounts . Thus
,
Governor General de Coppet gave 100 francs to a mosque in Medina in
1937.69 Important marabus sometimes received more substantial assist-
ance — for example Ibrahima Niass, an important Tijani leader, re-
ceived a fifty percent reduction in the duties on the building mate-
rials which were shipped from Dakar for his mosque. ^0
Gradually, then, as the years went by, the cooperation between
the French and the marabus was taken for granted. Symbolically, high
government officials began to appear at important Muslim ceremonies.
This had not always been the case. A political report in 1917 noted
66. Dakar Archives, Director of Political, Social and Administrative
Affairs to Director of Cabinet (March 22, 1946), No. 524, 19 G 3
(1) FM.
67. See Dakar Archives, Dossier, ’’Succession Bou Kounta,’’ 13 G 67.
68. For example, see Dakar Archives, Lieutenant Governor to Governor
General (April 22, 1909), No. 672, 13G 67; Malik Sy to Lieutenant
Governor (September 2, 1916), 13G 72; Governor General to Amadou
Diagne Latyr (April 11, 1938), 19G 63 (108) FM.
69. Dakar Archives, Letter No. 619 A/G (March 12, 1937), and Governor
General to Administrator (March 22, 1937), No. 275, 19G 63 (108)
FM.
70. Dakar Archives, Ibra Niasse (March 27, 1937); Director of Cabinet
(May 3, 1937); Governor General to Inspector (May 12, 1937); A1
Hajj Kane (February 18, 1938), 19G 63 (108) FM.
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with satisfaction that, as the marabus gained confidence in the
French, they tended to stop hiding their activities and even invited
the administrators to participate in their ceremonies, although a few
years before Europeans were systematically excluded. 71 The inclusion
of French officials in Muslim ceremonies became an accepted part of
Muslim life in Senegal. When in 1937 the Governor General himself
appeared at Tabaski (the Festival of the Lamb ceremony), leading
Muslims greeted this as a noble gesture and an honor. 72 The Governor
General appeared in order to show his administration’s sympathy for
Islam, 73 and his move was imitated by subsequent heads of the AOF.
This move cemented the identification which had taken place between
the marabus and the French. At every level now administrators offi-
cially were present at Muslim festivals and the major Muslim cere-
monies became the occasion for important speeches in which the great
contribution to Islam by the French was praised and the solidarity
between the Muslim rulers and the colonial authorities underlined .74
The Failure of the Early Policy
Clearly, the early policy adopted by the French had failed.
The French had hoped to stop the spread of Islam, disseminate the
French language and culture, and end the marabus’ exploitation of the
masses by destroying the Muslim leaders’ temporal power. As far as
their first goal was concerned, the colonial officials were completely
unsuccessful. Islam continued to attrae^t-adherents while the various
brotherhoods were able to extend their membership among neighboring
Muslim and pagan peoples despite the "politique des races." Thus,
membership in the Muridiyya rose from 70,000 in 1912 to 400,000 male
members in 1963.75 The number of Muslims in Senegal went from ap-
proximately 1,026,000 in 1907 to 2,798,320 in 1963, while the total
African population rose from 1,120,000 to 3,110,000.76 Even allowing
for different methods of estimation in different periods — early
estimations probably exaggerated the number of people called Muslim
— the number of Muslims as well as the size of the population almost
trebled.
The second goal — the spread of French language and culture —
was to be achieved by extending French education and restricting the
Qu’ranic school. But attempts to enlist the support of the marabus
71. Dakar Archives, "Rapport Politique du S6ndgal" (July 6, 1951),
No. 1811.
72. Dakar Archives, Abd el Kader Diagne to Governor General (February
25, 1937), 19 G 63 (108) FM.
73. Dakar Archives, Governor General (February 17, 1937), 19 G 63
(108) FM.
74. For example, Dakar Archives, "Report of the Tabaski Prayer"
(January 20, 1940), 19 G 63 (108) FM.
75. Nekkach, "Unpublished Report"; Vincent Monteil, "Une Confr£rie
Musulmane: Les Mourides du S^ndgal," Archives de Sociologie des
Religions (1962), 88-90.
76. Louis Verriere, "La Population du S£ndgal (Aspects Quantitatifs)
"
(unpublished Fh.D. dissertation, Dakar University, 1965), 73;
Government of AOF, Situation Ggndrale . . . pour l’Annge 1907
(Dakar, 1908).
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in modern education schemes had limited success. The marabus dis-
couraged their disciples from attending French schools whenever pos-
sible. Ahmad Bamba, for example, was forced to agree to pay for a
school in M’Backe which taught French to Murid disciples, and had to
send other taalibes to the French school in Diourbel.77 But neither
he nor his successors apparently sincerely encouraged their followers
to attend French schools. Thus, the M T Backe school never received
much support, even after its removal to Diourbel in 1915.78 The
French Murid school, which taught basic methods of agriculture as
well as French, was received with more enthusiasm as a 1932 report
indicates, 7 9 but it was never expanded or duplicated in other places.
Nor did the French-sponsored madrassa in St. Louis flourish. It never
had more than a handful of students and eventually was abolished. In
1936 Governor General de Coppet proposed the creation of another such
madrassa to be combined with a national mosque which he proposed to
construct. 80 But money for the school and mosque was not forthcoming
(perhaps because of the war) . The madrassa was never built and the
mosque itself was not constructed until Senegal was independent.
The Qu’ranic schools remained virtually untouched by the ad-
ministration for the strict 1903 and 1906 legislation was never imple-
mented. Paul Marty himself had deplored these decrees as unrealistic
and impractical. 81 He would have continued to demand a registry of
students and to encourage the marabus to send their pupils to French
schools, 8 2 but even his limited proposals were not enforced. It was
not until the Vichy regime that there was any attempt to reform the
schools along the lines proposed in the early legislation. The Vichy
regime was much less tolerant of the marabus than its predecessors
had been and sought to limit their activities in a number of ways, one
of which was to restrict their Qu T ranic schools. The 199-0 Annual
Political Report echoes many of the criticisms made thirty or forty
!
years before, thus indicating that the situation had not much changed,
j
The Qu T ranic schools, it said, did not meet requirements of health or
of intellectual achievement since the majority of the marabus were
i notoriously ignorant. The children were expected and forced to work
for their marabu and to beg for him. They were punished by being
beaten. These schools were too often "like a school of charlatanism
where the pupil benefits as quickly as possible from the formulas he
learns in order to sell them as talismans to the people, whom he leads
thus in superstition and opposes our official teaching. "83
A decree was passed in July 1942 to remedy the situation sound-
ing in large part like a repetition of the 1903 and 1906 laws. It had
eight major provisions requiring: (1) administrative authorization
77. Dakar Archives, Commandant of Baol, "Rapport sur Ahmadou Bamba et
les Mourides” (October 31, 1913)
,
No. 16316 (cabinet stamp)
,
Dossier.
78. Dakar Archives, Commandant of Baol, "Rapport Ahmadou Bamba et
ses Mourides" (October 22, 1915), Dossier.
79. Dakar Archives, "Rapport Politique du Sdndgal" (1932), 2G 32.21.
80. Dakar Archives, "Rapport Politique du Sdndgal" (1937), 2G 37.1,
and letter No. 916, AP/2 (June 15, 1937), 19G 63 (108) FM.
81. Marty and Salenc, Les Ecoles Maraboutiques
,
75.
: 82. Ibid., 48, 74-86.
|
83. Dakar Archives, "Rapport Politique du Sdndgal" (1940), 2G 40.26.
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before a school could be opened; (2) registration of all existing
schools to be approved before the following January; (3) inspection
of schools by the Chef de Service de l T Enseignement; (4) that no
students be sent to beg; (5) that the marabu have enough monetary re-
sources so as not to exploit his pupils; (6) that the teaching marabu
be Senegalese; (7) that no Qu’ranic school be located in animist ter-
ritory; and (8) that the refusal of authorization or its withdrawal
be made by the Governor. 84 But by the end of 1943, the Vichy gov-
ernment had been replaced by the Gaullist regime. Many Vichy laws
were revoked, among them the provisions for the Qu T ranic schools on
the grounds that these provisions interfered unjustifiably in reli-
gious matters and trampled on tradition and religious liberty.
The laws passed in 1942 have not been followed, the return
to the republican faith making it a duty for the Administra-
tion not to interfere in confessional questions and the text
of 1942 attacking both custom and religious liberty. 85
Thus, the only serious effort to control Qu T ranic schools was dis-
missed with the Vichy regime. The French public education system
also failed to do what had been planned by drawing students away from
the marabus. It was true that many parents quickly recognized the
profit their children could gain from knowing French and technical
skills. The French schools, as a result, generally did not lack for
candidates who wished to prepare themselves for remunerative posi-
tions. However, the French school system grew very slowly over the
years to 1945, largely because little money was invested in it. Few
Senegalese benefited from Western education and few, therefore, knew
French or were acquainted with French culture.
The following chart compares the Qu T ranic schools with the
French. It must be stressed that the figures are crude estimations,
and, furthermore, that estimations were made differently in different
years. Nevertheless, the chart indicates that the number of Qu’ranic
schools continued to grow as did the number of students in these
schools. The number of French schools and pupils attending them also
grew and formed an ever larger percentage of the population. However,
the chart shows that official efforts to restrict the Qu T ranic schools
had very little effect.
One major part of the French program to stop exploitation by
the marabus had been to end the collection of alms by the religious
leaders. As is shown above, the use of Qu’ranic school students to
beg for their masters was never stopped. Similarly, other aspects of
the alms system were never brought under control. Indeed, the income
from alms collections rose to large quantities for the important
marabus in the following years. The Murid marabus, for example, be-
came extremely wealthy. Thus, the commandant of Baol estimated in
1915 that in a good year Ahmadu Bamba disposed of at least 205,000
francs. 86 Forty-one years later, his son Falilou received approxi-
mately 40,000,000 francs from one single festival. 87
84. Dakar Archives, "Rapport Politique du Sdn£gal" (1942), 2G 42.1.
85. Dakar Archives, "Rapport Politique du S6ndgal" (1943), 2G 43.16.
86. Dakar Archives, Commandant of Baol, "Rapport sur Ahmadou Bamba et
les Mourides" (October 22, 1915), Dossier.
Nekkach, "Unpublished Report."87 .
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The French were helpless to prevent the collection of alms by a
marabu from followers who lived around him or who came to visit him.
The trips of the marabus would seem easier to control, but this ap-
parently was not the case. A number of lesser marabus without impor-
tant family connections were tried for the extortion of money and were
imprisoned or fined, 88 but, for the most part, the French did not
interfere with those influential marabus who cooperated with them. As
a result these marabus, with the explicit or tacit sanction of the
authorities, regularly sent their representatives or went themselves
to collect offerings. An early example of such an influential marabu
is Shaykh Saad Bu, a Mauritanian marabu who had helped the French in
their conquest of Mauritania. He made frequent profitable trips to
Senegal until 1913 when he was very old and ill and so fat that he
could not enter the compartment of the Dakar-St. Louis railway. 8 9
His peers continued such trips over the years. The Vichy regime, in
line with its harder attitude toward the marabus, attempted to control
the collection of offerings, but even these administrators did not en-
visage an end to these trips and merely wished to restrict them.
Thus, the political report of 1940 states:
Whatever may be our desire to support the material and moral
situation of certain marabutic families in repayment for the
services rendered by them ... it seems proper at the present
time . . . for trips of this kind to only accredit those
personnages really worthy of particular attention. 90
Even these efforts at control were dropped, however, when the Free
French regained Senegal. The gathering of offerings remained essen-
tially as it had been fifty years before. In fact, if the system was
different, the difference was in the interest of the marabus who could
travel farther than formerly on the railways in the broad areas paci-
fied by the French and could receive free transportation. 91
The final and most important aspect of the French program for
the marabus was to end their role as temporal rulers in Senegal by re-
placing them or undermining them as political leaders. This part of
the Muslim policy was never implemented. There were not enough French
administrators to fill all the temporal functions which the religious
leaders carried out. Moreover, the European officials remained ir-
remediably separated from the people they governed by language.
88. Dakar Archives, Commandant of Kolda (December 1914), 13G 67.
89. Dakar Archives, Lieutenant Governor to Governor General (July 2,
1905), No. 98, 19G 3; Lieutenant Governor to Governor General,
(March 3, 1906), No. 149, 19G 3; "Rapport Politique du S4n£gal"
(1908), 2G 8.10; "Rapport Politique du S4n£gal" (June 18, 1913),
2G 13.8; Governor General, Rapport d T Ensemble 1913 (Dakar, 1916).
90. Dakar Archives, "Rapport Politique du S£n£gal" (1940), 2G 40.2.
91. Not all marabus, of course, could receive free transport. A note
in 1944 points out that a representative of Mamadu Mustafa had
been turned down. He had asked for free transport to the Ivory
Coast to see the disciples of the khalif. But the note also
shows that the khalif himself, or a close relative, would have
been permitted to go. All that the refusal meant was that such
collections should be restricted to "marabus or close members
of their own family whom the administration is interested in sup-
porting or in encouraging their traditional prestige." Dakar
Archives (April 13, 1944), No. 782 AP/2, 19G 3 (1).
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traditions and thought patterns. They tended to feel themselves su-
perior to the Senegalese, and the latter in turn viewed the French
toubabs (Wolof for white foreigners) as alien to their way of life.
There was no question of the French officials actually being able to
replace the marabus as the recognized political leaders.
Many of the aims of the early policy, of course, were approved
of by later administrators — even after the liberation of Senegal.
Numerous Western-educated officials deplored the Qu T ranic schools and
especially the unlimited control of the marabus over their disciples
.
a control which appeared to be a species of exploitation. But
the early Muslim policy failed because it actually was replaced by
another Muslim policy based on a different set of priorities. In the
early 1900*3 the brotherhoods appeared to threaten the hegemony of the
French, but, gradually, as the French hold over Senegal was consoli-
dated, the fear of the brotherhoods faded. Thus, in 1911, the Politi-
cal Report could state tentatively: nAn Islamic movement directed
against our authority [seems to be] difficult if not impossible to
organize, and, in any case, the people scarcely think of such a
thing.” 9 2
The administrators never trusted the marabus entirely, but the
French grew confident of their ability to control the brotherhoods
.
Destruction of the authority of the Muslim leaders, therefore, no
longer seemed as important. The brotherhoods themselves had grown
more conservative since their establishment in Senegal, and this fact
reinforced the impressions of the French. It now became more impor-
tant to use the marabus in whatever ways possible in ruling Senegal.
This became the major plank of the Muslim policy which was consis-
tently pursued throughout the twentieth-century colonial period. The
colonial officials were most concerned with running Senegal peacefully
and at the least possible cost to themselves. There was little money
to invest in West Africa, so the administrators made use of the re-
sources they had, which, in Senegal, seemed to be the marabus. The
use of these as auxiliaries of the French became necessary for the
smooth running of the colony. Concurrently, between the first and
second world wars, the tone of official comments in regard to Islam
changed completely. Thus, in 1937 the Governor General wrote:
There is no longer time for doctrinaire discussions on the
Islamization of West Africa ... It is now an accomplished
fact . . . [Moreover], the morale of the Prophet creates
... a discipline . . . which constitutes against their
[African] disorganization [when] confronted with European
doctrines which are difficult to assimilate, a protection
which it would be imprudent to ignore.
These facts make one ask oneself if it would not be bet-
ter not only to maintain a benevolent neutrality in regard to
Islam, but also to give it . . . active support. 93
92. Dakar Archives, "Rapport Politique du S4n£gal" (August 22, 1911),
No. 1011, 2G 11.7.
93. Dakar Archives, Governor General to Minister of Colonies (June
15, 1937), No. 916 AP/2, 19G 63 (108) FM. It must be recognized
that the personalities of the Governors General (as well as the
Lieutenant Governors and administrators) affected Muslim policy.
For example. Governor General de Coppet probably personally fa-
vored Islam more than his immediate predecessors or successors.
Nevertheless
,
it is still accurate to trace a liberalizing of at-
titude in the 1930 *s in contrast with the early part of the cen-
tury.
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In the pattern of relationships established between the French
and the marabus
,
the marabus may have had the upper hand. In one
sense, however, as the French became more involved in Muslim affairs,
the marabus found themselves more restricted. The religious leaders
could not do exactly what they wanted, for they were bounded by the
limits of French law. If they challenged these limits as Bayaga had
done, they could be destroyed. But the marabus, if they did not re-
volt against the French, had a considerable amount of independence.
They were free to relate to their followers as they had always done.
Moreover, their position was reinforced by privileges granted them by
the colonial officials. The Muslim leaders were recognized by all
as the appropriate intermediaries between the people and the govern-
ment. The marabus, then, had strengthened their political position in
Senegal by becoming allied with the French. The pattern of relations
which had grown up between the French administrators and the marabus
remained in force after the Second World War and was adopted by the
Senegalese politicians when they took control of Senegal. Thus, the
marabus remain today vital parts of the Senegalese political scene.
They are important adjuncts to the Senegalese politicians, although
their position is not identical with their role in the colonial
period. 94^
94-. See Lucy Behrman, Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal
(Cambridge, Mass., 1970) for a detailed discussion of the modern
period.
CHAPTER 11
ISLAMIC INFLUENCES ON POLITICS IN MAURITANIA
Alfred G. Gerteiny
Unlike most other African states, Mauritania’s most crucial and
vexing problem is not primarily one of economic development, although
economic development Is indeed a source of preoccupation to the lead-
ership of this country; it is, rather, tribalism and racialism and
the impact these have on the nation 7 s aim for social, political, and
economic cohesiveness. If tribalism and racialism, however, fetter
such cohesiveness, Islam provides it with a tool which, if used ju-
diciously, may more than counterbalance its negative impact.
Mauritania T s leadership, therefore, must at all times be con-
scious that everything of national importance is conditioned by the
racial and cultural factors and that any development, be it positive
or negative, within such a sphere, has portentous incidences on the
national level and, potentially at least — because of the role that
Mauritania played in Islamic proselytizing since the tenth century --
on the regional one as well. While the importance of this statement
could not be overemphasized, it would appear meaningless without a
brief description of the conditions from which it draws its pertinence
and which clearly exert a significant influence on Moktar Ould Dad-
dah T s thoughts and political behavior. The Islamic Republic of Mau-
ritania is, with nearly 4-19,000 square miles, one of Africa’s largest
states, in fact a large one by any standard, but it is one of the more
sparsely populated — about 1,000,000 inhabitants. 1 The Mauritanian
Republic is not an historic state, though its tribes and its ethnic
and racial components have their own particular histories sung by
ighwiyun , or bards. Nevertheless, should Mauritania withstand the
rigors of present-day politics and grow in stature within the com-
munity of nations
,
then the sum total of these histories would com-
bine, providing both historical roots and cultural richness to the
new state, cementing and reinforcing its emerging social and political
institutions.
Mauritania T s social, economic, and political condition and
development, in short the substance of her current history, is con-
ditioned by geography, which stands both as a constructive and
1. The 1959 official French census estimated Mauritania’s population
at 655,657 inhabitants. In 1964-
,
the Mauritanian government’s
estimate showed 1,200,000 inhabitants. Experienced Mauritanian
observers, however, generally refer to 850,000 inhabitants. See
R£publique Islamique de Mauritanie. Bulletin Statistique et Eco-
nomique (Dec. 1963 - Jan. 19640 for Mauritania’s population
estimates.
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destructive factor to the process of nation building. Geography has
also shaped the country’s ethnic composition and the traditional
social structures of its humanity, influenced its pre-national his-
tory and dictated inter- and intra-racial relations — so important
in the determination and direction of the new country’s political and
philosophical perspectives.
Situated between the 5° and 17° west longitude and the 16° and
27° north latitude, Mauritania belongs, geographically (as do her four
sister states: Mali, Niger, Chad, and Sudan), to Northern Saharan
Africa and, therefore, in a way, to the Middle East and to sub-Saharan
Africa — thus to Black Africa, also. Ethnically and linguistically,
Mauritania’s inhabitants include Hassaniya-speaking^ Bidan (white)
Moors, Hassaniya- and/or Zenet (Berber) -speaking Zenaga tributaries,
and lower caste Sudan (black) Moors, 3 as well as a variety of negroid
minorities, Lekwar (sing. Kewri) ,** whose tongues and traditions are
intrinsically African. Clustered on the northern shore of the Senegal
Rive;r, below the seventeenth parallel, the Lekwar form nations within
the state and move freely into Senegal and Mali — the countries of
many among their relatives --a situation which makes them quite elu-
sive to governmental authority.
The Islamic Republic of Mauritania may thus be described as a
multiracial state, a pluralist society that has not yet jelled, an
amalgamated nation — not a nation in the accepted sense of the term.
In this respect, Mauritania shares similar characteristics and prob-
lems with other African unhistoric states. What distinguishes her
from most other African nations is that her populations include
caucasoids and negroids
,
both conscious of the color bar and both har-
boring prejudices that have for centuries aggravated the normally un-
easy relations found among various ethnic and racial groups and even
among tribes in a primitive setting. Nevertheless, the age-old cul-
tural, historical, and political interaction among this ethnically and
racially diverse tribal population has produced a faint religious bond
manifested in the relatively similar character of their Malakiist
Islam. This single national bond, however, is threatened by the
gradual generalization of modern education and its eventual result —
secularization. The absence of a monolithic Muslim institution.
2. The Hassani Arabic dialect, spoken in its purest form by the edu-
cated monastics (zawya , Fr. Marabout tribes) shows striking
similarities in vocabulary and accent to the Arabic spoken in the
northern hilly countryside of Iraq; actually the Hassaniya is
fraught with Azer and Zenet. It was introduced in the Mauritanian
hinterland by the Bani Hassan, a Yemeni tribe, in the sixteenth
century, following three centuries of isolation in the Wed Dra’
area (southern Morocco)
.
3. The Sudan are not necessarily blackskinned; they form a variety of
castes. This traditionally rigid system has for centuries frozen
social mobility. Mention must be made here of the ’abidin
(slaves) as well as of the harratin (freedmen)
.
M-. The Lekwar include some 130,000 Halphoolaren (Tukulors)
,
65,000
Sarakoles, 20,000 Fulbe and 10,000-15,000 Wolofs and Bambaras.
All these societies are highly stratified.
5. Malikiism in Mauritania combines with Sufism and Maraboutism; these
in turn are influenced by traditional pre-Islamic beliefs, super-
stitions, and magic. What emerges is a particularist Islam dis-
tinguishable in its character and varying in its multiple mani-
festations. Three main turuk flourish in Mauritania; they are.
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indeed the diversity of Islam in Mauritania, manifested by the multi-
plicity of turuq (ways; restricted and often secret brotherhoods),
the jealousies among their leaders and their struggle for political
influence while fettering national cohesion aid in the preservation of
the state through an intricate power-balancing process the success of
which depends almost exclusively upon presidential political finesse.
There really exist two different worlds in Mauritania, neither
willing to lose its identity by assimilation to the other or by re-
gional political regroupement unless, and even then many reservations
exist, Saharan and sub-Saharan entities participate in it, preserving
the delicate racial balance. Indeed, the relative order and security
achieved by the French colonization is deeply appreciated, particularly
by the negroids. Moreover, security, not necessarily peace, was
established in Mauritania by the passage of the loi cadre and the sub-
sequent period of independence^ was greeted by a placid and resigned
people but hardly by a homogeneous or harmonious Mauritania where
social hierarchies and ethnic and racial cleavages, suspicions and
psychologies had survived, 7 aggravated by a then imperceptible, dis-
locating factor inadvertently created through France’s attempts at
universalizing her culture and reinforced by the nature and magnitude
of local oppositions to the spread of this culture — the emergence of
an educated elite drawn mostly from the least privileged strata. ^ The
political and economic problems posed by Mauritania’s emergence as a
sovereign state and the threat to its continued existence by Moroccan
irredentism^ minimized, however, the importance of such sociological
revolution during the first three or four ensuing years.
by order of importance, the Qadiriya, the Tijaniya and the
Shadeliya. These are further irrevocably splintered by the per-
sonal Qur’anic interpretations of the Murabitin (Marabouts) in
their search for virtue and salvation. Furthermore, in this
pursuit they tend to follow a traditional personalist tradition
adding to it innovations of their own. As religious leaders they
hold unlimited power and are often considered as intercessors be-
tween the faithful and God. Such power has, historically, often
been challenged by their rivals.
6. Mauritania was proclaimed independent on November 28, 1960;
internal autonomy, however, had been enjoyed since 1958.
7. For a full description of Mauritania’s society, see Alfred G.
Gerteiny, Mauritania: A Survey of a New African Nation (New
York, 1967).
8. While cooperation among Mauritania’s populations was fostered by
the introduction of French as a vehicular language, the minister-
ing of modern education was unintentionally unevenly distributed by
the colonial administration as the children of tributaries, freed-
men, and slaves were quietly substituted by the aristocratic
classes in an attempt to "preserve their own children from the
evil effects of the infidels’ teaching." Such practice was com-
mon both among Moors and Lekwar. On the other hand, the latter
being sedentary as opposed to the nomadic Moors, more sustained
contacts with the colonizer led to a numerically more important
spread of modern education among them — thus the seeds of a
social revolution were inadvertently sown.
9. For further discussion, see Kingdom of Morocco, Minister of For-
eign Affairs, White Paper on Mauritania (Rabat, 1960), and R.I.M.,
La Rgpublique Islamique de Mauritanie et le Royaume du Maroc
(Paris, 1960).
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The man upon whose shoulders political responsibility was
vested, Maitre Moktar Ould Daddah, well-born member of the monastic
Wlad Berri tribe, seemed to have realized from the outset the enormity
of the task of building a modern nation in Mauritania when he decided
on the choice of its juridical name, ’’The Islamic Republic of Mauri-
tania.” Indeed, the Islamic epithet was judiciously added as a per-
manent reminder of the common heritage and bond upon which a nation
could be built. Timid, retiring, introverted, and docile, pious and
intensely human are perhaps his most outstanding characteristics and
those which made him most suitable for the highest office in Mauri-
tania and most acceptable to the French who wished to maintain a cer-
tain influence there as well as to the Mauritanian traditional leader-
ship who sought to preserve, even to augment, their influence.
Moreover, he is a French-trained jurist (then the only one in
Mauritania) and a Muslim scholar with a pronounced ability to recon-
cile divergent viewpoints; a consumated arbitrator — exactly what
Mauritania needed.
Ould Daddah T s traditional Islamic education and his modern
French training pervade his philosophical being and such ambivalence
is evident in all his actions and thoughts. Allah T s Our* an and Mon-
tesquieu^ Esprit des Lois are his most constant references. His
government is both Islamic and Republican; the first attribute does
not necessarily connote intolerance nor does the second necessarily
imply democracy. In fact, ’’Islamic Republic” carries a contradiction
similar to that suggested in ’’Catholic University.”
Moktar Ould Daddah is not prone to theorizing; nor has he,
since assuming office, found leisure to think out or conceive an
elaborate personal theory molded to the physiognomy of his people
and their particular circumstances. The absence of systematic philo-
sophical works does not, however, necessarily imply an absence of
philosophical thought and his political ideas and philosophy of
history must be culled from less formal and direct sources, adding
to their authenticity and richness. As a pious Muslim issued from a
tribe of monastic tradition in a desert milieu, religion — Islam —
pervades his way of thinking marking his attitude toward life, the
nature of man, his purpose on earth, and his ultimate destiny, as well
as his attitude toward history and government. As a Moor, however,
his Islam, though orthodox as to its basic tenets and Malikiist as to
its jurisprudential appertinence
,
is marked by a series of long di-
gressions evolved through centuries of independent development ingen-
iously molded to suit the particular circumstances of a singular
milieu, its heritage and requirements. Indeed, Moorish Islam has a
character of its own, traditional reformism, and a peculiar malea-
bility to political and sociological imperatives.
Islamic eschatology is omnipresent in Moktar T s mind but it does
not necessarily lead to classical negative Islamic fatalism. And
though Ould Daddah subscribes to providentialism
,
there is much room
left in his philosophy for a determinant free will. In fact, it is
this happy blend of rationalism and spiritualism that makes for his
enlightened realism toward both the past and the future as history.
The following sentence is most illuminating in this context; Ould
Daddah often uses it to close his speeches and in discussions: ”May
Allah aid us to persevere in the way we have traced for ourselves.”
Ould Daddah T s philosophy of history is dialectical and therefore
Muslim in form. Substantially, however, it reflects the intense
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political insecurity so characteristic of Africa T s new nations but in
its Mauritanian complexion. As do most rational and total historical
projections, it seeks universal order, harmony, and peace.
In this context there is a dialectic of insecurity-^ in Ould
Daddah T s mind which is environmental and traditional, historical and
experiential; in a simplified three -level form, proceeding from the
basic Mauritanian family unit, the tent, as a thesis which, though
offering an admirable example of group solidarity and mutual help is
quite insecure in a desert milieu, he moves on to the less insecure
antithesis of the fraction and from there to that of the tribe as the
synthesis. From that synthesis the second level of the dialectic of
insecurity takes off with the tribe as the thesis, the ahel (confed-
eration) as the antithesis, and the nation as the synthesis. Simi-
larly, the third level would give us the following picture, the one
that refers to Ould Daddah T s historical projection, with the Mauri-
tanian nation as the thesis
,
African Unity as the antithesis
,
and
world unity as the synthesis insuring world peace. In the same vein,
Ould Daddah T s cry, "Faisons ensemble la Mauritanie," basically a call
on the tribal and ethnic entities within Mauritania to work together
for the preservation, in fact for the creation, of the nation, re-
bounds theoretically into two distinct echoes: the first one, fol-
lowing national consolidation, being "Faisons ensemble l T Afrique,"
an achievement which would insure the integrity of his borders and
eliminate African claims to it while eradicating the centrifugal
forces of racial origins from within — similarly, this would ulti-
mately reduce the threat of neocolonialism in Africa — therefore, in
Mauritania; the second one, "Faisons ensemble le Monde,” seeks com-
pletely to eliminate neocolonialism and prevent international aggres-
sion and its consequences at home, insuring perpetual peace and
cooperation on a humane level and without the lure of nationalistic
gains. All this serves to emphasize Ould Daddah T s great preoccupa-
tion with survival in Mauritania, stressing what may be called his
"enlightened nationalism." His basic problem, nevertheless, in the
present and immediate future remains to create a Mauritanian nation.
To this end he seeks the utilization of, rather than reliance upon,
Islam; of precolonial and colonial experiences as well as his personal
academic acumen and administrative background. "May God aid us to
follow the way we outlined for ourselves; building a stronger and hap-
pier Mauritania within a free and united Africa and thus participate
in preserving world peace" (November 28, 1964).
With independence gained in 1958 and due to the lack of a bet-
ter alternative, Islam emerged as a living ideology in Mauritania, a
national, intertribal, interethnic, and inter-tariqa bond. The legi-
timization of Islam as the national religion and culture in Mauri-
tania; indeed, the confirmation of this fact through the incorporation
10. While generally one may speak of the existence of a dialectic of
peace, it must be stressed that such dialectic has a motivating
variable relative to the valerian or valetudinarian character of
nations. Indeed, although the ultimate desire — peace — is
singular, the former group of powers seek assurance of peace
while the latter insurance of peace. Hence, it might be more
useful to contrast the dialectic of security of the first case
with the dialectic of insecurity in the second.
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of the Islamic qualification in the official title of the state —
The Islamic Republic of Mauritania — betrays the otherwise frail
basis for unity in Mauritania. Islam in the government of Mauritania,
in spite of this, is only a political subterfuge, and the Islamic
character of the Republic does not imply any conformity with the
classical conception of the Islamic polity. And while it suggests
that republicanism in Mauritania must be mindful of the Islamic heri-
tage, so important as a national bond, it suggests also that Islam
must accommodate modern realities.
Religion is an important factor in the state but it does not
alone give its content to the state, not even to an Islamic
state. The law of the state is derived from religion but the
state abstracts itself in practice from the whole compass of
its validity and follows its own aims. Human need and effort
have founded the state as a necessity, and it exists for man.
God helps him, enlightens him, and directs him.H
Ould Daddah evokes the past glories of the Almoravid with some detail
in many of his public pronouncements and mentions in general terms the
historical achievements of the Arabs, the Berbers, and of the Mauri-
tanian racial minorities
,
reminding his listeners that the sum of
these experiences constitutes Mauritania T s past. He even often speaks
kindly of the colonial period as an integral part of his nation’s
history. Indeed, while he rejects colonialism today, he considers it
to have been a constructive step toward the creation of Mauritania.
His speech is carefully balanced to give credit wherever due and to
instill a national historical feeling within his constituents. His
references to past history appear as an incentive to rejoin greatness
once more but to rejoin it "together” and, therefore, differently. He
avoids the divisive factors in the histories of his people and em-
phasizes modern reality and present necessities, urging the Mauritan-
ians to adapt and interpret past concepts and to evaluate past history
only in this light.
As its temporal patrimony, the spiritual patrimony of Mauri-
tania shall be preserved. Our country which did so much in
the past for the radiating of Islam remains imbued of Muslim
civilization. But faithful to our humanist tradition, we re-
pudiate sectarianism and affirm the spirit of tolerance which
inspired our constitution .
^
The past, therefore, may have been good and it is important to
look back to it and consider its validity but in its own perspective;
it is a period that has spent itself and could no more be revived in
its original form nor must it be imitated. Thus the past is only im-
portant when it could be used to service the present, and it is evil
if it claims to control and direct the present, if it claims prece-
dence to it or stands as a perspective future. There is, then, almost
an apologetic to Mauritania’s history with a negation of the tradi-
tional biological concept of history as attributed to Caliph Omar.
Instead, Ould Daddah’s concept is organic and, by order of priorities,
national, continental, and universal:
11. Moktar Ould Daddah, speech, November 28, 1960.
12. Ibid.
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If our human groupings represent living entities with par-
ticular vocations [then] we shall superimpose on them a single
entity capable of summarizing them all: Mauritania. To the
forces of distortion [and division] be they from the north or
the south we shall substitute, with our unanimous will, a
single overwhelming idea, a single ideology: the Mauritanian
nation. ... a Mauritania within a free and united Africa
[participating] in preserving world peace. 13
He has what may be called a cosmic view of history, ex-
plaining historical vicissitudes in terms of distinct revolutions or
phases of "light” or day, depicting glory and of "shadow,” darkness
or night, corresponding to gloom. Nevertheless, the nature of the
phase is interpretative and variable not only in time but also
according to its utility and in terms of its ultimate significance
— evolution. This intellectual or rational, as opposed to romantic
or emotional, view of history is characteristic of Ould Daddah T s
duality of mind — Ould Daddah the modern African utilitarian and
Ould Daddah the moral relativist student of Montesquieu.
Thus, French colonialism is referred to as a phase of darkness
in the history of Mauritania but an important, positive factor in the
creation of the nation. "The result of half a century of French pre-
sence in Mauritania is foremost the unity of the fatherland. It is
also a series of realizations that allowed us to progress in all
domains . "1*+ Similarly, Mauritania’s traditional tribal and racial
past was a phase of light because it meant freedom and self-
determination; this represents today, however, a negative centrifugal
factor to nation building. In Ould Daddah* s view, man was created
essentially good; but as a free willed individual in a world of good
and evil, he is both subject to and capable of evil. Evil and malefic
influences may be of natural or supernatural origin. He is a politi-
cal being by nature, with animal instincts and a God-given conscience.
All men are equal before God and before the Law, but circumstances of
physical and intellectual character have, in time, established dis-
tinct traditions and disrupted this equality. Ethics and true reli-
gion must strive to reestablish, in time, equality among men. Such
endeavor will have long-lasting effect if performed through education
and exemplary attitudes. Only thus will the psychologies of the
master and of the slave be transformed and the original designs of
God attained. It may thus be said that Moktar Ould Daddah’s doctrine
includes both causality and natural law and, in this sense, it con-
flicts with some interpretations of orthodox traditional Muslim theo-
logical views; nevertheless, it is essentially similar to the
emerging in the Sunnat Allah so often appealed to in the Qur T an.
Environment, pre-Islamic, Islamic, and colonial heritage in
western Saharan regions have combined to help mold particular natural
orders and definite traditions and characters
,
the legitimacy of which
is only circumstantial and temporal, sociological and political. Thus
desert conditions and historical circumstances gave the Moor his
characteristic individualism; they have helped since his tribalism and
factionalism; they were propitious for the conception and elaboration
of laws governing man’s relationships to man, institutionalizing the
13. Ibid .
14. Ibid.
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ghazi and condoning looting, encouraging slavery, servitudes, depen-
dencies, and exploitations of man by man. But these times, these
circumstances have spent themselves; their creatures must be revoked
without requital but with a full appreciation of their causes and
intentions. Here again, Ould Daddah T s moral relativism is reminiscent
of Montesquieu. He sees no contradiction between his respect for tra-
dition and freedom from it; he is neither a revolutionist nor an
evolutionist; he is a revulsionist. Unlike the traditional Muslim
philosophers and historians, Ould Daddah is not content to summarize
in general terms the historical process, but, like Ibn Khaldun, he
attempts to explain it.
From the providential physical isolation of men, not only from
the world yonder but within what is now called Mauritania, from one
another, a social order was created in which individualism, tribal-
ism, factionalism, rigid caste systems, hierarchism, racism and
slavery combined, tempered, and harmonized by Islam and the word of God
to help man subsist. Society, therefore, exists by man and for him;
it defines his attitude as well as his liberties rather than con-
fining them; it creates balance and harmony. The individual exists
neither by himself nor for himself. Men organize in a society throiigh
which their freedoms and liberties are returned and asserted. In this
way, the individual fashions and serves a society conceived to serve
him in the fulfillment of his destiny; a balance emerges insuring
order and security.
The Mauritanian has thus subsisted within a primitive setting
in a form of society that has spent itself. The balance and harmony
of yesterday spell imbalance and chaos in modern Mauritania; the re-
strictions imposed on the individual under the primitive order and
the traditional relationships between the individual and his society,
although they insured order and security, spell, today, disorder, in-
security, and injustice. The individualism so traditional to the
Moor is seen today as disruptive to progress, to the creation of a
Mauritanian society fashioned to meet the requirements of the modern
world. Thus the ills of the nation appear to be "tribalism, indi-
vidualism, regionalism," all inherited from the colonial system.-^
From the beginning in his first speech as the leader of Mauritania,
Ould Daddah indicated the necessity for change and hinted that a
whole new system of relationships must be conceived to allow for
the unity and growth of the nation and to prevent its dismemberment
as well as its annexation by neighboring nations. He did not, how-
ever, implement his ideas on the subject until 1963, when he incor-
porated them in a vigorous program aiming at the transformation of
society as well as the role of the individual within it. Many reasons
may be advanced to explain this phenomenon; first Ould Daddah waited
until he felt more secure at the helm of government; second, he gave
himself enough time to study his country, its resources, and poten-
tialities both through direct contact with the people and the various
regions of the land and through the various surveys conducted by
foreign specialists working for his government; last, but not least,
he gave his people enough time and opportunities to realize that
neither the traditional system nor the one inherited from the colo-
nizers were suited to the national circumstance. This is one of the
main indexes of Ould Daddah T s revulsionist political philosophy.
15. Opening speech by Ould Daddah, Conference of the Cadre of the
PFM, Kaedi, February 1964.
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Mauritania had to breach a 2000 -year gap with the modern world;
this could not be achieved without a clearly defined plan or by a well
planned program only, but through the "mobilization of all the living
energies of the nation," as he so clearly states over and over again.
Moktar T s attack on individualism may be misleading. It is not, in-
deed, against individualism per se that he stands. In other words, he
is not seeking a totalitarian society. He stands against the type of
"rugged individualism" that was descriptive of the opening of the West
in the United States, against lawlessness and organizations that es-
cape the law of the land; his stand is against the individuals taking
of the law in his own hands and using it for his own selfish purposes.
In his opinion, Mauritania could not be granted the privilege of time
to become a nation. Time, indeed, works against the creation of a
nation unless it is properly used and unless energies are channeled
according to a master plan. Both the individual and the collectivi-
ties, in what is today Mauritania, are self-ordered in a fashion that
is still not nationally conscious. Their interpretation of history is
biological, not organic. It naturally developed from particular en-
vironment and circumstances now negated. It does not answer modern
exigencies. Ould Daddah T s concern with the explanation of the inade-
quacies of the traditional regime are both symptomatic of his attach-
ment to Islam — specifically of his endeavor to reconcile the ideals
of the Shari T a with the facts of history — and of his revulsionist
tactics. Revulsionism may be described as an attempt to bring about a
realization among people of the need for change for the purpose of
enlisting their support in the process of change rather than imposing
change from the top down as would be the case in a revolution. It is
a flagrant attempt at preserving the concept of ijma T so important in
Islamic political and juridical tradition.
Ould Daddah does, indeed, want the individual to be associated
with the government. He wants him to be an organic part of the so-
ciety in which he lives. But he realizes the dangers inherent in such
association without benefit of education and of knowledge. He also
realizes that calling for reforms and change and modernity could be
meaningless without the ultimate understanding of these terms by the
individual -- without the will of the individual to implement and sup-
port the Presidents policies.
The individual remaining in his traditional mileu could not
possibly conceive of a different life, of different ways, of different
possibilities without an example — thus Ould Daddah T s studied policy
of sending, on a rotating basis, individuals on missions abroad, who
obviously do not possess the qualifications for fulfilling political
or diplomatic assignments. The intent of such journeys is to bring
about a realization at the grass-roots level of what a modern state
and a modern society is and what its achievements may be.
Ould Daddah T s concept of the relationships between individual
and society have, according to this writer, remained basically con-
stant since he took office. What has changed are the means the
President has ultimately devised to effect cooperation between the
individual and the government. From the outset, he attempted to
mobilize his people toward the goal of nation-making and nation-
building. He appealed to the various political parties to fuse into
a single comprehensive party in which one and all would concetrate
efforts to this end. The fact that political parties were at first
tolerated though discouraged does not imply that Ould Daddah believed
in the Western concept of democracy at first, although a case could be
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made to this effect. It means, rather, that he had not judged the
time opportune to enforce one-partyism in Mauritanian politics. After
a brief experience in multi-partyism during which he hoped that its
impracticability would become obvious to the Mauritanians
,
he turned
vigorously toward building a single party democracy patterned after
similar examples found in Africa, particularly in Guinea and Mali.
The argument used to support one-partyism in Mauritania was, again,
based on circumstantial exigencies. Just as he had systematically
attempted to convince the people of the necessity of turning away from
the traditional past because of its incompatibility with the modern
concept of nationalism, he attacked party politics as unrealistic in
modern Mauritania:
The Mauritanians have understood this fundamental exigency
(political unity above all) when, beginning in December 1961,
all existing parties fused to give birth to the PFM.
The Mauritanians then became conscious
,
following a full
year of independence, that the hour of reconciliation had
arrived for all and that all energies were to converge toward
a single goal: national construction. Until the birth of the
PFM, our country had known only one kind of political party
(that which only wakes up and stirs the people in electoral
times) . The Unity Congress of December 1961 had condemned
this type of political party to death and decided to substitute
for it a mass party — in other words, a party in which first
place is accorded not to the individual candidate and then to
the elected one, but to the people — to the mass of citizens.
Unfortunately, the ills plaguing our political structures were
not to disappear so easily. We have to transcend a double
past. A traditional past, first where the only structures were
the tribe, the fraction, and the village, all animated by the
spirit of clannishness; a colonial past, second, which be-
queathed upon us other structures ill adapted to our realities,
among which were political parties playing the game of de-
mocracy; such were the two obstacles that had to be surmounted
by the infant PFM — a difficult task demanding determination
and perseverance. Two years passed without victory over either
of the two obstacles [to national unity]. A necessary and
healthy crisis thus developed, which I was thereupon empowered
by the National Political Bureau to solve.
I decided to convoke a conference of the cadres of the Party
which, during its inaugural session was transformed into an
extraordinary Congress. This was the Kaedi Congress of January
1964, which one might already term as an historic one.
Briefly, these were its decisions: to fight against
clannishness while divorcing [the nation] palpably from the
traditional [political] schemes withheld by France and by
other Western countries.
^
This argument, in fact, does not merely attempt to justify a
policy by explaining its reasons; it strongly implies that the new
policy was dictated by the common will. It is not only the substance
of the speech but its form as well that suggests that the President
16. Moktar Quid Daddah, speech, November 28, 1964.
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is not his own agent but that he is acting in the name of the people.
The Constitutional injunction to the President to present a yearly
"Message to the Nation" (Art. *+3) in which he explains his government
activities and aims is not indicative of any kind of adaptation of
Western political democratic practices, in spite of close similarities
to the annual American message of the President to the nation. But
it reflects a modern adaptation of the traditional Muslim political
concept of ijma’ .
There is much in Ould Daddah T s political philosophy that is
wittingly or otherwise derived from the political philosophy of Ibn
Khaldun and, therefore, much in Ould Daddah T s thought stands in con-
tradiction to the teaching of the falasifa who belonged to the same
school of jurisprudence — Malakiist. This is particularly true of
his view on the relationship between the individual and society or
government.
Ould Daddah cannot conceive of polity without social solidar-
ity; to him the lack of social solidarity spells chaos, and multi
-
partyism in Mauritania, in his view, was disruptive of socal soli-
darity; it was, also, totally alien to Mauritania’s experiences:
Polity [mulkj is the natural result of social solidarity
[’assabiyyah j ; it cannot occur as a matter of preference
Liradah J but is solely the consequence of the necessity and
order of existential reality . . . Laws and . . . many other
things that men may be engaged upon require solidarity, since
otherwise their object will not be attained. 17
There is an implication in these words of Ibn Khaldun that
without solidarity on the means to attain a specific goal, that goal
will not be attained. This represents very accurately the philosophy
of Moktar Ould Daddah in reference to party politics. Indeed, he
considers that Mauritania’s circumstances and past history are not
conducive to a natural ’assabiyyah . The subsistence of nations,
tribes, and fractions, as well as of outmoded systems of social hier-
archies within Mauritania would ultimately lead by the sin of pride,
of greed, and of luxury, anathematized by the shari ’
a
, to centrifugal-
ism — the opposite of solidarity — and thus prevent the attainment
of the immediate goal which is national unity — even if such goal
were solidly agreed upon. Ould Daddah ’s rationale is that the most
important and immediate goal of Mauritania is the "construction of the
nation." Since, therefore, a national society (nation) does not exist
but is being constructed, how could the individual be left free to
operate and have a normal relationship with a nonexisting entity. The
individual is, therefore, called upon to deal with a theoretical so-
ciety or an abstraction, something that is beyond the appreciation of
the average citizen. Until, therefore, the individuals at large could,
through education and example, learn to understand the problem with
which they are faced, the government will have to rely exclusively
upon a restricted representative common will, an elite capable not
only of understanding the situation but willing to labor solidly
within it. Meanwhile, all efforts will be made to enlarge the circle
of this elite ultimately to include all individuals. Once national
construction is achieved, then a re-evaluation of the system of rela-
tionships between individual and the state or nation will become
17. Ibn Khaldun, Abd el-Rahman, Muqaddimah (Beyrout, n.d.)
,
202.
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necessary. If Ould Daddah were to edit Ibn Khaldun 1 s words on the
common good and happiness
,
they would read as follows
,
with the
President’s words in parentheses:
The situation concerning the good (of the Mauritanian nation)
is that it is, in reality, achieved through preference and
will (of a knowing and solidary elite) and therefore (Mauri-
tania is capable of becoming a nation and) achieving happi-
ness; and that (Mauritania) which seeks, in the association
of its (elite)
,
cooperation in those things which lead to
(the construction of the nation and therefore) to happiness
(and the common good) is truly the ideal (Mauritania)
.
In his own words, Ould Daddah has put it this way:
Similarly to all underdeveloped countries, Mauritania realizes
the urgent necessity of [conceiving] a political system cut
to its needs. She cannot adopt in their integrality either
the regime of the liberal democracy of the Western world, or
the totalitarian regime of the Communist countries for the
simple reason that she does not possess any of the means re-
quired by [either of] these systems. Our country, in fact,
is in a state of war against centrifugal forces breaking the
construction of the nation and against underdevelopment which
maintain our people in [a state of] misery and ignorance.
Our essential and immediate task consists in creating
a veritable political elite which, in turn, will create a
true public opinion and insure the stability of our economic
options
.
Until, therefore, a true and enlightened public opinion is
created within a true nation, only the party’s opinion will be con-
sidered as the voice of the nation, because at this juncture of the
country’s history there is only an embryonic or atomic nation — the
party (PFM) . As for the ideals of freedom and liberty, they are in
this prenational stage inconceivable.
But one might say, public liberties, freedom of opinion and
of expression particularly are flouted. To this I answer by
asking in turn the following question: What is the freedom
of the hungry man who cannot find salaried work, of the ill
person who does not get relief, of the ignoramus who is
prisoner of his own ignorance? It does not exist, this
freedom. It is a caper brandished by the demagogues whose
aim is to mislead people through borrowed ill concepts. No,
it does not exist. This hungry man who suffers and who is
ignorant, I say that he is subjugated and that he is held in
a condition of human indignity. We must endeavor to create
the social and economic conditions of this liberty, so dear
to us [so one day the average Mauritanian] may say TTyes ,T or
,Tno ,T knowledgeably.
Of course, Ould Daddah in his last sentence seems mistakenly
to interpret freedom and liberty as the simple prerogative of saying
yes or no. Such, however, is not the case. Be that as it may, the
President reiterates his beliefs in freedom and in the full partici-
pation of the citizen, whatever his sex or social condition, in the
politics of Mauritania, but only when a true nation is created in
Mauritania; this, he believes, is a long and tedious process:
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Our final objective? To transform our archaically structured
society into a modern society that will have been capable of
preserving the intrinsic virtues of our people. Such funda-
mental mutation will only be realized in the forthcoming years
,
more precisely, in the forthcoming decades.
It is believed that upon his accession to the leadership of his
country, Moktar Ould Daddah had a sketchy mental blueprint for his
country and his people. Timidly at first and with a certain amount of
compromise which he deemed indispensable but for which he drew severe
criticism by the more impatient segment of the population sharing his
views of a homogeneous Mauritania, he later grew more assertive as he
learned to grasp and utilize power. Nevertheless, in his utilization
of power he has never, thus far, transformed it into ruthlessness.
Rapidly, through constitutional amendments and the legal prerogative
stemming from them, he transformed the government into a republican
regime which strengthened it. As the secretary general of the PFM and
head of the government, he manoeuvered and made the existence of rival
political parties and opposition groups virtually impossible.
The free existence of parties, symbol of classical democracy,
must be prohibited for reasons that I have lengthily explained.
This is why the National Political Bureau has proposed in the
course of the meeting ... of the National Assembly to insti-
tutionalize the PFM, which will thus become the only Mauri-
tanian political party (and this is to bring about an amend-
ment to our 1961 constitution, art. 9). This decision is a
turning point in the political history of our country. Both
officers and party militants will demonstrate their ability
in this new orientation and make out of the PFM a true mass
party where, from the grass roots to the top, free discussion
will exist, limited only by the final decision of the majority
of the members.
In other words
,
Ould Daddah following the examples of Guinea
and Mali, in particular, believes in a dictatorship of the party, or
to put it kindly, in single-party democracy the decisions of which are
autocratically applied. Ould Daddah relishes quoting President Nassir
of the United Arab Republic, whom he admired boundlessly. In fact,
beginning in 1964, following a de facto recognition of Mauritania by
the UAR, Nassir has become Ould Daddah T s model of leadership. Ould
Daddah, without being a demagogue, relentlessly tells his people that
with their help he will build a Mauritania where goodness, happiness,
and ease will prevail.
But, some may ask, who will lead [this] country to this
[garden of] Eden? A dictator with boundless powers who would
impose his will on the people? Dictators do exist around
the world, this is true. But I know that in Mauritania an
aspirant dictator would be doomed to failure.
The President of the I.R.M., secretary general of the PFM,
holds, in fact, important political and constitutional powers.
As long as he will hold them, he will be inspired by a single
will — to substitute to the man that he is and that his suc-
cessor will be a responsible team, veritable dorsal spine of
the country.
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Such remarks and many others indicate the President’s resigna-
tion to the fact that his position is not a permanent one. In fact,
he told this author in answer to a question that he "will gladly leave
the Presidency when the people [one must understand the Party] will
have decided that I have accomplished my task."
Indubitably, Ould Daddah believes that democracy is the privi-
lege of the developed nations and autocracy that of the underc /eloped
ones. He also hints that totalitarianism is not all evil and that
in some instances it is indispensible to a responsible leadership. As
a good Muslim, however, and, therefore, a believer in the spirit of
iima’ — be it a restricted one — he rejects personal dictatorship
while favoring the party dictatorship which, in a Muslim context, is
the dictatorship of i.jma T — of the community or its representatives.
Indeed, as Ibn Khaldun would say, "The ’assabyyah [association of men
for mutual assistance] fulfills the wise purpose of God for their sur-
vival and preservation of the species"; without the help of the com-
munity, therefore, what God has willed for the populations by them as
his vice-regents, could not be perfect.
Briefly, the task that is expected of us demands a party the
prime concern of which is to officer the masses who have be-
come in the industrialized countries as well as in underde-
veloped tones] a determinant political factor.
It tour task] demands methods, not totalitarian [per se ] but
authoritarian [thus restricting the concept of political par-
ticipation as conceived in the West], borrowing, but after
thought [and necessary modification], certain methods used
in the totalitarian countries.
This apologetic of Ould Daddah’ s concept of political power is,
indeed, indicative of his character and upbringing. It may be said
that he is a utilitarian, but an Islamic one, as a wise leader he seeks
support for his actions in an attempt to prevent his own downfall; as
a Muslim leader, he seeks the sanction of the i.jma
’
because through
popular consent even a wrong is right. Indeed, Islam holds that God
does not allow decisions made by the totality of his community or
its representatives to be wrong.
What can one think of Ould Daddah’ s political philosophy? Will
it have any effect on the shape of the developing political system in
Mauritania? It is not our intent in this paper to discuss the rela-
tionship of ideology to politics
,
although such an answer seems im-
perative at this point. Nevertheless, such an answer will hopefully
emerge within our evaluation of Ould Daddah ’s thinking and action in
the context of Mauritania’s political community. In Ould Daddah ’s
attempt at creating a nation and, given the difficulties he has en-
countered in this endeavor, he came to distinguish between his
country’s natural community and its politically and legally defined
community — the former including but represented by the latter.
Though a nationalist fundamentally, Ould Daddah rejects the
nineteenth-century nationalist concept of the legitimate rights of
the entire natural community to government. As a twentieth-century
nationalist, he seeks to shape and adapt the primitive segments of
the natural community for full political participation in political
affairs. As an African nationalist, however, he recognized only that
segment of the elite which shares his views or which happens to be in
a better position of power, denying their political rights to the
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others. He considers the primitive segments of the Mauritanian soci-
ety as having once been ideal societies; modern circumstances,
however, have made them liabilities rather than assets. It is because
of the presence of these liabilities that Ould Daddah refuses to re-
cognize the legitimacy of the opposing elites. It may be argued that,
assuming Ould Daddah is convinced of the rightness of his policies
,
he underestimates the intelligence of the primitive segment of his
citizens and their abilities to distinguish right from wrong. Thus,
in a doctrinaire fashion, he refuses to expose these "minors” to the
baneful effects of the opposition to protect them, as it were, from
succumbing to its evil. His beliefs in man and his free will appear
in this fashion diminished, and his constant reference to Mauritania
as being "the land of Man" seems meaningless. On the other hand, if
we were to assume that Ould Daddah is not necessarily convinced that
the oppositions policies would not be at least as positive as his
in creating a nation, then we could find no justification to this
opposing elite and we would term him a dictator.
From a practical and utilitarian point of view, the immediate
aim of his selective democracy, that of insuring the rapid creation of
a nation out of a primitive society, is easily understandable if not
acceptable.

CHAPTER 12
WOMEN IN AFRICAN ISLAMIC LITERATURE
Lyndon Harries
The term literature in the present context is taken to refer
to texts either from the oral tradition or from the literate tradi-
tion. The latter includes modern works in a European language, of
which there are at present only a few, and traditional works emanating
from an African society, notably in Swahili and Hausa, where there has
long been a literate tradition.
The greater part of oral tradition in Islamic Africa is still
unrecorded. Even so the corpus already available is much larger than
what exists in the literate tradition, but any comparison between
texts from the oral tradition and, say, modern works in a European
language by Muslim writers, is likely to be irrelevant. The latter
attempt to provide a unified work of art. This is also true of tra-
ditional poetry in the vernacular, e.g. Swahili poetry, in which the
written word is meant to be a complete, unified work upon which the
musical accompaniment is superimposed, a melody freely based on some
Arabian modal scale. The author and the performer are usually dif-
ferent persons. But texts from African oral tradition reflect only
one aspect of the original creation. Poetry from the oral tradition
is usually a combination of literary and of some other art like song
or/and dance.
For the oral tradition, terms like "poetry," "literature," or
"poetic function” have to be defined with reference to the particular
genre of a particular work. Generally, in referring to such works we
use much too loosely terms that belong to the literary criticism of
works from the modern literate tradition. For such terms to be valid
in the traditional African context, they must be capable of transla-
tion into the relevant African language, but far too often they are
not. Even the use of the word "poetry" has to be qualified when re-
ferring to works from African oral tradition.
Literature has always been the dominant art of the Muslim
world. The one great contribution of the Arabs to Muslim civilization
was their literary tradition, which includes the Koran. For this
reason we might expect to find strongly contrastive features between
African Islamic literature and African Islamic oral tradition, but
this is not the case. Both the written and oral literatures from
Islamic Africa share many similar stylistic and contextual features.
The reasons for this lie in basic attitudes of Muslim society found
also in African tribal society. For example, the Muslim hates change.
For the Muslim, the best Islam was in the beginning. By looking back,
by changing to the ways of the first Muslims — the equivalent in this
connection of the tribal elders — by upholding the tradition of the
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ancients and by rejecting innovation, the qualities of the early bet-
ter representatives of the community would be preserved in contem-
porary society.
As Grunebaum has written of Islamic literature after A.D. 1000,
"In terms of achievement this leaning toward the past, this craving
for the static, are expressed in depreciation of originality. Inno-
vation became less important that formulation; wording outranked
meaning. "1
Grunebaum T s comments about Arabic literature apply equally to
African oral tradition and also to Islamic literature in an African
language, like Berber, Hausa, or Swahili. For instance, he writes,
"Arabic literature never had been at its best when individualizing
its figures . . , Only rarely did the writer round off his observa-
tions to achieve the portrayal of a character who would act out the
qualities ascribed to him by his inventor. "2 In this connection the
present writer has previously noted that
African folk-tales may sometimes be about ordinary people
and everyday African things, but the characterization is
presented in such bold relief that no room is left for the
subtleties normally associated with literary presentation.
The narrator is hardly ever involved in what he relates.
Behind any Cinderella in African folk-tales it is difficult
to imagine any other Cinderellas. One would be enough if
she were delineated as a real person, but this seldom happens.
T. S. Eliot’s maxim that humankind cannot bear very much re-
ality seems equally true of Africans in relation to their
oral tradition.
3
So any criticism that this discussion of women in African Is-
lamic literature does not provide the reader with a description of
individual women becomes void. Individualization of the female char-
acter simply does not occur in African Islamic literature, neither in
the written nor in the oral tradition. The women are types of the
good or the bad. Within the tradition of Islam this springs from the
Muslim habit in Arabic literature of dissecting the human character
into individual qualities such as pride and humility, liberality and
miserliness, truthfulness and dishonesty, which were discussed one
after another, preferably in pairs of opposites. "Individual man or
woman was interesting merely as an illustration of a general observa-
tion which was owed to the sagacity of one of the wise."
1
*
Similarly, in African oral tradition most characters represent
a particular trait. The strong moralising element which is a feature
both of Islamic and of African tribal tradition partly accounts for a
hierarchy of types whereby the triumph of any one conventionally ac-
ceptable trait over its opposite is assured in predictable and, at
least to the Western reader, rather monotonous fashion.
1. Gustave E. von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam (Chicago, 1953)
,
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2. Ibid
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3. Lyndon Harries, "Vernacular Literature in African Language Teach-
ing , " Proceedings of Conference on African Literature (Evanston
,
1966), 69.
4. Grunebaum, Islam
.
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Women as represented in Islamic literature in an African ver-
nacular are anonymous. Though the women of the Prophet T s family are
known by name, each name identifies a prototype of Islamic womanhood.
Each possesses all of the womanly virtues. Within the Islamic oral
tradition of Africa, women are equally anonymous. Though the female
characters of a local folk-tale may each be given a name, the name
merely identifies a particular type of woman. Only the prototypes
have all of the virtues
,
but a local folk-type may possess more than
one of the vices which one shining good trait in the person of a hero
or heroine is able to overcome.
This anonymity or impersonality springs from social custom,
whether Islamic or tribal. Islamic convention forbade the use of
real names of womenfolk in Mohammedan times. Slave girls might be
mentioned; ladies never. Although the rigor of this convention re-
laxed as time went on, it should be remembered that African Islamic
literature is related to the earliest Mohammedan period of literary
creation, notably the earliest biographies of the Prophet and his
Four Companions, designated as Maghazi literature. ^ Love poetry
resembles that of classical, that is pre-Islamic, poetry whereby the
beloved T s physical charms are praised in consecutive sequence from
head to pretty toes. Although acquaintance with a single poem of
this type is an intriguing and happy experience, further acquaintance
with other poems of the same type from different areas results in the
disappointing conclusion that it is the same woman whose charms the
poets set forth with, on the whole, comparable skill and similar
conventions. When a more modern African poet in the Islamic tradi-
tion writes charming love lyrics expressing personal sentiment for
the beloved, we are indebted more to the invention of a poet who is
an African than to Arabian Islamic convention.
Whereas African oral tradition excludes detailed description
of the female anatomy — most African peoples have a strong tradition
of modesty in this respect — there is much the same convention of
anonymity in representing female characters in tales and in poetry.
Although a woman may be given a name, it is usually a common personal
name enabling the hearer merely to identify the character. The names
of women in African Islamic oral tradition are well known only in the
sense that they are in fact common names and not because of any indi-
vidual memorable characteristics identifying the holder of a particu-
lar name as an unusual woman. In Islamic African convention it was
contrary to custom to attract public attention to the women. Women
saints and teachers might be given recognition, but the average Afri-
can Muslim preferred his womenfolk to stay home and live an incon-
spicuous life.
In the development of new ideas and patterns of behavior fol-
lowing the industrial revolution in Africa, it is a commonplace that
women remain far behind their menfolk. It still remains true that the
majority of African women are illiterate. As with the men, many
women who know how to write cannot or do not write in their own lan-
guage, because their education was in some other language, e.g.
Arabic, English, or French. The education of women started later
than that of men in most African countries, and the Western education
of Muslim girls was last of all. The time factor is important in
partly accounting for the comparative lack of womens T names in any
5. Lyndon Harries, Swahili Poetry (Oxford, 1962), 24-27.
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bibliography of modern African literature. In North Africa most
modern writing in French is Algerian, due chiefly to the longer period
of colonisation in Algeria (from 1830) as compared to French colonisa-
tion, say, in Morocco (from 1912). The time factor is important also
in accounting for the emergence of women writers who take up the
feminist cause. Only those with a fairly long contact with Western
society can make comparisons between the status of women in the rele-
vant countries. There are no feminists represented in African oral
tradition.
The writings of the Algerian woman, Djamila Debeche, are less
important for their literary value than for their sociological sig-
nificance. Her novels, Aziza and Leila, jeune fille d T Alggrie
.
6
have
implications of which not even the author may have been aware. She
attacks the tradition which places Muslim women of North Africa in
subordination first to the father and then to the husband. As Ger-
maine Tillion has shown, ^ the system of marriage among the endogamous
peoples of North and Northwest Africa is in many important respects in
direct violation of the teaching of the Koran. Neither Djamila Debe-
che nor Marguerite Taos, a Berber Christian writer, 8 who expresses the
need for female emancipation from the same traditions
,
are concerned
with restoring or implementing what the Koran actually teaches on such
subjects as female inheritance. Both writers are more concerned with
promoting feminism in the Western sense than with restoring orthodox
Islamic practice to the marriage institution among Algerian Muslims.
The tribal structure of most peoples in the Maghrib is based
upon safeguarding the paternal line. The ideal marriage is for a man
to marry the daughter of his paternal, not his maternal, uncle. A
Berber proverb from Morocco says that the people love this type of
marriage just as they love to eat the meat from their own cattle. The
system excludes female inheritance, and this is in violation of the
teaching of the fourth chapter of the Koran. It is forbidden by the
Koran for a brother and sister to marry into the same family, but this
is practiced frequently in Muslim families of North Africa, especially
among Hie Kabyles of Algeria. The tribal structure is endangered
where female inheritance is allowed or where women marry "strangers,”
i.e., men not of the paternal lineage.
Yet, since independence in Morocco and Algeria, the Koranic law
has been made obligatory for all Muslims, a revolutionary fact of
great sociological importance which, if the law is observed, is bound
to affect the social structure. The strong probability is that the
Muslim law concerning marriage and inheritance will continue to be
ignored wherever it conflicts with established practice, not least
because the introduction of obligatory adherence to Muslim law was
more a gesture of loyalty to the Faith than to the particular provi-
sions of the Islamic legal system. Adherence to Islam covers a
variety of beliefs and practices
,
not all of which conform to the
precepts and principles of orthodox religion.
6. Djamila Debeche, Aziza (Alger, n.d.); Djamila Debeche, Leila,
jeune fille d T Alg£rie (Alger, 1955).
7. Germaine Tillion, Le Hareifi et les Cousins (Paris, 1966).
8. Marie-Louise Amrouche, Jacinthe Noire (Paris, 1947); Marie-Louise
Amrouche, "Rue des Tambourins," Table Ronde (1960).
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The underlying problems of social change are not dealt with
adequately by modern African writers in the Muslim context, either be-
cause such problems are too complex or because the writers may not
themselves fully understand them. It is much easier to attack some
abuse of the system, such as forced marriage, but in doing so they are
not engaged in pioneer reform. The novel. Sous 1 T orage , by Seydou
Badian Kouyate from MaJ.i, for instance, deals with forced marriage.
^
He makes an eloquent dppeal for female emancipation in a matter where,
in most African Muslim countries, women already have a large measure
of freedom. Forced marriages are rapidly becoming the exception, and
indeed a case could be made for showing that even in traditional so-
ciety most marriages between Muslims were by consent. The freedom to
choose or accept a partner by consent is now so widespread in Muslim
countries that a book like Sous 1 T orage , written as recently as 1957,
already appears outdated. Public opinion, even in the author 1 s own
society or country, is largely already on his side.
But in any case, forced marriage is not a specifically Islamic
practice. In dealing with modern writings by Muslims or in a Muslim
setting, it is important to distinguish between practices that are
Islamic in origin and those that are tribal in origin. Even within
Islam, Muslims sometimes identify as Islamic practice customs that
were never specifically enjoined in the Koran. The practice of cir-
cumcision, for example, is not mentioned in the Quran and yet many
believe that it is of Islamic religious origin. The wearing of the
veil is mentioned only incidentally in the Koran and is prescribed
specifically only for the women of the Prophet 1 s family. Public
prayer, according to the Koran, has priority over the observance of
the Ramadan fast (certain classes of people have a dispensation from
fasting in Ramadan)
,
but in North Africa particularly many people con-
sider themselves good Muslims without ever going to the mosque to
pray, and yet they put into prison any Muslim who is known openly to
have chosen not to keep the fast. In North Africa, as elsewhere in
tribal Africa, the subordinate position of women itself, where it
still exists, may not be of Islamic origin, but derives from ancient
pre -Islamic social institutions that have become part of the tribal
system.
The dichotomy between orthodox Islam and tribal belief and
practice is evident in African oral tradition. This is in contrast
to the fairly uniform orthodoxy of literature in an African language,
notably Swahili or Hausa. Swahili poetry originated in that part of
Swahili society which, although ethnically partly Bantu, was essen-
tially Arab-Islamic in culture as well as in many aspects of social
structure. The question of the conflict of Islamic and Bantu culture
in social institutions hardly arose, and Islamic law was normally
recognized. Where non-Islamic practice is considered in Swahili
literature it is invariably from the orthodox point of view. 10 The
literature was instructional, and people who heard the poetry per-
formed were familiarised with orthodox belief and practice. The
prototypes of Islamic womanhood, like Hadija and Fatima, members of
the Prophet’s family, are known to Swahili women as women to be
respected whose good lives they must try to emulate.
9. Seydou Badian, Sous 1 T orage (Avignon, 1957).
10. See Harries, Swahili Poetry , 226-232.
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The nineteenth-century Swahili woman poet, Mwana Kupona, wrote
a well known poem on the wifely duty. She wrote it knowing that she
had a fatal disease and addressed it to her daughter. It is as ortho-
dox a work as any Muslim religious leader would like to read or hear.
The poem was written in the style of the best passages in the Book of
Proverbs attributed to Solomon, which can be paraphrased thus:
My daughter, come and sit beside me — the end is not far
off — receive instruction more precious than jewels, pro-
fitable both for this world and the next. For man’s life
is but a vain shadow; yet if thou hold fast to the counsels
of righteousness, thou wilt pass on to a better life here-
after.
Professor Alice Werner wrote of Mwana Kupona’ s poem:
Religious duties are dealt with at some length, and the poem
removes some misconceptions, still occasionally repeated, as
to the position of Swahili women. It has been said that they
are "remarkably indifferent to their religion and often unable
to repeat the Fatiha," but although that may be so in some
cases, this poem and my experience support a contrary view.
Swahili women whom I met were extremely well instructed in
matters of the Faith.
H
Mwana Kupona was not versed in precise Islamic theology, and
her poem illustrates how even in an orthodox environment popular be-
lief may have no justification in the Koran. On this Professor Werner
writes
:
There is no warrant in the Quran for the statement (stanzas
26-27) that a wife’s chance of entry into Paradise is dependent
upon her husband’s will, though there appears to be a popular
belief to that effect, as, for instance, an old dame at Lamu
on learning that I was not married, asked, "Then how do you
expect to get into Paradise?," though in that case there was
no actual suggestion that a husband could keep me out, if he
so desired. Indeed, the notion is distinctly negatived by
the Quran in such passages as "Allah has promised to the be-
lieving men and the believing women . .
.
goodly dwellings in
gardens of perpetual abode" (Quran ix.72, xii.23, etc.). 12
Popular belief has not affected belief in the fundamental doc-
trines of Islam among the Swahili, but elsewhere this has happened,
and the women have been the most fervid and unknowing promoters of
religious heresy.
The relationship between Islam and African culture found its
expression in Swahili life in a remarkable and, for Africa, quite a
unique unity of culture. Along the East African coast Islam did not
penetrate existing communities but created a new community in which
its members at all levels were satisfied with the distinctive ethos
of their common life. They did not seek to expand the range of their
11. The Advice of Mwana Kupona upon the Wifely Duty , Alice Werner and
William Hichens
,
trans. (Medstead, 1934), 23.
12. Ibid
. ,
25-26.
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culture among neighboring Bantu societies. Any absorptions from
Bantu life were either selectively made and remoulded to harmonize
with the basic assumptions of Islam or, if contrary to Islam, were
allowed to exist parallel to the Islamic system.
Both oral and written Swahili literature sprang from this uni-
fied culture, and the women were able to contribute to both. In
places like Lamu, Mombasa, and Zanzibar women poets wrote and still
write within the framework of orthodox Islam. The neighboring Bantu
societies were never completely Islamized, and their oral tradition
has scarcely any traces of Islamic influence
,
except where they have
borrowed directly from Swahili tradition. For the most part this oral
tradition is related to traditional, non-Islamic culture. Unlike the
Swahili literate tradition, the women are represented in this tradi-
tion only by tales and short snatches of song, and never by extended
_works of poetic creation. It is a general characteristic of African
oral tradition that the men are the creators of extended poetry and
the women, while often performing work of the male poet’s original
creation, create works of a much less complex nature.
In West Africa the tension between Islam and African culture
was much more apparent than among the Swahili people. For four cen-
turies up to the beginning of the nineteenth century a series of re-
forming Muslims repeatedly sought to bring about the acceptance and
practice of orthodox Islam by the Sudanese rulers and their subjects,
and thereby to destroy pagan and syncretistic practices. In Hausa
country, according to Waldman,!^
Whenever the chronicles say that Islam flourished ... it
is most likely that the reigning sarki showed himself willing
to encourage, and possibly to protect, the presence of Islam
and of learned men in his State and in his entourage, than
that any extensive conversion took place among his subjects.
The Fulani jihad of 1804- was a reforming movement led by Usuman dan
Fodio who not only brought most of the Hausa Emirates under the con-
trol of his followers, but also initiated an important literary
movement to restore some measure of orthodoxy among people nominally
Muslim.
I
1
* It is said that there are current in manuscript, and also
in a lively oral tradition, some 700 poems attributed to Usuman in
Arabic, Hausa, and also in the Fulani language, but their systematic
collection and interpretation is still only in an early stage.
This literature originated in the continuing necessity, from
the Muslim point of view, to reform not only political abuses, but
also social and religious practice. Such a necessity never arose in
Swahili life
,
so that Swahili literature
,
apart from being in earlier
times a useful means of instruction, was the creation of people who
like to write. They wrote within the fixed conventions of prosodic
form, but a borrowed medium became the means for a creative art form.
Swahili poetry became an expression of Swahili life. It is doubtful.
13. M. R. Waldman, "The Fulani Jihad: A Reassessment,” Journal of
African History . VI, 3 (1965), 333-335.
14. For the movement led by Usuman dan Fodio see primarily the writ-
ings of M. G. Smith, and also of M. Hiskett and A. Bivar in the
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,
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however, if Hausa Islamic poetry ever became the spontaneous expres-
sion of the Hausa way of life. This may account for the comparative
absence of Hausa women poets within the Islamic context. 15 Hausa
women are best represented in oral tradition, a tradition that relates
primarily, not to Islamic, but to tribal or local belief and practice.
The same can be said of the literary situation in other African coun-
tries even where Islam has official status.
Although Islamic knowledge is greatly esteemed, non-Islamic
cults still flourish among the Hausa. The pre-Fulani cult of spirit-
possession (bori} in which the spirits are called and entertained by
singing their praises, has many devotees, especially among women. The
practice of roko, eulogy, praise-singing, among the Hausa is, accord-
ing to M. G. Smith, "an informal regulative institution through which
praise or shame are distributed. "16 He writes:
The female ceremonial of bori expresses most clearly the values
basic to roko . It does this by personalizing these values,
together with their relations and appropriate behaviour, in
spirit form . . . The values expressed in bori are basic to
roko because they are basic to Hausa society, and because
roko is the institutionalized mode of their expression. Like
the gods of Greece, the Hausa bori are amoral representations,
but there is no possibility of doubting their character as
personifications of social values. 1?
Smith has also noted that the exclusion of religious leaders
and Koranic scholars from the category of persons at whom roko may
be directed shows that the valuations which this institution expresses
are independent of those of Islam. Even so, among the Hausa it is of
interest that bori is not universally regarded as being in conflict
with Islam. The situation is typical of other cults in Islamic soci-
eties which, from the orthodox viewpoint are unacceptable, but which
are basic to the relevant culture. Death of the cult means a gain for
orthodoxy, but a loss for the particular African society.
In northwest Africa the cult of the marabouts or "saints" is
anathema to orthodox Muslim theologians. In Morocco especially women
often know more about their local marabout than they do about the
Prophet Mohammed. Berber tales told by the women often concern the
behavior or actions of their local "saint." Montet has written: "A
marabout attached to a specific place appears there like the right
arm of God, to the exclusion of the most renowned saints of Islam. "16
In the sixth century of the Christian era, Procopius made men-
tion of the female prophets of North Africa. 19 The multiplicity of
marabouts, male and female, reflects the absence of any centralized
15. Nana, of the family of the Wazir of Sokoto at the beginning of
the nineteenth century, was one of the few women in Hausa country
to gain a reputation for poetry in the literate tradition.
16. M. G. Smith, "The Social Functions and Meaning of Hausa Praise-
Singing," Africa , XXVII, 1 (1957), 27.
17. Ibid.
,
41.
18. Edouard Montet, Le Cult des Saints Musulmans dans l TAfrique du
Nord (Geneve, 1909).
19. See Procopius (works of), ex recensione G. Dinsdorf, trans. from
Greek to Latin by C. Maltretus (Bonnae, 1833), I, 443.
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religious authority establishing a "communion of saints" — "It is
the voice of the people which beatifies and canonizes, "20 and the con-
sensus is strongly dependent on the beliefs of women. Moulay Idris,
founder of the ancient town of Fes, receives at least as much venera-
tion as the Prophet, and Sidi Abdul-Kadr El-Jilani, founder of the
Quadriyya Order in Morocco, is considered more venerable than even
Moulay Idris.
In Popular belief everything is permitted to the object of
one T s veneration. In orthodox Islam asceticism is not much in favor,
for the Koran is generally opposed to self-abnegation. North African
marabouts vary from the most ascetic to the most debauched. There are
"saints" austere and "saints" obscene; there are "saints" who are
venerated by Muslim, Christian, and Jew alike. Their enormous pres-
tige has enabled them to play an important political role in strength-
ening local sentiment against foreign domination or, less frequently,
in supporting the foreign government to effect particular aims. Even
with the coming of independence. West African governments have to
remember the potential influence of the marabouts. In Senegal, for
instance, the history of the Mourids, a sect founded by the marabout
El-Haji Bamba, the grandfather of the present marabout, El-Haji Fali-
lou Mbake, is remembered by those in power. Bamba T s initiative in
starting a movement the main principle of which was to combine work
(the production of groundnuts) with prayer resulted in his imprisQn-
ment because his growing influence worried the French authorities.
Today, President Senghor is careful to honor the annual commemoration
of Bamba T s death by his presence at the religious celebration in Tuba,
where Bamba lived. The Wolof Mourids regard Bamba T s representative,
the present marabout, as their religious head and give him the respect
and honor, to say nothing of dues, which in a more orthodox environ-
ment are awarded to the Prophet Mohammed himself.
On the other hand there are tribes where the marabouts are
despised, and this appears in oral tradition as, for example, among
the Ida and Blal of southern Morocco where in tale and proverb the
marabouts are satirized and mocked. 21 Both the veneration and the
mockery are expressions of popular belief which in neither case has
its origin in orthodox religion.
The voice of Islamic orthodoxy is invariably the voice of a
man, not of a woman, because in Islam only the men become scholars and
theologians. However, this voice is seldom heard in rural areas where
marabout-worship is practiced within the Islamic context. Orthodoxy
is not the measure of a man T s excellence as a poet so long as he be-
lieves in God and vaguely in His Prophet. He can still express the
highest values of his community even though those values are not
likely to win favor in every respect with the more orthodox. Extended
poetry by men in the Tamazight dialect of Berber, for instance, deals
with such subjects as the general decline in modern religious observ-
ance, general religious fundamentals such as the inevitability of
death, the fight for independence by an Islamic people, etc., and al-
though there are references to Koranic texts, the poet does not have
20. Montet, Cult , 25.
21. See Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad, Les Gnomes de Siti Abd er-Rahman
el Medjedhoub , H. de Castries, trans. and ed. (Paris, 1896);
R. Basset, "Les Dictons Satiriques Attribu£s h Sidi Ahmed ben
Yousef," Journal Asiatiqrue (Sept. -Oct. 1890).
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to be an orthodox Muslim in every particular to create work appreci-
ated by his hearers. 22 The general effect is religious and conserva-
tive, protecting the limited ideal and helping to prevent a wider
departure from conventional religious behavior. The people them-
selves do not regard these poets as primarily religious poets, be-
cause the religious element is taken for granted, and they are more
interested in references to current events and behavior. In some
instances the specifically religious poems are a useful stand-by for
instant reproduction.
The association of women with action songs is itself an indica-
tion of the contextual character of oral tradition by women. Whereas
men create works in which the subject matter is displaced, i.e., it
may have no immediate reference to the time or occasion of its crea-
tion, texts from women generally have a direct relationship with a
contemporary activity. Women do create praise songs, but, apart
from these, most songs by women spring from some solitary occupation
like grinding by hand. In Islamic African society, especially among
the more prosperous families, communal work activities tend to exclude
female participation. In theory Muslim women are excluded from com-
munal work on the farms. The poetry of men often includes the theme
that woman’s place is in the home bringing up the children, not on the
farm working with the men. Where Muslims can afford to dispense with
their wives* help in outside activities they will do so, but in fact,
even among the more prosperous, women do take a share in what needs to
be done outside the dwelling place. Even so, it is a woman’s part.
She does not do the work of a man. Even when the activity is the
same, as in weaving, there are clear indications of the division of
labor between the sexes. Among the Hausa, for instance, the women
use a different type of loom from the men. Men dig up the groundnuts,
but women separate the nuts from the leaves and rocks.
The division of labor is not, of course, the same in every
area, but traditionally there are fixed limits on what women are ex-
pected to do. With modern change, women share in activities promoted
to further their education in the Western sense, and songs are intro-
duced as an accompaniment to their efforts in sewing, care of the
children, and so on. These songs have a direct relationship to tradi-
tional women’s songs although the activity may not be exactly the
same. Even with modern changes, women’s oral tradition is not some-
thing apart from their daily life, but springs directly from it. Its
inspiration is not primarily from Islam, but from life itself. Since
the life itself may be more closely related to tribal values than to
Islamic values, it is doubtful if oral tradition by women in an
Islamic society can in most instances be termed "African Islamic
Literature" at all. It belongs more properly to the general field of
tribal oral tradition in which women have their special part to play
and in which they represent others as types of the bad or the good.
Their interpretation of a "good Muslim" is not usually according to
religious behavior in the objective sense. Women are not represented
objectively, because the yardstick is usually the normal standard of
tribal behavior. Oral tradition, after all, is an expression of
tribal life, a much wider manifestation of human activity than that in
which Islam may have only nominal adherence.
22. Personal communication from Jeanette Harries, University of
Wisconsin.






